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‘Inequalities’ under national superannuation

Canberra Times 15th May 1984, p.9.

A national superannuation scheme would help to perpetuate the financial inequalities inherent in Australia, the ANZAAS congress was told.

In a joint paper delivered to the social-welfare section of the congress, Mr John Tomlinson and Ms Helen Creed, of the Darwin Community College, said that such a scheme would do little to redress the subjugated position of women, Aborigines and the young unemployed, many of whom were excluded from the workforce by “structural issues”.

They noted that the overwhelming majority of the 46 per cent of Australian workers currently covered by superannuation schemes were males. Only 22 per cent of female workers had access to such schemes.

“Among superannuates, those who obtain the greatest benefits are those most able, in terms of income available to them, to see to their own future,” the paper said.

Despite limited attempts at reform, discrimination on the basis of gender, age or race remained an intrinsic component of employment practice.

A guaranteed minimum income scheme appeared a better option than a national superannuation scheme in that “whilst there would still be gross inequalities present between those who had been able to successfully exploit the capitalist system and those who were excluded from the productive process, it would be possible to have a minimum level of income for all Australians set at a livable level”.

“The proposed (by the present Government) national superannuation scheme, if introduced, would provide some benefits to those members of the workforce not presently included in superannuation schemes,” it said.

“However, if the introduced scheme is anything like the one proposed by the Hancock committee, then it will involve actually perpetuating the inequalities experienced by workers into the retirement phase of their lives because the benefits will be income related.”

A guaranteed minimum income would:

  • Provide every person with the security that their survival was ensured.
  • End the total financial dependence of unemployed married people on their spouses.
  • Remove from young people under 16 their almost total dependence on their parents or parent substitutes, such as child-welfare departments.

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‘Mutual obligation’ policies do little to help the poor and underemployed

ON LINE opinion – Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate

Posted Friday, 20 February 2004

The Howard government purports to be a pragmatic government interested in achieving practical outcomes. It claims the imposition of its “mutual obligation” regime upon social security recipients is designed to sort out the “needy from the greedy” and to prevent recipients becoming “welfare dependent”.

Many scholars argue that social security regimes like Australia’s fail to assist many poor people simply because of design faults in every targeted welfare system. Other writers declare the concept of “mutual obligation” in income support systems as ethically unsupportable. A leading ethicist, Catriona McKinnon, mounts a sustained argument that reciprocal obligations should not be attached to elementary income support programs but should govern the distribution of privileges. Professor Robert Goodin and other researchers have established that the problem of “welfare dependency” is of little consequence because, even if it is a real phenomenon then, it affects very few recipients. A much more widespread problem, which is exacerbated by the imposition of “mutual obligation”, is the fact that so many of the people who are eligible for targeted income support programs fail to be paid. Still others point out that design faults in tax/social security claw-back system create a far greater problem for people on lower incomes (pdf, 132Kb) than does any alleged recipients’ fecklessness induced by receiving social services. Even the Health Minister, Tony Abbott, acknowledges that the Australian tax/social security claw-back system creates substantial poverty traps.

Federal legislation and regulations create these poverty traps. It would be possible for any reasonably competent parliamentary legal counsel, working with economic advice, to remove such poverty traps within a matter of months. Such action or failure to act is entirely the prerogative of the Government.

The Howard government claims to believe in the economic rational person who is motivated by economic self- interest. Instead of removing any financial incentives to choose welfare over work, it has set out on a far more contentious course to discover the “unworthy” and assist the “worthy” to avoid the scourge of “welfare dependence”. This is a paternalistic imposition upon the entire community in an attempt to change the motivation of a few.

If economic pragmatism were the force driving the Howard Government, the most effective way to end the alleged propensity of social security recipients to remain in receipt of income support, as a result of poverty traps, would be to remove the poverty traps. Such an action is clearly within the competence of this Government.

Even the most ardent supporter of “mutual obligation” policies would admit that “weeding out the unworthy” and assisting people to escape from the clutches of debilitating “welfare dependence” is an inexact science. Despite his Department informing him they had no evidence as to why people had dropped out of “mutual obligation” programs the then Minister for Employment, Mal Brough, commented “Compliance is a strong motivator and it also flushes out dole cheats.” Such a statement implies an unwarranted certitude.

The importance of being worthy

The fact that the Howard Government has chosen to undertake an indirect rather than a direct route to ending “welfare dependence” raises the possibility that “weeding out the unworthy” has a greater attractiveness to this government than ending “welfare dependence”.

The paternalism implicit in the imposition of “mutual obligation” upon social security recipients would seem to derive from Howard’s social conservatism rather than his economic fundamentalist form of liberalism. Certainly none have suggested that the imposition of duties enhances the individual liberty of recipients of social security. Instead, Howard Government Ministers, echoing Lawrence Mead, one of the architects of “workfare”, speak of enforcing “tough love”.

It would be churlish to suggest that the entire Howard Coalition Government and their senior bureaucrats have chosen to ignore the substantial body of literature which points to the impossibility of ensuring that all the “worthy needy” and only the “worthy needy” are paid. Assuming they are aware of such literature, and that they are committed to identifying and paying “the needy” then it is important to test the proposition that “mutual obligation” is a pragmatic method of pursuing that goal.

Given that the “mutual obligation” regime has been in place, in one form or another, for six years, it raises the question as to either the competence of this Government or the bona fides of the Government’s pronouncements in this area of social concern.

The Howard government prefers a liberal utilitarian rather than a universal rights-based approach to welfare (pdf, 59Kb). It frequently speaks about a preference for pragmatism over theory in social policy. Such an abhorrence of planned social change, often expressed as “social engineering”, has been part and parcel of conservative regimes since at least the 18th century. Additionally the Howard government has assertively set out to win the “culture wars”. The sacking of Dawn Casey, the ex-director of the National Museum for not following the Government’s colonialist rewriting of Indigenous/white history and the recent attack on the state school system for failing to impart values of national identity are just two of many examples of Howard’s culture wars.

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In late 2003 St Vincent de Paul and the Brotherhood of St Laurence produced a report (pdf, 263Kb) listing many problems that some recipients encountered with the “mutual obligation” regime. The authors of this report concluded that obligations, which many social security recipients are forced to meet, result not in a “welfare to work system” but a “welfare as work system”.

Not everyone has equal difficulty meeting the “mutual obligations” imposed upon them. Unemployed, white, middle class, organised, well educated, good looking, compliant, nicely dressed, Australian born people who are skilled communicators and who are not having family or transport difficulties don’t seem to have any difficulty gaining and retaining social security benefits. Clearly they must be both “needy and worthy”.

The St Vincent de Paul and the Brotherhood of St Laurence report, replicated in Schooneveldt’s research, identifies particular groups which have more difficulty obtaining and retaining social security benefits under a “mutual obligation” regime. These groups are composed of people who have social, intellectual, mental health, addiction, educational and communication difficulties. Indigenous people, recently arrived migrant and refugees also encounter disproportionate difficulties meeting the dictates of Centrelink staff.

It may be that ministers in the present government would judge some of these people as “unworthy”. It is unlikely that the Government, as a whole, would hold the view that simply experiencing one of more of these difficulties should automatically disqualify a person from obtaining benefits.

If the government were of that view then it would be appropriate for it to attempt to legislate to that effect. If it is of that view but convinced that the Parliament would not pass such legislation then it seems an unethical approach to impose roundabout sanctions on such groups. This amounts to a less than transparent process of exclusion that is not only unconscionable but is a denial of natural justice that no affluent group would tolerate.

Within such groups some are cut off benefits more than once. Clearly the greater the disadvantage a person experiences the more difficult they will find it to establish their eligibility for benefit. They are the ones who have the greatest difficulty meeting imposed obligations. They may not understand they are required to meet such obligations. They often don’t understand why they are expected to meet such obligations. They are more likely to interpret the imposed obligation as an imposition rather than assistance. They are often living in extreme poverty having lived with their disadvantage for many years. The reality is that the most disadvantaged are the ones most adversely affected by increased targeting, “mutual obligation” surveillance and compliance measures.

The “mutual obligation” regime is not a pragmatic way to ascertain “the worthy and the needy”. Nor is it a way to deter “the greedy”. It imposes paternalistic obligations without assisting people find work or alternative income sources to social security. It diminishes the liberty and self–respect of recipients by saddling them with stigma. It is neither a direct nor efficient way to run a welfare system. It is a misnomer to call “mutual obligation” pragmatic. Given that the policy has, in one form or another, been in place for over six years it would seem a legitimate question to ask, “What use is the ‘mutual obligation’ regime to the government?”

The number of people receiving social security is limited by the generic design faults in targeted welfare assistance systems and by the imposition of stigma. Such difficulties are exacerbated if recipients lack bureaucratic sophistication or experience a disadvantage. Apart from such shortsighted savings, there seems little apparent advantage deriving to the Howard Government. It is cheaper because it fails to pay many people who are eligible for a benefit. The savings that accrue to the federal government are, in substantial part, displaced onto the various state governments, charitable bodies and to poor families themselves. “Mutual obligation” may be cheaper, but it is poor policy because it fails to ensure that all eligible people are provided with a liveable income. Its cheapness is not a sufficient explanation. It does not explain the ardent promotion of the “mutual obligation” regime by so many Ministers in the Howard government.

The underlying use of “mutual obligation” is an ideological one. It provides the Howard government with a tool to berate the poor for their poverty while absolving the Government of the need to pay them. It reinforces middle-class preconceptions about people who are poor and excuses their failure to help those less fortunate than themselves. It undermines feelings of noblesse oblige and portrays as ridiculous any idea of socialist solidarity with such “unworthy” people. In an insidious fashion, it erodes the viability of many poor families. It destroys the social cohesion of this nation as it undermines egalitarianism. In fact, “mutual obligation” is a weapon of mass distraction in Howard’s culture wars.

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“Mutual Obligation”: John Stuart Mill versus Dennis Milner – lessons for 21st century policies on income support

Written 2006, don’t know where published

Australia’s current policies on income support will be viewed through the eyes of two significant writers. The central themes which will be interrogated include: liberty, conditionality, desert and paternalism. This is done with a view to assessing whether the current policies are designed to enhance or reduce the autonomy and dignity of people who receive income support. The current income policies started to take shape in the mid-1980s under Labor but have become more clearly defined since the election of the Liberal Coalition Government led by John Howard. The first Australian legislation dealing with Federal income support was introduced in 1908 (prior to that income support came under the jurisdiction of the States). State and Federal policies on income support have been significantly influenced by attitudes enshrined by administrators of British Poor Laws.

The approach taken here is to select from the writings of the British philosopher John Stuart Mill (one if not the most, celebrated 19th century liberal defender of freedom) and to compare his views with those of an early 20th century proponent of Basic Income: Dennis Milner. Mill was selected because many Australian politicians and social policy aficionados are familiar with his writings particularly his essay On Liberty. Milner was chosen, rather than one of the many current proponents of Basic Income, because his writings demonstrate that policies on income support which enhance autonomy have a long lineage.

This article will examine the different approaches taken by John Stuart Mill [in his essay On Liberty] and Dennis Milner in Higher Production by a Bonus on National Output: A proposal for a minimum income for all varying with national productivity (1920) in relation to how they interpret the ethics of imposing obligations upon people who receive income support from the State. Mill’s earlier and far more extensive text, Principles of Political Economy, originally published in 1848, will be relied upon to put into context some of the statements he makes in his essay On Liberty.

It would require a very long article to do justice to Mill’s extensive writings on moral philosophy, his utilitarianism or even his writings on the concept of the social contract. This article does not purport to be a major philosophical or policy analysis of Mill’s writings. Many others have attempted to do this. I have simply taken his essay On Liberty, rigorously searched it for comments on liberty particularly where they relate to income support and compared them with passages from the writing of Dennis Milner. In relation to Milner, I am indebted to Walter Van Trier (1995) who devoted a considerable part of his PhD thesis to analysis of Milner and his colleagues’ attempts to introduce a Basic Income in Britain in the early 20th century.

This brief analysis will then be used to interrogate the approach to rights and responsibilities taken by Prime Minister John Howard in the last decade.

Mill

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) originally published his essay On liberty in 1859 and it ran to four editions in a decade. It is available on the World Wide Web thanks to Bartleby.com. Within a short time, this book came to be acknowledged as the classic liberal defence of the freedom of the individual. Mill set out to explore “the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual” (Ch. 1 p. 1) and the “struggle between Liberty and Authority” (Ch. 1 p. 2). He says:

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle … That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant (Ch. 1 p. 9).

Mill constructed the concept of “self-regarding” actions to explain what part of human behaviour he considered the absolute right of that individual to control. Essentially, he determined that unless harm could be demonstrated to another from an individual’s action then society had no right to intervene in the actions of the individual. Mill elaborates upon this point when he makes his celebrated distinction between acts likely to incite and action likely to inform:

An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard (Ch. 3 p. 1).

Mill qualifies somewhat his absolute position about the freedom from interference for individuals, who do not cause harm to others, when he argues that all members of a society should be compelled to do their duty by giving evidence in court, playing a role in common defence of the society and “interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage (Ch. 1 p. 11)”.

Mill clearly sets a high bar, in defence of individual rights when he asserts:

The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind (Ch. 2 p. 1).

Mill returns to the issue of general obligations owed to fellow members of a community when he writes:

Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest (Ch. 4 p. 3).

This issue of the absence of a real or implied “contract’ is one to which I will return later. I prefer, for the moment, to concentrate on the issue of good form and the concomitant absence of the right to compel. Mill claims this balance lies in the fact that “We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours (Ch. 4 p. 5)”. Mill equivocates on this point when he allows that knowledge of a person’s “vices” might “corrupt or mislead” (Ch. 4 p. 8). Here, as in most of On Liberty, Mill refers to the general obligations of every person, irrespective of their social rank, to comport themselves as good citizens.

In his final Chapter, Mill is clear that fellow citizens might warn another against foolish or non-violent drunken conduct but should not compel another. But then abruptly goes on to claim:

idleness, except in a person receiving support from the public, or except when it constitutes a breach of contract, cannot without tyranny be made a subject of legal punishment; but if, either from idleness or from any other avoidable cause, a man fails to perform his legal duties to others, as for instance to support his children, it is no tyranny to force him to fulfil that obligation, by compulsory labour, if no other means are available (Ch. 5 p. 6).

The closest that Mill comes to arguing this point is when he asserts that:

It still remains unrecognised, that to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society; and that if the parent does not fulfil this obligation, the State ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as possible, of the parent (Ch. 5 p. 12).

I will return to these largely unsupported statements later in this article when dealing with points of departure between Mill and Milner.

Milner

In 1920, Dennis Milner (1892-1956) published one of the early English books supporting the introduction of a Basic Income. It ran to only one edition. The entire book can be accessed at the Basic Income Guarantee Australia (BIGA) website. From 1918 to the early 1920s Milner, his wife Mabel and Bertram Pickard campaigned in Britain for the introduction of a Basic Income, paid to all individuals irrespective of age (Van Trier 1995, Cunliffe and Erreygers 2004). They variously referred to their proposal as a “State bonus” or a “National dividend”. All three were Quakers.

The Milners’ pamphlet a “Scheme for a State Bonus” (1918 reprinted in Cunliffe and Erreygers 2004) argued that their proposal would increase feelings of security, abolish poverty, improve health, assist large families, improve education by keeping poor children at school longer and improve gender equality (pp.126-131, see also Pickard 1919 reprinted in Cunliffe and Erreygers 2004)”. The Milners went on say:

in order to produce a healthy race everyone must have access to the primal necessities of life, namely, food, shelter and liberty. Then, in order to encourage work it will be necessary to offer proper inducements, such as just pay, proper conditions of labour, public opinion, patriotism and the common welfare (p.131).

The Milners’ main justification for the provision of a Basic Income (1918 p.131) was similar to that of Thomas Paine’s “natural right” or the right to a share of the common wealth (1797 reprinted in Cunliffe and Erreygers 2004). They were concerned that the administration of the welfare system, particularly the requirement to prove destitution prior to receiving assistance, created perverse incentives. They did not fear that the presence of a Basic Income would create work disincentives. They were more concerned that “No one should be driven by the threat of destitution into accepting work which is underpaid, unhealthy, or even dangerous (p. 124)”.

In Higher Production by a Bonus on National Output: A proposal for a minimum income for all varying with national productivity, Milner (1920) set out to do just as the title suggests; designate ways in which national productivity could be increased in a way which would reward all and punish none. His first Chapter dealt with the “Problems of production”. In the second Chapter he sets out a proposal to introduce a minimum income guarantee “for every man, woman and child in the country (p. 19)” paid from a pool of “one-fifth of National production (p.21)”. He does qualify that universalism by excluding unnaturalised foreigners and Irishmen who lived in England less than six months (pp. 27-28). But he insists “The Minimum Income would be absolutely inalienable and free from all legal obligations (p. 28)”. He saw his Bonus replacing much of the welfare and social insurance systems.

Chapters 3 to 6 inclusive, deal with the creation of an efficient workforce by encouraging but not compelling labour. In Chapter 5, he deals explicitly with the problem, of those he indelicately terms “slackers”, arguing that of those who would be tempted to avoid work and just live on the income guarantee “is the type of man who does exceedingly little now” and he goes on to argue that national efficiency would be improved if they were removed from the work force “so that their feeble efforts would no longer be a drag on the work of others (p. 84)”. Finally, he returns to the topic of increasing production by avoiding strikes and unemployment and ensuring that all get a decent living in the land in which they toil.

The points of similarity

Both Mill (1909) and Milner (1920 Chs. 3-6) considered that public opinion was a great modifier of the amount of effort people contribute. Mill argued that “though the ‘master’s eye’, when the master is vigilant and intelligent, is of proverbial value, it must be remembered that in a Socialist farm or manufactory, each labourer would be under the eye not of one master, but of the whole community (1909 p. 205, see also Milner 1920 p. 85)”. After pointing to similarities between religious communities and socialist communities, Mill goes on: “independently of the public motive, every member of the association would be amenable to the most universal, and one of the strongest, of personal motives, that of public opinion (1909 p. 206)”.

Milner (1920), whilst strongly of the view that a Basic Income would discourage idleness (p. 79 and Ch. 6) points out “that there is no way of compelling willing work, which is the only efficient work (p. 81 italics not in original)”. Milner accepted that his proposal “will enable the idle to do no work (till their neighbours, in the interests of the Common pool, take the matter in hand) [p. 117]”. Some 80 years later Guy Standing wrote:

Dignified work needs basic security, or real freedom is denied. The ultimate paradox is that it requires the freedom to do no work at all. Dignified work can only exist when it is done for intrinsic reasons, not because a landlord, a boss or the state says it shall be so (2002 p. 277).

Mill writes quite favourably about some forms of socialism. He says, “The most skilfully combined, and with the greatest foresight of objections, of all forms of Socialism, is that commonly know as Fourierism (1909 p. 213, see also Cunliffe and Erreygers 2004 Chs.10 and 11, Cunliffe and Erreygers 2001)”. Mill refers to Fourier’s 1803 suggestion of a Basic Income as “distributing a certain minimum (1909 p. 214)” to every member of a community. He prefers the Fourier approach to that of communism because Fourier, in addition to the minimum, allowed other economic distribution commensurate with talent and labour.

Mill (1909 p. 969) supports the public provision of “certainty of subsistence” for the destitute who were able bodied rather than have them rely on private charity for the following reasons:

  1. “charity almost always does too much or too little: it lavishes its bounty in one place and leaves people to starve in another”.
  2. the state provides for the criminal poor and should do the same for those who have committed no crime.
  3. “Private charity can give more to the deserving. The state must act by general rules. It can not undertake to discriminate between the deserving and the undeserving indigent. It owes no more to the first and can give no less to the last … The dispensers of public relief have no business to be inquisitors. Guardians and overseers are not fit to be trusted to give or withhold other people’s money according to their verdict on the morality of the person soliciting it”.

Milner’s colleague Pickard argued for the abandonment “of public and private philanthropy, which, however well intended, has failed to raise permanently any considerable number of the ‘submerged tenth’ from an abyss where Faith is a mockery, Hope is an impossibility, and Charity a byword indeed (1919 p. 136)”.

The points of departure

Milner claimed that under his scheme “there is no advantage to the idler (there will be nothing to be gained by laziness, everything to be gained by working), because earnings will be no bar to receiving the Minimum income (1920 p. 98)”. He writes “if, therefore, we wish to see a growing productivity, we must undermine suspicion by a tangible pledge that all classes will actually share the benefits of greater National Income (pp. 111-112)”.

At this point, we should return to the two long quotations from Mill’s On Liberty from Chapter 5 which concluded the first discussion of Mill’s writings, in this article. There, he contended that, once a person was reliant upon receiving support from the public, they forfeited the right to be left to their own devices. Mill does not justify that position in On Liberty but he attempts to do so at length in his earlier Principles of Political Economy (Book 5, Ch. 9 section 13). He concedes some people require assistance “and none needs help so urgently as one who is starving (p. 967)”. He goes on:

in all cases of helping, there are two sets of consequences to be considered; the consequences of the assistance itself, and the consequences of relying on assistance. The former are generally beneficial, but the latter, for the most part, injurious … And this is never more likely to happen than in very cases where the need of help is the most intense. There are few things for which it is more mischievous that people should rely on the habitual aid of others … and unhappily there is no lesson which they more easily learn (p. 967).

Mill commends the principle of less eligibility, enshrined in the 1834 Poor Law. He approves “guaranteeing all persons against absolute want” on the condition that “those who are supported by legal charity can be kept considerably less desirable than the condition of those who find support for themselves (p. 968)” claiming that the application of strict rules by the Poor Law Guardians had succeeded in abolishing pauperism from parts of England.

The language Mill employed in the mid 19th century may well seem antiquated but, as will be seen below, the essence of what he said is very much a part of the debate about income support in 21st century Australia. Many of the same struggles which the Milners and Packard fought in England during the early 20th century are still being waged in Australia today.

Moral jeopardy

Nowadays, economic fundamentalists who wish to limit the access of less affluent people to welfare assistance rely substantially upon the sort of argument originally mounted in 1848 in Principles of Political Economy (Mill 1909 Book 2, Ch. 1, Book 5, Ch. 9 section 13). In particular, the argument that whilst limited assistance is sometimes necessary it should be temporary and provided under conditions which ensure:

that the assistance is not such as to dispense with self-help, by substituting itself for the person’s own labour, skill, and prudence but is limited to affording him a better hope of attaining success by those legitimate means (Mill 1909 p. 968).

Perhaps those righteous rich, allegedly so concerned about the moral wellbeing of the poor who are given welfare assistance, should read Mable and Dennis Milner’s 1918 pamphlet where in relation to those who claim:

there is a moral value in poverty, both to the poor and to those who assist them. Yet there is abundant evidence that those who live in ‘want and the fear of want’ are cramped in their spiritual outlook, and the few who are virtuous would be so under any circumstances. On the other hand, those who minister to the needs of the poor will find ample scope for their efforts when the merely economic factor in destitution is removed.

Surely this economic minimum is the first step to the realisation of any spiritual advance. ‘Great are the uses of adversity’ – but even the preacher has his breakfast (p.132, italics in original).

The suggestion that imposing obligations upon poor people who receive assistance helps them avoid “welfare dependency” did not impress the Milners. In a far less theological vein, I have argued that it is the affluent who are the clear beneficiaries of such mystifying suggestions (Tomlinson 2004).

Howard

At the time of writing this article, John Howard has completed a decade as Prime Minister of Australia and political commentators are falling over themselves to assure the public he is still as popular as he was in 1996 when he promised, that if the voters would only toss Labor out of office, we would all become “relaxed and comfortable” (Borghino 2006). The Australian economy has experienced 12 years of continuous growth. The Australian military has pre-emptively engaged in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thousands of asylum seekers have been incarcerated for years on the Pacific Islands of Nauru and Manus and in outback immigration detention centres like Woomera and Baxter. The independent, elected Indigenous agency (the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission) has been abolished. Over 100 Indigenous communities have been coerced into signing shared responsibility agreements in return for receiving access to goods and services most Australians take for granted (See Manne 2004, Marr and Wilkinson, Brennan 2003, Bessant, Watts, Dalton and Smyth 2006, Tomlinson 2005 [a], [b], 2004, 2003).

Since Howard (1999, 2000) set out his plans for social welfare in this country, the social security system has become more selective and targeted. Recipients have been forced to meet increasingly oppressive requirements (Ziguras, Dufty and Considine 2003). This Government policy is euphemistically described as providing recipients with the opportunity to meet their “mutual obligations”. Howard claims that if people receive assistance from the Government it is only fair that they give something back in return. Here he is invoking the concept of a contract, albeit unwritten, between the recipient and the Government. This contract soon takes on a physical form. Officers of Centrelink (the department which pays social security) make their “customers” enter into written agreements in return for receiving social security benefit payments. Such Government conduct would seem to fly in the face of Mill’s suggestion in On Liberty that “society is not founded on a contract, and … no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it (Ch 4 p. 3)”.

Many writers (Kinnear 2000, Goodin 2001, Tomlinson 2003, Schooneveldt 2004) have suggested that such contracts are unethical because poor people have little choice but to comply with the dictates of government. Howard is asserting that it is right (just) for the State to unilaterally impose a contractual obligation upon some of the most powerless people in our land. Goodin (2001) points to the propensity of governments to assert an implied consent for changes in income policy between welfare recipients and the State through the widespread use of the language of the social contract. He conjures the image of a highwayman declaring that even if one had parted with one’s money in return for one’s life; no court would enforce such a contract. He goes on:

The proposition that the welfare worker is putting to her putative ‘client’ is: ‘Agree or starve.’ That is the same, in all essentials, to the proposition the highwayman puts to his victim: ‘Agree or die.’(p.191).

Just as we still have an obligation to feed people even after they have committed heinous crimes so too we have an obligation to not let people starve even if they have committed mortal sins against the labour market …Welfare recipients have not agreed to those new arrangements at the macro-level; and such consent as they give at the micro-level, in ‘agreements’ negotiated under effective duress with welfare caseworkers, has no moral standing (p.195).

If we seriously believed that work is good for you and that it is the state’s legitimate role to force you to do it, then we would have no grounds for confining our paternalism to the poor. Paternalistically speaking, it would be equally important to make the rich work too (p.198).

It is a pity that the Howard Government has ignored Mill’s assertion that:

The dispensers of public relief have no business to be inquisitors. Guardians and overseers are not fit to be trusted to give or withhold other people’s money according to their verdict on the morality of the person soliciting it (1909 p. 969).

If the Government has taken anything from Mills in relation to welfare assistance it is from the two pages immediately preceding this quotation. In particular:

There are few things for which it is more mischievous that people should rely on the habitual aid of others … and unhappily there is no lesson which they more easily learn (1909 p. 967).

Conclusion

Mill, in his essay On Liberty, provides a reasoned defence of freedom for all individuals except those who, from necessity, are forced to rely upon income support assistance. Every reader selects what appeals to them in the texts that they read. That being the case, we are left to wonder about the thought processes of Howard Government ministers that lead them to believe that if social security recipients are not forced to engage in “work for the dole” programs, fill out a “dole diary” and meet all their other “mutual obligations” then they will sink into the slothful state of “welfare dependency”.

It is clear from the actions of the Howard Government that they do not trust social security recipients to make an effort to escape poverty without such compulsion. It is unfortunate that they have not come to share Bertram Pickard’s view that “Even the cynic will probably admit that genius, love of family, satisfaction in labour well done, ambition, and the desire for free and full development, together account for a very large proportion of the stimulus that urges men and women to work (1919 p.138)”.

The Government’s paternalistic claim that by imposing obligations upon social security recipients it is assisting people avoid “welfare dependency” flies in the face of Mill’s injunction that society should avoid such impositions because a citizen’s “own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant (Ch. 1 p. 9)” to intervene.

It was equally open to Government Ministers to adopt Mill’s (1909 p. 969) suggestion that it was not the job of dispensers of welfare to determine the moral worth of recipients. Had they done this, they might have been able to move on to the early 20th century ideas of Dennis Milner and see the job of social security as being to provide “a minimum income below which none can fall (p. 117)”.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Penny Harrington for her editorial assistance and encouragement.

Bibliography

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More Info

“Real freedom for the filthy rich – precariousness for the rest of us: Why we must fight for a Basic Income.” *

Paper given at the 15th BIEN Congress Montreal Canda 2014, 27-29th June.

* The title of this paper acknowledges my debt to Philippe Van Parijs’ Real Freedom for All: What (if anything) can justify capitalism and Guy Standing’s The Precariat: The new dangerous class.

Abstract

Following the Second World War it looked as if governments in Britain, many parts of Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and to a lesser extent the United States of America were intent on expanding the scope and generosity of each of their welfare states. In 1964 President Lyndon Johnston declared a “war on poverty” but somehow these efforts have metamorphosed into a war against the poor (Tomlinson 2013).

The rich are getting richer, the middle classes are being hollowed out and the poor are sinking deeper into poverty throughout much of the English-speaking world and the western world more generally.

Despite the United Nations setting Millennium goals designed to abolish poverty in the Third World, famine, starvation and malnutrition still cause about 40,000 deaths every day of the year.

Australian governments have generated downward envy, railed against welfare dependency, allowed the spread of casualised, part-time, insecure and precarious employment while simultaneously decreasing industrial protection. Government policies discriminate against Indigenous Australians and asylum seekers.

The paper will survey these features of Australian life and argue that many of the worst excesses of our present existence would be mitigated if the citizenry of my country were convinced to support a universal Basic Income.

The post World War II welfare state

Following the Second World War England set out to abolish the five giant evils of society, namely “squalor, ignorance, want, idleness, and disease” identified by Sir William Beveridge (Timmins 1995). Much of Northern Europe expanded their welfare services. The Scandinavian countries developed the most comprehensive system of social provision. Australian, New Zealand and Canadian governments expanded both the scope and generosity of their social security, health and educational systems. The US had during the 1930s Depression launched the New Deal to provide relief for the unemployed, reform of the financial system to prevent depression and a return to normal economic circumstances. Gradually the US social welfare system expanded. In 1964, President Johnson declared a “War on Poverty”.

In 1968 the economists John Kenneth Galbraith, Paul Samuelson, Robert Lampman, Harold Watts and James Tobin, joined by some 1,200 colleagues, called on Congress “to adopt this year a national system of income guarantees and supplements” (cited in Moynihan 1973 p. 126). President Nixon saw in the negative tax suggestion the possibility of reforming the welfare system in ways compatible with his general political orientation: workfare not welfare. (Tomlinson 2003, Chapter 9, pp 7-8).

During the 1970s, in both Canada (Pasma and Mulvale, pp 6-9) and Australia (Henderson 1975) government inquiries recommended the introduction of what Canadians tend to call a guaranteed adequate income or a guaranteed annual income and what Australians term a guaranteed minimum income. It looked for a time as if universal income guarantees was an idea whose time had come.

Where are we now? The US points us in the direction most of the western world is heading

In the United States of America “the real median income of full-time male workers is lower than it was 40 years ago (Dartagnan 2014)”.  As Paul Buchheit (3rd September 2013) points out:

One out of every five American children now lives in poverty, and for black children it’s nearly one out of two … UNICEF places us near the bottom of the developed world in the inequality of children’s well-being, and the OECD found that we have more child poverty than all but 3 of 30 developed countries.

In a later article Buchheit (7th October 2013) notes that:

In 1983 the poorest 47% of America owned about 2.5 percent of the nation’s wealth, an average of $15,000 per family. In 2009 the poorest 47% of America owned zero percent of the nation’s wealth (their debt exceeded their assets).

Anyone who doubts that the middle class is being hollowed out in the United States would do well to read this article (See also Pear 2011).

George Monbiot writing in The Guardian on the 14th January 2013 noted that:

In 2012, the world’s 100 richest people became $241billion richer. They are now worth…just a little less than the entire output of the United Kingdom.” He suggested that the policies leading to this result included reductions in the tax rates paid by high income earners, failing to pursue tax payments from the rich, “government’s refusal to recoup a decent share of revenues from minerals and the land; the privatisation of public assets and the creation of a toll-booth economy, … and the destruction of collective bargaining.

“The Economic Policy Institute, a think-tank, calculates that chief executives at America’s 350 biggest companies were paid 231 times as much as the average private-sector worker in 2011” (JS.2012). This same think-tank calculated that in the year 2000 these executives or their equivalents had been paid in the order of 400 times average private-sector workers: whereas in 1975 this ratio was only 20 times the average workers salary. At Walmart the ratio between the pay of the CEO and the median workers pay is over 1,000 to one. “The average total remuneration of a chief executive of a top 50 company listed on the Australian Securities Exchange in 2010 is $6.4 million – or almost 100 times that of the average worker” (ACTU 2013) and it needs to be remembered that two-thirds of Australian workers receive less than the average wage.

The gradual development and erosion of social protection in Australia

In 1907, the Arbitration Commission, in what came to be known as the Harvester Judgement, installed a minimum basic wage system sufficient to sustain a man, a non-employed wife and a couple of children. In 1910, the government started paying age and disability pensions. The system of social security gradually expanded until by 1947 it included child endowment, unemployment and sickness benefits, age, widow, and disability pensions and a range of other benefits and allowances. It was categorical and means and asset tested (Kewley 1973). The scope and generosity of benefits continued to increase until the late 1980s (Kewley 1980, Tomlinson 2003 Ch 2).

Since then, and at an increasing rate, the protections of the arbitration system and the social welfare system have decreased. We are in the process of becoming a far less egalitarian society. The emphasis is shifting away from full-time secure employment towards contractual, insecure, part-time and precarious employment with split shifts and on-call work predominating.

The Keating Labor Party in 1995 announced that “reciprocal obligations” would be attached to many social security payments. The incoming conservative Howard Government substantially increased the intensity and extent of what it termed “mutual obligations” through “work for the dole” and compulsory attendance at courses, training programs, interviews and whatever else some petty bureaucrat decided was appropriate. The six years of Labor governments between 2007 and 2013 gave some slight respite but the return of the ultra- conservative Abbott Government has signalled a return to forcing recipients of social security to give something back in return for receiving a below the poverty line welfare payment. Australia is fast moving away from even paying lip service to ensuring that all in need are assisted by the social security system and is heading in the direction of self-provision.

Australian Superannuation lacks equity

From the third decade of the 20th century the majority of support for superannuation came from senior ranks of the public service, high paid owners and senior staff of large businesses and the conservative side of politics. In the mid 1970s the Whitlam Labor Government commissioned the Hancock Committee to enquire into alternatives to the age pension. In 1976 the Hancock majority report recommended introducing:

a pension for all over the age of 65 years, set at a rate of 25 per cent of average weekly earnings, with a means tested supplement raising the income to 30 per cent of average weekly earnings for those without other forms of additional income. Others would receive the base payment plus a purchased pension dependent on contributions, in this case no means test would apply to the base payment. The proposal was to be funded by an extra income tax levy of 5 per cent of income in excess of 30 per cent of average weekly earnings. Those whose income was less than 30 per cent of average weekly earnings would not have contributed. (Tomlinson 1989 Chapter 6)

In the early 1980s Treasurer Paul Keating in the Hawke Labor Government became the main backer for a privatised national superannuation scheme. At the time only 46% of male and 22% of female employees had access to any form of superannuation. In May 1984 Helen Creed and myself presented a paper to the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science Congress in Canberra in which we pointed out that the privatised superannuation scheme the government was putting forward would perpetuate financial inequality and “that such a scheme would do little to redress the subjugated position of women, Aborigines and the young unemployed, many of whom were excluded from the workforce by “structural issues” (Canberra Times, 15th May,1984, p 9). Our central argument was that:

A guaranteed minimum income scheme appeared a better option than a national superannuation scheme in that “whilst there would still be gross inequalities present between those who had been able to successfully exploit the capitalist system and those who were excluded from the productive process, it would be possible to have a minimum level of income for all Australians set at a livable level (Canberra Times 1984, 15th May, p 9).

A major obstacle to the introduction of an above the poverty line universal Basic Income in Australia is the existing taxation treatment of superannuation. There is strong support for the form of privatised superannuation by the rich and super-rich who are the major beneficiaries of the schemes. There is also strong support for superannuation amongst trade union leaders who control many of the “Industry Funds”. Banks and insurance companies derive massive profits from the superannuation funds they control. Support also comes from those members of the working class who want to avoid the stigma and control associated with the “welfare system.” Those whom the capitalist press is wont to call “aspirational voters” tend also to be strong supporters.

Whilst workers generally might collectively gain more from a universal Basic Income some of them feel that as individuals they can get disproportionately more from the capitalist system though personal privatised superannuation. The ideology of economic fundamentalism continues to be a very strong force in Australian society.

Jim Chalmers, former Chief of Staff to Wayne Swan, Federal Treasurer in both Rudd and Gillard Labor Governments and who is now a member of the federal parliament suggests:

We now need the courage to admit to the Australian people that the concessions for wealthy Australians built into the superannuation system are neither desirable nor sustainable. ..we can no longer maintain a system that disproportionately favours the rich at the expense of the poor. This is subpar policy too, as the cost of tax concessions for superannuation outstrip the savings they are meant to generate from less reliance on the age pension. (page 183)

Gerard Hughes (2008, pp.104-147) supports the view that the Australian form of privatised superannuation results in the government disproportionately advantaging the wealthy. Following a 900 page commission of audit, handed to the Abbott Government, which recommended major reductions in government spending on social welfare services former Leader of the Parliamentary Liberal Party, John Hewson, called for any review of the government expenditure to include a full review of taxation concessions noting that the foregone tax on superannuation is an amount in excess of the cost of the age pension (ABC Breakfast 2014 a). A left-leaning think-tank, The Australia Institute based at the Australian National University, also supports scrapping tax concessions on superannuation as a more equitable way to fund increased income support for the aged (Glenday 2014).

Austerity for the poor

In 2013, Canadian Senator Hugh Segal noted that: “From Washington to Ottawa to London to Paris, austerity, in different measures and calibrations, has taken the place of innovation. We do not and have not taken a fundamental new approach to poverty reduction in a quarter of a century.”

The Australian Treasurer Joe Hockey has repeated warned that “the age of entitlement is over” suggesting that “the age of personal responsibility has begun” (News.com.au 2014)”. At a large anti-Abbott government rally in Sydney in March of this year one of the posters held aloft read “I feel entitled to a decent government.” In the run up to the Budget, Hockey foreshadowed forcing more Disability Support Pensioners on to unemployment benefits (which are paid at significantly lower rates and are surrounded with extensive obligations). Hockey signaled other welfare cuts to single parents and their children and imposing extra costs on medical services. “The less provision we can claim as a citizenship right, the more can be offered as propaganda, on the basis of some putative moral advantage (Seymour 2014)”.

This at same time as Prime Minister Abbott is advocating paying working mothers a 6 month maternity allowance at their existing rate of pay for those on incomes of up to $150,000 a year. It should be remembered, “the average total weekly earnings of women in Australia is $871.30”(ABS 2013 a). This amounts to an annual wage of $43,565. As a general rule approximately two-thirds of Australian women earn less than the average wage. So some well-off women would be paid a maternity allowance of $75,000 whilst their less affluent sisters on average earnings would only receive $21,782. Mothers who are not working would not be paid a maternity allowance.

Political correspondent, Ben Eltham (2014 a) notes that:

Despite 21 years of continuous economic growth, Australia does not face a wages break-out. Rates of pay for most workers are in fact constrained, by any measure. The latest wage price index figures from the Australia Bureau of Statistics saw wages rise by only 2.5 per cent for the year to December 2013. In the same period, gross corporate profits were up 9.5 per cent (See also Heap 2013).

In addition Ian McAuley (2014 a) says that :

the highest estimates (by the right-wing Centre for Independent Studies) show our consolidated public debt to be just over $600 billion, or around 30 per cent of GDP. That’s considerably lower than the OECD average of 90 per cent.

One of Australia’s leading novelists, Tim Winton, last year reflecting on the erosion of egalitarianism wrote:

I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to say that citizens in contemporary Australia are now implicitly divided into those who bother and those who don’t. It seems poverty and wealth can no longer be attributed – even in part – to social origins: they are apparently manifestations of character. In the space of two decades, with the gap between rich and poor growing wider. Australians have been trained to remain uncharacteristically silent about the origins of social disparity (p 24).

Winton concludes his look at class in Australia by suggesting:

… it disturbs me to see governments abandoning those at the bottom while pandering to the appetites of the comfortable. Under such conditions what chance is there for the working poor to fight their way free to share the spoils of our common wealth (p 31)?

The casualisation or (contractualisation) of the lowest paid academics leads them into a precarious existence that demands subservience but can’t command loyalty. The deskilling or at least the refusal to recognise existing skills (and the fierce determination by management not to pay for any of the pre-existing skills such non-tenured academics might have in such teaching-only positions) is destructive to the interests of universities because it converts the craft / profession of university education into low status job.

This is not only happening in universities. It may have started in economic fundamentalist driven companies where the just in time mentality, making savings by cutting training budgets and foregoing worker safety leads to increases in the economic bottom line for high-flying executives and wealthy shareholders. Nowadays top executives are saddled with the task of finding something to do between the welcoming financial handshake and their parting golden parachute. As executives they settle for stripping assets, slashing working conditions and cutting staff. Such fiscal rectitude is now rampant in all Australian government departments and corporations.

In the not-for-profit welfare sector agencies are forced to compete with each other for government contracts to provide services that governments can’t or won’t provide to clients. Governments have encouraged such agencies to fiercely compete to ensure the lowest possible price. The days when welfare agencies, in a locality, cooperated to provide a comprehensive service in their district are long gone.

This is what is happening to government and welfare workers. What chance is there in such working environments that people who are Indigenous, asylum seekers, refugees, recent migrants, unemployed, ill, disabled, widowed, elderly, homeless, orphaned or impoverished for other reasons are going to be treated humanely and with respect for their individual dilemmas. As we say in Australia they have Buckley’s – meaning “no chance” (Wikipedia 2014).

The tone of the times – some themes

In order that people who don’t live in Australia might acquire a sense of what is happening in my country I’ll make a few brief points of some pivotal issues namely: the Northern Territory Intervention, the repeal of Section 18C and other Sections of the Racial Discrimination Act, the holding of asylum seekers in camps in distant parts of Australia and on Manus Island (in Papua New Guinea) and on Nauru, forcing back asylum seekers to Indonesia and the repeal of the Rudd Labor Government’s financial advice reforms.

Financial advice

Let’s start in reverse order. The Rudd Labor Government had in the wake of the Storm Financial collapse, where largely elderly investors had together lost billions of dollars, legislated to prevent financial advisors receiving undeclared commissions, force such advisors to act in the interests of their clients and to end (after 2 years) ongoing commissions to advisors unless their clients agreed to an ongoing arrangement. The Liberal Government’s Assistant Treasurer Arthur Sinodinos who, in the past, had worked for Goldman Sachs, JB Were and the National Australia Banks and as the Chairman of Australian Water Holdings (AWH), where he had been paid $2000 an hour for his labours, tried to overturn the Rudd legislation (McAuley 2014 b). He had been Treasurer of the New South Wales (NSW) Liberal Party at the same time he was on the board of AWH. He had stood to gain a $20 million success fee had a deal with the NSW Government gone through. Donations to the NSW Liberal Party made by AWH are currently under consideration by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (For further details see Seccombe 2014).

Asylum seekers

“As at 30 September 2013 there were 6,403 people held in immigration detention facilities and 3,241 in community detention in Australia (Human Rights Commission 2014 a).” Those who arrived by boat are mandatorily detained and held in detention centres on Christmas Island, mainland Australia, in a malaria-infested part of a Naval Base on Manus Island and on Nauru in the Pacific Ocean. Of those in detention under the last Labor government “As at 30 September 2013 the average period of time a person would spend in closed immigration detention was 115 days, but 106 people had been held in immigration detention for over 2 years (Human Right Commission 2014 a).” Of those in detention: “As at 31 December 2013 there were: 1,028 children in closed immigration detention facilities, and a further 1,637 children in community detention in Australia Human Right Commission 2014 b) ”, many of them unaccompanied minors. The Abbott Government insists that those on Manus who are found to be refugees will be resettled in Papua New Guinea even though the Papua New Guinea Prime Minister says that not all people found to be refugees will be resettled there. Australia has been putting pressure on the governments of the Solomon Islands and Cambodia to resettle those found to be refugees.

Those asylum seekers found to have passed Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation’s (ASIO) checks and health checks are released into the community pending determination of their refugee status. An allowance is paid by the Red Cross and other voluntary bodies (the money for this comes from the government). The amount is far below any social security payment paid to citizens and is well below the poverty line.

Many asylum seekers languish for years behind the razor wire and those without an ASIO clearance are held in detention centres indefinitely. In line with the treatment meted out to Joseph K in Franz Kafka’s The Trial they are not given access to the accusations against them.

Many asylum seekers are driven mad by their months or years behind the razor wire. Both Labor and Liberal governments in recent years have adopted similar policies towards asylum seekers arriving by boat. Scott Morrison, Immigration Minister in the conservative Abbott Government, has recently instituted a policy towing boat arriving in Australian waters back to Indonesia. In a particularly arrogant manner the Minister refuses to comment on what he terms “on water matters.” (For a more in depth look at the current situation see Toohey (2014) “That Sinking Feeling: Asylum seekers and the Search for the Indonesian Solution”, See also Corbett (2014) and Brett (2014).

The Abbott Government is planning to reintroduce Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs) for those living in Australia, who have not yet been found to be refugees. Those on TPVs, should they leave Australia, are prevented from returning, they are refused family reunion and can be returned to their country of nationality at any time the government decides it is safe for them to return. “The counterpoint to this approach is Sweden, where there is no mandatory detention of asylum seekers and where these days they are not just welcomed when they arrive, but encouraged to come, as are their families (Grant 2014)”. Upon arriving in Sweden people are provided with a government lawyer, interviewed within weeks, a determination is made within 4 months and all the while people can either stay in government provided accommodation or (if they can afford it) live in the community. The Government provides a small allowance in either case. “If you get a permit you take your place in Sweden as an equal, with everybody else. Normally, after five years, you can get citizenship, if you have no criminal activities and pay your taxes (Grant 2014).”

On the 31st of March this year, Scott Morrison, the Minister of Immigration announced that (in relation to the 2,400 people detained on Manus and Nauru, those not yet processed on Christmas Island and in mainland detention facilities in Australia) the government would no longer pay lawyers previously contracted to the Department to provide legal advice to any asylum seekers at a “saving” of $25 million a year (ABC Breakfast 2014 b).

Racial Discrimination Act

In 2009, white supremacist radio, newspaper and television shock jock, Andrew Bolt, defamed 18 Aboriginal Australians in 2 separate articles by claiming:

that you have to have black skin to consider yourself Indigenous, and that if you have light skin, you must be using your Aboriginality for self-interested reasons – is not greatly different to the sort of half-baked racialism that used to pervade Australian life (Eltham 2014 b).

Bolt was taken to court charged with offences under the Racial Discrimination Act. Section 18 C of the Racial Discrimination Act makes it unlawful to act if:

(a) the act is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or a group of people; and (b) the act is done because of the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of the other person or of some or all of the people in the group.

The Bolt case has become such a cause celebre amongst the rich, white business racists who manage or own many of our leading companies that it has been taken up by the Institute of Public Affairs an ultra-right-wing think-tank that rich business owners largely fund.

This is what politics in Australia has come to. A powerful newspaper commentator racially vilifies a group of prominent Aboriginals… His article is scientifically ignorant, racially prejudiced and socially inflammatory. He also gets his facts wrong. When the subjects of his article sue, his defence of good faith collapses in court.

Three years later, the elected government of Australia decides to change the law to make sure that he could, if he chose, write that article again – and escape any legal sanction for racial vilification (Eltham 2014 b, See also Marr 2014).

The Attorney General George Brandis went so far as to claim in the Parliament, whilst introducing his exposure draft of the repeal of Section 18 C, that “people do have a right to be bigots.”

The Northern Territory Intervention

The last throw of the dice for the outgoing conservative Howard Government was to impose the Intervention on 73 Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory ostensibly to safeguard Aboriginal children from sexual abuse or neglect and to protect women from being assaulted. The police and the army were sent into remote Aboriginal communities. The Government suspended the Racial Discrimination Act in order to quarantine half the social security payment made to Indigenous people. The amount quarantined was placed on a ‘Basics’ card that could only be used for approved purposes at certain stores and alcohol was banned from many communities (Altman and Hinkson 2007, Tomlinson 2007).

Labor came to power in 2007 promising to continue the Intervention for a year before reviewing it. A committee was set up, headed by Aboriginal leader, Peter Yu, that recommended winding back most of the compulsory aspects of the Intervention except where it could be proven that Indigenous people were incapable of handling money. Labor ignored the report. It has moved towards providing incentives for the use of a Basics card whilst allowing people to “request” they not be required to have a Basics card. At the same time the government has expanded the areas of the Northern Territory and elsewhere in Australia where Aboriginal and other ethnic groups are cajoled into a paternalistic administration of their social security. It has reinstated the Racial Discrimination Act and so cannot specify any particular ethnic group that is forced to participate. What it does instead is select geographical areas where particular ethnic groups predominate and legislate to force all residents of those areas to participate in its paternalistic form of social security.

Summary of themes

These themes were not selected at random, rather they stand out in any consideration of welfare which uses the yardstick of decency, humanity or tolerance of the other to evaluate Australian welfare practice. In evaluating such themes I will consider alternative policies, as was done in the case of Swedish refugee processing policy. I will look at the question of affordability of present policies in comparison to past policies against the backdrop of the alleged need for drastic austerity that is becoming the accepted wisdom in many developed English-speaking western countries.

Policies embraced by the two major political parties in Australia in the 21st century in relation to asylum seekers arriving by boat are more repressive, inhumane and indifferent to the suffering of those arriving on our shores than they were in the 19th century. The Abbott conservative Government is even more ruthless than the last Labor Government.

Since the invasion of Australia 226 years ago Indigenous Australians have suffered dispossession of much of their land, displacement, denigration, rape, murder and the theft of their children initially at the hands of the colonial authorities and the pastoralists and now at the hands of welfare officials, miners and police. The last punitive expedition, according to Professor Charles Rowley, occurred in the north of South Australia in 1942 (Rowley 1972 p. 204). The last intentional mass poisoning of Aborigines occurred in Alice Springs on the 28th of March 1981 (Brown 1981). No-one was charged with the murders. Aboriginal children are being disproportionately taken from their family and community in 2014. There are now more Indigenous children separated from their family and community than in 1997 when the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families brought down its findings (Briggs 2014, Pilger 2014). Aboriginal people die on average 17 years younger than other Australians.

There are a number of issues encountered when trying to calculate the age of death ratio between Indigenous and other Australians, however if one compares all non-Indigenous Australians with all Indigenous Australians one finds that there is a great disparity between them:

…the United Nations has ranked Australia second behind Norway in its annual Human Development Index – for public health, social wealth, education, even happiness. But if Aboriginal peoples go stand-alone they would not be part of that 2nd rating – they would be 122nd (Georgatos 2013).

There a variations in the Indigenous median age of death in various parts of Australia:

In 2011, the median age at death for Indigenous men ranged from 50.3 years for those living in SA to 58.5 years for those living in NSW [1]. Levels were around 20 years less than those for non-Indigenous males, which ranged from 66.6 to 79.7 years. For Indigenous women, it ranged from 50.3 years for those living in SA to 66.2 years for those living in NSW. Levels were around 20 years less than those for non-Indigenous females, which ranged from 73.5 to 85.3 years (Australian Indigenous HealthInfoNet 2014).

Aboriginal prisoners constitute 27% of those in prisons whilst making up less than 3% of the total population. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013 b) figures reveal;

At 30 June 2013, there were 8,430 prisoners who identified as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander. This represented just over one quarter (27%) of the total prisoner population (30,775) and remained consistent with 2012. … At 30 June 2013, the Northern Territory had the highest proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander prisoners (86%). Victoria had the lowest proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island  prisoners (7%).

The Aboriginal population of the Northern Territory is in the order of 25 % of the population. The ratio for Indigenous / non-Indigenous locked up in juvenile detention centres are even more disproportionate:

As an Aboriginal adult you are 14 times more likely to be incarcerated. (Australia wide young Aborigines are 21 times more likely to be incarcerated than other Australians). Juveniles in Western Australia are 48 times more likely to be imprisoned than their white peers (Creative Spirits 2014).

Despite the findings of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (1987-91) more Aboriginal people are dying in custody now than then simply because state and territory governments now incarcerate many more Indigenous people than in 1991. (In order to place some of these issues in context see Tomlinson 2003 Chapter 6)

We have recently heard the Attorney General declare that every one has the right to be a bigot whilst introducing the exposure bill to repeal essential parts of the Racial Discrimination Act. The conservative Howard Government suspended the Racial Discrimination Act entirely when it launched the NT Intervention.

Protection against racial discrimination cannot be guaranteed in Australia, as most non-whites understand. The paternalistic intervention in the Northern Territory into the lives of Aboriginal people legislated for by both Labor and conservative Commonwealth governments would not be tolerated by white working and middle class Australians but is deemed to be all right when enforced upon remote Aborigines and other racial minorities (Harris 2014, Pilger 2013).

The process of marginalising various sections of society which can in turn be denigrated – the unemployed called dole bludgers, disability pensioners become malingerers, single parents become welfare mums who brought their problems on themselves, the original owners of this land are converted into drunks and paedophiles, asylum seekers are called illegals and queue jumpers – has now turned round to bite the very people who engaged in maligning the disadvantaged. Commentators around the country are calling on the government to end “middle class welfare”. The values which neoliberal economics promote inspire envy and hatred of out-groups and undermine solidarity.

Monbiot (2013) points out that “the recent jump in unemployment in most developed countries – worse than in any previous recession of the past three decades – was preceded by the lowest level of wages as a share of GDP since the second world war.” The promise of neoliberal economics – that if governments would get out of the way and leave everything to the market then the rising tide would lift all boats and everyone would be better off – has failed to come true.

We’ll all be ruined – welfare is unsustainable

The Australian Minister for Social Services, one Kevin Andrews, who (when he was a minister in the Howard Government) took away the right of people suffering a terminal illness in the Northern Territory to obtain voluntary euthanasia, notes that one in five Australians receives some form of government payment.

The minister described the level of welfare as “unsustainable” and “relentless” and said that more must be done to reduce the burden on the federal budget. He highlighted two areas for attention – the disability support pension, or DSP, and Newstart, the payment for the unemployed (Whiteford 2014 p 1).

Professor Peter Whiteford agrees that there have been considerable increases in both Disability Support Pensioners and New Start (unemployment) beneficiaries arguing that there are several reasons for this:

the proportion of people receiving welfare payments peaked at nearly one in four of the working-age population in 1996, before falling to one in six in 2008, just before the global financial crisis. After the GFC, the proportion of working-age people receiving benefits rose to 17.4 per cent in 2010, then started to fall again, reaching 16.9 per cent in 2012 – not quite back to the 2008 level, but the second lowest level in the past two decades (p4).

Whiteford argues that increases in the population as a whole, the raising of the age at which people can access the Age Pension, people of working age changing from one type of payment to another, government decisions to phase out some types of social security payments and changes to the labour market have all had significant effects. What can be concluded from Whiteford’s analysis is that despite Minister Andrews’ histrionics the number of people receiving government payments is neither “unsustainable” nor “relentless”.

We need to remind our fellow Australians that, unlike much of Western Europe and North America, Australia emerged virtually unscathed from the recent global financial recession. Australia as a nation has very little government debt when compared with the rest of the OECD. Australian citizens on average have never been richer when compared with any other period of our history – yet it seems that we have never been more indifferent to the plight of our fellow citizens.

The last forty years of neoliberalism have resulted in massive increases in inequality, obscene wealth for a tiny few, but no greater happiness for the many. Falling union memberships and the slow erosion of organised labour as a politically powerful force has played a key role in the ascent of global capital. For the ordinary middle classes, aspiration has not brought happiness, and for an entire generation of young Australians, the ideal aspiration of owning a home is no longer possible anyway (Eltham 2014 c).

What’s holding us back?

Whether one wants to follow Cunliffe & Erreygers (2004) back to 15th century Europe or Walter Van Trier’s (1995) early 20th century Britain or Thomas Moore’s 16th century Utopia or Thomas Paine’s 1797 Agrarian Revolution, it is clear that the idea of Basic Income has a long and distinguished lineage. In my PhD (1989) I showed that ideological support for universal income guarantees could be identified in a broad range of classical political alignments from conservative and liberal, through social democrat and socialist to communist positions. Yet as Malcolm Torry (2014) points out “a constellation of ideas appears to be firmly lodged in the minds of politicians across a variety of cultures, including ours: that universal benefits make people lazy, even though the opposite has been shown to be the case, both in theory and in practice”. Torry notes many politicians’ attachment to means-testing despite its propensity “to be expensive, inefficient and prone to error and fraud”. He points out that such politicians are attracted to using the family or household as the unit of payment rather than the individual even though prospects of “complexity, expense, error, and fraud” are increased.

In Australia, the preferential tax treatment of the privatised superannuation system has exacerbated inequality. The very rich get more from the government in foregone income tax contributions than do age pensioners. The more a person is able to invest in superannuation the greater the returns. Such a system always advantages those who are better off financially.

Political correspondent Ben Eltham (2014c) wrote “The growing intellectual and academic movement coalescing around the idea of inequality in recent years has yet to move into the mainstream. But the sudden respectability of once-loopy ideas such as a universal basic income shows how quickly the ground is shifting.”

In recent years, I have equivocated on the likelihood of a universal Basic Income being implemented in Australia (2012 a and b) but in mid 2014 feel that it will be at least a decade before the first steps will be taken in the direction of a truly universal income guarantee.

A universal Basic Income is a necessary first step

In the absence of a universal Basic Income Australia has become a far less egalitarian country than it was in the 1960s and 70s. Part-time, casual, and precarious employment is replacing full-time work. Many full-time employees are forced to work split shifts. Industrial protection is being eroded. Solidarity is weakened in such a dog-eat-dog world. Union membership is declining with only 17 per cent of the working age population being members of unions. The workers’ share of production is declining and owners’ profits are rising.

The number of Indigenous people jailed is rapidly increasing; the number of Indigenous children taken from their communities is skyrocketing. There is conflicting evidence available as to whether the health of Aboriginal people is improving or getting worse.

Asylum seekers, arriving by boat, are subjected to inhumane treatment.

At the last election in 2013, Abbott’s conservative coalition claimed, that it was on a unity ticket with Labor in supporting the national disability and Gonski educational reforms (ABC News 2013, Osborne 2014). Now in government… Yes you guessed it. The Abbott Government has watered down its support for both the increased educational spending and changed direction on other aspects of the educational reforms. It is delaying the introduction of the National Disability Insurance Scheme and altering some of the other previously agreed directions.

Australia’s Prime Minister on the 23rd of January 2014 in a speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland said, “No country has ever taxed or subsidised its way to prosperity.” Crikey (2014) scoffs at this statement by pointing out that:

Australia’s GDP per capita sits at around seventh in the world by most measures. Above it is Norway, which taxes at 50% and up, and equal or just below us — and lacking ours and Norway’s resources windfalls — are Denmark, Sweden and Finland, also 50%-plus taxers.

And those statistics are made more revealing when you look at estimated GDP per capita figures from 1900, where Australia sits at No. 2 (behind New Zealand), riding high on the sheep’s back. Sweden is 13th, Norway is 17th and Finland 20th. So we have gone down five or six places, while they have gone up, across a century in which they have applied consistently higher taxation.

The present Australian government has pledged itself to repeal the carbon tax and the mining tax on the urging of the big end of town. The repeal of the regulations relating to financial counselling which would have required financial counsellors to (amongst other things) act in the interest of their client are being foisted upon mum and dad investors by the big banks and the superannuation industry. The cut-backs, in the industrial and arbitration protection available to workers when coupled with the government’s assault on the union movement are cheered on by the employer organisations.

The Treasurer’s message about the “age of entitlement being over” is directed at those reliant on means-tested below-poverty-line social security, particularly those who are unemployed and single parents. The super-rich mining magnates will not be expected to take a haircut. Austerity will be something experienced by low paid workers and those already disadvantaged by the existing system of targeted, categorical and means-tested social security.

The conservative Abbott Government is very aware that “The less provision we can claim as a citizenship right, the more can be offered as propaganda, on the basis of some putative moral advantage (Seymour 2014).” How else could one explain the present government’s desire to pay a $75,000 maternity allowance to women earning $150,000 a year whilst cutting below-poverty-benefits to lone parents and people who are unemployed. The present Australian government has effectively wedged the working class. Abbott delights in defining one sector of welfare recipients as morally superior to another.

Since the early 1990s governments have split off sections of the Australian working class intent on marginalising them from the main working class movement. Whilst workers fail to acknowledge solidarity with unemployed people and welfare recipients generally, ignore racial discrimination and refuse to uphold the human rights of asylum seekers, the power of the entire working class is weakened. We will not generate the groundswell necessary to lay the foundations on which to build a truly universal Basic Income. It will only be when the majority of the working and middle classes come to realise that the struggle for one is the struggle for all that the slogan “The workers united can never be defeated” will become a reality. Then we’ll have a universal Basic Income.

Acknowledgement

I thank Penny Harrington for her editorial assistance and continuing encouragement.

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“The self-made man admiring his creator”: Basic Income beats targeted welfare.

First published in New Community Quarterly, Vol. 4 (4), Summer 2006, pp. 52-55

Abstract

This article will look at some of the reasons why Australia perseveres with outmoded income maintenance policies which are targeted, categorical, means-tested, piecemeal and lacking in generosity. It will suggest that the introduction of a universal Basic Income would go some considerable way to providing increased income security for all permanent residents, removing stigma, and ending our centuries old preoccupation with a poor law system of welfare assistance. It will reflect upon the current debate about “social inclusion” arguing that the mechanisms enforced by governments’ to facilitate “social inclusion” actually result in the marginalisation and social exclusion of many poor people. The article will conclude with a brief summary of the advantages of a Basic Income over other forms of income maintenance.

Australia today

In 1999, Prime Minister Howard declared himself to be simultaneously a neo-liberal and a social conservative as he set out to justify imposing his “mutual obligations” regime upon some of the poorest Australians in an attempt to save them from the scourge of “welfare dependency”. Since that time Australia, along with the United States of America and Britain, has engaged in actual wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps what has had an even greater impact on the nationals in these three countries is their involvement in a metaphorical “war on terror” which those who oppose such hysterical reactions more correctly name a “war of terror” (Tomlinson 2004).

In addition, Australia has maintained a punitive campaign against asylum seekers who arrive without visas (Marr and Wilkinson 2004, Kevin 2004, Maley 2004). In 2001 the Howard Government excluded many of our nation’s offshore islands from the migration zone to allow it to implement its “Pacific Solution”. This “Solution” involved transferring asylum seekers to other countries, such as Nauru, for processing, thereby placing them beyond the jurisdiction of Australian judicial review. Recently, the Howard Government moved to exclude all of Australia from the Migration Act for all asylum seekers who arrive without a visa. This was done to placate Indonesian political leaders who were angered by the granting of temporary protection visas to 42 West Papuan asylum seekers who had arrived on the Australian mainland (Metcalfe 2006).

In recent years, there have been scare campaigns waged about the percentage of the population who are older Australians. This percentage will approach the present European age distribution by 2040, if current Australian population trends continue. A lot of nonsense has been written about the tyranny of demography leading to a shortage of labour. The Treasurer claimed Australians are, in the future, going to have to retire later in life. There was little mention of the current underemployment of part- time workers, the pool of unemployed workers (Bell and Quiggin 2006), the failure of the nation to address the poor health of the Indigenous population (AIHW 2006, Ch.1), the failure to train available labour adequately or any of a range alternatives which might be utilised to stave off the “dependency burden” which the Government alleges an “aging Australia is about to inflict”. The Treasurer advised mothers they “should have three children – one for Mum, one for Dad and one for the country (McKew 2004).”

Just in case potential parents decided to ignore the Treasurer’s advice, the Government imposed further cutbacks to the generosity of payments to disability support pensioners, sole parents and unemployed people (Harding, Ngu Vu and Percival 2005, Ziguras 2005, Tomlinson 2005). The workforce was rewarded for increases in productivity with further deregulation, more flexibility, a full-on assault on the existing arbitration and award systems and the demolition of legislation which offered workers some protection against unfair dismissal (McCallum 2006).

The labourist/productionist obsession

The Government is determined to squeeze even more “efficiencies” out of the workforce and impose more obligations upon those which industry and government policies combine to exclude from paid employment (Tomlinson 2006[a]). Sibyl Schwarzenbach (2004, p.110) argues that the modern western state operates on a specific conception of labour relations where “the paradigm of production and private property has clearly dominated.” There is little or no recognition in Australian Government circles of the need to support more reproductive forms of production. That is, the need to reproduce the social conditions necessary regenerate and sustain the societal and individual capacity to labour (Standing 2002).

Schwarzenbach (2004, p.107) asserts:

Moreover, it is in comparison with this (productionist) model of labour…that guaranteeing a basic income for all citizens of a society, irrespective of their own capacity for work, appears a perverse incentive for laziness and a foolish handout to the unworthy at best. At worst, such a basic income is viewed as outright theft, and the direct violation of the rightful, hard-earned property of others.
If, however, we begin from a different paradigm of work – what I will call “reproductive labour” in an extended ethical sense – many of the perceived difficulties in justifying basic income vanish. For, on this model of labouring activity, the goal is not the production of things but the maintenance and ‘reproduction’ of human relationships.

Guy Standing (2004, p. 12) expressed a similar idea when he wrote:

the overall system of social protection must shift away from its almost exclusive focus on risk compensation to one of extending and enhancing individual and collective rights, based not on labour as in the twentieth century, but on citizenship in its broadest sense.

Basic Income

A Basic Income is a form of income support paid to each individual permanent resident irrespective of their wealth, income, gender, race, age, place of residence or marital status. An equal amount is paid to those in employment and those not at work thereby limiting the potential for downward envy. The Basic Income is not taxed. All existing tax free thresholds would be abolished so that tax would be payable on each and every extra dollar earned. The only eligibility question to be determined is whether the applicant is a permanent resident of Australia. Further details about Basic Income can be found at Basic Income Guarantee Australia or Basic Income Earth Network web sites or see (Tomlinson 2006 [a] & [b], Tomlinson 2003, Tomlinson, Harrington and Schooneveldt 2004).

False consciousness: one reason why Basic Income is opposed

Ronald Hill is the Bank of America Professor of Corporate Social Responsibility at the University of South Florida. He describes his students’ reaction to Philippe van Parijs’ (1991, 1997 Ch. 4) Basic Income redistributional arrangement between “Lazy” (a person with modest achievements who is happy to live simply) and “Crazy” (an overachieving workaholic): “Using a capitalist model that is steeped in the myth of the ‘self-made wo-man’, they struggle with the implied position that people should reap the benefits of others’ hard work (Hill 2005 p. 215).”

Of course, had these budding capitalists read Volume 1 of Marx’s Capital they would surely have understood that “reaping the benefits of others’ hard work” is the central plank of capitalist relations of production. The entire process of extracting “surplus value” from the work of employees lies at the heart of employers accumulating wealth. Those who own shares in successful companies gain their wealth by “reaping the benefits of others’ hard work”. The share owners might have worked and saved to purchase the shares but equally they might have acquired them by way of an inheritance, fraud or other less strenuous means.

The student response that Hill is describing is therefore not based on a rejection of people “reaping the benefits of others’ hard work” per se and in all cases. Rather, the students’ reaction is in response to the idea that poor people might, without demonstrated effort, gain an income redistributed from more affluent people. Such students are, on the face of it, accepting that the current distribution of wealth is legitimate and simultaneously seem disinclined to question the manner in which individuals and classes come to amass wealth.

It was exactly this type of response which allowed the conservative Howard Government to generate, in the minds of the more affluent, a “Downward Envy” towards welfare recipients (Tomlinson 1999). The feeling that unemployed people in particular were getting an income, albeit one below the poverty line, to which employed people were not entitled was then used to legitimate cutbacks in social security programs. Cutbacks in social protection might have started with the imposition of obligations such as “work for the dole” on young unemployed people in 1998 but by 2006 had spread to disability support pensioners and lone parents whose youngest child was 8 years old.

Additional reason given for opposing Basic Income

Almost without exception when critics of Basic Income tire of their pronouncements on the moral hazards of poor people getting social benefit without working, or meeting some other imposed obligations, they switch their attack to the cost of providing income support. There is usually little attention paid to cost to poor people in particular and the nation generally of failing to provide adequate levels of income support to impoverished people. Australia is a wealthy nation which can afford to introduce a Basic Income at a level above the poverty line (Tomlinson 2006[b]).

In the last decade, some critics of Basic Income, particularly those who are backers of “Third way” systems of government, have pointed to the need to ensure that poor people – particularly those who are unemployed – are “socially included”. Guy Standing (2002 pp.164-170) mounts a sustained assault upon such an assertion. He says “Third way” supporters in accepting the need to increase inter-country competitiveness justify cutting social protection coverage and generosity and are accepting of “several forms of social dumping” (p.166), that they regard universal social protection as “neither feasible nor desirable” (p.168), that there “should be no social rights without social responsibilities…the reciprocity principle …is the heart of Third Wayism, and the New Paternalism that guided it (p.168 [italics in original]).”

Logically, it is difficult, for those not addicted to “Third way” thinking, to comprehend how forcing poor people to comply with the dictates of government officials removes stigma or makes them more autonomous, self-sufficient and included in society. It is even harder to understand how decreasing their payments or cancelling their benefits for up to 6 months assists them in becoming included. On the contrary, Schooneveldt (2004) and Ziguras, Dufty and Considine (2003) found that many unemployed people who were breached (for failing to meet the obligations imposed by the Australian Government) became homeless, experienced a decline in living standards, suffered increased mental health difficulties and, as a result, became even more marginalised.

In 2000 Ray Cassin, Senior Writer for The Sunday Age wrote:

You can be ‘on’ social security in the literal sense of receiving benefits, but this usage does not carry the pejorative flavour of being ‘on’ welfare. The reason is not mysterious: we do not talk about social-security dependency, or social- services dependency because ‘social security’ and ‘social services’ are bound up with an older notion of entitlement, and an understanding of mutual obligation that goes beyond tit-for-tat reciprocity.
The ideal of mutual obligation underpinning a system of social security is not one of reciprocity, but of obligation borne by all of us to contribute to the support of people who would otherwise be destitute (p. 22).

During the last decade in Australia, many ideas about workfare, the need to end dependency (sometimes expressed as the importance of self-sufficiency), the nexus between rights and responsibilities, social inclusion and moral hazard have been imported, fairly unreflectively, from Britain and the United States. This has occurred at a time when economic fundamentalism has been the ascendant economic ideology. In addition Prime Minister Howard has pushed his particular amalgam of social conservatism and economic liberalism which he first set out in detail in 1999. Howard has taken the earlier concept of reciprocity and destroyed its socially sustaining meaning by converting it into the much narrower sense of “mutual obligation”. Many Government Ministers now claim that if unemployed people or Disability Support Pensioners are provided with a meagre income then it is only fair that they give something back in return. This tit for tat reciprocity signifies a meanness of spirit rather than an enhancement of inclusion or solidarity with the poor.

As mentioned earlier, Howard successfully implanted in the minds of many employed Australians a feeling of downward envy towards income support recipients who the more affluent saw as getting a payment to which the affluent weren’t entitled. Howard was not offering to introduce a guaranteed income so all might enjoy income security. Rather, he was creating the circumstances under which he might use such widespread disaffection with the existing system of social assistance to decrease the generosity of the system of income support for many of the poorest Australians. Equally, Howard was not suggesting affluent Australians would personally benefit from whatever social security recipients “gave back in return for their benefits or pensions”. The only thing on offer to the affluent was the suggestion they could become relaxed and comfortable, secure in the knowledge that single parents, unemployed people and pensioners were prevented from “getting something for nothing”. Those employed Australians who voted for such policies were sold a pup. All that has been achieved is that income support has become more targeted and hedged around with increased obligations. Australians’ economic citizenship has been diminished at the same time as the humanity of government supporters has been consumed by the corrosive effects of downward envy. Inclusion is a receding goal for many low income earners in this country.

Ensuring both citizens and permanent residents have a right to a Basic Income is an act of inclusion, even incorporation. Installing a universal Basic Income will be a small social advance not a panacea for all social ills. A Basic Income will only mean the removal of one obstacle (albeit an important one) to the introduction of a socially just society. For, as disability activist David Morell (1998) warns, “Citizenship is more than ‘inclusion in the community’” (p.16). He says:

Inclusion ‘in the community’ is not enough. Indeed, the very concept does not make sense. The ‘community’ itself is so full of oppression, separation, exclusion, diverse interests and conflict for many of those who are already ‘included’ in it as to render the uncritical use of the of the concept positively misleading and the pursuit of the goal of inclusion disempowering (p.17).

Why Basic Income is better

The Australian piecemeal, means-tested, targeted, categorical system of income maintenance provides minimal levels of support to some of our poorest citizens. Yet it denies assistance to other equally impoverished citizens. It is not generous in comparison with other OECD countries (Boreham, Dow and Leet 1999, Chapter 4). It is riddled with stigmatising practices which saddle recipients with obligations that, by their very nature, erode the autonomy of recipients. The Australian welfare state has clear philosophical links with the British Poor Law system (Stretton 1996). It attempts to distinguish between the deserving and undeserving poor. It is based on 15th century philosophical approaches which have long outlived their functionality. The Australian system of income support needs to be upgraded in order that it might play a useful part in reinvigorating social and productive life in the 21st century.

One way in which that might be achieved is by replacing much of the system of income maintenance with a Basic Income. Other improvements on targeted welfare systems have been suggested such as Negative Income Tax, Guaranteed Minimum Income, Job Guarantees / Participation Income and Earned Tax Credits. Each of them has their supporters and opponents. The entire issue of Rutgers Journal of Law & Urban Policy Vol.2 No.1, Fall 2005, was devoted to a heated exchange between Basic Income advocates and proponents of Job Guarantees / Participation Income. Professor Ronald Henderson proposed a tiered Guaranteed Minimum Income scheme for Australia in 1975. In that same year, the Commonwealth Government’s Priorities Review Staff proposed a Negative Income Tax. A Guaranteed Minimum Income or a Negative Income Tax system has the administrative complication that it is paid in inverse proportion to other earned income whereas a Basic Income is paid at the same rate to each and every permanent resident irrespective of other income. Earned Tax Credits such as those that exist in Britain and New Zealand have requirements about the minimum number of hours which need to be worked each week before a person qualifies for the payment. This frequently results in part-time and casual employees who have their hours cut losing both wages and tax benefits simultaneously (Wellington People’s Centre 2006). The conservative Tony Abbott, when he was Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations said “the trouble with earned income tax credits is that they tend to shift the poverty trap rather than remove them (2002 p. 3).”

Because a Basic Income is paid to each and every permanent resident it generates widespread support evaporating downward envy. The existing system of income support has, in recent years, experienced severe strains as a result of considerable public resistance to providing welfare assistance to single parents, unemployed people and even Disability Support Pensioners. As Robert Goodin and Julian Le Grand pointed out in 1987, universal payments have the potential to enhance feelings of solidarity thus strengthening support for the social welfare system. Whilst some might prefer to have a system of income support which paid all the poor and only the poor such a system has never existed (Goodin 1992). This is mainly because the least bureaucratically sophisticated (who are often the poorest of the poor) are least well equipped to find their way through the welfare maze. The only feasible way to ensure that no poor person misses out on receiving sustainable income support is to pay everyone and then recoup tax from the more affluent.

The last three Basic Income Earth Network Congresses have provided, and their forthcoming conference in November this year in Cape Town will provide, evidence that a Basic Income is an affordable, efficient way to abolish poverty, enhance social life, remove stigma, increase autonomy, maintain productive output whilst improving the relations of production. Whatever the grounds for moving to introduce a system of Basic Income overseas there are pressing reasons to do so in Australia (Tomlinson 2006 [a] & [b], Tomlinson 2003, Tomlinson, Harrington and Schooneveldt 2004).

Conclusion

Introducing a Basic Income for all permanent residents in a country promotes personal autonomy and would go some considerable distance towards including those marginalised by existing piecemeal, categorical and means-tested income support systems. It would promote greater egalitarianism and has the capacity to ensure that no-one in need is excluded from base line income support. In particular a Basic Income has the greatest chance of reaching those least bureaucratically sophisticated.

Recently, a coalition consisting of the Council of Churches in Namibia, the National Union of Namibian Workers, the Namibian NGO Forum and the Namibia Network of AIIDS Service Organisations urged their government to introduce a Basic Income in Namibia to abolish absolute poverty (Haarmann and Haarmann 2005). If implemented it would the abolish absolute poverty experienced by nearly half of the citizenry.

In technologically advanced countries, such as Australia, absolute poverty is a far less widespread phenomenon. Here, relieving relative poverty is the prime purpose of income support systems. A Basic Income, such as have been proposed in Australia, would lift all permanent residents above the Henderson Poverty Line (Tomlinson 2006[b]). It would enhance feelings of social solidarity, increase egalitarianism, social justice and personal autonomy.

Bibliography

Abbott, T. (2002) “Towards Opportunity and Prosperity.” 4th April. http://www.tonyabbott.com.au/speech/unimelb.html
AIHW (2006) Mortality over the twentieth century in Australia: trends and patterns in major causes of death. Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Canberra.
Basic Income Earth Network http://www.etes.ucl.ac.be/BIEN/Index.html
Basic Income Guarantee Australia http://www.basicincome.qut.edu.au/index.jsp Bell, S. & Quiggin, J. (2006) “Employment Policy: Unemployment and Labour Market Insecurity.” In McClelland, A. & Smyth, P. (eds) Social Policy in Australia: Understanding for Action. Oxford University, South Melbourne.
Boreham, P., Dow, G. & Leet, M. (1999) Room to manoeuvre: Political aspects of full employment. Melbourne University, Carlton.
Cassin, R. (2000) “Let’s just call them leeches and be done with it.” The Sunday Age 27th., August, p.22.
Goodin, R. (1992) “Towards a Minimally Presumptuous Social Welfare Policy.” In van Parijs, P. (ed.) Arguing for Basic Income. Verso, London.
Goodin, R. & Le Grand, J. (1987) Not only the Poor: The Middle Classes and the Welfare State. Allen & Unwin, London.
Haarmann, C. and Haarmann, D. (2005) The Basic Income Grant in Namibia Resource Book. Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Republic of Namibia, Windhoek. http://www.cdhaarmann.com/Publications/BIG_Resource_Book.pdf
Harding, A., Ngu Vu, Q. & Percival, R. (2005) “The Distributional Impact of the Proposed Welfare to Work Reforms upon Sole Parents and people with Disabilities.” Paper presented at the 34th Conference of economists, University of Melbourne. 28th September.
Hill, R. (2005) “Do the Poor Deserve Less Than Surfers? An Essay for the Special Issue on Vulnerable Consumers.” Journal of Macromarketing. Vol. 25, No.2, December, pp. 215-218.
Howard, J. (1999) “Building a Stronger and Fairer Australia: Liberalisation in Economic Policy and Modern Conservatism in Social Policy.” Address to ‘Australia Unlimited Roundtable.’ 4th. May. http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/1999/AustraliaUnlimitedRoundtable.htm.
Kevin, T. (2004) A Certain Maritime Incident: the sinking of the SIEV X. Scribe, Melbourne.
Maley, W. (2004) “Refugees” in Manne, R (ed.) The Howard Years. Black Inc Agenda, Melbourne.
Marr, D. & Wilkinson, M. (2004) Dark Victory. Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest.
Marx, K. (1970) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. 1, (edited by Engels, F. translated by Moore, S. & Aveling, E.) Lawrence & Wishart, London.
McCallum, R. (2006) “The Fantasy of Choice.” Workers Online. May. http://workers.labor.net.au/features/200605/b_tradeunion_mccallum.html
McKew, M. (2004) “Economy will nurture population growth: Costello.” 7.30 Report, ABC. http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2004/s1261874.htMetcalf, S. (2006) “Immigration: Pacific solution Mark II.” New Matilda, 24th May. http://www.newmatilda.com/home/articledetailmagazine.asp?ArticleID=1584&Home pageID=142
Morrell, D. (1998) “The Long View from Conferenceville.” Abstract. Vol. 2, No. 1, March, pp.16-19.
Priorities Review Staff (1975) Possibilities for Social Welfare in Australia. Australian Government, Canberra.
Schooneveldt, S. (2004) “Do Mutual Obligation breach penalties coerce compliance with government expectations?” Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 155-167.
Schwarzenbach, S (2004) The Limits of Production: Justifying Guaranteed Basic Income.” in Standing, G.(ed.) Promoting Income Security as a Right: Europe and North America. Anthem, London.
Standing, G. (2004) “About time: basic income security as a right.” in Standing, G.(ed.) Promoting Income Security as a Right: Europe and North America. Anthem, London
Standing, G. (2002) Beyond the New Paternalism: Basic Security as Equality. Verso, London.
Stretton, H.(1996) “Poor laws of 1834 and 1996.”The 15th Sambell Memorial Lecture, 12th August, Brotherhood of St Laurence, Melbourne.
Tomlinson, J. (2006 [a]) “Faint Praise for a Chimera: Selectivity versus Universalism in social Policy.” New Community Quarterly. Vol. 4, No. 1, Autumn.
Tomlinson, J. (2006 [b] forthcoming) “Australia: Basic Income and Decency.” Paper to be given at the Basic Income Earth Conference, Cape Town, November. Tomlinson, J. (2005) “Disability on Howard’s ‘Animal Farm.’” Online Opinion 26th May. http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=3491
Tomlinson, J. (2004) “‘The War on Terror’ is what it claims to counter.” Online Opinion. 17th August. http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=2462 Tomlinson, J. (2003) Income Insecurity: The Basic Income alternative. http://www.basicincome.qut.edu.au/interest/e-books.jsp
Tomlinson, J., Harrington, P. & Schooneveldt, S. (2004) “Why Australian Workers and Unions should Support a Basic Income.” http://www.basicincome.qut.edu.au/docs/Why%20Australian%20Workers%20and%20Unions%20should%20support%20BI%20Final%202004.doc
van Parijs, P. (1997) Real Freedom for All. Oxford University, van Parijs, P. (1991) “Why surfers should be fed: The liberal case for an unconditional basic income.” Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol 20, Spring, pp. 101- 131.
Wellington People’s Centre (2006) “Working For Families A benefit Cut: Why Working for Families is not working for poor families.” (March).Wellington People’s Centre , Wellington.
Ziguras, S. (2005) “Counting the Cost: Changing payments for sole parents and people with disabilities.” August pp.4-5.in Brotherhood Comment. Brotherhood of St Laurence. http://www.bsl.org.au/pdfs/commentaug05.pdf
Ziguras, S., Dufty, G. & Considine, M. (2003) Much Obliged: Disadvantaged job seekers’ experiences of the mutual obligation regime. Brotherhood of St Laurence and St. Vincent de Paul http://bsl.org.au/pdfs/MOreportV2.pdf

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A decent Incomes policy

Published in ACTCoss News Vol. 8, Number 3, pp. 34-38 1993

At the Federal level the Australian Labor Party has monopolised the rhetoric about social justice in recent times. Over the last five years Brian Howe, in various ministerial guises, has flounced around the country mouthing social justice platitudes before returning to his Canberra bunker to betray social justice principles.

In the ACT the Labor Party has been serious about trying to operationalise social justice policies. With the one noticeable exception of its efforts to implement the inane ideas of the Priorities Review Board manifesto(1), the last Liberal Alliance Government, which preferred the term ‘social equity’, also took seriously social justice agendas.

The social justice debate in the ACT has been most heavily influenced by the work of Michael Salvaris who was employed by the ACT Administration on the request of ACTCOSS. His report Canberra: Planning a Fair Community(2) sets down four basic principles: access, equity, equality of rights and participation. Solidarity and freedom are also basic driving forces in social justice which Salvaris and others accept but which are insufficiently discussed.

We need to conceive of solidarity with rather than, as so often happens in the welfare industry, solidarity is thought about in terms of doing for. In the court and prisons industry it is too often a matter of doing to.

Solidarity with those less fortunate than ourselves is basic to any decent society. The degree of militancy we are prepared to accept in the pursuit of solidarity will determine the quality of social justice outcomes in this city and our nation.

Before I get down to looking in detail at income maintenance policies, I want to reflect on aspects of the wash-up of the federal election and some particular features of the ACT community.

1993 Election

Paul Keating rightly declared that the thrust of Labor’s electoral appeal was its social policies of inclusion (Medicare, awards, etc.). But the Federal ALP’s concept of inclusion has to be extended to mean more than its corporate government model of big business, big unions and a shrinking government. There is a large gap between triennial visits to the Blaxland Sports Centre and solidarity with the Australian people.

Solidarity is about sharing, caring and involvement in the struggle to improve life for all, particularly those worse off than yourselves. In Keating’s terms, ‘reaching back and pulling people up’. It is about rejecting Hewson’s idea that pulling people up only slows the rest of us.

The fact that there were several within the Liberal party who wanted Bronwyn “Sherman Tank” Bishop as leader and Wilson “Iron Bar” Tuckey as her deputy highlighted the level of despair the federal Liberal Party has reached. In their search for vision they found a one-eyed man and made him king.

ACT

In the ACT we can’t claim to have made an effective start on our social justice agenda until we:

(a) have a police force prepared to uphold the law. At the moment this police force has members who perjure themselves, bash people and generally see themselves above the law.
(b) Build a decent incarceration facility capable of ensuring a civilised corrections approach to those we currently transport to NSW’ s prisons.
(c) Provide emergency accommodation for homeless people irrespective of their gender.
(d) Revitalise our concessional system in a way which treats people equally in relation to their income and one which no longer discriminates against the young and the unemployed. Cutting out school clothing allowances and limiting school bus passes was not an auspicious start.

But as the ACT Government attempts to provide an equitable concessional or income support system for our poorest citizens, its job is made harder to the extent that the Federal Govemment fails to implement a national income support program which is fair, rational, adequate, understandable, implementable, and which at least treats people in equivalent financial situation equally. The ACT Government is further constrained in its social justice efforts by the failure of the Federal Government to ensure that those without work are found employment or another meaningful activity to fill their day.

Income Support / Employment

Because of the way we have constructed our overall income policies the options available to implement an equitable income support system is circumscribed. The intimate connection between employment and income is widely accepted, the reluctance to see education and training as integral to employment as well as income support, and the failure to acknowledge the real costs to this society of not ensuring meaningful participation for all permanent residents are central limitations which determine the political acceptability of different income support options.

The current system of federal social security in Australia began in 1908 with the introduction of the Age and Invalid Pension. It was subsequently extended during the 1940s to include payments for children, widows, the sick, and the unemployed. When in 1947 all these various pieces of social policy were pulled together in the one Act the Labor Government also introduced a Special Benefit which was capable of being paid to anyone without the support of a spouse who was not enmeshed in industrial disputation. Unfortunately the Special Benefit provisions were never interpreted in their widest sense.

The implementation of the social security system was riddled with racism, ageism, and sexism. Menzies’ 20-year rule hardly influenced the system of income support, except that racism directed towards Asians decreased significantly and towards Aborigines a little.

Whitlam’s arrival on the scene with Bill Hayden as Minister for Social Services saw the erosion of worthiness and race as the prime determinants of eligibility for income support. Young unemployed were paid benefit at the adult rate. Female sole parents, who had not had the foresight to get a man to the altar or the registry office, were provided with an income. In 1973 Hayden also promised to introduce a guaranteed minimum income.

Fraser’s coup put pay to that. Fraser’s rise to power on the back of a ‘bash a’ dole bludger today’ campaign began a reign of terror against the unemployed, particularly the young unemployed which is continuing to this day. Perhaps it will take the creation of an unemployed peoples army before the bulk of employed Australians will realise that there is a class war going on around them.

Margaret Guilfoyle extended the lone mothers payment so as to include men with children. The Fraser Government also introduced the Family Income Supplement which was a limited income guarantee for families with children.

The Hawke Government substantially increased the value of this payment renaming it the Family Allowance Supplement. This Government rationalised some income support payments integrating levels of assistance across education and social security.

When Brian Howe crawled out from under the Ministry of Defence Support to take over the Social Security portfolio this sounded the death knell of social improvement in income maintenance policies. Policies became more targeted (read: fewer people got them); more efficiently administered (read: cost less); more selective (read: worthiness returns); more integrated (read: wherever two or more schemes were being brought together the rates and conditions were set at the lower level).

Just one example in one of Howe’s budget: he ‘saved’ $100,000 by insisting that school leavers who applied for Sickness Benefit waited 13 weeks. This was supposed to be equitable because unemployed school leavers had a 13-week waiting period. The group who were most affected by this change were young pregnant women who had to leave school. This exemplifies Howe’ s social justice record.

Jobsearch, Newstart, and the various Mickey Mouse training options were all done with the main aim of creating the illusion of caring about those searching for work and stomping on dole bludgers. In fact, Labor in office has spent very little money on training and job creation when compared with the Fraser Government.

Federal Labor has failed to introduce a decent income support system. Instead it has created the nightmare of a privatised superannuation scheme which can only advantage the rich and corporate criminals(3).

The only way to create a socially just income maintenance policy is to introduce a guaranteed minimum income set at or above the poverty line. Whilst Labor continues to pander to the better-off through excessively generous tax concessions on superannuation, it rules out the possibility of a truly universal income guarantee which could in the words of the Liberal Lady Rhys Williams provide a floor below which no one can fall without creating a ceiling above which no-one can rise.

A guaranteed minimum income would provide security for all, it would be paid in inverse proportion to a persons other income. It would ignore concepts of worthiness, gender, age, class, race/ethnicity, locality, ability, disability, marital status, living arrangements, etc. It would not impose restrictions on where people lived, what they studied, where they worked, how long they worked, how they dressed, what they thought, and so forth.

Governments would be forced to provide training and educational courses which people wanted to attend. It would involve governments putting their trust in Australian people’s creativity. We may see a far greater sharing of work than at present. At the moment we have a very large percentage of our full-time work force spending more than 50 hours a week on the job, 11% of citizens with no work, at least a further 5% so discouraged that they have given up the search for employment, and many in the part-time work force who are desperate for more hours of paid work.

The Federal Labor Party really has to decide if it is serious about being a party of inclusion and social justice or whether the Keating victory is just the last hurrah of the Party which brought us West Australia Inc., the State Bank fiascos in Victoria and South Australia, deregulation, a floating dollar, the ‘level’ playing field, privatised superannuation, a shrinking government sector, 11% unemployment, the deepest recession since the 1930s depression, and a mean minded social security system.

(1)  Priorities Review Board, Priorities for Improved Public Sector Management. Priorities Review Board, Canberra 1990.
(2)  Salvaris, M., Canberra: Planning a Fair Community. ACT Administration, Canberra 1988.
(3) ACTCOSS, The Super Tax Rort. ACTCOSS, Canberra 1992.

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A most neglected movement

Published on BIGA QUT website 2007

In 1920 Dennis Milner was the first person to publish, in the English language, a book length explanation of a universal Basic Income. The book was entitled Higher Production by a Bonus on National Output. A Proposal for a Minimum Income for All varying with National Income. This book brought together the 1918 arguments outlined in a 16 page pamphlet written with his wife Mabel and a 78 page book written by his friend Bernard Pickard in 1919. They were Quakers and members of a group promoting what they called a State Bonus Scheme. Essentially Dennis Milner’s proposal was that 20% of all incomes in Britain would be pooled and paid as an identical payment to each person irrespective of age.

Milner wrote:

The Minimum income is thus an attempt to secure capability for work by abolishing destitution (as to which it is new only to the extent of its simplicity) and an attempt to encourage willingness to work in an atmosphere devoid of Industrial Compulsion (p.19).

Van Trier (pp.31-32) notes that Milner’s ideas were debated at the 1921 Brighton Conference of the British Labour Party. You might suggest that there is nothing remarkable about all that. But it would appear that after 1921 the struggle to introduce a Basic Income waged by the Milners and Pickard was virtually forgotten.

Between 1921 until the 1980s there is hardly a mention of them. Professor Rob Watts in 1984 acknowledges Denis Milner’s book as a forerunner to the modern Basic Income debates but it was not until 1989 that Walter Van Trier began to uncover the extent of Milners and Pickard’s forgotten contribution to Basic Income. In 1995 Van Trier published his PhD thesis, entitled, Every one a King. Over a third of the thesis is devoted to the Milners and Pickard.

Van Trier thesis is in part a detective story about three missing people and the demise of a movement promoting a universal system of income support. Like most writers on income guarantees I had, in 1989, credited Lady Juliet Rhys-Williams with being the originator of the idea of guaranteed minimum incomes in 1943. When, in 1975, the Henderson Poverty Inquiry recommended the introduction of a guaranteed minimum income in Australia it was to Rhys-Williams rather than the Milners to which he looked for a model. In the same year, a group of Australian Finance and Treasury officials using the collective name, Priorities Review Staff, put up a counter proposal to Henderson. It was to the right wing economic fundamentalist Milton Friedman’s negative income tax model they turned. Neither Rhys-Williams nor Friedman mention the Milners nor Pickard.

Given that it is 81 years since Milner wrote and until recently the memory of Milners and Pickard have been erased by the accumulated detritus of history, one might ask: what is the point of resurrecting their writings? Do these writers have any relevance in current income security debates? Above all are there lessons for people working in the human service industry which can be drawn from their writings?

The answer to all these questions is an emphatic yes!

The Milners and Pickard argued for universal payments; that is non-means tested and paid as a right to every permanent resident (irrespective of age) in a country. They were determined that there was to be no compulsion to accept work. They were attempting to replace the misunderstandings, abuses and inequalities of the categorical targeted poor law system with a simple easily understood system. They were writing at the end of the First World War. By the time Rhys-Williams was putting forward her ideas, Friedman claimed to have started thinking about his ideas in the same year, the world was nearing the end of the Second World War and she specifically wanted to exclude from payment able bodied workers who refused employment. By 1962 when Friedman first published his ideas on negative income tax – his ideas came with much of the erosion of workers entitlements, youth wages, the industrial deregulation, abolition of minimum wage provisions, and so forth which we associate with the present globalised industrial and social welfare landscape.

In Australia in 2001 the McClure Report on participation income, the entire mutual obligation debate, work for the dole, compelled literacy and numeracy training, youth payments at 44% of the Henderson Poverty Line, with 386,946 Australian breaches imposed upon Social Security recipients in the 2001/2002 financial year. Dole Diaries, two year waiting periods for migrants, increased surveillance of welfare recipients, the proliferation of Dob in a Dole Bludger hot lines and all the other stigma inducing components of the present day Australian categorical means tested Social Security system are the very antithesis of what the Milners and Pickard were on about.

At the very time when Australia as a nation is economically stronger than at any other period of our post invasion history the government is imposing on the least affluent citizens increasing pressure to establish their worthiness to receive Social Security. Mutual obligation is based on the assumption that compelling people to do something in return for payment of poverty line income is appropriate. Prime Minister Howard has spent a considerable amount of energy campaigning against workers upward envy being directed towards wealthy sections of the community. Yet is seemingly oblivious to the fact that demanding a return for providing poverty line income fans the flames of downward envy. Unemployment has hovered between 6.0 and 7.0% in 2002/3. Australia refuses to share the available work amongst all the available workers or even to adopt a 35 hour a week limit on employees as France has done. It refuses to provide a decent income guarantee for all those without other income sources as recommended by Professor Henderson in 1975. It is time we as a nation turned again to the idea of providing a universal Basic Income as suggested as early as 1920 and being seriously considered by governments and academics in many parts of the world.

Anyone interested in Basic Income can find out about international developments by visiting the Basic Income European Network (BIEN).

Bibliography

Basic Income European Network BIEN web site:
http://www.etes.ucl.ac.be/BIEN/bien.html
Friedman, M. (1962) Capitalism and Freedom. University of Chicago, Chicago.
Henderson, R. (1975) Poverty in Australia Vols. I and II. Australian Government, Canberra.
McClure, P. (2000) Participation Support for a More Equitable Society, Final Report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform, Canberra, Department of Family and Community Services.
Milner, D. (1920) Higher Production by a Bonus on National Output: A proposal for a minimum income for all varying with national productivity. George Allen & Unwin. London.
Priorities Review Staff (1975) Possibilities for Social Welfare in Australia. Australian Government, Canberra.
Rhys-Williams, J. (1943) Something to look forward to. MacDonald, London.
Tomlinson, J (2001) Income Insecurity: The Basic Income Alternative.
http://www.basic income@qut.edu.au
Tomlinson, J (1989) “Income Maintenance in Australia the Income Guarantee Alternative.” PhD. Murdoch University, Western Australia.
Van Trier, W. (1995) “Every One A King.” PhD. Thesis Department of Sociology, K.U. Leuven.
Watts, R. (1984) “The Light on the Hill: The origins of the Australian welfare state.” PhD thesis, University of Melbourne.

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A savings device that provides enough for all? What a super idea!

ON LINE opinion – Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate

Posted Thursday, 3 June 2004

In the early 1990s Paul Keating fell for the three-card trick of the private insurance mafia and moved Australia towards privatised superannuation rather than a social insurance system, as is the practice in much of Europe. The Labor government passed legislation compelling the majority of employers and workers to pay into private superannuation funds. Keating spoke, at the time, of the need to embrace superannuation in order to safeguard Australian’s retirement income. Mark Latham’s latest superannuation plan is a return to the Keating blueprint.

When the current treasurer, Peter Costello, announced his major revamp of superannuation he declared, “You can retire and work”. Costello warned that because the average age of death in Australia was increasing there would be too few workers supporting too many retirees if something was not done to keep workers’ noses to the grindstone for longer. There are many more innovative ways to approach the issue of encouraging sufficient workers to stay in the labour market and to provide decent income support programs. Before looking at them, it is worth briefly considering where the private superannuation industry is leading us.

In the past three years, HIH has gone broke, AMP has made significant losses (in 2004 it wrote down its assets by an amount in excess of $8 billion) and the majority of superannuation funds have not increased the savings of those paying into them. In 2002, the government watchdog charged with the surveillance of superannuation warned that 10 per cent of superannuation funds “fell into the ‘high or extreme risk’ category”. Many workers, especially those with more than one job, are paying inordinately high fees to several superannuation companies. In 1986 only 22 per cent of female employees had any superannuation cover but Keating’s changes increased women’s access to superannuation. Currently there is in excess of $300 billion tied up in Australian superannuation funds, with most workers having some superannuation cover.

Women generally, and the overwhelming number of male workers who are likely to retire or be retrenched in the next decade or two, will leave the workforce with inadequate superannuation to provide for their retirement. Costello’s changes to superannuation will make it more difficult for many to access partial age pension payments to supplement their private retirement income. Other older workers will increasingly find they are forced to dig into their superannuation savings in periods where they are temporarily incapacitated for work or unemployed. This will reduce their chances of living comfortably, on their superannuation, when they finally exit the workforce.

Currently 5.9 per cent of the workforce is officially recognised as unemployed and another 6 to 12 per cent are disguised/discouraged unemployed or underemployed. The reality is that Australia has, since 1975, failed to create sufficient jobs for all available workers; since that time, there have been about 11 workers available for each job vacancy. Yet some politicians would have us believe that there is a “crisis of an Aging Australia”. They suggest that very soon there will be too few workers to support those leaving the workforce on account of age. Australia is not now, nor is it likely in the future, to be facing a shortage of potential employees. On the contrary, the problem is to create sufficient paid work for all unemployed and underemployed people.

Senior journalist Kenneth Davidson in an article in The Age aptly titled “Don’t be misled: the aging population is a good thing” demolishes the myth that the increasing age of the population necessarily increases the number of citizens dependent on an ever-decreasing workforce. Davidson notes that children in their first few years and the elderly in their very last years of life place the greatest demand on others for support. He notes that there will be fewer young and that although the population is living longer, on average, many older people are remaining healthy well into old age.

Economist Ross Gittins concurs with Davidson’s assessment in The Sydney Morning Herald but noted that the public believes the age pension will, in the not too distant future, be unaffordable. He points out that Treasurer Costello’s comments have added to such inaccurate perceptions. Gittins notes that Costello has “built his career as Treasurer on exploiting the public’s misconceptions, not correcting them”. Gittins suggests that the reason Costello wishes to keep large numbers of older workers in the workforce is to maintain downward pressure on wages.

Davidson writes: “Compulsory superannuation is, in effect, an income tax in all respects except that the funds are not socially accountable for their investment portfolios.” He suggests that there are far superior alternatives than continuing to force the majority of those enmeshed in private superannuation to keep contributing to such private funds. Many, who currently pay into superannuation funds, will find that their superannuation payment significantly erodes their access to social security in retirement. In 1991, the ACT Council of Social Services in a monograph entitled The Super Tax Rort raised similar concerns.

The alternatives

Social insurance (as is available in Europe) could provide a government guaranteed income in times of unemployment, sickness, disablement or retirement. The current compulsory superannuation contributions, converted into an increased tax rate and combined with existing social security budget allocations, would be sufficient to finance social insurance. Similar proposals were put forward in Australia in the 1930s and 1940s by the conservative side of the Federal Parliament but opposed by Labor.

Social insurance would ensure income support (for many who now find their retirement savings have evaporated when they try to access their superannuation funds). No form of income support is absolutely secure but because the entire country is guaranteeing social insurance it is far more secure than any private fund can be.

Social insurance is far superior to existing Australian targeted social security programs. It is more reliable and has clearer eligibility conditions. It avoids stigma, is efficient, alleviates poverty and doesn’t create poverty traps. However, social insurance systems are proving difficult to fund in many parts of Europe. Several countries have restricted the coverage and generosity of social insurance payments. Unemployed workers under 25 years old have been excluded. Limitations have been placed upon the length of time social insurance is paid, while the number of years it is necessary to have worked to get full retirement pensions has been increased.

Private superannuation is designed to provide income support upon retirement, but there are other reasons people may not be able to work well before retirement age such as: caring for children, studying to upgrade skills, illness, retrenchment and so forth. In such circumstances, superannuation is not now accessible. Social insurance or social security could provide income support in some of these circumstances.

Private superannuation can never accommodate all the potential needs of people as they go through life. Older migrants and refugees coming from countries without portable income support systems will not have adequate retirement income coverage. Many Indigenous Australians with private superannuation cover may not live long enough to access their superannuation. The average age of death for Indigenous males is 56 as compared with 77 for non-Indigenous male Australians and Indigenous women die on average at 63 and non-Indigenous women at 82 years: “approximately three-quarters (74.5 per cent) of Indigenous males and two-thirds (64.6 per cent) of Indigenous females deaths were before the age of 65 years”.

There is an income-support system that could provide for every permanent resident’s essential income support needs and that is a universal Basic Income. It would be paid to individuals irrespective of their income, assets or social relationships. Many social security applicants are refused assistance because the government assumes that family members are automatically dependent upon other, better-off, family members. A Basic Income makes no such presumption about dependency. It would be an equal payment to all over the age of 16 years; a proportion of the adult rate would be paid to those under 16 years who are living with their family.

Why don’t we do it?

Firstly, it would require a major policy change; secondly, many argue that we can’t afford it; thirdly, they and others argue that (if such a scheme existed) workers would leave work in droves and fourthly, were Australia to move in such a direction the Howard government would not be able to enforce its “mutual obligation” policies.

It is true that if a Basic Income were introduced no-one could be forced, by a lack of income, to engage in compulsory activities. There needs to be a major debate in Australia before citizens will want the government to provide for everyone not just the “worthy” who receive social security.

The economics involved to pay for a universal Basic Income would necessitate a substantial shift of income from the affluent to less well off but such changes do not constitute an insurmountable obstacle. There are sufficient funds; they just need to be distributed in a more egalitarian manner.

The Henderson Poverty Inquiry suggested a similar program for Australia in 1975; the Irish Government considers that Basic Income is economically feasible for that country (Healy and Reynolds 2002). Economic historian, Keith Rankin, has shown how such schemes could be afforded in New Zealand. Alaska has had a partial Basic Income for 20 years (Goldsmith 2002). None of the research done in Australia or elsewhere supports the view that there would be a large-scale exodus from the workforce. Indeed, some research suggests the exact opposite.

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A universal basic income advantages all.

Some Australians are old enough to remember a time when a fair day’s work meant receiving a fair day’s pay, when unions were strong enough to represent their members and few were left to languish without access to some form of social support.

Nowadays we have decreasing numbers of people with secure full-time employment, casualised work is becoming the order of the day, insecure and part-time work has become the norm. The gig economy is upon us and robots look increasingly likely to destroy many jobs. The system of social security which had existed in last half of the 20thcentury has been eroded by governments enamoured with neo-liberal economics.

There is a nostalgia for a more stable and secure life. However, the past was never a golden age. Fortunately, there is an exciting way forward which can guarantee a livable income for all permanent residents and which ensures there are incentives to produce and earn. That is through the introduction of a universal basic income.

The idea of generalised income guarantees paid to the entire populous is a very old idea. Professor Guy Standing in his book Basic Income: and how we can make it happen traces its beginnings as far back as ancient Greece 400 years before Christ. In the 1920s a group of Quakers led by Dennis Milner attempted unsuccessfully to convince the British Labour Party to adopt a “national bonus on productivity” which was a form of universal income guarantee.

In 1975, the Henderson Poverty Inquiry recommended a two-tiered form of guaranteed minimum income in Australia which the then Minister of Social Security, Bill Hayden, supported. Unfortunately, the Governor General, Sir John Kerr, dismissed the Whitlam Government before they could implement such a system.

Why we need a UBI

For the last 43 years Australia has seen governments of Labor and conservative persuasions increasingly committed to a neo-liberal agenda. Our social security system has been transformed from one which, though targeted and means tested since the mid 1940s, had managed to ensure few were left without some form of income support. Social security is now becoming like the poor law system of 19thcentury England. Politicians continue to claim that people are paid according to need, when in fact they are paid according to their perceived worthiness. Universality is fast disappearing. Increasing numbers of people are having their income support payments stopped for periods of up to 8 weeks.

Asylum seekers, recently arrived migrants, Aborigines living in regional regions, inarticulate applicants, people with several forms of disabilities (particularly those with mental health issues) and the bureaucratically least sophisticated are the most likely to find their income support payments suspended or cancelled. People are paid not according to who is in need but rather who is in favour.

A universal income would be paid to every permanent resident without any requirement other than they establish that they live permanently in Australia and are legally entitled to do so. It would be paid on an individual basis irrespective of whether they live alone or with others. It would take no account of wealth. People would not be required to demonstrate work willingness or the lack of the ability to work. A basic income would replace all other forms of government provided income support but not affect any other aspect of the welfare state.

What would a UBI achieve

A universal basic income would dramatically clarify the central income support system for all Australians, it would improve equity by ensuring that everyone has access to a livable income. It would end stigma and downward envy because all would have an equal entitlement. Discretion and moral judgement would disappear from income support. It would also remove racism. Unlike the present social security system, there would always be a financial incentive to undertake available work and encourage productive capacity.

Governments would no longer be able to impose obligations upon citizens. Work for the dole would become a distant nightmare. Young people would not be forced to work for a pittance for an employer on the grounds that they are trainees not workers. Employers would have to pay award wages and even above award wages to attract the most sort after workers. Dangerous and undesirable jobs would either be phased out or at least pay a decent wage.

Once a basic income was in place there would be less need for people without income to engage in economic crime because they would have a regular income on which to rely. People coming out of jail would be assured that they too had access to a regular livable income to sustain them until they found work. There would be less need to build jails and the court system would no longer be clogged with petty criminals forced into crime to survive.

But they would leave work in droves

Opponents of basic income claim that if people were provided with a regular income paid at above the poverty line then this would encourage shirking. It is true that many hold such views but all the evidence from trials around the world in places such as Canada, Namibia, India, Kenya and the Netherlands do not support such ill-founded fears.

Hand in hand with this common objection is the question “Why pay millionaires when they don’t need it?” This question is usually followed by the assertion that as “There are limited fund to pay for income support so all available funds should be expended on the poor.”  The answer to the question is that a universal basic income is far cheaper to implement than targeted categorical systems and it will greatly improve tax compliance because welfare tax officials won’t be chasing small overpayments and they can be redirected to go after tax evasion. Paying millionaires makes tax avoidance harder for them. In addition, because there would need to be an income tax imposed on all income additional to the basic income, millionaires would not be net beneficiaries in straight financial terms. Because workers up the average wage would get the basic income and pay tax most would be marginal net beneficiaries.

There is no set amount available to pay for income support. Every budget governments prioritise some welfare groups over others. Universal services attract far greater public support and are likely to see such systems consolidate and improve over time. Medicare and the Pharmaceutical Benefit Schemes are prime examples.

All Alaskan residents receive a partial basic income and it is has become the most egalitarian state in the union. A basic income paid to all Australians would have a similar effect. People living in more equal societies have better happiness and health outcomes. So were a universal income come to be paid here, both rich and poor would see their health and well-being improve. Everyone would be a winner.

Written 2018

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ABC: No child will live in poverty

Morning Show (2CN, ABC Radio), 4 January 1990

TITLE: ACT Council of Social Services Director claims the complicated nature of our social security system is hindering people from obtaining their full entitlements. A simpler social security system is suggested, whereby a minimum income is guaranteed regardless of other income earned which would be taxed.

John TOMLINSON – Director, ACT Council of Social Security.
Reporter: JULIE DARRETT


JULIE DARRETT: The Prime Minister’s 1987 manifesto claims that no child need live in poverty by 1990. Although applauded widely at the time that this was made, it may possibly be the statement that the Prime Minister regrets making the most, and is certainly quoted and misquoted by journalists and politicians alike.

John Tomlinson, Director of the ACT Council of Social Services, maintains that 7,000 people in Canberra alone, are living below the poverty line because of the complicated nature of our welfare system. Apparently there are 127 different forms of welfare payment administered by 10 commonwealth departments; so, it’s no surprise that thousands of Australians have trouble finding their way through the system. John, in fact, says that after 25 years of working in the system, he can’t figure it out!

So, John, welcome to the studio.
JOHN TOMLINSON: Good morning, Julie.

JULIE DARRETT: Thank you very much for coming in. One hundred and twenty-seven payments – it makes it pretty hard, doesn’t it?

JOHN TOMLINSON: It certainly is. And when it’s spread across so many departments with their different rules and eligibility requirements – Social Security Department alone has 4,000 pages of manuals, and that’s as well as their Act, and the Audit Act and the Finance Act that people are expected to understand if they are working in the system – they’re very confused themselves, and people coming in often face literacy problems and have great difficulty finding their way through what we call the `welfare maze’.

JULIE DARRETT: So, you expect that there are a lot of people out there who are entitled to different payments but just can’t figure out how to get them or don’t even know they exist?

JOHN TOMLINSON: Well, even the most simple one, the Family Allowance Supplement which is available to all families on low income that have children or all single parents that have children, they’re able to apply for that if their income is low enough, and 50 per cent of those people who would have an entitlement, on the best figures that Social Security can provide us with, indicate that they’re not applying.

JULIE DARRETT: Why not?

JOHN TOMLINSON: Well, one of the reasons they don’t apply is that people don’t want government interfering in their lives. They’ve had unhappy experiences with departments in the past. Other groups of people are people of migrant backgrounds who’ve come here, don’t speak English very well, don’t read English very well, don’t understand what their entitlements are. Aboriginal people, of course, in Central Australia and Northern Territory and north west of Queensland have massive problems in getting their entitlements. The other people are people who have changeable income and this week they might be entitled and next week they’re not, and it’s too much of a hassle.

JULIE DARRETT: Does the government realise that it’s an unwieldy system or are they quite pleased that it’s overwhelming difficult to manage and the money just isn’t going out?

JOHN TOMLINSON: Well, I think it’s probably a bit cynical to suggest that the Government is happy the people don’t apply but, clearly, if they were serious about people applying, they would do a lot more to make the system simpler. I know that every Council of Social Service in Australia has been telling the Government for the past 10 to 12 years that the system is unworkable, and I’ve personally discussed with Brian Howe on eight or nine occasions and told him that I think it’s crazy that he’s got a system as complicated as that.

JULIE DARRETT: And what’s his response been? Brian Howe, of course, is the Minister for Social Services.

JOHN TOMLINSON: Yes. The .. well, his response has been that he’s got to make sure that people don’t get things they’re not entitled to. And my argument is that while he’s doing that, half the people who are entitled are missing out. So, if you were selling cars and you were the sole supplier of cars to the Australian people and you only got cars to half the number of people who wanted to buy them, that would hardly be regarded as efficiency. When .. what Social Security is the major supplier of social security benefits and if they’re only getting to half the people who have an entitlement, they’re being very inefficient.

JULIE DARRETT: How would you simplify it?

JOHN TOMLINSON: Well, I’d simplify it by basically adopting Professor Ronald Henderson’s 1975 poverty inquiry suggestion, which was to introduce a guaranteed minimum income which would be the same for all people in Australia. Ronald Henderson actually made it a bit more complicated than I’d make it. He had two tiers and he based it on the family. I’d base it on the individual because many groups of people live together, and whether or not they’re a family is a moot point. Some people live together for a very short period of time. Some people, like my mother-in-law and father-in-law, have been living together unhappily for a long period of time. Now, whether or not they’re a family, I don’t know.

JULIE DARRETT: I’m sure they didn’t want you to say that on air. John, well, we should move right along there. So, you’d give everybody an income?

JOHN TOMLINSON: Everybody would be entitled to an income at the poverty line.

JULIE DARRETT: Regardless of whatever else income was coming in?

JOHN TOMLINSON: Regardless of that other income, and the other income would be taxed. The first dollar would be taxed and every other dollar would be taxed on that. And if you paid tax of 50 cents in the dollar on all earned income but you had an income guarantee of, say, $140 a week which is currently what’d be needed for a single person.

At the end of a $400 a week job, you’d be paying roughly the same tax as you are now, because you’d get from the Government $140 a week, and they’d take back $200 a week in tax from your $400 a week job; so, in fact, you’d lose $60 on your $400 a week.

JULIE DARRETT: It all presumes, of course, that people aren’t just going to say, `Oh, right, well’. Throw my hands up and say, `Well, I’ll just live on the minimum allowance. I’ll just take that, thank you very much’.

JOHN TOMLINSON: Well, there’s been some experiments done on that and quite widespread experiments right through the United States and Canada. We have had some experiments done by the Brotherhood of St Lawrence in Melbourne in the period of the early eighties where they ran what they called an `arc program’ and they actually did provide a guaranteed income for families that used to come and see them for assistance, and that worked there.

There’s no evidence to suggest anywhere in the world that people don’t want to work. There are certainly some groups of people who wouldn’t work in an iron lung. Now, you don’t get any production out of them anyway, and industry would be far more efficient if they were paid to stay away than being there and just creating a nuisance. It slows down production lines. It slows down all sort of productivity.

JULIE DARRETT: So what you’re saying: if people are people, good and bad ….

JOHN TOMLINSON: Well, that’s right. Once you sort out the income issues, then the other issues such as education, housing, health, are very easy to sort out because there are no complications. At the moment someone goes into a hospital, we’ve got to work out whether or not they’re on private funds, whether or not they’re on Medicare, and whether or not they’ve got an income from this source or that source, whether it’s State income, whether it’s part State income, part private income. It just gets so complicated. Whereas, if you had a system which was totally integrated with the Taxation Department and Social Security – I’d in fact abolish Social Security and have the Taxation Department run all income, both in their taxing side of it and their giving side of it; that was the way it was done in Australia up till 1927, and it’s the simplest way to go ahead because you’d then only got one checking agency. At the moment you’ve got 10 agencies checking on people with tax being just one of those people that invade your privacy.

JULIE DARRETT: John it’s a .. well, that’s a map for social change if every I saw one. Is anyone going to take you seriously?

JOHN TOMLINSON: Well, the last report that came out of Brian Howe’s department at least recognised that that’s a suggestion which has to be considered; that was in response to the issue of their unemployment paper, but certainly the Labor Government in the 1970s, the Whitlam Government, took that seriously. Bill Hayden announced in the 15 March 1973 that they were going to introduce a guaranteed income. Don Grimes, the next Labor Minister in Social Security under the Hawke Government, said that they were going to look very seriously at a guaranteed minimum income. Brian Howe, himself, on the day he took up his office, when he replaced Don Grimes, said he was going to introduce a guaranteed minimum income. Malcolm Fraser considered a partial guaranteed income during his period of office.

JULIE DARRETT: Then why hasn’t it happened?

JOHN TOMLINSON: Well, it has happened in New Zealand and it hasn’t happened here because, basically, I think Australian people are scared that their neighbours would stay away from work. They know that they wouldn’t, but they think that the young people down the street might. And what’s happened in this country is that we’ve become divided between the old and the young, between householders and renters, and those divisions have created suspicion. What we need to do is understand that all of us are struggling either to pay off mortgages or to pay rent and to pay electricity bills. We’re all Australians, and as a right of citizenship we should be guaranteed an income. Very few people in Australia would actually support having people starve to death, irrespective of what they did, whether they worked or not, and we therefore pay Social Security. If we are going to pay Social Security, for a very small amount more, we could have a very simpler system which was (1) guaranteed everybody an income above the poverty line, and (2) would ensure that everybody paid their appropriate rate of tax.

JULIE DARRETT: Why would that cost more? I would have thought that if you get rid of those 4,000 pages of regulations, you won’t have to have 9,000 clerks running around trying to make it all work?

JOHN TOMLINSON: The extra costs would come in ensuring that women at home who look after children and who don’t go to work and who are currently excluded from payment of social security or men at home who are looking after children, that aren’t working, they would then be paid as citizens. In Australia, we regard that as a very worthwhile and honourable activity ….

JULIE DARRETT: But we don’t pay anybody to do it.

JOHN TOMLINSON: We don’t pay anyone to do it and that’s really sad, because if parents believe they should stay home and look after their children, then those children are better off if those parents believe that, whereas other parents believe that their children are better off if they’re placed in child care. And the only research that I’ve ever seen that’s been quite devastatingly clear has been .. it relates very much on whether the parent believes that their form of child care is the best form of child care, whether they stay home or whether the child goes into care.

JULIE DARRETT: I’ve heard that about education as well. It doesn’t

JOHN TOMLINSON: That’s right. And .. but if we as a society are saying that motherhood and fatherhood is a good thing, then we should be prepared to pay for that because that next generation is going to pay for your and my pension. I mean, the money that we pay this year in tax doesn’t get saved up by Mr Keating, put in a box and said: `This is John Tomlinson’s

pension funds’; this goes to pay for pensions and benefits this year to people who are older or incapacitated or out of work this year. And so, what we need to do is make the next generation of children far more productive so that people of our age can look forward to a decent retirement.

JULIE DARRETT: And a simpler system would do all of that?

JOHN TOMLINSON: A simpler system would do that and it would do it much better because we’d have a system where people didn’t miss out. And what happens to people who miss out currently, is they usually go and rely on assistance from other people who are getting a pension or benefit or they rely on other family members who are working; so that we’re often forced into situations where we’re paying for people who should have an entitlement to a payment, but haven’t been able to work their way through the system.

All of us would know people who’ve been out of work for a while, who haven’t got onto the appropriate benefit or pension and who need help, and that most people are giving that help to their family or friends and that help should be coming directly from the State out of the tax. I mean, if we have a defence Force because we say we need to be defended from the enemy, then we don’t say we have a Defence Force that’s only going to defend the workers. It’s also going to defend the unemployed and the pensioners, and it’s even going to defend that very small group of people – about half a percent of people who wouldn’t work no matter what the situation was – but the Defence Force doesn’t say: `I’m not going to defend Australia for that group of people who won’t work’; so why should the social security system be any different?

JULIE DARRETT: John, I take your point. Thank you very much for coming in today. It’s a fascinating sweep around the social security system and a map for social change.

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An Australian History of Basic Income

First published on Basic Income Guarantee Australia website, 2004

The concept of Basic Income in Australia is at one level a recent arrival in this country at another level it can be seen to have evolved out of the Trade Union and welfare activists’ struggles to improve upon the conditions of the working class. The division between the worthy and unworthy, integral to the British Poor Law system, has been part of the welfare traditions here since the earliest times. The British Trade Union tradition influenced the struggle here for an arbitration system which might provide increased security for workers from want, exploitation, and insecurity.

The construction of the Australian income support system

Initially the various States Governments of Australia, often in association with church charity agencies, provided forms of welfare in time of need. The first Federal social security payments were the Age and Invalid Pensions introduced in 1909. During the 1930s Depression unemployed people were forced to rely on the “susso” a system whereby relief was given in return for their labour- a work for the dole system. Asian Australians were not paid social security until the 1940s. Child Endowment in 1942 was paid, even in respect of Aboriginal children, not living on missions or settlements. By the late 1960s Aboriginal people living in the cities were paid social security and this was extended to include rural and remote Aborigines by the mid 1970s. Unemployment benefit is still not paid on many Aboriginal communities, instead a form of ‘work for the dole’, the Community Development Employment Program (CDEP), was installed in its place.

Throughout most of the 20th Century the system of welfare income provision became more widespread, generous and comprehensive. But with the exception of the 1947 consolidation of social security legislation, there was little effort made to conceive of it as a unified system of income support. The first serious attempt to cut back on the comprehensive nature of income support began under the Hawke Labor Government and has proceeded apace under the Howard Coalition Government.

Australian income guarantees

Overseas writers have significantly influenced the development of the Basic Income debate in Australia. In particular the British Liberal economist Lady Rhys-Williams 1943 book called Something to look forward to. Lady Rhys-Williams’ aim was “To provide a floor below which no one could fall without imposing a ceiling beyond which no one could rise.” The economic fundamentalist writer Milton Friedman claims that year also as the time during which he developed his ideas on his form of income guarantee (the Negative Income Tax) but it took him a further 18 years before he published his ideas.Though there was some minor acknowledgement of Dennis Milner’s (1920) important book on Basic Income his ideas have not until recent times received the attention of Australian researchers and then mainly due to Walter Van Trier’s (1995) research.

In 1975 Professor Ronald Henderson in the Main Report of the Poverty Inquiry, borrowing heavily on Lady Rhys-Williams’ ideas, advocated a Guaranteed Minimum Income for Australia. There had been some earlier articles written about the need for income guarantees in Australia which can be found on this site. Bill Hayden the Minister for Social Security and subsequently a Treasurer in the Whitlam Labor Government essentially endorsed the idea put forward by Professor Henderson. Also in 1975, a group of Australian Finance and Treasury officials using the collective name, Priorities Review Staff, put up a counter proposal to Henderson. It was to the right wing economic fundamentalist Milton Friedman’s Negative Income Tax model they turned. The dismissal of that Government effectively ended Federal Government support for generalised income guarantees.

Throughout the period 1975 to the present some social welfare activists and academics continued to advocate general income guarantees. Initially promoting a Guaranteed Minimum Income and subsequently a Basic Income [Watts (1984, 1995), Tomlinson (1989, 2001), McDonald (1995) VCOSS and Good Shepherd (1995)]. There have also been economists promoting Tax Credit and Negative Tax schemes such as ‘The Five Economists letter to the Prime Minister, 28th October 1998’ Dawkins (1999).

The major overseas academic influences impinging upon the history of income guarantees in recent years have been scholars associated with the Basic Income European Network BIEN, the Universal Basic Income New Zealand web sites: notably Van Parijs, Standing, Gortz and Goodin. The last of these authors is currently researching in Australia. There has also been some input from Learner, Clark and Needham (1999).

Now

In recent years there has been renewed interest in Basic Income. The idea has yet to blossom but the tree is alive and the buds have formed. The renewed interest may be substantially due to the intractability of widespread unemployment, the increasing casualised and precarious nature of work, the adoption of economic fundamentalist economic policy and the imposition of mutual obligation upon social security recipients. The last Labor and the present Liberal Governments have substantially reduced certainty in the social security system. Those in the Basic Income campaign want to see the introduction of a universal income guarantee and expanded social wage provisions. The Australian Government’s prescription for what it terms “welfare reform” is enforced obligation, highly targeted benefits and tighter surveillance of recipients. The major point of difference is the degree to which each side wishes their income guarantee to ape the welfare income support system with its various categories of payment and means test or instead argue that income support should be in the form of a truly universal payment to all as a right of citizenship/permanent residence.

Bibliography

Basic Income European Network BIEN web site:
http://www.etes.ucl.ac.be/BIEN/bien.html
Dawkins, P. (1999) ‘A Plan to Cut Unemployment in Australia: An elaboration on the ‘Five Economists’ Letter to the Prime Minister, 28th October 1998’, Mercer-Melbourne Quarterly Bulletin of Economic Trends, 1, 48-57.
Henderson, R. (1975) Poverty in Australia Vols. I and II. Australian Government, Canberra.
Lerner, S., Clark, C. & Needham, W. (1999) Basic Income: Economic Security for All Canadians. Between the Lines, Toronto.
Milner, D. (1920) Higher Production by a Bonus on National Output: A proposal for a minimum income for all varying with national productivity. George Allen & Unwin. London.
Priorities Review Staff (1975) Possibilities for Social Welfare in Australia. Australian
Government, Canberra.
Rhys-Williams, J. (1943) Something to look forward to. MacDonald, London.
Tomlinson, J (2001) Income Insecurity: The Basic Income Alternative.
http://www.basic income@qut.edu.au
Tomlinson, J (1989) “Income Maintenance in Australia the Income Guarantee Alternative.” PhD thesis, Murdoch University, Western Australia.
Universal Basic Income New Zealand website:
http://www.geocities.com/ubinz/
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Income Revisited. VCOSS & Good Shepherd, Melbourne.
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Australia: Basic Income and Decency

Tomlinson, John (2007) New Community Quarterly, 5 (1), Autumn 2007, pp.33-41

Originally given as a paper at the 11th BIEN Congress, University of Cape Town, in Cape Town, South Africa 2nd-4th November 2006.

also published by the Youth Affairs Network of Queensland in their New Transitions Journal Vol. 11, No. 1 2007.

Abstract

There are many reasons to introduce a universal Basic Income in Australia. In this paper, I shall list some of them and then expand upon their applicability in the context of current ideological and socioeconomic debates.

The amalgam of social-conservative and economic-liberal ideologies, which has been the hallmark of the Howard Coalition Government for the last decade, has resulted in increased targeting of the categorical and selective social security system. Each year, many thousands of social security recipients have had their payments suspended for up to 26 weeks because they failed to comply with recently imposed obligations. Some, for instance, have been “breached” for failing to attend an appointment at Centrelink (the Federal Government’s social security agency) or a private job search agency.

Were a universal Basic Income introduced in Australia then unemployed people, those with disabilities and others who have limited access to income would have greater financial security. The nation would have the opportunity to develop into a more egalitarian and less censorious society.

Introduction

Some have attempted to argue the case for the introduction of a Basic Income because of the ease with which it could be allocated to citizens (Milner 1920). Others recognise its capacity to invigorate the economy. Amongst these writers, some believe the economy would expand following the introduction of a Basic Income because it would free up entrepreneurial imagining, provide opportunities for workers to engage in new occupations and remove many obstacles to further production. Others argue that the economy would contract if a Basic Income was introduced because many people would choose to live more sustainably and would work fewer hours. Some writers suggest that the presence of a Basic Income would lead to more people joining the labour force because of the greater flexibility in the work place and because a Basic Income removes welfare benefit poverty traps (van Parijs 1992[a]). While others contend that many employees would leave work because they would no longer experience the economic necessity which forces them to seek employment. These writers propose that if a Basic Income were introduced it should have a work participation component attached to it (Atkinson 2002).

The objection that “people would not work with a BI” seems to have a special quality: once launched, it is taken as self-evident… we have overtime work performed by people who already have a salary, and there are people who start working again immediately after early retirement (in all cases, with retirement benefits that are significantly superior to those appearing in the different BI proposals). Nonetheless, the assumption still persists that, with a BI, “nobody would work”. A strange way of understanding the matter. Is it not closer to prejudice than reasoning (Raventós 2005 pp.1-2)?

Standing (2002) has based his support for Basic Income on the grounds that it erodes paternalism and Van Parijs (1997) suggests it could provide Real Freedom for All. The elimination of poverty, in countries which introduce a universal Basic Income, is frequently given as the reason for supporting this idea. Frankman (2002) argues that the introduction of a Basic Income in every country in the world would abolish poverty and malnutrition from the planet. Some writers have proposed a Basic Income because it would promote social justice. Others argue it promotes equity and would usher in a more egalitarian society. Nattrass (2004) suggests a Basic Income in South Africa would help in the fight against AIDS and poverty. Other writers have suggested that a Basic Income could ensure a fairer distribution of income support, weaken administrative discretion and enhance poor people’s sense of security. Some have argued for a Basic Income because it would promote industrial democracy.

Thomas Paine’s Agrarian Justice published in 1797 argued that the right to a Basic Income stems from our right to use the commons (Reprinted in Cunliffe and Erreygers 2004, pp. 3-16). In everyday parlance, this is the right to share the common wealth of the nation or the planet. In Real Freedom for All van Parijs (1997) makes the case that the common wealth which should be shared includes inventions because no invention is created in a vacuum. That is, an invention is a small departure from all the other inventions of humankind which have preceded it (see also Heinlein 2004 [written in 1938-39]).

I argue that the most compelling reason to introduce a Basic Income is that it is the decent thing to do. Some might consider such a position smacks of noblesse oblige, stemming from an inherently conservative idea of good form but it arises from a commitment to socialist humanism. It is tempting to replace “decent” with “correct”, but this has the potential to suggest that of all the possible grounds for supporting a Basic Income, there is one right way to proceed. Such an approach is far from my reasoning about what is the decent thing to do.

There are indeed excellent reasons for introducing a Basic Income: many are compatible and so provide cumulative grounds for arguing the case. For example, the idea that a Basic Income is socially just does not interfere with the fact that it enhances equity and promotes a more egalitarian society. The increased income security which a Basic Income would give to low income earners and those without access to other funds, is part of living in a more egalitarian society. We know that the more egalitarian a society the less differentiated are the health outcomes among classes of people (Wilkinson 1996, Eckersley, Dixon and Douglas 2001). There is nothing incompatible about working in an industrial system where there is widespread industrial democracy and living in a socially just country.

Some reasons we might want to introduce a Basic Income in Australia

A universal Basic Income has many advantages when compared with the existing Australian residual, means-tested, categorical system of income support. The main gains which would flow from changing to a universal income support system can be grouped into five major themes. A Basic Income would:

  1. be economically sustainable,
  2. be easy to administer,
  3. be ethically sound,
  4. be non-discriminatory, and
  5. enhance citizenship.

Economic sustainability

(a) The level of payment of a Basic Income determines the extent to which it alleviates poverty: if set high enough, it has the capacity to abolish poverty in a country. Frankman (2002, 2004), van Paris (2002), Kunnemann (2005) and others have put forward proposals to abolish absolute poverty throughout the world.

(b) A Basic Income is affordable. Australia is an affluent country which could easily afford to introduce a Basic Income paid to every permanent resident at a rate slightly above the Age Pension for single pensioners. An amount of five hundred dollars per annum above the Age Pension rate would be needed to cash out the tax deductibility concession currently provided to Age Pensioners who have additional income, if they are not to lose in the transition to a Basic Income. A Basic Income at this level would ensure that no current social security pensioner or beneficiary would be disadvantaged by the shift to a Basic Income whilst most social security recipients and low income earners would be financially better off.

Critics of such a proposal might claim that the affordability of such a Basic Income scheme is not established simply by asserting it is feasible – and they would be correct. But there have been economic analyses of the financial feasibility of Basic Income and like programs in Australia. In 1975 The Henderson Poverty Inquiry costed the introduction of a Guaranteed Minimum Income. Saunders (1995) argued that a conditional Basic Income, with participation requirements, was affordable. Humphreys (2005) has argued an Negative Income Tax of $9,000 per annum is affordable in Australia. Economic historian, Keith Rankin (1998), has demonstrated that a Basic Income is affordable in New Zealand (our closest developed neighbour) and the Irish Government has come to similar conclusions in their country (Healy and Reynolds 2002). Casassas, Raventós and Wark (2005) have suggested a Basic Income is viable in East Timor. Miller (2006) has set out a three tiered system of income support which differentiates between children, working aged people and those of pension age in Britain and claims it is economically affordable.

Perhaps the clearest and most succinct refutation of the suggestion that Basic Income is unaffordable was put forward by Jose Iglesias Fernandez (2002). He argued for a Basic Income for Catalonia at a rate of half of the per capita income of this region of Spain. He says that since the wealth needed already exits, the question is not affordability but willingness to redistribute that income. The proposal suggested here for Australia is a Basic Income of approximately 25% of average weekly earnings which would involve considerably less redistribution than that suggested for Catalonia.

(c) A Basic Income would lessen many labour market obstacles to revitalising our economy by removing labour market inflexibilities. The increasingly narrowly targeted system of social welfare benefits in Australia, particularly when coupled with the vicious breaching and “mutual obligations” regime of the Howard Government means that workers cannot be sure they will have a social welfare safety net to fall back on if they lose their job. This causes workers to oppose changes in the workplace which they perceive as potentially undermining their employment security. This, in turn, makes it harder for employers to develop cooperative restructuring of workplaces. A Basic Income would guarantee workers an on-going capacity to live in frugal comfort even if they lost their jobs and would lessen resistance to workplace change.

At the same time as it encourages people to work, a Basic Income does not compel them to work under unbearable conditions because income support cannot be removed by a government in times of an industrial dispute, as is currently the case in Australia (Nolan 1997). A Basic Income is a “kind of unconditional and inexhaustible strike fund (Wright 2005 p. 201)”. Dennis Milner argues, on the contrary, that a Basic Income:

would remove much suspicion about the sharing of national prosperity and would make strikes unpopular, since the share coming into every home would be directly reduced by the absence of contributions from those on strike, locked out or unemployed as a result of either contingency (1920 p. 121).

All this needs to be balanced by the realisation that even when people in the European Union have won prizes which guarantee a salary for life (much more generous than any Basic Income proposal), few leave work and, of those who do, most take on other jobs more in keeping with their preferences or abilities (Marx and Peeters 2004).

(d) A Basic Income provides a known economic base on which government’s other social, health, tax and educational policies can be constructed. In 1983, the Australian Parliament’s Joint Committee of Public Accounts identified 10 Departments with a responsibility for 127 income maintenance programs the level of complexity of which was bewildering (Vol. 1 p. 1). Since then, efforts have been made to rationalise some of these payments but further complexity has arisen from increasing use of age as a determinant of level of payment. Some income support is provided through the tax system and there is a confusing array of mechanisms which combine tax and social welfare clawback. This often results in very high effective marginal tax rates making it nearly impossible for non-experts to calculate how much a person is likely to end up with, in their hand, even when the benefit they are receiving is known. In addition, two individuals in almost identical circumstance might be eligible for any one of up to three payments, leading to further confusion.

The end result is that no government can predict the income level of any group of social security recipients. This makes it hard for governments to work out what supplementary income support programs or ancillary services might be needed to ensure adequate levels of support are provided. In 1983, the Joint Committee of Public Accounts found that as far as The department of social security was concerned “In relation to pensions and benefits, the prime policy objective is:

to provide a basic level of income support below which no one can involuntarily fall (Vol.2 p.5).”

This statement evokes memories of Rhys-Williams comments in 1965 about a guaranteed minimum income floor. The present Government has retreated some considerable distance from the 1983 position.

Were a Basic Income in place, governments could be certain that no individual permanent resident’s income was below the Basic Income. This would facilitate planning in community services, health, tax and education.

(e) A Basic Income is ecologically sound. Under the existing Australian system of privatised superannuation people are expected to provide for their own future in retirement. Currently, those who are unable to provide for themselves can apply for an income and asset-tested Age Pension. If people’s economic wellbeing in retirement is substantially dependent upon the amount they can accumulate, during their working life, then they are likely to be driven to exploit the environment and existing industrial infrastructure in order to maximise their economic return.

If, on the other hand, people lived in a society which recognised the importance of communal provision then quite different economic practices would prevail.

Future economic prosperity is totally dependent upon having an environment – both natural and industrial – which has the capacity to continue to produce sufficient wealth to maintain standards of living for all…If retirement income is dependent upon those in employment paying their taxes which are then redistributed to the young and the retired, this results in the basic structure being in place to encourage all permanent residents to develop environmentally sustainable exploitation and to ensure that investment is made in industrial, educational and technological infrastructure. (Tomlinson and Lincoln 1995 p. 61).

(f) A Basic Income removes the mystification that the existing Australian social security system is redistributive and, at the same time, underlines the need for the tax system to take on a clear redistributive function. Many Australian writers have pointed to the vast differences in income and wealth among different classes of citizens (Eckersley, Dixon and Douglas 2001). The disparities in income and wealth are increasing (Briggs and Buchanan 2000, LHMU (2003). There is a huge variation in average wealth of people living in different post code areas. Generally, the further one lives from a capital city the poorer one is likely to be.

Indigenous Australians are frequently excluded from mainstream employment, they experience racism and poverty, and have poor access to health, housing and community services: as a result they die on average between 15 and 20 years younger than other Australians (ABS and AIHW 2003 Ch. 9, Jonas 2003 Appendix 1, Tomlinson 2005).

Social security payments are set at levels ranging from slightly above the Henderson Poverty Line (Age Pensioners) to as little as 40% of that Line (young unemployed people). Social security has the capacity to maintain people in poverty but not remove people from being in poverty. Combined welfare and tax clawback mechanisms ensure that when poorer citizens attempt to escape poverty they encounter many obstacles.

The tax system has been extremely well crafted to provide the rich with tax loopholes, deductions and avoidance arrangements which are not available to the poor. This has always been the case in Australia. The payment of income tax is optional for many of the most affluent citizens (Smith 1993, Caro 2005).

The existing social security system does not redistribute sufficient income to let people escape poverty: the present tax system doesn’t try. Increasingly deregulated workplace relations, coupled with the proliferation of casual part-time and precarious jobs, offer little hope of affluence for low skilled employees.

One benefit of a Basic Income would be that unlike the present system where hardly anyone knows how little social security recipient receive, everyone would know the rate of Basic Income. This then has the capacity to encourage rational debate and might lead to pressure to raise the level of the Basic Income.

(g) A Basic Income increases the bargaining power of the poorest permanent residents. It increases workers’ power vis-à-vis capital (Wright 2005). The present Australian Government has enforced an imposing array of “mutual obligations” upon social security recipients, particularly those who are unemployed. A 2003 report entitled Much Obliged, commissioned by the Brotherhood of St Laurence and St Vincent de Paul Society, asserts that people who become long-term unemployed have so much of their time taken up just meeting the obligations imposed on them by the Government that they don’t have time to find work: the report concludes the “mutual obligation” regime “is failing the most disadvantaged job seekers. Overall the system operates…not as ‘welfare to work’ but ‘welfare as work’” (Ziguras, Dufty and Considine 2003, p.43).

There is very little mutuality in the present Australian system of “mutual obligations”. The Government provides an income which, for most, is less than the poverty line but demands in return that recipients meet a series of enforced “obligations” The Federal Government in recent years imposed its “work for the dole” policy, demanding young unemployed people who have literacy or numeracy difficulties attend classes on threat of having their benefits reduced, and increasing threefold the number of suspensions of payments inflicted on Social Security recipients in the three years to 2002. Centrelink imposed 386,946 breaches during the 2000–2001 financial year (ACOSS 2001, 2002, p. 2). Considerable numbers of those who have had their payments suspended have experienced homelessness and other life crises (Ziguras, Dufty and Considine 2003, Schooneveldt 2004).

Because a universal Basic Income is not dependent upon the recipient doing anything in return for the payment, apart from establishing that they are a permanent resident, they cannot be compelled to do anything. The introduction of a Basic Income would substantially increase poor peoples’ sense of security and feeling of having control over their lives. It would be likely to make many feel they were again stakeholders in society. At present, many poor people in Australia feel more like steak holders at a barbecue who get to put the steak on, cook it and watch while the rich take it off and eat it.

Ease of administration

(a) As a concept, a universal Basic Income provided to each permanent resident of a country at the same rate irrespective of work readiness or any other social feature, is straightforward and easy to understand. Unfortunately, many of the proposals put forward in specific countries have been quite complex. The complexity arises, for the most part, because of the need for a transition from social insurance or a system of categorical welfare (or both) to a Basic Income. Other complexities are introduced by the desire, on the part of Basic Income advocates, to ensure that non-affluent people don’t lose as a result of the change-over.

(b) A Basic Income is easy to administer and provides an efficient way to ensure that people in need are provided with an income sufficient for them to live in frugal comfort. It is easy to administer because identical payments are made to all permanent residents without having to determine age, gender, marital status, work readiness or any other social status. The only administrative determination to be made is whether the person is a permanent resident.

Ethically sound

(a) A Basic Income is ethically sound in the sense of being just / fair, yet it treats everyone equally. Proponents of Basic Incomes (van Parijs 1997, Standing 2002, 2004, Gorz 1997 Lerner, Clark and Needham 1999, Murray 1997) have expended considerable effort setting out their ethical justification of Basic Income and criticising the ethical failings of targeted and means-tested systems of income support, particularly those which impose obligations upon recipients (Kinnear 2000, Goodin 2001, Schooneveldt 2004, Tomlinson 2003[a] Chapter 8, Boston and St John 1998). Irrespective of their personal ideological position, these writers suggest the superior ethical claim of a Basic Income is that it is more just, fair and equitable than welfare distribution systems (similar to that of Australia). Boston and St John (1998) have acknowledged that, because both rich and poor receive identical payments, a Basic Income doesn’t direct the most income to those most in need, the outcome is potentially inequitable. The argument being that to treat unequals equally is as unjust as treating equals unequally.

Boston and St John (1998) writing about New Zealand – but with huge relevance to Australia – point to the increasing complexity of targeted benefit systems in recent years and go on to point out that “despite constant political rhetoric to the contrary, greater targeting has not protected the relative position of the poor or delivered a fairer society (p. 23)”. Advocates of Basic Income assert this is not a design flaw in the system of Basic Income; rather it is the inherent unfairness of the capitalist relations which leads to the problem. This means that the system of class relationships in societies, like Australia, needs to be addressed in addition to providing a Basic Income if a truly egalitarian society is desired.

(b) A Basic Income evaporates moral hazards by simultaneously removing the perverse financial rewards and poverty traps present in the existing welfare system. The existing welfare system has been subjected to frenzied attacks by workfare supporters like David Green (1996) and Lawrence Mead (1997, 1986) both of whom suggest such systems encourage “welfare dependency”. Their position has, in turn, been criticised by participation income supporters like Atkinson (2002), Job Guarantee supporters (Mitchell and Watts 2003, 2005) and by Basic Income advocates (Goodin, Headey, Muffels and Dirven 1999, Rob Watts 1995, Tomlinson 2003[b]).

Poverty traps and high marginal clawbacks, due to combined tax and welfare withdrawal mechanisms, have been criticised by a range of commentators from Australian Federal agencies (Economic Planning Advisory Council 1988), conservative government ministers (Abbott 2003) to welfare academics (Boston and St John 1998).

Universal Basic Incomes pay all permanent residents, as individuals, whether they work or not thereby simultaneously avoiding poverty traps and perverse financial incentives.

(c) A Basic Income is non-judgmental, is less subject to bureaucratic discretion and it abolishes any worthiness criteria because it is paid universally to all permanent residents of a country. When I studied social work in the 1960s, one of the points of difference (my lecturers made) between social work and charity work was that social workers did not judge the worthiness of their clients (Biestek 1974). I later criticised the wholesale embracing of non-judgmentalism by counsellors in a paper entitled “Father Biestek and the 7 Little Mystics” (1982 pp. 86-97). Arguing that counsellors should use their judgement when assisting clients is a far cry from suggesting that people applying for income security should be divided into worthy and unworthy or deserving and undeserving categories. Under a Basic Income, bureaucratic discretion is restricted to determining who is a permanent resident and who is not.

Embedded in all non-universal income support systems are judgements about the needs and the social worth of potential recipients. When the first Australian Commonwealth pensions were introduced in 1910, applicants were required to establish they were of “good moral character” before they would be paid. Such provisions remained in place until 1973. The 1601 and 1834 Poor Laws made a distinction between deserving and undeserving applicants. Joel Handler (2002) has traced this distinction back to the Statute of Labourers in 1348 with its intention to avoid assisting “sturdy beggars”. Such distinctions have probably been around since the concept of charity emerged.

Non-discriminatory

A Basic Income does not discriminate on the basis of age, sexual preference, marital status, willingness to work or any other social feature. All permanent residents of a country are entitled, as individuals, to receive the Basic Income.

(a) A Basic Income is inclusive of people with disabilities. Whilst there may be some medical conditions where discrete divisions exist between those who can work and those who have an impairment which prevents them from working, most people applying for a Disability Support Pension do so because they experience a multitude of factors, which leads them to consider themselves “disabled”. Most medical, psychiatric and social impairments are manifested on a continuum from mildly inconvenient to clearly “disabling”. It is the way that the various health, social and psychological components interact which determine whether the assessors consider the individual has met the thresholds of “disability” sufficient to justify payment of the Disability Support Pension.

When Australia had an Invalid Pension (1910- 1991) the person applying had to establish to a Commonwealth Medical Officer that they were 85 % incapacitated. They could be incapacitated by medical or psychiatric conditions but social disabilities, like poor education or behavioural difficulties, were not supposed to be taken into account. The Disability Support Pension that replaced the Invalid Pension purports to be based on far more rigorous and technologically advanced criteria. These claims are little more that pseudo-technical quackery but do allow a wider range of social functioning to be taken into account.

The application of a template, which purports to measure accurately the degree of impairment, reduces professional decision making about levels of impairment to some quasi-technical function. Even if the schedule, which determines levels of impairment is applied and assessed accurately, this only succeeds in raising further questions about what exactly is being measured. We know that people assessed as experiencing equivalent levels of impairment often have very different work histories (Perry 1995 p. 29).

Smith (2001) asserts that we are led into this trap because of the preoccupation of governments with the “problem of dependency and the myth of independent living” particularly as it is applied to people with disabilities. He suggests that the “problem of dependency” is often “socially constructed as individually asymmetrical. That is, the disabled person becomes defined as dependent upon others in such a way that denies the possibility of understanding the relationship in more ‘enabling’ forms (Smith 2001 p. 597)”. What we are doing is using the measurement of impairment as an indirect measure for the assessment of financial need. Goodin (1992) concedes that in a perfect world a welfare system might be able to identify and pay all the poor and only the poor. But the State often employs surrogate measures and bases its presumptions about “need” on sociological “facts” which are “uncertain, highly variable and, in any case constantly changing (p. 210)”. Because of this, Goodin (1992) asserts that an efficient income support system is dependent upon avoiding such presumptions about human behaviour through the provision of an unconditional universal payment.

Nattrass (2004) points out that in South Africa people with HIV – AIDS who receive appropriate treatment sometimes find they are subsequently assessed as not being sick enough to continue to receive a disability payment and are cut off benefits. This leads some to withdraw from treatment as they have no other way to support their family. Nattrass’ insight into perverse rewards applies in other situations and other countries. In Australia, we are “scientifically” measuring features which have little to do with what we should be assessing if we are trying to determine an individual’s need for financial support. This, in turn, raises the question as to whether income support should be provided because of the existence of an impairment or as a right of citizenship, as Basic Income advocates urge.

(b) A Basic Income is non-racist. The Commonwealth of Australia maintained explicitly racist social security provisions against Asians at least until the 1940s, Indigenous people living in the cities until the 1960s and Aboriginal people living in remote Australia until the early 1970s (Tomlinson 2003 [b]). The legislation and the regulations are no longer explicitly racist but the way they impact upon asylum seekers and Indigenous people often is. A Basic Income is colour blind.

(c) A Basic Income provides an opportunity to ensure that Indigenous Australians have a greater control over their lives and communities. Aboriginal people living in the 1,000 rural and remote communities across Australia frequently find that the only employment available to them is the Community Development Employment Program (CDEP). Recently there have been increased obligations imposed on Indigenous Australians engaged in CDEP schemes in rural and remote areas (Karvelas 2005). The Government announced its intention to force young Indigenous CDEP workers from remote communities to leave their communities to get western training in cities (Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [DEWR] 2005, p. 11).

In 2005 in the North of Western Australia, the Halls Creek Centrelink office began a scheme to stop social security payments to families whose children weren’t attending school (Strutt 2005). The Centrelink staff announced that Indigenous families could have their social security withheld if they didn’t comply with government dictates (contra Debelle 2005, Gordon 2005, Tomlinson 2005). Then, early in 2006, the Federal Government announced it had signed 120 “Shared Responsibility Agreements” with Aboriginal communities. These agreements oblige the community to do something the Government wants done in return for being provided with services most Australians take for granted (Background Briefing 2006).

If a Basic Income was in place, Indigenous people would be far better equipped to control their own lives and their communities. Governments would have less opportunity to impose white inspired obligations on them (Tomlinson 2005, 2003 [b] Chapter 6).

At 10 communities across the country, a federal or state department took responsibility for co-ordinating government programs and consulting with elders to ensure government help was well-targeted, timely and effective. But new data reveals that vast sums are being spent on overseeing the trial in some cases up to 10 times more than the money they are administering. In the most extreme case, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs spent $327,784 to administer funding of just $34,318. This year it plans to spend $250,000 on administration even though no program funds have been allocated (Schubert 2006).

(d) A Basic Income does not discriminate against people on the basis of locality, gender or age (assuming there is no child payment category or distinction made between working age and older aged residents as in the Miller 2006 and Henderson 1975 proposals). Beneficiaries and pensioners living in some remote parts can claim a small Remote Area Allowance designed to assist them with the extra cost associated with living in such areas. A Basic Income would, in the interests of simplicity, not make such a distinction.

The Australian social security system has since 1908 contained gender specific conditions, these are being phased out. A Basic Income would be gender blind.

Also since 1908, parts of the Australian social security system have discriminated on the basis of age. Age discrimination has become a more frequent feature of this system in the last decade. Ideally a Basic Income would not discriminate on the basis of age but, as a part of the transition to a full universal Basic Income, it may be necessary to pay children (living with their parents) who are under the age of 16 years a lower amount than adults. This may be necessary in the short term because of prevailing attitudes about children and parental responsibilities.

(e) Because it is paid to individuals irrespective of their marital, employment or other social status, a Basic Income will help minimise intra-family inequality. It has been recognised in Australian policy circles, at least since the 1975 Asprey Report, that inequities can occur when one member of a household monopolises control of income. To many feminists such policy insights were no surprise. A Basic Income, because it is provided to each individual, helps alleviate many of the intra-household income distributional issues in relation to basic needs.

Citizenship

(a) A Basic Income is an entitlement paid to all permanent residents of a country. It is not a charity and no stigma will attach to it. A Basic Income paid as a right to each permanent resident becomes an entitlement of citizenship. It is not a charity or a handout and so provides the conditions to finally end the poor law mentality of less eligibility which has underpinned the welfare system since the British invaded Australia in 1788 (Tomlinson, Dee and Schooneveldt 2005).

(b) A Basic Income provides an enabling as opposed to a compelling system of income support (thus enhancing citizenship). Workforce partisans (Mead 1997, 1986, Green 1996), participation income advocates (Atkinson 2002, White 2003) , job guarantee proponents (Mitchell and Watts 2005), and other stalwarts of ‘active society’ propositions (Cass 1995, 1988, Pixley 1993) argue that welfare recipients should engage in some approved activity in return for receiving assistance. The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard adopts somewhat similar ideas in his 1999 Roundtable paper and his 2000 “Quest for a decent society” article in which he laid out his ideal social coalition – between government, businesses, churches, families and individuals. He saw the cement for such a coalition being what he terms “mutual obligation” – whereby those who receive something from the Government are expected to “give something back”. Writing in 1938-39, though not published until 2004, Robert Heinlein attacked such expectations (Chapter 10).

Basic Income advocates, for the most part, don’t want to attach any requirements to receipt of the Basic Income. Some, like Standing (2002) and Goodin (2001), take this position to combat society’s propensity to act paternalistically towards those provided with income assistance. Van Parijs (1997) rejects attaching conditions to Basic Income because to do so erodes “real freedom”. Still others (Milner 1920, Widerquist 2004, Raventós 2005, Tomlinson 2003[b], Segal 2005 p.344) reject conditions being attached on the pragmatic grounds that, if a Basic Income were in place, the overwhelming majority of people would continue to work and / or make other contributions to society without compulsion.

Robert Goodin (1992) wants to avoid compulsion because he sees Basic Income as an exercise in “minimally presumptuous social policy”. Jose Luis Rey Perez denies that reciprocity demands any particular “contribution” by recipients, arguing that “the State must offer an infrastructure that promotes participation, but does not require it (2005, p. 233)”. He, like many Basic Income advocates, suggests that a Basic Income enhances citizenship by promoting social insertion / inclusion. Segall asserts:

Reciprocal relations…based on equity would be quite different from reciprocity …based on the equality principle, and more so from one based on the need principle…It is therefore wrong to hold that strict proportionality, for example is the only true interpretation of the principle of reciprocity (2005 p. 337)”.

(c) A Basic Income removes more affluent people’s opportunity to engage in downward envy. The Howard Government effectively marshalled the affluent and many workers with the suggestion that “their hard earned income” was going in taxes which were “paying the lazy unemployed to sit on the beach”. The suggestion was that these “Dole bludgers” were “shirking their responsibilities to work or in other ways give something back”. The downward envy thus generated was used to justify / mystify the imposition of “work for the dole” and other compelled obligations (Tomlinson 1999). As everyone would get the Basic Income there will be less opportunity to divide workers from their out-of-work comrades.

(d) Because a Basic Income pays every permanent resident an equal benefit, it should lead to wide community support for such programs. Robert Goodin and Julian Le Grand in 1987 argued that universal income support programs are more likely to engender widespread community support than targeted programs. Such a conclusion is confirmed by the work of Boston and St John (1998) in New Zealand. Many Australian observers have pointed to the increasing divisiveness in society and lack of support for welfare services occurring in the absence of universal programs in Australia. Despite a decade of attempts by the present Australian Government, the Medicare health insurance system, though weakened, has continued to be supported by the majority of citizens because its health safety net is available to all permanent residents.

(e) Because a Basic Income is universal, it is comprehensive and increases feelings of social solidarity. Many participation income advocates argue that requiring people to engage in some approved activity in return for the receipt of an income encourages social inclusion / insertion. Even though they oppose participation requirements, Basic Income supporters (Rey Perez 2005, Standing 2002, 2004, Hutton 2002) contend that enhanced social inclusion will be one of the outcomes of having a Basic Income in place. I argue that the effect of a universal Basic Income is more positive than that. A Basic Income converts the meaningless phrases of “increasing community capacity” or “increasing social capital”, “ensuring social insertion / inclusion” into a substantial process by encouraging sharing whilst allowing an equal taking from the society’s income pool. A Basic Income has the capacity to increase equality and because all permanent residents benefit to some extent, it also has the potential to increase the sense of solidarity.

(f) A Basic Income discourages the idea that the provision of secure income support causes “welfare dependency”. It encourages the idea that an income floor, below which no permanent resident will be allowed to fall (Milner 1920 p. 117), is simply a way to provide income security.

Governments which most ardently push a “mutual obligation” agenda are the very ones who are preoccupied with “welfare dependency”. Ray Cassin, chief leader writer of The Sunday Age, reflecting on these phenomena points out that:

You can be ‘on’ social security in the literal sense of receiving benefits, but this usage does not carry the pejorative flavour of being ‘on’ welfare. The reason is not mysterious: we do not talk about social security dependency, or social-services dependency because ‘social security’ and ‘social services’ are bound up with an older notion of entitlement, and an understanding of mutual obligation that goes beyond tit-for-tat reciprocity….

The ideal of mutual obligation underpinning a system of social security is not one of reciprocity, but of obligation borne by all of us to contribute to the support of people who would otherwise be destitute (2000 p. 22, see also Cass 1995 p. 38).

From 1918 until 1922 Dennis Milner, Mabel Milner and Bernard Pickard campaigned for the introduction of a Basic Income (Van Trier 1995 Part 1). As Walter Van Trier (1995) and Philippe van Parijs (1992[b] p. 25) remind us, ever since the pleas for Basic Income written by Bertram Pickard (1919) and Milner (1920) economic efficiency arguments have played a major role. The Milners and Pickard wanted to ensure the inadequacies of the British poor law system were overcome, to enhance national productivity and to provide a more equitable base from which workers might negotiate wages (Van Trier 1995 Part 1). Many of the issues dealt with here are synonymous with those which preoccupied the Milners and Pickard. Milner did not see the introduction of a Basic Income as the be-all and end-all; just one step on the way to a more secure life for all citizens.

Social programs have to be paid for

There are many ways a country might pay for its social programs. In Alaska, for instance, the Basic Income was initially financed from royalties on oil production and is now paid for mainly from interest on investments made from oil production (Goldsmith 2004). Australia does not have sufficient proven oil reserves to fund such a scheme and it is therefore likely that a Basic Income would be paid out of current tax revenues, as is the existing system of social security. That is, the funding for income support programs does not come from past income – taxes paid this year go to pay for social welfare payments this year.

There is no groundswell of public opinion likely to force Australian governments in the near future to set aside royalty payments from resource extraction to fund future income support payments. This increases the importance of educating the public about the need to pay taxes if their income support needs are to be safeguarded in the future. There has been a concerted campaign in Australia and the United States, since Regan, to lower taxes and install user pays (loser pays) regimes. This is part and parcel of the economic fundamentalist hegemony that has slowly enveloped much of the English- speaking West (Pusey 1991, Vintila, Phillimore and Newman 1992, Rees, Rodley and Stilwell 1993, Omerod 1994, Kelsey 1995, Hutton 2002, Standing 2002, Stilwell 2002).

In Australia, economic fundamentalism has led to more tightly targeted income support programs and even the abolition of some: such as, unemployment payments to young people below the age of eighteen years (Tomlinson 2003 [b]). Excessive imposition of so-called “mutual obligations” has led to widespread suspension or stopping of payments (AJSI 2002, Ziguras, Dufty and Considine 2003, Schooneveldt 2004). There have even been large-scale cutbacks in the provision of social insurance and other income support payments in many parts of Europe in recent years (Standing 2004). One end result of the increasing meanness in social welfare provision is increasing uncertainty and feelings of individual vulnerability. Another major thrust of fundamentalist economics is an increasingly deregulated labour market that has resulted in over half the Australian workforce being engaged in part-time, casual or precarious employment (Lucarelli, 2005, Schooneveldt 2004).

Together, these changes lead to Australian people feeling at greater risk than two decades ago. Governments and industry determinedly push self-provision over communal provision, reward “success” at any social cost and attack unions resulting in a dog-eat-dog world as we try to beat others in the race to the bottom. This is the exact opposite of what is needed if people are to make a fair contribution to tax revenue in order that they too might draw from the common wealth when they need it.

The push towards self-provision assists the better off

Privatised superannuation rewards people in inverse proportion to their needs – “to those that have shall be given”. Councils of Social Service have been warning since at least the early 1990s of the built-in inequities of privatised superannuation (ACTCOSS 1991). Low paid seasonal workers and those who spend most of their most productive years raising children find their contributions to superannuation whittled away by fees and charges. Then there are others who join funds only to find that corrupt operatives have syphoned off their contributions.

But the biggest failure of privatised superannuation is that many of the most impoverished Australians will never receive any benefit from such schemes. Many who are unable to enter the workforce on account of severe disabilities, Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders who work on the Community Development Employment Program (CDEP) and those relegated to low paid intermittent employment never get as far as making payments into such schemes, let alone drawing money from them (Tomlinson 2003 [b]). Yet governments waste billions of dollars allowing superannuation tax rorts each year. Such processes undermine the sense of solidarity amongst the population.

Conclusion

A Basic Income provides a foundation stone on which to build an advanced civilisation precisely because it legitimises both the gift of giving and the joy of receiving. It embodies a sense of social solidarity through engaging in a form of mutuality that goes beyond “tit for tat reciprocity” (Cassin 2000). It provides a minimum income floor beyond which no one can fall yet has no ceiling which prevents people rising (Rhys-Williams 1965 p. 163, see also her 1943 and 1953 books, Milner 1920 p. 117). The ideological emphasis which a Basic Income brings is that of an inclusive citizenship: the duty that each of us owes to all and the equally pressing duty that all of us owe to each.

A Basic Income would ensure that people have access to money when they are in financial need. It does not interfere with incentives to increase income and it rewards self-help. It inculcates the young, reminds the middle aged and the old of the need to ensure that no-one goes to bed hungry and in this way allows and encourages intergenerational transfers by underlining the importance of social solidarity. It stigmatises no-one because it treats all permanent residents equally. It converts the meaningless phrases of “increasing community capacity” or “increasing social capital” “ensuring social insertion /inclusion” into a substantial process by encouraging sharing whilst allowing an equal taking from society’s income pool. It is a universal program, and because it does all the things listed above it enhances the quality of community life.  Above all, it is the decent thing to do.

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Australia: Will Basic Income have a second coming?

Chapter in Basic Income Guarantee and Politics Richard K. Caputo (ed), Palgrave Macmillian, New York, 2012 pp.153-176

Australia has had a federal social security system since the inception of the 1908 age and disability pensions legislation in 1910. From then until the late 1980s the system became more comprehensive and generous. It was and still is a categorical and means tested system paid from the Commonwealth government’s general tax revenue. It provides assistance to older Australians, to families with children and to people when they are sick, unemployed, experiencing a disability or illness and to those enrolled in some education programs. The Commonwealth system runs alongside private superannuation, commercial unemployed and sickness insurance and a war veteran’s benefit system.

In 1975, in its First Main Report, the Poverty Inquiry, headed by Professor Ronald Henderson, recommended the introduction of a system of guaranteed minimum income that had the potential to ensure that no Australian permanent resident would be left without some form of financial assistance. Since the late 1980s, in response to economic fundamentalist and neoconservative attacks upon welfare assistance and social security recipients, Australian governments have tightened conditionality and imposed increased obligations upon those needing to rely on social security.

The seesawing between a universal philosophical approach and an individualized categorical means tested charity approach to the provision of social security assistance has been part and parcel of the income maintenance debate in Australia for well over a century. This chapter will describe that debate, particularly some of its most recent manifestations, and attempt to predict the direction in which it is heading.

The decade following Federation

Australia began as a series of British colonies, which by the end of the nineteenth century had become states, which subsequently federated in 1901. There was never an established poor law system as in England – rather welfare provision was provided by church based charities and state or local governments. Despite the absence of poor law administrators, the attitudes with which much of the delivery of welfare assistance was imbued shared a great similarity with that of the British poor law system. Given that the overwhelming majority of migrants had arrived from Britain, this is hardly surprising.

By the turn of the twentieth century, there were other influences at work, deriving in part from the tradition of Bismarck’s Germany and other continental European traditions and emerging political movements. Indigenous Australians, once subdued, were controlled on government reserves and church missions. Race was a predominant consideration in the young Australian nation. The immigration act was the first piece of legislation passed by the Australian Parliament. Permanent Asian residents were not provided with social security until the 1940s. From 1945, some Indigenous Australians who could establish they had had previously maintained full time work for considerable periods of time were paid unemployment or sickness benefit in the event of unemployment or illness. Although in 1959 Commonwealth social security legislation was amended to place Aborigines on the same footing as other Australians (Kewley 1980, p.122, F/n 7), city dwelling Aboriginal people were not properly incorporated in the social security system until the mid1960s and their rural and remote cousins had a further decade’s wait before they were assisted.

In 1907 the industrial Arbitration Commission in the Harvester Judgment set a minimum wage sufficient for a male worker to support a wife and three children. Women’s wages were subsequently set at between 60 and 75 percent of the male wage until 1967 when an equal pay judgment was handed down. However because of the gender segregation of much of Australian industry, women still do not have full wage equality with men. Aboriginal workers were also accorded formal wage equality with other Australians in the late 1960s but because of continuing discrimination in employment and education and because of the remote localities in which many Indigenous people live there is still a huge gap in wage, health and educational outcomes between them and other Australians.

In 1908, legislation passed both houses of the Federal Parliament introducing pensions for citizens in the event of permanent injury or reaching the age of 60 for women and 65 for men. These pensions began to be paid in 1910 to aged citizens who could establish they were of good moral character and who had previously adequately supported their families. Invalid pensioners needed to establish they had resided in Australia for five years but were not required to pass a character test (Kewley 1973, p. 91). Means and asset tests applied to both pensions and applicants for an invalid pension had to establish their relatives could not maintain them. So, by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, the full time white male workers (in unionized work) and their families had a minimum wage and social security cover in the event of permanent injury or old age.

Gradual increments in social security provision

In 1912, the social security legislation in relation to applicants who were legally blind was amended to allow for the payment of a blind pension without the requirement that they establish they were permanently incapacitated. All other invalid pensioners had to establish they could not work. In relation to blind pensioners “the desire was to provide them with every inducement to earn (Kewley 1973, p. 93).” This eventually led to subsequent changes, which provided legally blind citizens with a means and asset free pension. Such a provision has particular relevance in relation to Basic Income.

The Commonwealth Treasury Department administered social security until 1927, after which time a new department was set up. In this early period clear eligibility categories were established in order to facilitate accountable bureaucratic decision- making. Yet even then, discretion was widely used to determine who was/not of good moral character. It seems that blind musicians playing in the street caused consternation to the treasury officials who were uncertain as to whether they should be classed as working or begging and usually decided that they were beggars who should not be paid a blind pension (Jordan 1984).

Also in 1912, legislation was enacted which provided for maternity allowance to be paid to non-Asian and non-Aboriginal mothers. When the 1929 Depression hit Australia a third of the workforce was left without a job. There was no Federal unemployment benefit. Various state and local governments provided dole/rations in return for work and often forced men to move on after short periods allegedly to encourage them to find work. Pension payments were reduced and increased effort was put into making relatives support pensioners in the early 1930s. Any pension paid was held as a debt against the estate. This practice was abolished in 1936.

The Depression and the Second World War made a major impact on the Australian mindset and this subsequently led to increased solidarity and support for an expansion of the social security system. In 1941, a universal child endowment was paid for each child after the first, was paid to migrants with children a year after they entered Australia, was paid in respect to adopted children and could be paid to Aboriginal mothers provided they were not nomadic nor wholly dependent upon the Commonwealth or state government. In 1950 child endowment was paid in respect to the first or only child. This child payment was granted without a means test and was disregarded as income for taxation purposes (Kewley1973 Ch. 10).

The early 1940s saw legislation providing widows with a pension provided the child was under the age of 16 or under the age of 18 in full-time education and not employed. A pension was also paid to widows over the age of 50 whose youngest child was over 16 years of age. A woman who had lived in “a bona fide domestic relationship” with a man for a period of 3 years immediately prior to his death could be paid a pension provided she had custody of a child under the age of 16 years. A widow without children in “necessitous circumstances” could be paid a pension for up to 26 weeks following her husband’s death. Widows needed to have lived continuously in Australia immediately prior to her husband’s death. In 1960 a woman whose husband was in jail for longer than six months could if she had a child be paid a widow’s pension.

Unemployment and sickness benefits were provided for in the 1944 legislation that came into effect in July the following year. Aboriginal Australians who worked for award wages in the towns qualified for benefit in times of unemployment or sickness. This 1944 legislation created a “special benefit” that was to be paid those in financial need who did not meet the totality of eligibility requirements for other social security payments. The special benefit was paid at the discretion of the Director-General to a person who “by reason of age, physical or mental disability or domestic circumstances, or any other reason, … is unable to earn sufficient livelihood (Kewley 1973 p.269). This benefit was to be paid at the same rate as the unemployment and sickness benefit. The special benefit was paid to a relative who was required to care for a sick or incapacitated child or parent. It was paid to people who could not meet the residency requirement for other payments. It is clear from the documents at the time that the special benefit was designed as a catchall benefit capable of providing anyone in financial need with sufficient income to sustain them when they were unable to establish eligibility for other benefits or pensions. The requirement that the Director-General use his discretion in granting the benefit meant that the benefit was not conceived of as being the equivalent of the French Minimum Insertion Income. Even so, when I worked in the Department in the mid-1960s the special benefit was a widely used benefit paid to people who were in the process of establishing their eligibility for another benefit or pension. This benefit could have easily been extended to become something similar to the French Minimum Insertion Income.

The Consolidation Act of 1947 brought all the Federal social security legislation together in one place and made the administration of a range of benefits and pensions much easier to manage. From then until the mid-1980s the generosity and range of benefits gradually increased. Some of these extensions to welfare provision will be elaborated upon later in this chapter following a discussion of universal income guarantees.

Competing Ideologies

Throughout the entire period since federation no single ideological force has held total sway over the motivations of politicians controlling the social welfare system. There have been differing ideological positions taken by the public at large when particular pieces of social welfare legislation have been discussed. There have been times when support for universal provision of pensions and benefits has commanded greater approval in the parliament and the public generally. At other times the general mood has turned away from universal provision towards support for more targeting and means testing of social security (Mays forthcoming).

The major political parties have generally tended to have candidates with a wide range of views. The major parties on the right attract conservative, agrarian socialist, neo- liberal (economic fundamentalist) and small “l” liberals. On the left, the Labor Party has combined neo-liberal, small “l” liberals, laborist, social democrat, socialist and the occasional (undeclared) communist as candidates. Currently the Greens candidates are nature conservationists and further to the left on most social issues than the Labor Party. In the first half of the twentieth century the Communist Party attracted a significant following.

In relation to social welfare policies a number of competing ideas are likely to emerge in a parliament with such a range of political positions represented. It is not surprising that conservatives with their beliefs in traditional values, established order, the sanctity of private property and small government should champion the targeting of welfare benefits to those in most “need” and refusing those whom they believe should fend for themselves. This sieving out the “needy” from the “greedy” is a distinction harking back to the days of the poor laws and the concept of “less eligibility.” Conservatives, because of their belief in the imperfection of humans and their desire to enforce traditional values, want governments to impose obligations upon recipients in return for providing assistance.

Neo-liberals join with their conservative colleagues in such targeting of assistance and the imposition of onerous obligations upon recipients of social welfare because they know that such mechanisms decrease the number of people applying and thereby the amount of taxpayer’s funds needed. The conservative attachment to the sanctity of private property leads them to insist that welfare services should encourage thrift. Neo- liberals support such views because they can’t see further than the government’s economic bottom line.

Mainstream liberals are philosophically attached to the idea of individualism, freedom, self-help, property, progress, rule of law, and the free play of market forces. Neo-liberals join them in their belief in self-help and progress which in turn leads them to the old “rising tides lifts all boats” cliché without taking into account the need to ensure that everyone’s hull is in a sound condition prior to the turn of the tide. There seems little understanding that insufficient social security creates for many doubts that they will escape poverty even in prosperous times. Both mainstream and neo-liberals interpret the combination of freedom and the free play of market forces to insist that recipients take any available job, irrespective of how suitable it is for the individual. This leads them to limit the amount of assistance provided so as to ensure recipients are not tempted to stay on welfare indefinitely.

Some small “l” liberals have an attachment to equity whereas social democrats and socialists see themselves as striving for equality, albeit for social democrats attainment of equality is something to strive towards. Socialists and Marxists see equality as a prime and immediate goal. The socialist belief that treating unequals equally is as unfair as treating equals unequally confounds their desire for absolute equality yet leads them in the general direction of universal provision of welfare assistance. In this they are joined by social democrats.

The hallmark of the social democratic position is equality, government intervention, representative government, and the peaceful transition to socialism. The last flowering of this tradition in Australian social welfare was in 1973-5 during the Whitlam Labor government. The widows pension was extended to lone mothers, the necessity to pass a character test before an applicant was “deemed worthy” to receive a pension was abolished, and the government set in train a number of Inquiries designed to recommend ways to improve worker compensation and social welfare services generally. I worked in the Department at the time and the mood changed for many from being there to ensure that nobody got more than they were entitled, to a feeling that it was necessary to ensure that all people obtained the totality of benefits to which they were entitled.

It is not only conservatives and liberals who rely upon “the need for welfare assistance” as the prime justification for the supply of benefits. Marxists also rely on “need”; this is exemplified in their maxim “From each according to ability, to each according to need (Wikipedia 2011)”. In this statement Marxists are attempting to come to terms with their desire for both equity and equality.

Beyond the political ideological struggle described above there are other ideological tussles in the society generally and the welfare arena in particular. Feminists argue that discrimination on the basis of gender is not peripheral to an understanding of power in Australia but is a core feature which structures social interaction. The individual is the main unit utilized in relation to taxation but the social security system insists that the family is the appropriate unit to be used when determining means and assets when assessing benefit applications. Many people who might otherwise qualify for a benefit are refused payment because of the income of their partner. Conservatives see the family as the main vehicle for controlling reproduction and transferring property between generations. Marxists are divided between those who see the nuclear family as a major bulwark against ruling class oppression and those who envisage the family as the way the ruling classes ensure the reproduction of the next generation of exploitable workers.

In addition to gender the main organizing features of Australian society are class, age race and locality. Australia is a huge country but most people live in the capital cities or along the Eastern seaboard. Those living in the major urban conglomerations have better access to health, education and other services and live longer than their rural counterparts. Teenagers and young adults who were unemployed have been singled out for the imposition of the most repressive obligations through programs such as “work for the dole” and compulsory training by Labor and Conservative governments in the last decade and a half. Older unemployed workers frequently encounter employer resistance to employing them. Teenage social security recipients are paid considerably lower rates of benefit than are adult recipients. Class is an accurate determinate of lifespan. Racism is a daily experience for Aboriginal people whether they live in towns, cities or remote communities. As well as these ideological features, people with significant impediments find that they are regularly discriminated against in relation to employment, education and access to buildings. Recent governments have argued that many disability support pensioners do not have disabling conditions sufficient to warrant their being paid a pension and have shifted many to less generous unemployment benefits with onerous work search obligations (Mays forthcoming; Galvin 2004).

Income guarantees in Australia

The conservative Menzies government initiated the child endowment legislation. The widow’s pension legislation was put forward in 1942 by the incoming Labor government but had bipartisan support. Labor enacted unemployment and sickness benefit provisions and spearheaded the improvements in the Consolidated Act in 1947. Labor lost office in 1949 and Menzies returned to the Prime Ministership and stayed there until 1966. The conservatives continued in power for a further 6 years.

By the time conservatives relinquished office, despite Menzeis’s efforts to gradually extend social welfare resources and programs, poverty, particularly poverty amongst the aged, was starting to emerge as an issue. Writers like John Stubbs (1966) and Professor Ronald Henderson with his colleagues Alison Harcourt and John Harper (1970) played important roles in raising the issue of poverty. Church-run charities like the Brotherhood of St Laurence took leading advocacy roles. The McMahon conservative government, which was to lose office in 1972, set up the Henderson Poverty Inquiry. The incoming Whitlam Labor government massively expanded the scope of the Poverty Inquiry.

In 1975, in the first main report of the Poverty Inquiry, Henderson set out (at Chapter 6 of Vol. 1 and Appendix 6 of Vol.2) a detailed suggestion for the introduction of a guaranteed minimum income in Australia. The income guarantee which Henderson proposed was intended to simplify and move towards unifying the social security and taxation systems and to treat those with stable and those with fluctuating income equitably. He wanted to reduce the emphasis on the various categories of pensions and benefits and make the withdrawal rate on earned income more transparent and hence understandable. Under the proposal, the population was divided between those who qualified for a social security benefit or pension whom he called “Categorical” and those who were not able to establish eligibility for an existing payment. He foreshadowed subsequently broadening the eligibility provisions in order that “no person at risk of poverty will henceforth be denied an income” (Henderson 1975 Vol. 1 p. 67, see also pp. 30-32). For those whom he called categorical, Henderson proposed a rate of payment at 106 percent of the poverty line but he suggested paying the non-categorical groups as little as 50 percent of the poverty line. He considered abolishing all categories within the system of income support but decided against it on the grounds that a simple guarantee at the poverty line for all would result in a taxation rate of 50 percent that he considered political unsalable (Henderson 1975 Vol. 1 p. 74).

The Henderson proposals were compatible with the existing social security system in that they were in the form of a demogrant, expressed as a social right, flat rate and non-contributory. He considered the guaranteed minimum income would make the income maintenance system in Australia more humane, less categorical, and more comprehensive. It would have done all this, however, the basic weakness of the proposal was that it failed to dismantle the existing system and restructure it in a way that would facilitate the complete integration of the income maintenance and taxation systems. The Henderson proposal would have reduced but not abolished the advantages accruing to people with fluctuating incomes compared with those in stable employment. His proposal to abolish the existing progressive taxation system and replace it with a proportional tax would on the face of it appear to advantage the more affluent. He did, however, propose a 5 percent tax surcharge for incomes over $240 per week as at August 1973 (Henderson 1975 Vol. 1 p. 78).

The major problem with the Henderson proposal was that dividing the population between the categorical and non-categorical, providing the categorical group with a guaranteed income equal too or better than the poverty line but only guaranteeing others an income of between 50 and 71 per cent of the poverty line would not decrease the desire of the non-categorical group to be considered categorical. Because it does not guarantee the non-categorical group an income above the poverty line it cannot ensure that some Australians would not remain in poverty. Another disappointing aspect of the Poverty Inquiry’s guaranteed minimum income scheme was that it used the family as the basis of calculating the appropriate rate of benefit. It did envisage older children living in the family home being paid in their own right.

Also in 1975 a group of senior public servants predominantly from Treasury and calling themselves the Priorities Review Staff proposed introducing a negative income tax or a tax credit scheme. Like the Henderson proposal, they proposed a two-tiered scheme that treated more favorably those qualifying for pensions and benefits than those who could not establish their eligibility for assistance. The categorical group would receive 100 percent of the Henderson poverty line (non-working) and the non-categorical group would receive 55 percent of the poverty line (working). They suggested a proportional tax rate of 43 per cent for prime earners and a 33 per cent tax rate for a second earner in a family. They recommended a tax surcharge of 5 per cent for those with an income of $17,000 – $20,000, rising to 25 per cent for those over $58,000 (Priorities Review Staff 1975 p. 34). They too adopted the family as the unit of income for assessing their income guarantee.

The Priorities Review Staff had a similar desire to Henderson in wanting to mesh the tax and social security systems, provide assistance to those poor people who were not assisted by existing categorical schemes, and generally simplify the social welfare system. Whereas the Poverty Inquiry wanted to put in place an increased range of services, the Priorities Review Staff wanted to limit or abolish as many supplementary services as possible. The Priorities Review Staff set out a way to mesh their proposal with the recommendations of the Woodhouse National Compensation Scheme (1974).

The Woodhouse injury compensation scheme has continuing relevance because, in 2011, the Productivity Commission has made similar recommendations. The Woodhouse Commission was charged with designing a comprehensive income support system for injured, disabled and sick people. Woodhouse recommended that people who were sick or disabled would be paid a benefit at 85 per cent of their previous wage up to an amount of $425 per week. Non-earners were to receive $42.50 per week. Low income earners would be paid at 100 per cent of the minimum wage. His scheme was designed to replace the expensive worker and road accident legal jungle in which many wait an inordinate time before settlement and then some get windfall settlements whilst others receive nothing. It was intended to fund the scheme via a 2 per cent levy on wages and 10 cent per gallon petrol tax. In addition the government would provide $370 million annually (the amount it was then spending on invalid pensions and sickness benefits [Woodhouse 1974 p.260]).

Another contemporaneous Inquiry was asked to design a national superannuation scheme to replace the means tested age pension. This Hancock Committee failed to come to a unanimous conclusion and brought down a majority and minority report in 1976. The majority report recommended a pension of 25 percent of the average weekly earnings, with a means-tested supplement raising the income to 30 percent of the average weekly earnings for those without other income. The more affluent would receive the base 25 per cent without a means test plus a purchased pension dependent upon contributions. The proposal was to be funded by an extra 5 per cent income tax levy on income over 30 per cent of average weekly earnings. The minority report thought Hancock’s proposal placed too high a burden on low income earners and recommended a pension without a means test for all over 65 years of age and supplementary means tested benefits.

A common feature of all these Inquiries was they were all critical of the existing categorical means-tested social welfare system. Even so none of these proposals could entirely wrench themselves away from the categorical targeting of particular groups of people. Both the majority and minority Hancock proposals would have guaranteed an income to the elderly – but the age pension already provided most poor older people with an income guarantee. The Woodhouse scheme would have rationalized workers and road accident compensation as well as unifying sickness benefit and invalid pension provisions but would have still left many who did not fit into the existing categorical welfare system without assistance. The Woodhouse and Hancock majority reports both extended the inequalities of the employment situation into the post-work phase of peoples’ lives.

Henderson (1977 p.103 and p.108) rejects the recommendations of both the Woodhouse Inquiry and the Hancock majority report on equity grounds. He quotes the words of the minority report of the Hancock Inquiry to help establish his case: “Benefits payable under the scheme (Hancock) in 1977 would require an estimated 5.1 percent of Gross Domestic Product. This may be contrasted with the 2 percent required to finance the age pension system.”

Only the Henderson and Priorities Review Staff suggestions had the potential to ensure every Australian received an income. Neither would have resulted in equal or equitable distribution but either of them would have rationalized and modernized the social security system simplified the tax and social security combined withdrawal rates and watered down the excessive targeting that is the hallmark of the Australian welfare system.

The outcome of the Inquiries

As mentioned earlier, the period of the Whitlam Labor government saw the last flowering of the social democratic philosophical position in Australia. There was a real concern that poverty should be addressed, that the social security system should be equitable, that people should obtain the totality of benefits to which they were entitled, and that Aboriginal people should be granted land rights to traditional lands, which had not, by then, been alienated to white interests.

The abolition of the character test and the expansion of the widows pension scheme by the addition of a separate but reasonably similar payment to single mothers with a child in their care exemplified the difference between the Labor government and the 23 years of unbroken conservative rule that had proceeded Whitlam’s 1972 electoral victory. Bill Hayden, the Minister for Social Security, described himself as a socialist and worked hard to promote equal treatment of recipients. A prime example of this was the considerable increases in the benefit rate that occurred on his watch.

Pensions, which had both income and asset means tests, were paid a substantially higher amounts than were unemployment, sickness and special benefits which had only an income means test applying to them. Traditionally there were three benefit rates for those aged 16-18 years of age, those aged between 18 and 21 and an adult rate. In February 1973, the Whitlam government introduced legislation providing “for a common rate of benefit, irrespective of the age of the beneficiary, and brought the rates to parity with those for pensions” (Kewley 1978 p. 125). This action was repeated four more times by the Whitlam government although on the last occasion in November 1975 and just before being dismissed from office the benefit rate for unmarried unemployed recipients under the age of 18 years was not raised in line with the other increases.

Perhaps the litmus test of generosity in Australian social welfare is the degree of robust enforcement of the “work test provisions” applying to applicants for unemployment benefit. In May 1973, Hayden believed the overwhelming majority of unemployment beneficiaries wanted work and instructed that there should be a less strict enforcement of the work test saying it was preferable that a few people took advantage of the system “than that people genuinely seeking work should be unfairly penalized” (Kewley 1980 p. 134)..Hayden and other Ministers declared themselves in support of generalized income guarantees as a way of rationalizing the hodgepodge of benefits, pensions and allowances (ACOSS 1975).

Whether the Whitlam government would have accepted the recommendations of the Poverty Inquiry in relation to the introduction of a guaranteed minimum income or the negative income tax proposals of the Priorities Review Staff, or adopted some of the suggestions of the Woodhouse or Hancock Inquiries cannot be known. Wider political events overtook the Whitlam government, in particular ill discipline amongst several members of the cabinet, the Khemlani overseas loans affair (Whitlam dismissal 2011), and losing its majority in the Senate led to the Governor General dismissing Gough Whitlam and installing the conservative Malcolm Fraser as leader of a caretaker government. The Fraser government won the subsequent general election. What can be asserted with confidence is that the Australian Council of Social Service produced two monographs supporting the introduction of a guaranteed minimum income.

Many social welfare academics and practitioners supported such a change in income maintenance policy whilst others were critical of such a change. Many of the papers written about Basic Income at the time and since then have been placed on the Basic Income Guarantee Australia web site. It is my belief that had the Whitlam government been able to retain office; some form of generalized income guarantee would have eventuated. The general thrust of the rationalization of rates of benefit aimed at developing equity between beneficiaries and pensioners signals the direction in which the Labor Party was heading.

The unemployed, and the young unemployed in particular, were to experience far stricter work and other eligibility tests under the Fraser government. In March 1976, The Fraser government announced that as of the end of that school year, school leavers would not be paid unemployment benefit until the start of the new school year. The agrarian socialist philosophical position of the conservative side of the parliament was revealed later that year when it was announced that farmers who had previously been denied unemployment would henceforth be assisted when experiencing financial hardship.

Fast forward to mid 1980s and early 1990s

The Fraser Government did not raise the benefit rates for teenage beneficiaries in its entire three terms of office. By the time Labor regained office a considerable gap between pension and benefit levels had again emerged and the young were most severely affected by this change in thinking. In 1977, the conservative government did extend the supporting mothers payment to include lone fathers who had custody of one or more children. Fraser slightly amended the Northern Territory Land Rights draft prepared by the Whitlam government and pushed it through the parliament. Apart from these changes the period of the Fraser government was one of general continuity on the social welfare front.

Whitlam had abolished the means test for age pensioners over 75 years of age in 1973 and for those between 70 and 74 years in 1975. In 1976, Fraser removed the asset test for those over 70 years of age but retained an income test. In 1983, the Hawke Labor government was elected. In November of that year, Hawke reintroduced a slightly more generous income test for those over 70 years of age, compared with younger pensioners. In 1985 he reintroduced an asset test.

The mid-1980s to the early 1990s was a period of fiscal restraint in social welfare spending. Hawke had come to an accord with the trade unions to limit wage demands in return for tax, Medicare, and superannuation benefits. The Labor Party had traditionally opposed privatized superannuation because they feared it would undermine support for the age and invalid pension but times had changed as will be seen when superannuation is discussed in detail below.

The Fraser government changed the child allowance system to a family allowance system. Like the child endowment it was not subject to any income or assets test, nor was it taxable. Subsequent Labor governments basically retained the family allowance system but gradually applied mechanisms to limit payment when families had other income. In 2000, the conservative Howard government replaced the existing family allowance system with a family tax benefit that assists families, with incomes of up to $150,000 per annum, raise their children. This benefit is paid though the tax system and the amount received is in inverse proportion to other income.

The recession, in late 1980s and the early 1990s lead to a substantial rise in unemployment as well as a rise in interest rates. Brian Howe, who had been Minister for Social Security since 1984 was deputy Leader of the Keating Labor government from 1991-1995. Prior to entering parliament he had studied theology in Chicago 1967–69 before returning to Australia and serving as a Methodist minister in various parts of Victoria. He had been preoccupied by the idea of intergenerational welfare dependency at least since 1987. He took every opportunity to save funds in his portfolio. In the 1988 mini-budget, the most miserly reduction was the imposition of a stricter income test on (short-term) special beneficiaries who received payment for less than 13 weeks. The majority of those who received the payment were single women immediately prior to and just following the birth of their baby. In order to receive the payment, mothers had to establish they were not working, not living in a bona fide domestic relationship and had no other substantial income. This income test imposed a 100 percent withdrawal rate on all earned income in excess of $20 per week. At the time of this action I suggested that Howe was behaving like a Victorian parson doling monies out of the parish poor box.

Economic fundamentalists had a considerable influence in the Hawke and Keating governments. The social welfare emphasis had shifted from assisting applicants in need to delivering occupational benefit and generalized assistance to families. Following the Mabo High Court Judgment, Keating pushed through the Native Title Act that provided an opportunity for Indigenous traditional owners to lay claim to unalienated land.

Unemployment became a considerable problem for the Keating government and, in 1994; the Prime Minister issued a White Paper entitled Working Nation in which he set out his prescription to solve it. The plan included guaranteeing employment to every unemployed person out of work for 18 months. But in return for this employment guarantee plus other assistance the unemployed were required to accept their “reciprocal obligation” to do all that was possible to find work or make themselves “job ready.”

Superannuation

Contributory superannuation schemes had been promoted by the conservative side of politics in Australia and several attempts had been made to introduce them. The Labor Party had opposed them on the grounds that they would undermine support for social security programs. During the Hawke/Keating period in office, Labor changed its approach and introduced a compulsory privatized contributory form of superannuation, quite unlike the social insurance model of superannuation prevalent in Europe.

The change came about in part as a result of the Accord and the amalgamation of craft unions into super unions whose leaders saw an opportunity to bolster their power by setting up industry superannuation funds to safeguard their members’ contributions and tie the workers more intimately to the union. The banking and insurance industries offered private superannuation schemes and welcomed the opportunity for a massive expansion. Prior to compulsory superannuation, some firms had set up superannuation schemes for their workers and permanent government employees were provided with defined benefit superannuation as part of their salary package. Most defined benefit schemes have now closed their books to new members and the system of superannuation that has evolved in Australia means that the superannuation that people receive is roughly proportional to what they paid in, the wisdom of fund investors, the choice that individuals make about investment strategies and just plain luck. Those in seasonal, part time or casual employment find that many employers either don’t deduct superannuation contributions or if they do then don’t pass on the contributions to superannuation funds.

The Banking and Insurance industry controlled funds usually charge larger fees than Industry Superannuation funds so this too affects the amount of money people receive when they retire. Social Insurance superannuation generally results in superannuation payouts roughly in line with contributions and a country’s capacity to pay. Privatized superannuation is often less equitable and tends to advantage those with greater financial resources (Hughes 2008).

Howard government

John Howard swept Paul Keating from office in March 1996. Howard (1999) described himself as a social conservative but an economic liberal. Many of the policies he pursued certainly placed him in the camp of the neo-liberal economic fundamentalists. His deputy, Peter Costello, had made his name as a relentless employers’ advocate. Their first target focused on young employed people whom Costello described as “job snobs”. The solution was the imposition compulsory literacy training, compulsory “work for the dole” and other “mutual obligations.”

Howard’s next target was the Native Title Act. He set out to win what became known as the “culture wars.” He described the position taken by many pro-Aboriginal historians and anthropologists as representing a “black arm band” view of the early days of white expansion of the continent. In turn, Howard was regarded as having a “white blind folded” view of the early Aboriginal/white interaction. Howard amended the Native Title Act to increase the difficulty that Aborigines had establishing their claim. The amendments included a clause insisting that Aboriginal applicants had to establish a continuous and unbroken connection with any land claimed. This made it impossible for many traditional owners, who had been forcibly removed from their traditional land and herded onto missions or settlements, often at gunpoint, to launch a successful claim.

The main weapon in the Howard government’s industrial arsenal was the Work Choices legislation that created extensive penalties for both workers and unions taking unauthorized industrial action. In the early years, this legislation was not as strongly pro-

employer as the government wanted because their zeal was held in check by the fact they did not have an absolute majority in the senate. In their last term, they obtained control of the senate and were able to pass more repressive industrial provisions. This eventually led to a backlash. The trade unions successfully mobilized substantial opposition.

The Howard government persevered with the policy of mandatory detention begun by Labor and imposed harsher internment conditions upon asylum seekers, who arrived by boat. The government set up detention centers on Nauru and on Manus Island in New Guinea. This off shore processing of asylum seekers was termed the “Pacific Solution.” Refugee advocates waged a determined and prolonged campaign and towards the end of Howard’s term five of his senior backbenches forced the government to release children from detention.

Howard expanded family benefits, boosted careers benefits, significantly increased the pharmaceutical benefits for pensioners and self-funded retirees and allowed people to make huge contributions to private superannuation schemes. This conservative government became alarmed by large increases in the number of people receiving the disability support pension and set out to reduce that number by one third (Galvin 2004; Mays forthcoming).

In June 2007, The Howard government announced the Northern Territory Intervention into 73 Aboriginal communities. This Intervention was supposedly instigated in response to The little children are sacred report co-authored by Rex Wild and Pat Anderson. The Intervention was justified on the grounds that it would protect Indigenous children from neglect and pedophilia and would protect women and vulnerable people from being assaulted or stood over for money. In order to facilitate the Intervention the Howard government suspended the Racial Discrimination Act, quarantined half of people’s social security and placed this money on a Basics card that could only be used for approved purposes (Altman and Hinkson 2007). It imposed compulsory town leases and health checks.

Labor in the 21st Century

Kevin Rudd led the Labor party to victory in 2007. The unions massive mobilization around the excesses of Howard’s Work Choices legislation played no small part in that victory but the Labor Party needed a leader who would not frighten the horses. Rudd declared he was a fiscal conservative, a church going Christian, someone who would continue the Northern Territory Intervention for at least another year and his wife was a wealthy businesswoman who had built a large business. He looked and sounded like a safe pair of hands. Rudd promised to end the offshore processing of refugees, to restore a balance in industrial relations, and bring a new humanity to the administration. Howard on the other hand looked old, tired, and mean.

The Rudd government removed the most draconian aspects of the Work Choices legislation, through Keynesian countercyclical pump priming managed to avoid the recession that enveloped other developed countries, abolished the Pacific Solution and tried to cope with the increased boat arrivals. An inquiry was held into the effects of the Northern Territory Intervention. This Inquiry recommended ending the suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act, restricting the compulsory quarantining of half of peoples’ welfare payments to those people who wanted it or who were actually neglecting their children, and ending other repressive aspects of the Intervention. Rudd insisted the Intervention continue. Rudd championed significant increases in taxes to be paid by multinational mining conglomerates and the imposition of a carbon emission reduction scheme. The multinational companies launched a massive media campaign opposing the tax increases and caught Rudd on the hop. He decided after two failed attempts to get his carbon emission through the hostile senate to shelve it at least until 2013.

Rudd’s deputy, Julia Gillard, in June 2010 with overwhelming cross-factional support (within the parliamentary Labor Party) toppled her leader and became Australia’s first female Prime Minister. She quickly struck a deal with the mining companies. When the Gillard government faced the electors, in August 2010, Labor failed to get a majority of seats in the lower house and has been forced to rely upon cross bench support in order to govern.

The Gillard government continued the crackdown on disability support pensioners and the unemployed that Howard had started and Rudd had continued. In February 2011, Gillard appeared on the ABC Four Corners program arguing that it was her ambition to get many people off welfare as possible by getting them a job “for the simple dignity that work brings.”

The Gillard government took a harsher attitude to asylum seekers, arriving by boat. By the middle of 2011, the Gillard government claimed to have struck a deal to return asylum seekers, arriving by boat, to Malaysia for processing. Malaysia is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention and regularly canes asylum seekers entering its territory. The government claimed it intended returning unaccompanied minors and pregnant women to Malaysia (ABC News June 4).

In 2007 most progressives assumed that, after a year, the Northern Territory Intervention would be replaced by a community development approach that would include consulting appropriately with Indigenous communities, ensuring the Racial Discrimination Act was re-instated, an end to quarantining of social security and expanding health, housing and education programs (Tomlinson 2011). What progressives had not understood was that Howard had won the “culture wars” that Rudd and Gillard either weren’t interested in the ideological battle, shared many of the same values as Howard or were just incapable of mounting a sufficiently sustained ideological defense of social democratic values.

A universal Basic Income

In Australia, a full universal Basic Income, if it were to abolish poverty, would need to be paid to every permanent resident at or above the existing single rate of age pension (that is pegged at 25 percent of the average wage and is slightly above the Henderson poverty line). It would be paid to individuals irrespective of their marital status, whether they lived alone or with others, irrespective of their race, age, gender or other social status. In the short term, partly because of attitudes surrounding the nuclear family and partly because of the history of family payments, it would probably be necessary to pay parents of children, under the age of 16 years, living in the family home at a rate of half the adult rate. It would be paid to rich and poor, whether or not they were employed or in education. No work or other obligations could be attached to the receipt of the Basic Income and governments or other bodies could not garnishee it (see Tomlinson 2003).

Basic Income: Obstacles and what is going for it?

The major obstacles to the introduction of a Basic Income in Australia are questions surrounding affordability, the presence of a privatized superannuation system, and the ideological maelstrom that envelops discussions of social welfare, migration, the work ethic, race, age, gender and disability. Several of these issues have been discussed above and there will be further discussion of some of them here.

Governments and oppositions in Australia have demonstrated a capacity to bamboozle the public about the capacity of the nation to afford to introduce improvements in the social wage, protect the environment, lift wages, and increase or decrease other expenditures. Political parties talk about lowering carbon dioxide levels yet allow the Defense Department unlimited access to petro carbon guzzling planes, tanks, trucks, and ships.

Every Australian Broadcasting Commission’s news and current affairs program has several items dealing with the economic implications of this or that aspect of our economy. Yet, the public is not sufficiently economically literate to understand the implications of a lot of the discussion. They tend to get swayed by the cleverest 10 second grab. To be fair to them, the old adage “Give me 10 economists and I’ll supply you with 15 different answers” applies in this country.

There is obviously sufficient money available to pay every individual an income at 25 percent of the average wage. It is not a question of affordability – it is a question of whether the public is prepared for such an egalitarian redistribution. In 1975, Australia went within a stone’s throw of introducing an income guarantee for all residents. The economists of the Poverty Inquiry and the Priorities Review Staff believed it was affordable then. Australia is a far more wealthy country today than then –we could more easily afford to introduce a Basic Income now. The question is whether as a nation do we desire a universal Basic Income.

The privatized compulsory superannuation scheme delivers considerable benefits to the better off sections of Australian society. The one third of Australians who earn more than the average wage are the prime beneficiaries. Many of the two thirds who earn less than the average wage see what ever superannuation they receive as their entitlement: unlike social security or the family tax benefit which they view as complicated, hedged around with conditionality, and given grudgingly. Most of the two thirds aspire to climb the income ladder and are prepared to allow the perks of the rich to remain whilst they still dream of joining them. Most of the two thirds have little idea of just how inequitable the privatized superannuation system is – few understand that thousands of the very rich get more government assistance (in the form of foregone tax on their superannuation) than age pensioners get from the government.

Superannuation contributions are taxed at a rate of 15 percent. As Ben Eltham (2011 p. 4) notes those earning less than $37,000 get no concessions (because they pay a tax rate of 15 percent on their salary. People paid a salary of million dollars a year pay 45 percent on their salary but only 15 percent on any contributions they make to superannuation. He also points out that the forgone capital gains tax exemption on the sale of the family house will cost $23.5 billion in 2011-12 the same amount as the total outlay for unemployment benefits and the disability support pension combined.

The Howard government managed, in 1996, to poach many blue-collar workers from the Labor Party by suggesting that Keating was wasting government monies pandering to Aborigines, asylum seekers, single mothers, and dole bludgers. This group, mainly from the outer suburbs of cities, became known as “Howard’s battlers.” Downward envy drove them to criticize social security payments to low income single parents, disability support pensioners, the unemployed, refugees, and Aborigines on the grounds that they did not receive such payments. They seemed oblivious to the fact that a single parent living below the poverty line, did not have disabilities, and were not unemployed or sick. This fracturing of working class solidarity allowed the rich to continue to enjoy their benefits and the government to tighten conditionality and targeting of social security benefits.

The current situation is one where such downward envy is still bubbling below the surface but has an additional component namely the suggestion that middle income earners do not need help to raise their children. That is that a lot of the family tax benefit is being wasted on “middle class welfare.” Eltham (2011 p.3) suggests that the expression middle class welfare is misleading because the Australian welfare state is “among the most targeted in the western world, with steep cut-offs for many entitlements. It’s a measure of the ‘downward envy of voters that the issue is even a live one.” Whilst the two thirds of the population, who earn less than the average wage, can be distracted from the real income distributional debate and kept struggling amongst themselves the perquisites of the rich and very rich are safe from scrutiny.

The government wants to reduce the number of disability support pensioners because it has observed a rise in the number of such pensioners caused by a crackdown on recipients of other benefits such as unemployment and raising women’s qualifying age for the age pension. People under 35 years of age will be required to develop a contract setting out their work participation plan with the disability support pension paying agency. Howard and Rudd tried to cut the numbers by threats; now the Gillard government is trying to ease people into work by allowing them to work up to 30 hours a week for up to two years and still remain eligible for a part pension (Karvelas 2011). This returns disability support pensioners to roughly the same position they were in before Howard tightened the eligibility requirements in 2005.

The public is of two minds when it comes to the question of disability. Some are positively disposed towards disability support pensioners but others see them as bludgers as the headline in the populist Sydney Daily Telegraph reflects when it proclaims “We’re an army of shirkers in NSW – disability pensions are a losing battle (Jones 2011).”

Despite the fact that Australia is now wealthier than ever it is unlikely that a universal Basic Income paid to all permanent residents at a rate above the Henderson poverty line will be enacted in the foreseeable future. It would appear that if there were going to be any substantial social welfare advance, it is most probably going to be to specific categories of people considered to be “worthy of extra assistance.”

One such indication of this is that in February 2011, the Productivity Commission recommended the establishment of a no-fault National Injury Insurance scheme and a separate dedicated agency with the task of ensuring that all permanent residents with significant disabilities receive appropriate services. Were such a proposal accepted then, all permanent residents who can establish they have a significant disability will be guaranteed an above the poverty line income. This would be brought about either by the National Injury Insurance scheme or via the blind or disability support pension or some combination of all of these. The non-affluent aged all ready have such a guarantee, as do families with children.

Other permanent residents, provided they meet categorical eligibility requirements and fulfill the associated “obligations”, are provided with some income. However the levels of benefits paid to full time students, unemployed, and temporarily sick people is not sufficient to lift them out of poverty. Young beneficiaries can receive as little as 40 percent of the poverty line.

On the other hand both the Howard and Rudd governments looked seriously at introducing a single rate of benefit for all working age people, one that would have simplified the current system immensely. Ken Henry the recently retired Head of the Treasury, in 2010, recommended introducing a far more egalitarian superannuation system through increasing the amounts low income earners would receive.

Still, there are no apparent signs on the horizon that a universal Basic Income is about to be introduced. Despite the Rudd government using Keynesian counter cyclical pump priming to escape the recession – neo-fundamentalist economists maintain a strong hold in government and business in Australia. It took 23 years of conservative rule before the last truly social democratic Labor Party came to power with a progressive social welfare agenda.

Neo fundamentalists have held sway for 25 years; the mining boom looks like continuing for at least another 20 years and hopefully some time soon the “Big wheel will turn” and Australians will again realize that we can afford an income guarantee for all permanent residents (paid above the poverty line) without compromising the economic prosperity of the nation.

Bibliography

ABC News. 2011. Radio National News. Australian Broadcasting Commission. June 4, 7.00am.
Altman, Jon and Hinkson, Melinda (eds.). 2007. Coersive Reconciliation: Stabilise, Normalise, Exit Aboriginal Australia. North Carlton, Arena.
Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS). 1975 Seminar on Guaranteed Minimum Income. Sydney, ACOSS.
Basic Income Guarantee Australia 2011. http://www.basicincome.qut.edu.au/
Eltham, Ben. 2011. “Middle Class Welfare And Other Furphies.” New Matilda. May 4 http://newmatilda.com/2011/05/04/budget-preview-middle-class-welfare
Four Corners. 2011. “The real Julia”. Australian Broadcasting Commission. February 7.
Galvin, Rose. 2004. “Can Welfare reform make Disability Disappear.” Australian
Journal of Social Issues. 39 (3) 343-355.
Hancock, Keith. 1976. A National Superannuation Scheme for Australia. Canberra,
Australian Government.
Henderson, Ronald, Harcourt, Alison and Harper, John.1970. People in Poverty: A
Melbourne Survey. Melbourne, Cheshire.
Henderson, Ronald. 1974. Poverty in Australia: First Main Report. Vols. 1 & 2.
Canberra, Australian Government.
Henderson, Ronald. 1977. “Criteria for welfare: needs or earnings?” Australian Journal
of Social Issues. 12 (2): 100-110.
Hughes, Gerard. 2008. “The Case for a Universal State Pension.” in Reynolds, Bridget & Healey, Sean (eds.) Making Choices- Choosing Futures. Dublin, Cori. Howard, John. 1999. “Building a Stronger and Fairer Australia: Liberalisation in Economic Policy and Modern Conservatism in Social Policy”. Roundtable Speech. May 4. http://home.vicnet.net.au/~victorp/21st_century/johnhoward.htm
Jordan, Allan. 1984. Permanent Incapacity: Invalid Pension in Australia. Canberra, Department of Social Security.
Jones, Gemma. 2011.“We’re an army of shirkers in NSW – disability pensions are a losing battle.” The Daily Telegraph. June 2.
http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/sydney-nsw/were-an-army-of-shirkers-in-nsw- disability-pensions-are-a-losing-battle/story-e6freuzi-1226067497524
Karvelas, Patricia. 2011. “‘Incentives’ to cut welfare dependency.” The Australian. May 10.
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/incentives-intended-to-cut-welfare- dependency/story-fn59niix-1226053605849
Keating, Paul. 1994. Working Nation. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.
Kewley, Thomas H. 1973. Social Security in Australia. Sydney, Sydney University Press.
Kewley, Thomas H. 1980. Australian Social Security Today. Sydney, Sydney University Press.
Mays, Jennifer. (forthcoming). “Australia’s disabling income support system: Tracing the history of the Australian disability income support system 1908 to 2007 – disablism, citizenship and the Basic Income proposal.” PhD thesis Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane.
Priorities Review Staff. 1975. Possibilities for Social Welfare in Australia. Canberra, Australian Government.
Productivity Commission. 2011. Disability Care and Support.(Draft Report). Canberra Australian Government.
Stubbs, John. 1966. The Hidden People – Poverty in Australia. Melbourne, Cheshire.
Tomlinson, John. 2003. Income Insecurity: The Basic Income Alternative. BIGA, Brisbane. http://www.basicincome.qut.edu.au/interest/e-books.jsp
Tomlinson, John. 2011. “Needs must when the devil drives”. On Line Opinion. http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=11494
Whitlamdismissal. 2011. http://whitlamdismissal.com/loans/
Wikipedia. 2011. “From each according to his ability, to each according to his need.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/From_each_according_to_his_ability,_to_each_according_to_his_need#References
Wild, Rex and Anderson Pat. 2007 .The little children are sacred. http://www.inquirysaac.nt.gov.au/pdf/bipacsa_final_report.pdf
Woodhouse, Owen. 1974. Compensation and rehabilitation in Australia. Canberra, Australian Government.

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Australia’s Welfare Wars – Book review

Phillip Mendes (2002) Australia’s Welfare Wars. University of New South Wales, Sydney.
Book review by John Tomlinson
Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 474-476, 2004.

Phillip Mendes has produced a comprehensive account of the policies, the ideologies and some of the players in the Australian welfare state. The book provides an extensive analysis of both the Labor and Liberal Parties’ Federal social welfare policies over the last 20 years. It does so by providing a history of Australian welfare during the last century – particularly since the Second World War. It provides considerable detail about Victoria’s welfare history.

At one level it deals with the clash between social democratic universal welfare provision and globalised neoliberal “enabling States”. Mendes understands that calling the neoliberal or third way version of welfare an “enabling State” is a misnomer. Because they are predicated upon self-provision, it would be better to call them disabling states.

The book is divided into three parts: the history, political and ideological context of welfare; a review of Labor and Liberal welfare policies from Menzies on; and an analysis of the welfare ideologies of the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), the churches and some of the other welfare players. Mendes’ book is an unapologetic polemic, yet its analysis is remarkably mainstream. It was written to defend the welfare state against the onslaught of the economic fundamentalists upon the social provision provided to the most vulnerable in this country. It is a committed critique but the commitment is to an essentially Fabian approach.

When Mendes looks at some of the non-government players, particularly ACOSS he does so with particular authority as his PhD discussed the history of ACOSS. He is a kind observer of ACOSS and perhaps exaggerates their power in policy debates. He is not uncritical of ACOSS, noting in particular their disastrous role in the introduction of a GST in Australia, their failure to help build an organization of unemployed people, and their lack of commitment to Indigenous Australians. For 6 years in late 1980s early 1990s, I was director of the ACT Council of Social Service and was constantly frustrated with ACOSS’ attempts at social policy horse trading. I suggested at the time that had ACOSS made a realistic assessment of its capacity to influence policy it would realise that all it had to trade was fleas.

Phillip Mendes is also kind to the social welfare arms of the churches. This is particularly so in relation to their current preoccupation with privatised and increasingly commercialised provision of much of what was government or not-for- profit services. He provides a not uncritical look at the Australian Association of Social Workers but, again, in a refined and civilised manner not calculated to cause distress to the blue rinse set, nor prick the professional pomposity of the membership.

This book takes an essentially optimistic look at the chances of saving much of the existing welfare state. When he looks at the Howard Government’s efforts to impose “mutual obligations” on Disability Support Pensioners, Mendes again optimistically concludes that Prime Minister Howard’s political pragmatism will lead him to realise that such an extension of “mutual obligation” is politically costly. The delay involved in publication means he probably wrote that in mid 2002. By late 2002 not only has the Government reintroduced this policy but the Labor Party has announced it will not oppose it. Furthermore the Government has announced it wants to extend “mutual obligation” to refugees who hold Temporary Protection Visas. The sheer ruthlessness of the Howard Government’s treatment of the poorest Australians was on display in early 2002 when ACOSS revealed that 386,946 breach penalties had been imposed on social security recipients, mainly unemployed people, in 2001.

Phillip Mendes’ book is a useful addition to Australian welfare writing because it utilises classical political science categorisations of the ideologies which impact upon the welfare state. The book accurately describes the range of ideological positions taken by Labor and Liberal social policy ministers. I think that if Mendes were to have started to write this book in 2003 he would include a section on the Australian Greens who are becoming an emerging force on the Australian political landscape.

The two areas of Australian welfare policy to which this book does not give sufficient regard are Indigenous social justice and refugee/asylum seekers issues.

It is a book which is clearly and carefully written, well researched, easy to understand and is certainly accessible at an undergraduate level. It provides a host of detail, Mendes is obviously well read. He is not oblivious to the old Left’s more virulent critiques of economic fundamentalist welfare policy, acknowledging many in the text.

It is a good introduction to Australian social welfare policies and politics. It contains a number of useful reflective mechanisms at the end of each chapter. I will be setting this book as a set text in my social policy class. It provides some very useful quotations of politicians from Chiffley, Menzies, Whitlam and Fraser which it counterposes with quotes from the Hawke/Keating and Howard eras. This will be particularly useful to those younger students who have difficulty thinking of alternatives to current Howard policies.

Clearly Mendes is committed to a better, fairer, more equal Australia. However, the book is written in a manner which will not distress the Lady Bountifuls enrolling in Social Work courses. It is a book for the study not the barricades.

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Australians All

written in 2001

Australians all let us regret
we are no longer free,
we’re swimming in the global tide
against the GST.

John Howard racked up the deficit,
not building knowledge nation,
imposing on the poor and Black
his mutual obligation.

Australians all let us regret
we are no longer free,
in Headland and in Woomera
we jail the refugee.

And in the war against the poor,
much to their consternation,
with highest praise for competition
provide incentivation.

The greedy banks have come and gone
and left us with huge fees.
Globalisation’s bottom line,
continuing miseries.

The answer to the Murray’s silt:
genetic manipulation.
The bottom line will suit us fine
that’s global devastation.

 

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Basic Income

A Basic Income is a form of income support paid to each individual permanent resident irrespective of their wealth, income, gender, race, age, place of residence or marital status. An equal amount is paid to those in employment and those not at work thereby decreasing the potential for downward envy.  Basic Income is not taxed. All existing tax-free thresholds would be abolished and tax would be payable on each and every extra dollar earned. The only eligibility question to be determined is whether the applicant is a permanent resident of Australia. Further details about Basic Income can be found at Basic Income Guarantee Australia or Basic Income Earth Network.

Some researchers have argued that if a Basic Income was put in place workers would stay away from work in droves: whereas others argue the opposite. The only study conducted in Australia into the impact on work willingness (where low-income families were provided with a guaranteed minimum income), showed these families experienced no decline in work willingness.

Much of the argument about the efficiency of a Basic Income has concentrated on the supply of benefits, in the least stigmatising fashion, to all who need them. There are broader aspects of efficiency that can and should be mounted in support of an unconditional Basic Income.

  • A Basic Income requires the least interference in the lives of citizens.
  • It supplies all permanent residents with equal assistance.
  • It is the most inclusive form of income support and the most secure, thus enhancing citizenship.
  • It provides sufficient income to allow people to explore their creative capacity.
  • It removes many of the obstacles to a reinvigoration of industrial, technical and computing infrastructure.
  • It allows the State a fuller understanding of the impact of its other social wage policies.

A universal Basic Income is not a utopian idea. It is an efficient, affordable way to ensure no Australian permanent resident remains in poverty. However, a Basic Income is just that – an unconditional universal income guarantee. It delivers an income floor without impeding productivity. It is a vast improvement on categorical, selective social services. It is an advance on all social insurance and private provision schemes which invariably result in the “individualisation of risk” and as a result create a “do it yourself welfare state”.

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Basic income conference in Ireland

Written in 2008 not published.

Goodbye to Australia forever
and farewell to Botany Bay
I’m off to Europe to find fame and fortune
so please, just get out of the way.

Goodbye to your tired old means testing,
your worn out ideas and obsessional fears
have reduced me to tears
you’ve no idea that they’ve had their day.

I’ll be dealing in Euros and pounds
far away from those small-minded clowns
ensconced in their cities and towns
sustained by sanctimonious frowns.

We’ll be speaking of universal payments
of caring and sharing, preparing and daring
of finding a place for all residents
not searching for malingers and dissidents.

We’ll talk about tomorrow’s citizenship
of social and economic rights for all
for rich and poor, for weak and strong
of equality; and righting wrong.

Basic income is about trusting each other,
neighbour, stranger, friend, sister or brother
to contribute what we should to the general good
and take what we need, not glorify greed.

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Basic Income in Australia: A distant horizon

In Basic Income Worldwide: Horizons of Reform (2012) edited by Matthew C. Murray and Carole Pateman, Palgrave Macmilliam, Houndmills, pp 227-249

From the first decade following Federation until the late 1980s, Australia seemed to be moving inexorably towards an increasingly comprehensive and generous welfare state. On occasions, it seemed as if a form of Basic Income was firmly upon the political agenda of the incumbent government. Many sections of the society, such as the aged, are guaranteed their income won’t fall below the poverty line. Many people with severe impairments are guaranteed an income. As will be discussed, one group of people with a specific disability is guaranteed a Basic Income whilst others with severe impediments are not. In recent times, the Productivity Commission has recommended introducing a comprehensive income guarantee for all people with severe disabilities.

The issue plaguing the introduction of a universal Basic Income has been a desire by Australian governments to target benefits to specific categories of people. Such a practice creates problems of administrative simplicity at the edges of such categories and, as a consequence, some people miss out. Until the late 1970s, some groups of lone parents were excluded from Federal income support. But it is the intersection of disability and unemployment that has consistently created the most angst.

Social scientists have long known that there is little relationship between the extent of people’s assessed levels of impairment and their work histories. Governments, despite proclaiming they are introducing evidence based policies, exhibit attitudes more in tune with 14th century knowledge (Handler 2002). In 2011, the Prime Minister indicated that she wanted everyone (including lone parents and people with disabilities) “earning or learning” “for the simple dignity that work brings” (Four Corners 2011). Peter Butterworth from the Centre for Mental Health Research at the Australian National University has been following 7,000 Australians for a period of 7 years. He found that “moving from unemployment to a poor quality job was associated with a significant decline in mental health” and that moving into a low quality job didn’t increase the “likelihood of getting a higher quality job over someone who was unemployed” (PM 2011). Governments’ desire to target income support and other impediments to the introduction of a universal Basic Income will be discussed below.

Since the 1970s, Australian academics, government ministers, social welfare practitioners, welfare lobby groups, and political activists have frequently discussed universal income guarantees and alternative income support arrangements. The Basic Income Guarantee Australia website has collected many of these universal income support proposals.

In 1975, it seemed like an idea whose time had come. The Government seemed generally supportive. However, the dismissal of the Whitlam Government removed the impetus for change. The first Australian Commonwealth social security legislation dealing with age and invalid pensions was passed in 1908. Prior to that, the various state administrations handled welfare related issues. By 1947, when all social security payments were consolidated into one piece of legislation, the Commonwealth was paying unemployment and sickness benefits, age, widow, invalid and blind pensions, child endowment and other allowances.

Australian ministers of social welfare since the 1950s have claimed to assist those experiencing ‘the greatest need’. Often they have also claimed to assist ‘all in need’. Running in parallel with calculations of ‘need’ were deliberations about ‘desert’. People had to be considered to be of ‘good character’ in order to receive government assistance. In 1973, however, the requirement that recipients of social security had to be of ‘good moral character’ was removed from the legislation.

In Australia, income support is provided via tax credits or through the social security system. Those who have such assurance include the old, people with severe health problems, the blind, lone parents who have children in their custody, working families with children, ex-service personnel with disabilities, orphans, unemployed people with prior work experience and the temporarily incapacitated. The level of income support for beneficiaries is below the poverty line. Young people who are students or unemployed are paid as little as 40 percent of the poverty line. Age pensioners receive 25 percent of the average wage, which equates with the current poverty line.

In addition, the existence of minimum wage legislation and widespread privatized superannuation leads to an impression that most Australians are assured of some form of income in the event of old age, incapacity or misfortune. Many permanent residents, however, are refused any form of income support because of their length of residence, age, locality, race or the financial well-being of their partner.

It was not until the 1960s that Aboriginal people living in towns were paid income support. In rural and remote areas, even in the mid 1970s, Aboriginal people were seldom paid social security. Many social security payments require migrants to have lived in Australian for a number of years before they are eligible. Many young unemployed people find they are denied social security based on one ruse or other.

The tax credit payments made to families with children are paid in inverse proportion to other family income. Nearly all social security payments are means and/or asset tested. There is one exception. The blind pension is, without a means or asset test, paid to all ‘legally blind’ permanent residents who meet the resident requirement (Jordan, 1984, Mays forthcoming).

1. The Poverty Inquiry and its aftermath

A reformist Labor Party came to power in 1972 after 23 years of unbroken conservative rule. It was an exciting time for social policy advocates. Many government inquiries were established or expanded and there was a sense of change in the air. Reports of the various inquiries criticized the social welfare approach to income maintenance existing at the time.

The earliest detailed blueprint for a guaranteed minimum income in Australia was provided by Professor Henderson in 1975 (Vol. 1, Ch. 6 & Vol. 2, Appendix 6). He wanted to provide all Australians with an income guarantee in order to reduce the emphasis on categories of assistance, provide an easily understandable retention rate on earned income, treat those with regular and those with fluctuating income equitably and lighten the administrative burden on both the taxation and social security departments. The amount of disposable income received by a family or an individual was to be determined by the formula:

‘Disposable income = guaranteed minimum + private income x income retention rate.’

Henderson proposed dividing the population between those who qualified for a pension or benefit whom he called the ‘categorical population’ and those who had not established they were eligible for social security who he termed ‘non-categorical’. He subsequently envisaged extending the ‘categorical population’ to include all people likely to be ‘at risk of poverty’.

He foreshadowed the possibility of paying unemployment and sickness beneficiaries less than age, invalid or widow pensioners and establishing an intermediate rate between the ‘categorical’ rate and the ‘non-categorical’ rate for people who were partially incapacitated. He argued that it might be necessary to pay farmers and self-employed people a lesser rate than the ‘non-categorical’ rate. Apart from individuals living alone, the family would be the unit of income. However, he did consider that older children might subsequently be paid in their own right. The Henderson income guarantee was designed as a social right – a flat rate, non- contributory demogrant.

In political terms, the essential strength of Henderson’s income guarantee proposals is that they grew out of and retained the essence of the existing social welfare system. They were in every sense a reform of that system. His suggestions for a guaranteed minimum income would make the income maintenance system more humane, less categorical and more comprehensive. Apart from the failure to tackle poverty in a systematic manner, the basic weakness in the proposals was that they failed to come to terms with the need to dismantle the existing system and restructure it in a way, which would have facilitated the complete integration of the income maintenance and taxation systems (italics in original Tomlinson 1989, p. 146).

Dividing the population into ‘categorical’ and ‘non-categorical’ groups and paying the ‘categorical’ group at the poverty line but only paying the latter group between 50 and 71 per cent of that line does little to decrease the ‘non-categorical’ groups desire to become ‘categorical’. Nor does it ensure that those who are not classed as ‘categorical’ can avoid poverty. Henderson’s desire to extend the coverage of the ‘categorical’ population stopped far short of including wives or husbands whose spouse (or children whose parents) inadequately support them. Henderson, whilst recognizing that intra-family transfers are often insufficient, offered no alternative.

Also in 1975, a group of senior Commonwealth bureaucrats (who called themselves the Priority Review Staff) published a plan to introduce a negative income tax or tax credit scheme. They too divided the population between those whom Henderson had termed ‘categorical’ and ‘non-categorical’. The ‘categorical’ population would be paid at 100 per cent of the poverty line (non-working) the ‘non-categorical’ population would be paid at 55 per cent of the poverty line (working). The Priorities Review Staff also adopted the family as the unit of payment.

The intention of both the Henderson Poverty Inquiry and the Priority Review Staff proposals was to rationalize the existing categorical social security system while also integrating the tax and social security systems. They also intended to find a way of assisting those less affluent Australians who received little or no help from government because they were unable to fit into the existing social security eligibility categories. Whilst Henderson was intent on retaining and expanding ancillary welfare services the Priority Review Staff, like the best-known proponent of negative income tax, Milton Friedman (1982), wanted to streamline welfare and abolish many ancillary services. Much the same criticism (made of the Poverty Inquiry’s proposals above) applies to the Priority Review Staff Report.

Both Henderson and the Priority Review Staff decided that adopting the individual as the unit of income for their suggested income guarantees would result in a greater drain on the budget. Neither seriously looked at the bureaucratic costs or the resulting inequities which result from adopting the family as the unit of income.

In 1974, the Woodhouse Inquiry had recommended a no fault comprehensive income support system to assist those who were sick, injured or who had severe impairments. A similar scheme currently operates successfully in New Zealand. In February 2011, the Australian Productivity Commission recommended the introduction of a National Disability Insurance Agency to ensure that all permanent residents with significant disabilities would receive appropriate services. In addition they recommended the establishment of a no-fault National Injury Insurance Scheme to cover all who experienced ‘catastrophic injuries’. The Commission argued it was necessary to create the National Disability Insurance Agency and a no-fault National Injury Insurance Scheme because:

The current disability support ‘system’ is inequitable, underfunded, fragmented and inefficient and gives people with a disability little choice. It provides no certainty that people will be able to access appropriate supports . . . Inadequate services can hit certain communities particularly hard – such as people in rural and remote areas, people from a non-English speaking background and Indigenous people (p. 5) . . . People with similar levels of functionality get access to quite different levels of support, depending on their location, timing, or the origin of the disability (p.6).

In the year following the First Main Report, the Hancock Inquiry recommended comprehensive social insurance superannuation akin to European schemes. The Hancock superannuation recommendation was designed to replace the age pension and other forms of state funded income support for older citizens. Neither the Woodhouse nor Hancock proposal was implemented. This is unfortunate because had the Woodhouse proposal been adopted many people with disabling conditions and others who have less severe impairments would have secured financial assistance; as it is, many people with incapacities fail to obtain support because they don’t fit the eligibility categories. Three decades on, most of inequities, identified by the Woodhouse Inquiry and experienced by those who encounter serious illnesses or accidents, remain (Mays forthcoming, Tomlinson 2003 Ch. 7). Had Hancock’s proposals been accepted then many of the inequities caused by Australia’s privatized superannuation schemes could have been avoided (Hughes 2008).

2. The governmental income support policies – Late 1970s to mid 1990s

Following the dismissal of the Whitlam (Labor) Government in 1975, a conservative Coalition Government led by Malcolm Fraser was elected and remained in power until 1983. Unemployed people in particular found life harder under this Coalition Government. The Whitlam government had ended the system whereby married women with children, who had separated or whose partner had died, could in many circumstances claim a widow’s pension but non-married mothers had to depend on state government family assistance. Labor had introduced a supporting mothers benefit for mothers who were not married that was slightly less generous than the widows pension. The Fraser Government extended this benefit to lone fathers.

Whereas the Whitlam government had set up inquiries and gave the inquiry heads substantial independence, the Hawke Labor government, 1983-1991, maintained a tighter managerial role in the social inquiries it set up. A classic example was the Cass inquiry into Social security. Professor Bettina Cass was provided with Department of Social Security staff for her Inquiry. She often worked from Departmental offices and reported, not to the Parliament, but to the Minister. It is reasonable to conclude that her published reports did not contain ideas that the minister considered objectionable. The Minister at the time, Brian Howe, was preoccupied with what he termed the propensity of welfare recipients to become ‘dependent’ on welfare payments and consequently losing interest in finding work. When Cass looked at unemployment (1988) she recommended extending the activities which people were required to undertake in order to receive unemployment benefit. She termed her system an active employment model. It was not unlike the participation income model suggested, in1996, by Professor Anthony Atkinson.

By 1994, unemployment had become a significant political problem. The then Labor Prime Minister, Paul Keating set out his solutions in a monograph entitled Working Nation. It involved guaranteeing work to people who had experienced 18 months continuing joblessness. In addition the Commonwealth increased the requirements that people who were unemployed were expected to meet before they would be paid unemployment benefit. Keating termed such an arrangement a ‘reciprocal obligation’.

3. From ‘mutual obligation’ to the intervention

In 2000 a review committee on income support, established by a minister in the Howard (conservative) government, dutifully reported to the government that there was a need to insist that social security recipients met their obligations to work, study or engage in other ‘activation’ activities (McClure 2000).

Claus Offe (2008 p. 10) argues that the enthusiasm for the euphemism of ‘activation’ results in categorizations – caring for, managing, controlling, treatment, supervision and frequent stigmatization of recipients – which in turn ‘reduces them to the passive status of sheltered, paternalistically regulated objects’ who are denied meaningful choice in their lives. Furthermore, a 2003 report entitled Much Obliged, commissioned by the Brotherhood of St. Laurence and the St. Vincent de Paul Society, asserted that people who became long-term unemployed have so much of their time taken up just meeting the obligations imposed on them by the government that they do not have time to find work. The report further concludes the ‘mutual obligation’ regime was ‘failing the most disadvantaged job seekers. Overall the system operates…not as “welfare to work” but “welfare as work”’ (Ziguras, Dufty and Considine 2003, p.43).

The Howard Government’s assault on welfare provision depended on selecting target populations, which it held up to critical scrutiny. On coming to office, it coerced young unemployed people into ‘work for the dole’ and compulsory literacy programs. It became common to hear ministers say that welfare efforts should be directed at those who are ‘genuine’.

The Howard Government’s social policy sought to define ‘the genuine’ (as in the sense of ‘the genuinely needy’ or those who were ‘genuinely looking for work’ or ‘those who had a genuine disability’) more narrowly. This process developed a momentum such that ‘the genuine’ appeared to be an endangered species facing imminent extinction. It started with young people excluded from the labour market. It enveloped lone parents and Aborigines and within a decade of coming to office, the Howard Government was targeting people with disabilities.

The Howard Government’s Emergency Response , in June 2007, in relation to 73 Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory is particularly noteworthy. The Government claimed to be acting to protect Aboriginal children from sexual exploitation and neglect. Five hundred pages of legislation were rushed through the House of Representatives with the support of the Labor Party on the afternoon it was tabled (Altman and Hinkson 2007 p.2). The legislation supporting the Northern Territory Intervention allowed the government to quarantine half the social security payment to each Aboriginal person by placing them on a Basics Card, which could only be used to buy food, clothing and pay for rent and electricity. Widespread alcohol restrictions were imposed. It allowed the suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act. Police were given new powers on Aboriginal communities, even entitling them to enter and search private houses as if they were operating in a public place. It threatened to withhold social security payments from parents whose children did not attend school. Lease conditions were imposed which meant that the government could compulsorily acquire Aboriginal land and even subsequently exclude traditional owners from the land it had acquired (Altman and Hinkson 2007).

4. Economic stimulation but business as usual on the welfare front

The worldwide recession presented the Government with a challenge. The Howard Government had left no Federal Government debt. China kept buying coal, gas and metals, and Labor, elected to office in 2007, determined to engage in stimulus spending which kept Australia from experiencing a technical recession and maintained employment at reasonable levels. The financial sector was provided with government-backed guarantees and it weathered the fiscal storm. Bank accounts of up to $1 million were guaranteed by the government.

The Labor leader, Kevin Rudd, had promised during the election that he would continue the Northern Territory Intervention for a further 12 months. It was generally assumed by progressive voters that, after a year, Labor would get on with implementing decent child welfare, housing, employment, community development and self-determination policies in Indigenous communities. After a year, Indigenous leader Peter Yu was appointed to head a review of the Intervention. The Review recommended winding back the hard-line aspects of the Intervention particularly ending the compulsory income management system and only quarantining welfare payments of those parents who actually neglected their children. It recommended the reinstatement of the Racial Discrimination Act and the payment of compensation to those communities whose land had been compulsorily acquired. The Rudd Government said it intended persevering with the Intervention for at least another year.

In August 2009, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, Professor James Anaya found that the measures of the NT Intervention:

‘overtly discriminate against Aboriginal peoples, infringe their right of self- determination and stigmatise already stigmatised communities’ and that ‘The emergency response is incompatible with Australia’s obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights; treaties to which Australia is a party’ (Hawley 2009).

Anaya’s report pointed out that all community members, whether or not they had children, or had had problems managing income in the past were forced to accept the income management of their social security(2010, p.5). In February 2010, Alistair Nicholson, the former Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia condemned the Labor Government’s plan to extend the quarantining of half of welfare payments beyond the Northern Territory to other areas of disadvantage.

While the Rudd government and Howard Coalition government may well have acted in a racially discriminatory fashion, they were not cheapskates. It costs $3,000 per Aboriginal person per year to have government officials ‘income manage’ welfare payments of around $10,000 per annum (cited in Behrendt and McCausland 2008, p.17). If the government had money to spare, then raising the social security payment by 30 per cent would have substantially boosted the economy in Indigenous communities and conceivably would have allowed Aboriginal Territorians to take greater control of their lives. It may have gone some way to compensate Aboriginal residents of remote communities for the much higher cost of living there.

5. Private superannuation

In the 1930s and early 1940s, some conservative politicians attempted to introduce private superannuation schemes subsidized by government. Labor opposed the idea, arguing that such schemes would undermine age and invalid pension schemes. As noted, in 1976 the Hancock Inquiry recommended introducing a comprehensive government backed social insurance superannuation scheme as a replacement for age pensions. The conservative Fraser government, strongly supported by the private insurance industry, declined to implement it.

It was the Hawke Labor government, with Keating as treasurer, which, with considerable union support, opted to introduce compulsory superannuation. The Australian scheme is a private superannuation model, divided between the trade union based ‘industry’ funds, private insurance company funds and government workers’ retirement funds. The compulsory contributions paid by employers ensure that the occupational funds accumulate considerable money but they disproportionately reward those on the highest incomes. Some employers and other well off people voluntarily pay into private insurance or bank based superannuation funds. The income taxes forgone by governments on superannuation contributions invariably provide the greatest advantage to those who have the largest investment in superannuation. Many rich people obtain more from the government, in foregone tax on their superannuation investment, than age pensioners get from social security.

The Australian Capital Territory Council of Social Service (ACTCOSS) in 1991 produced a monograph, The Super Tax Rort, in which it pointed out that whilst those in secure full time work would generally benefit from privatized superannuation there were many losers; namely, low paid employees, casual seasonal and itinerant workers, people in poorly unionized sectors of the workforce, those nearing retirement who would not have been able to contribute to superannuation schemes for any length of time, women who leave employment to care for family members or to have children, people with disabilities and older migrants who had not been long in Australia.

One group of people who are likely to gain little from privatized superannuation are Aboriginal people living in rural and remote Australia. From 1977 until 2010, about half the Aboriginal adults of working age living in these regions were engaged in a scheme called the Community Development Employment Program (CDEP). This involved their working on projects, which their communities decided were necessary. It could involve working in the health clinic, collecting garbage, driving the school bus, building houses, working with cattle, making artifacts or being wildlife rangers. Many of the jobs were a couple of days a week. The positions were seldom full time. Even if workers were working a five-day week, they were not entitled to superannuation from their employer. Their local CDEP organization received the bulk of its funds from the Commonwealth Government. That is, the Commonwealth Government was ultimately their employer. This same government, which insisted all other employers that CDEP workers were provided with superannuation contributions.

The irony is that even if Aboriginal people living in rural and remote parts of Australia had had superannuation contributions made on their behalf few of them would have been able to gain much benefit. Aboriginal people in those areas die on average 17 to 20 years younger than other Australians. In these regions approximately ‘three-quarters of Indigenous male and two- thirds of Indigenous females die before the age of 65 years compared with the Australian population as a whole where one-quarter of males and one-sixth of females deaths occur before that age’ (Madden and Trewin 2003, p183). Although these statics are some years old, there has been little if any improvement in Aboriginal health in rural and remote Australia in the last decade and some researchers have suggested the situation is worsening.

Whilst the Fraser Coalition Government tightened the eligibility for unemployment benefit, it commissioned a report which suggested that Aborigines living on their traditional lands be provided with a sustainable minimum income paid from mining royalties (Turnbull 1980). Unfortunately, governments persevered with the Community Development Employment Program from 1977 until 2010.

6. Division and downward envy

The main ideological underpinning of ‘work for the dole’ or other ‘participation income’ schemes is a belief that unemployed people need to be coerced to work. The idea that many people who receive a disability support pension exaggerate their impairments or are straight out ‘malingers’ has been around at least since the 1348 Statute of Labourers injunction forbidding assistance to ‘sturdy beggars’ (Handler 2002, p. 56, footnote No. 217). The Howard Government was able to convince a substantial proportion of low waged workers that many welfare recipients were defrauding the system and that the money they received caused the tax rates paid by low income employees to remain unnecessarily high.

The Australian categorical means-tested income maintenance system divides one category of recipients against another. It atomizes social solidarity and the idea of ‘a community of recipients’ evaporates in its wake. Unemployed people are paid at a different level from those who are age pensioners. Young beneficiaries are paid at lower rates than older beneficiaries.

If the working class and social welfare recipients are to build social solidarity and renounce downward envy, then they will need to let go of the ideological constraints which Australian governments and vested interest groups have used in the past to weaken social bonds between disparate groups of permanent residents. Indigenous Australians can no longer be consigned to the fringes of white society, nor various ethnic groups to particular suburbs. The population as a whole has to find a place at the table for sole parents and their children, those who are unemployed, homeless or who suffer impairments.

The bureaucratically sophisticated easily maneuver their way around Commonwealth requirements and are paid their benefits. Those who are poorly educated, people with severe mental health or addiction difficulties and those who are less bureaucratically sophisticated (even though they are often suffering greater financial hardship) are frequently breached for 8 weeks or have their payments indefinitely withheld.

Often there are considerable similarities between people who have a combination of a partial physical impairment, a minor mental health or personality problem and a recent poor work history. Yet the type of benefit they are paid can vary widely depending on who they see and how they are assessed. They could be:

  • rejected on the grounds they haven’t met their participation requirements,
  • considered as not capable of working 15 hours a week and provided with a disability support pension,
  • found to have a temporary illness and placed on sickness benefit,
  • paid an unemployment benefit, and
  • if they have just had their 65th birthday, they could be paid an age pension.

The disability lobby often finds itself caught in the cleft stick of need and desert. When governments attack unemployed people and some disability support pensioners for not looking hard enough for work, disability activists, instead of building a united front with welfare activists, tend to argue that those with a disability are in greater need of the income support than are able bodied unemployed workers. Lone parent organizations often plead their special needs over other groups. In 2010, the Liberal opposition leader, Tony Abbott,  announced plans to make it compulsory for all people under 50 years of age who are unemployed for 3 months to ‘work for the dole’. The incoming Gillard Labor minority government insists that from 2012 one third of all disability support pensioners will take annual medical check-ups and be interviewed by departmental officers twice a year ‘to encourage them into employment’.

One hundred years of Commonwealth means-tested and targeted social security payments have not resulted in a system capable of paying ‘all the poor and only the poor’; nor has it been able to ensure that no one is left without the means to survive. Commonwealth participation income and tax credits have not resulted in equitable or even equal treatment of all permanent residents. Even if it were fair to insist that fully fit unemployed people meet certain participation requirements before they are paid an unemployment benefit, there is no equity in insisting that someone who is only considered capable of working 15 hours a week meets identical participation requirements. It is nonsense to suggest that the inordinate complexity, invasion of privacy and stigma inducing practices of the Australian social welfare system have resulted in a fair distribution of payments in line with need. It is not possible to know if what occurs is equitable or reasonable. Nevertheless, we do know that the Australian social welfare system does not treat all applicants for assistance equally or equitably.

Because the Australian social security system uses the family as the unit of income, even if a person meets all the requirements for payment of a benefit or pension but is living with a partner, the partner’s income and assets will determine whether the person actually receives any payment. Given such disparity in possible outcomes for applicants, there is no way that Australian governments can claim they are capable of eradicating poverty whilst they persevere with the existing system of income maintenance.

7. Basic income as an alternative to the existing income maintenance system

Fully elaborated guaranteed minimum income schemes (Henderson 1975) and negative income tax proposals Priorities Review Staff (1975) were suggested 35 years ago. Alan McDonald (1995) proposed a detailed blue print for an Australian Basic Income a decade and a half ago. Various reforms to Australia’s income support system continue to be advanced by academics, government agencies and the welfare and disability lobbyists. Paul Spicker (2007) notes that many of the Northern European welfare systems which deal most effectively with poverty are social protection systems rather than poverty alleviation schemes, and he assert that ‘If a system is based on support for everyone, poor people will also be helped. If it supports only the poor, some are likely to be excluded (p.136).’ Robert Goodin and Julian Le Grand came to a similar conclusion in 1987, as have many others in the intervening years.

A Basic Income makes an equal payment to all permanent residents without regard to desert. Such schemes, because they are universal and entail no conditionality apart from establishing residency, are unlike participation income schemes and many targeted social welfare programs in that they avoid the problem of having to define standards of eligibility tightly (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2008, p. 5).

Is a Basic Income capable of treating all applicants for assistance equitably? The answer is of course ‘No’. However, it is capable of treating everybody equally. A Basic Income, provided it was paid (using the individual as the unit of income) at a rate above the poverty line, would abolish poverty. Governments would be in a position to know how much income support they are paying to each and every permanent resident and would be far better placed than they are now to work out what extra goods and services are required in order to promote equity and social justice throughout the land.

In 2006, I wrote that a universal Basic Income has many advantages when compared with the existing Australian residual, means-tested, categorical system of income support. The main gains which would flow from changing to a universal income support system can be grouped into five major themes. A Basic Income would:

(1) be economically sustainable,
(2) be easy to administer,
(3) be ethically sound,
(4) be non-discriminatory, and
(5) enhance citizenship.

A Basic Income provides a foundation stone on which to build an advanced civilization precisely because it legitimizes both the gift of giving and the joy of receiving. It embodies a sense of social solidarity through engaging in a form of mutuality that goes beyond ‘tit for tat reciprocity’. It provides a minimum income floor beyond which no one can fall but has no ceiling that prevents people rising (Rhys-Williams 1965 p. 163, Milner 1920 p. 117). Basic Income brings an inclusive citizenship: the duty that each of us owes to all and the equally pressing duty that all of us owe to each. Henning Melber (2009, p. 18) writes that a Basic Income:

seeks to restore human dignity and (self-)respect through a modest but nonetheless enabling financial transfer which allows recipients to become active and to make spending options they otherwise would not have. In that sense, it also fosters ownership over matters and creates an identity of belonging and citizenship as opposed to isolated destitution. … (It) allows the marginalized to make use of opportunities to actively participate in the society.

A Basic Income would ensure that people have access to money when they are in financial need. It does not interfere with incentives to increase income and it rewards self-help. It inculcates in the young, and reminds the middle aged and the old of, the need to ensure that no one goes to bed hungry and encourages inter generational transfers by underlining the importance of social solidarity. It stigmatizes no one because it treats all permanent residents equally. It converts the meaningless phrases of ‘increasing social capital’ or ‘ensuring social insertion /inclusion’ into a substantial process by encouraging sharing whilst allowing an equal taking from society’s income pool. It is a universal program, and because it does all these things, it enhances the quality of community life.

On the other hand, the existing Australian social security system is categorical, means- tested, and hedged around with contractual obligations (such as the requirement to apply for 10 jobs a fortnight and ensure one’s children attend school). The Commonwealth Government has been running one such school attendance study involving 6,600 parents and 5,000 children in Aboriginal communities in Queensland and the Northern Territory and some low income suburban areas. Though it threatened all families that their income support payments would be suspended for poor school attendance, in the first year it only suspended 95 families’ payments and all of those have been restored (Harrison 2011 p.16).

Behrendt and McCausland (2008) studied the withholding of social welfare payments from parents whose children did not attend school. They noted that Coalition and Labor Governments had been attracted to such policies (p.4), but found no evidence within Australia or overseas to suggest that such a policy on its own increased school attendance (pp.18-26).

If a government wished to increase school attendance, it might look at a Basic Income experiment recently carried out in the Otjivero-Omitara area of Namibia (See Ch. 2 in this volume). A Basic Income monthly grant of $100 (Namibian) was provided to every person under the age of 60 who had lived in the area for a year. No conditionality was attached to receiving the money. Within one year of receiving the grant:

  • school attendance and visits to the health clinic rose dramatically,
  • crime, poverty and child malnutrition all decreased,
  • the rate of those (above the age of 15 years) engaged in income generating activities increased from 44 to 55% of the population, and
  • household debt had dropped significantly while household savings had risen
    (Haarmann, C., Haarmann, D., Jauch, Shindondola-Mote, Nattrass, van Niekerk and Samson (2009, Executive Summary, pp. 13-17).

8. What would an Australian Basic Income look like?

Milton Friedman, who wanted to introduce a negative income tax (because he claimed that ‘it would assist the poor and only the poor’ and that once such a tax was implemented it would allow much of the welfare assistance machinery to be dismantled), was of the view that:

Only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable (Friedman and Friedman 1982, p. ix).

Australian governments have not perceived there is a crisis so far. Many poor people who go to sleep in cold houses, on the streets or in cars in back alleyways worrying about their children’s hunger or lack of shelter, understand there is a real crisis in their lives. Aboriginal people whose relatives die too young realize there is a crisis. A million people’s personal crises are a national crisis even if governments refuse to recognize it as such.

The most likely form of basic income I envisage being introduced in Australia would be paid to each permanent resident, irrespective of whether they were employed or not, regardless of their ethnic background or marital status. It would be paid to individuals whether they lived alone or with others, there would be identical payments made to city and country dwellers and receipt would not impose any social obligation upon the recipient. The Basic Income would take no account of a person’s income or assets. It would be a payment that neither governments nor commercial enterprises could garnishee. Income tax would be paid on each and every other dollar earned or received from investments.

The Basic Income would be paid to every permanent resident at a rate slightly above the single age pension rate. An amount of five hundred dollars per annum above the age pension rate would be needed to cash out the tax deductibility concession currently provided to age pensioners who have additional income, if they are not to be disadvantaged in the transition to a Basic Income. A Basic Income at this level would ensure that no current social security pensioner or beneficiary would be disadvantaged by the shift to a Basic Income whilst most social security recipients and low-income earners up to the average full time male wage would be financially better off. Two thirds of Australian workers earn less than the average wage.

It is true that people with disabilities often have far greater mobility costs than do able- bodied people, and people who are ill often have to spend a lot on pharmaceuticals. These extra costs need to be supplied by means of disability and health programs supplementing a Basic Income. It costs widows, young unemployed people, disability support pensioners and age pensioners much the same to buy food and pay rent. They have similar living costs and so should receive identical Basic Income payments.

In the short term, until subsidies on childcare and education are adjusted, the Basic Income for children under the age of 16 years (living in the family home) might need to be paid at half the adult rate.

9. Is a Basic Income affordable?

Australia is an affluent country, which could easily afford to introduce a Basic Income paid to every permanent resident at a rate slightly above the age pension for single pensioners. Australia exports huge amounts of natural gas, coal, iron ore, alumina, wheat and other farm products and if it is incapable of providing a Basic Income at the rate of 25 per cent of the average wage to all permanent residents then there is something drastically wrong with the system of income distribution. In 2010, the Reserve Bank estimated that the mining boom was likely to continue for at least 15 to 20 years.

In 2010, the Henry Review recommended substantially increasing the tax paid by large mining companies and making superannuation more equitable. The Government put the superannuation recommendation in the too hard basket. Prime Minister Rudd unsuccessfully attempted to impose higher taxes on miners. He was replaced by his Deputy, Julia Gillard, who settled for only modest resource tax increases.

In the 5 years leading up to the 2009 worldwide recession, Australia repaid its Federal Government debt. Even taking into account the recent stimulus spending, it is in a comfortable debt position when compared with other developed nations.

Australia could easily afford to provide a universal Basic Income paid to each permanent resident at slightly above 25 per cent of average weekly male earnings (approximately the current age pension level). The extra money needed could be obtained by imposing or increasing resource taxes, carbon taxes, a Tobin tax on financial dealings, consumption and excise taxes. It would be a wise equity measure to initiate a wealth tax on all wealth, including any equity in the family home, and on private superannuation. If superannuation were to be excluded from such a wealth tax then all existing tax advantages accruing to superannuation should be abolished. In Australia over $25 billion is provided to business by the Federal Government annually. Once a universal Basic Income was in place there would be far less need to bribe industry to create jobs and several billion dollars could then be retained in the government’s coffers. This could be used to help pay for the Basic Income (Standing 2009 pp.303-305).
10. Conclusions – Is a Universal Basic Income Likely to be Introduced in Australia?

From 1908 until the late 1980s, the Australian social security system gradually became more generous and comprehensive. Older permanent residents who had live here for at least ten years were guaranteed an income, lone parents with children were assured of income support and those who were considered permanently incapacitated were provided with an income guarantee. If the person was “legally blind” they were guaranteed a Basic Income. Orphans were provided with an income guarantee. Those who were temporarily sick were granted income support for the duration of their illness. Unemployed people who met set obligations were also granted a benefit. There also existed a “special benefit” paid at the rate of the unemployment benefit to those permanent residents who did not meet the residency or other requirements necessary to obtain the standard social security pension or benefit. This special benefit operated much like the minimum income schemes in France and other parts of Europe. In recent years, the use of the special benefit has been drastically curtailed.

The main obstacles to the introduction of a universal Basic Income in 2010 would seem to fall into two categories: self-interest and ideological preconceptions. An initial privileged position does not guarantee long-term privilege as many lone parents and disability support pensioners have painfully learned in the last decade. Low paid workers need to discover what they have in common with social security recipients and concentrate on these rather than the things that divide them. Once they accept that inordinate superannuation tax concessions provided to higher paid workers is a more obvious cause of higher income tax rates than the provision of a poverty line benefit to those without other income this might help cement working class solidarity.

Workers and social security recipients will need to jettison ideological preconceptions about ‘bludgers’, ‘malingerers’, the need to compel welfare recipients to meet obligations, racist ideas about the descendents of the original owners of this country and often equally racist ideas about recently arrived migrants and refugees. They will need to reexamine patriarchical ideas about retaining the family as the unit of income as the best way of maintaining the family as a social support system.

When one looks at the current social security system in Australia in terms of the potential for generalized income guarantees there is much to be optimistic about. Since the mid-1980s governments of both persuasions have significantly increased the family tax credit system whilst simultaneously tightening the eligibility requirements on the benefit and pension systems.

It has not been a one way street, the 2010 Henry Review into taxation suggested cutting back on the windfall gains which some rich people receive from the foregone tax on superannuation and increasing the benefits derived by lower income earners. In February 2011, the Australian Productivity Commission recommended establishing a no-fault National Injury Insurance Scheme and an agency to ensure that all permanent residents with significant disabilities would receive appropriate services. In mid-2011, the Gillard Government announced support in principle for such a scheme. If these recommendations are implemented, then, when taken together with the blind pension and the disability support pension, this will ensure that all permanent residents, who can establish they have a significant disability, will be guaranteed an above the poverty line income. Older residents and lone parents with children have a similar guarantee now.

It would not require much movement in the national accounts to extend the existing system of income support from its present income guarantees for substantial sections of the population to one which provided a universal Basic Income to every permanent resident. In Brazil, there are moves afoot to extend their family assistance program from serving the poorest to include most of the population. There the slogan is “For everybody – the poor first.” The biggest obstacle currently to such a move in Australia is the desire on the part of both the Labor and conservative sides of the parliament to retain the right to impose conditionality, obligations and sanctions upon some of the poorest citizens. Some working class organizations also consider that such requirements discipline the unemployed and stop welfare fraud.

Essentially, a better-informed ‘self-interest’ would allow workers to see the many advantages they would obtain once a universal Basic Income was in place. They will come to see that by providing income security for all it is possible to build a better society and move in the direction of even greater equity without the conflict, which such efforts sometimes evoke.

The self-interest of the better off and the privatized superannuation industry constitute a formidable but not insurmountable obstacle. It will be the job of up and coming Basic Income advocates to point out the inherent unfairness of the present income support and taxation systems which disproportionately advantage an affluent minority while, at the same time, are incapable of assisting all permanent residents who are in severe financial need.

Acknowledgment

I wish to thank Penny Harrington for her continuing encouragement and editorial advice.

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Basic income without obligation: Why unconditional income support is preferable?

Abstract

Is the introduction of a universal basic income politically feasible? What is there about a universal basic income which generates such negativity? Is there something wrong about getting something for nothing? What problems do selectivity, targeting, means testing and conditionality create? What is so frightening about paying millionaires the same level of guaranteed income as all other permanent residents? Is providing universal income support a radical social idea? Are income support programs which provide an above poverty line assistance to all permanent residents a useful way of creating the good society? Are there possible downsides to moving in this direction? Is there a better way to abolish poverty, destitution, slough, ignorance and intolerance whilst ensuring a socially desirable lifestyle for all permanent residents? Wouldn’t it be cheaper to direct all available funds to those in poverty?

Let’s answer these questions in reverse order.

Clearly it would cost substantially less to provide income support only to those who are poor rather than providing the same level of income support to all citizens irrespective of need. But this is not the full answer. Categorical / selective / targeted / means-tested programs have never in modern history ever reached all the poor and only the poor. There are many reasons for this. Namely: bureaucratic ineptitude, racism, meanness of spirit, favouritism, political interference are obstacles to identifying all the poor and only the poor. Perceptions of stigma, difficulties of applying, lack of knowledge about entitlement are just some of the reasons why people fail to apply for categorical income support programs. The least bureaucratically sophisticated, the most remote, the least educated, and the poorest of our citizens are the ones most like to miss out on some or all of their income support assistance.

One has only to look at the New Start Allowance (which used to be called Unemployment Benefit) to see some of the problems of categorical / selective / targeted means-tested programs. It is hedged around with conditionality, meanness of spirit and bureaucratic bastardry. The regulations controlling Australian welfare administrations are written in poor house ink.

Goodin & Le Grand noted in 1987 that policies which are specifically aimed at addressing the problems of the poor are poor policies. The reason for this is that, even if it were possible to assist every poor person and only poor people there would not be the public support available to sustain such programs, let alone enhance the level of income support provided. In relation to the New Start Allowance the base level of payment has not, in real terms, been raised since 1994. Since that time the severity of conditionality imposed upon recipients has dramatically increased.

A better way.

A universal basic income because it provides, without any demeaning conditions or enforced obligations, an austere but livable income to every permanent resident, is a better way and a more direct way of ensuring a socially desirable lifestyle for everybody. It ends enforced dependency on any other person because it is paid to each and every individual irrespective of any living arrangement or any other social status. It is paid irrespective of race, ethnicity, religious affiliation or lack of it. It does not take account of any other cultural trait. Because the basic income is not taxed and cannot be garnished by any individual, company or government it provides a known guarantee of sustenance above the poverty line. It ensures the government knows the minimum income support available to the citizenry on which it can then build its other educational, health, housing and disability programs.

It ensures the capacity to voluntarily engage in productive activity or pursue education, craft, vocation or artistic endeavour in a way which enhances freedom from domination without impeding freedom to accomplish.

Advantages and disadvantages of providing an above the poverty line income support.

We have long known that letting people live in poverty increases crime, mental health problems, a sense of hopelessness, removes an individual’s sense of agency, causes marital disruption, decreases capacity to find or hold employment and magnifies despair. But what is less well recognised is that how we act to remove people from poverty can enhance or exacerbate their situation.

Neoliberals are fond of trotting out the cliché that any job is better than no job at all. Julia Gillard, Labor Prime Minister, in the run up to the 2010 Federal election spoke about the simple dignity that a job brings (Four Corners 2011). Such attitudes justify enforcing a readiness to work policy, workfare, work for the dole, mutual/reciprocal obligation, and even the workhouse and outdoor relief policies in of mid 19thCentury policies in England. They lie at the heart of the worthy/unworthy divide. I will deal later with the specific argument about the risk of moral turpitude arising out of getting something for nothing embedded in ex-prime minister John Howard’s frequent claim that working age people who receive assistance from the state “must give something back”.

The central disadvantage often identified by neo-liberals and their ilk is that if people are not forced / encouraged / nudged / assisted / helped to get job ready or forced to take the first available job then they will become dependent of the state, perhaps for life. Jocelyn Newman who, herself, received two parliamentary and one military pension in retirement, whilst a government welfare minister,commissioned a report entitled The Challenge of Welfare Dependency in the 21st. Century.

Despite the hullabaloo, no one has been able to identify able bodied people who have been found to suffer intergenerational dependency but the myth is alive and well. Little attention is paid to detailed longitudinal studies which show that being forced to take a poor-quality job does little for unemployed people and, in many cases, worsens their predicament.

A longitudinal study of 1,000 unemployed respondents in the United Kingdom aged between 35-75 recently found that those who obtained low-paying or highly stressful jobs did not enjoy better health than those who remained unemployed. Whereas those who obtained good-quality jobs did enjoy better health outcomes (Chandola and Zhang 2017). This study replicates several of the findings of a seven-year longitudinal Australian study conducted by Peter Butterworth of the Centre for Mental Health at ANU, Canberra, who “found that moving from unemployment to a poor-quality job was actually associated with a significant decline in those people’s mental health and well-being compared with staying unemployed”: Butterworth also found that obtaining a poor-quality job did not increase that person’s chances of subsequently obtaining good quality employment (Long, 2011 p.1).

It would seem to me that what should be taken from these studies and of course the Namibian, Indian, Canadian and other basic income trials is that removing conditionality, abolishing obstacles to employment, providing a secure income and providing opportunities to obtain desired employment, rather than enforcing compulsion, is the best way to proceed.

Is providing universal income support a radical social idea?

Basic income has been around in English speaking circles for more than 500 years since Thomas More’s Utopia was published. Professor Guy Standing, acknowledges More’s contribution before suggesting such ideas proliferated among the Plebeians as early as 462 BC in ancient Greece. Such ideas formed the basis of Australian Aboriginal society and several other non-Western societies for at least the last 70,000 years.

Being old does not ensure that an idea is not radical. But those who would assert that the idea of a universal basic income is a radical idea would have to demonstrate its radical essence and I believe they would hard pressed to do so.

Ensuring every permanent resident has sufficient to sustain a dignified life is an extraordinarily mundane idea. Most leading religious figures have advocated ideas along such lines for the last few millennia.

What wrong with selectivity, targeting, means-testing and conditionality?

The current system of government provided income support in Australia creates many problems for those who receive the “assistance”, those who administer the provision of welfare and the society more generally. Earlier this article considered the fact that the way income support is delivered to the recipient often worsens their situation; as does the failure to provide such support to each and every individual. I am not going to revisit this except to say that in Australia the state fails to convey to recipients that their receipt of such assistance is a right of permanent residence not a handout.

Even bureaucrats with the best intentions will at times exclude some who should be assisted and assist others who don’t have an entitlement. But the bulk of those administering welfare programs designed to assist the poor are not sufficiently trained, are under constant pressure to find reasons not to pay and are forced to operate within extraordinarily tight budget constraints. They are rewarded for rejecting claims and put under pressure if they are seen as generous. Anyone who feels I may be exaggerating the propensity of middle managers and frontline workers to respond to inappropriate incentives should reflect upon the findings of the Banking and Don Dale Royal Commissions and the robo-debt fiasco.

Means-testing creates disincentives to find poorly remunerated casual/precarious employment, poverty traps, and frequently penalises those who do undertake part-time employment by not allowing them to write off the expenses associated with work and/or by clawing back from the welfare benefit anything from 50 to more than 100 percent of the income earned from employment.

But a major problem with selectivity / targeting / means-testing and conditionality occurs at a societal level. Such programs undermine social solidarity, evoke downward envy (Tomlinson 1999), devalue citizenship and undermine generosity of spirit. The entire neo-liberal philosophical emphasis is devoted to enhancing a dog eat dog competitive spirit by not relying on others (particularly the state). Such non-reliance on others which neo-liberals mistakenly term “self-help” is in reality a fig leaf for the neglect of less fortunate citizens. At its most extreme it is a call to glorify the survival of the fittest economic players. The end result is a mean-minded society without a soul.

Funding millionaires and billionaires.

It may come as a surprise to find me arguing that an above the poverty line basic income should be paid to every individual who is a permanent resident in a country rather than directing assistance only to those in the greatest financial need.

The basis of my argument is that a universal basic income is an entitlement of citizenship/permanent residence. Its essential characteristic is that it is an inclusive payment supplied without conditions but as a right. Millionaires and billionaires are citizens and therefore have an entitlement. So, paying them an identical amount as everyone else underlines their identity as an Australian permanent resident with the same rights and obligations as other Australians.

Whilst the basic income itself is not taxable all other income, from whatever source, is taxable.  Those Australians without any other income would not pay income tax but more affluent Australians would be paying tax on their incomes. In financial terms, millionaires would be paying many times more in tax than they received from the basic income. Other working Australians, up to those earning the full time average wage, would find they were receiving slightly more than at present or about the same once a basic income was in place. Less affluent Australians would be the main net beneficiaries following the introduction of a basic income.

Something for nothing.

Neo-liberals are quick to assert that getting something for nothing creates a moral hazard. They suggest it frequently leads to the slippery path of enduring dependency, slough and licentiousness. But it would appear that such temptations are, as far as the well-to-do are concerned, only likely to affect those on low incomes.

Well known basic income advocates, Daniel Raventos and Julie Wark, in 2018 at page 223, ofAgainst Charity, pointed out that “Very rich people tend to push the notion of meritocracy as deservingness, which they equate with justice so, therefore, there is nothing unjust about their wealth.” Earlier at page 138, having discussed colonialism and genocide they write “The rich are quick to point out that we cannot inherit our ancestor’s sin. Indeed. But how can they then be entitled to the fruits of those sins: to their huge inherited advantage in power and wealth” which derive from dispossessing the original owners.

It would appear that getting something for nothing under some circumstances is a good thing so long as such beneficence does not accrue to non-affluent people.

What generates the negativity?

The first generator of negativity is that a universal basic income is an innovation of the existing system. Change brings resistance. Australia is a multicultural nation and the reasons why people from differing ethnic groups might support or oppose the introduction of a universal payment will vary. First and second-generation migrants will have differing reasons to support or oppose a basic income. Indigenous Australians, who are one of the groups, most frequently adversely affected by the current situation are not a homogenous group and won’t express a unanimous opinion.

The age of Keynesian economics has, for the moment, been superseded by the rise of neo-liberal (economic fundamentalist) monetary ideas. The followers of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom and Milton Friedman’s Chicago School economics are the true radicals they have managed to overthrow orthodox social solidarity thinking and in doing so have brought us the global economic recession, precarious employment, declining unionisation, stagnating wages, skyrocketing profits and all the other joys of their dog eat dog world.

Whilst neo-liberal ideas prevail negativity towards generous universal income support systems will continue.

Is the introduction of a universal basic income politically feasible?

For something to be political feasible it needs to be financially feasible and sustainable into the future, able to be explained, reasonably easy to implement and capable of attracting widespread support. Once the people lead the politicians will follow.

Australians have never been as financially well-off as they are at present. An above the poverty line basic income is financially affordable in Australia. It is not a question of affordability but one of willingness to move towards a more equitable society. This does not mean that there would not need to be a substantial rearrangement of the existing tax system. Those earning above the average full time male wage would be required to pay substantially more tax than they do now. Tax avoidance by big business would need to be pursued with alacrity.  The black economy engaged in by many small businesses would need to be substantially decreased. Carbon and other pollutants would be taxed. Family trust and other avoidance/evasion mechanisms would need to become a thing of the past. There may be a need to reintroduce death and gift duties. But even taking all this into account the rate of tax on earned incomes would still be far less than the combined benefit claw-back and tax paid by some of the poorest Australians today.

Several Australian writers and activists are making valiant attempts to explain this system to their fellow citizens. There is not currently widespread support for a universal basic income but the ground swell is building. The 2020 Basic Income Earth Network Congress will be held in Brisbane, jointly hosted by the University of Queensland and the Queensland University of Technology. This will bring leading basic income advocates to our shores and generate increased interest in the topic.

Bibliography.

Chandola, T. and Zhang, N. (2017) “Re-employment, job quality, health and allostatic load biomarkers: prospective evidence from the UK Household Longitudinal Study.” 10thAugust.

International Journal of Epidemiology, dyx150, https://doi.org/10.1093/ije/dyx150

Four Corners. 2011 “The real Julia”. Australian Broadcasting Commission. February 7.

Goodin, R. & Le Grand, J. (1987) Not only the Poor:The Middle Classes and the Welfare State. Allen & Unwin, London.

Long, S. (2011) “Bad job worse for your mental state than no job at all.” ABC, PM. Program, 9thJune. http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2011/s3240169.htm.
Newman, J. (1999) The Challenge of Welfare Dependency in the 21st. Century. Department of Family and Community Services, Canberra.

Raventos, D. &Wark, J. (2018) Against Charity. CounterPunch, Chico CA.
Standing, G. (2017) Basic Income: And How We Can Make It Happen. Pelican, United Kingdom.

Tomlinson, J. (1999) “The politics of downward envy.” Union Songwebsite
http://unionsong.com/reviews/envy.html

Written 2018

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Berating the unemployed for their failure to find non-existent work

Written in 2002

The announcement by Mr. Larry Anthony Minister for Community Services that the unemployed are to have the number of jobs for which they must apply each fortnight doubled, coupled with the extension of the dole diary requirements makes little sense in the context of the Australian labour market. There are 8 to 10 people looking for work for each job vacancy. There are 800,000 Australian children living in homes where neither parent has paid employment. The 200,000 long term unemployed have not remained without work because of their failure to fill out dole diaries or apply for 10 jobs a fortnight.

The reason people become and remain unemployed has more to do with issues such as the demand for labour, the types of skills which are in demand, the preparedness of industry and government to create jobs than it has to do with personal failures of individual unemployed people. The reasons some people do not have the skills which are in demand at any particular point in history has little to do with unemployed people’s preparedness to work. Many older unemployed people have work skills which are no longer in demand precisely because they have been in continuous employment with employers who did not foresee the need to re-skill their workforce. Many younger unemployed people have not acquired the currently desired skills because they trained for or were skilled up for jobs which have now disappeared.

Why then would the Howard Government set out increase the job search and dole diary requirements forced on the unemployed? Do they believe the overwhelming majority of unemployed people have little interest in finding suitable employment?

Clearly they believe that some unemployed people need to be compelled to look for work. They believe that forcing people to fill out a dole diary somehow equips people to find and hold jobs. The Howard Government continues to believe that forcing people to work for the dole also has beneficial effects upon unemployed people’s capacity to get work. They believed that making it compulsory for young people with literacy and numeracy difficulties to attend training would increase their literacy and numeracy skills. The themes are remarkably constant; compulsion for the unemployed is good: and recent pronouncements indicate there is a feeling in this Government that it should be extended to people with disabilities and lone parents.

However this endorsement of compulsion for the marginalised, the unemployed, sole parents, people with disabilities is not a mindless endorsement of compulsion for everyone. The rich and the better off sections of the middle class are not to be coerced but rather encouraged via tax cuts, subsidies on their private health funds, incentives and so forth to increase their wealth. The Howard Government claims some historical connection with 19th century liberals like John Stuart Mills famous for his essay on liberty. Their desire to compel is not universal. They are not, in this instance, coming out as social bondage freaks.

It is the conservative rather than the liberal tradition which so distrusts the poor that it insists on compulsion of those who seek assistance is necessary not only for the maintenance of good order but also for the salvation of the poor themselves.

There are some problems which the latest increased compulsion of unemployed creates for our society. No matter how the compliance with the new regime is implemented it denigrates all unemployed people simply because it implies that within the reserve army of labour there are some who, are not only a drain on the economy by applying for the job search pittance, but also some are not meeting their obligation to seek work. Mr. Anthony’s statement is an admission that this Government, though on a life long search for dole cheats, is incapable of ensuring that it has eliminated all dole bludgers from amongst those unemployed people lucky enough to be paid the Job Search allowance.

Assuming that the Government is correct and that some unemployed people are not “genuine job seekers” then the overwhelming bulk of the unemployed are “genuine job seekers”. The “non-genuine” are not likely to be offended by the denigration of all unemployed people – nor are they likely to caught by such crass compliance techniques. However many of those who are desperately seeking work will be deeply offended by the suggestion they are dole cheats.

There will be an increase in violence as a result of this announcement. Firstly this will be the final straw of some unemployed who don’t have stomach for the increased indignity which the Howard Government is heaping on them. Some of them will suicide – creating a short term saving for this Government. Still others, unable to confront their real oppressor, will lash out at members of their family.

Some, at the point where they are “breached” for failing to meet the latest compulsion whim of the Howard Government, will lash out at the officer who interviews them and may assault that or several officers. They will not then be paid benefits – resulting in a short term saving to this Government. Of course the “offending non-complier” will be jailed at 10 times the cost of unemployment benefit but that cost or a lot of it will be transferred to some state government treasury. Other unemployed people, who are struck off Job Search or New Start, will have no other option but to try to survive through illegal activity.

It is however possible that some of the unemployed will do the analysis. They will realise who their real oppressors are. They will realise that the members of this government, who support increasing the indignity inflicted on unemployed people, are the direct oppressors of the unemployed. They might act unilaterally or they might join with others in a concerted attack on those who would oppress them.

 

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Beyond the new paternalism: Basic security as equality – Book Review

Guy Standing (2002) Verso, London.

In early December 2003 I finally got round to reading Philippe Van Parijs’ 1997 Real Freedom for All, I needed to read it before the 10th National Conference on Unemployment being held later that month. Van Parijs, the doyen of the European Basic Income movement, presents an exceedingly tightly written ethical justification for Basic Income but I found it rather heavy-going compared with much of his earlier writing. And so it was with some mixed feelings that on a hot Sunday afternoon I picked up Standing’s latest book Beyond the New Paternalism even though I had enjoyed some of his earlier writings.

Guy Standing is the Director of the Socio-Economic Programme of the International Labour Organisation in Geneva. Beyond the New Paternalism is a timely book as we face the last hurrah of the socially-conservative, economic-fundamentalist Howard Government and the onslaught of Latham’s “third way social capitalism”. Standing is well equipped to look at the similarities between George Bush’s “caring conservatism”, Tony Blair’s “Third way” and some of the European countries in retreat from the policies of social protection of the welfare state. Australian readers will easily transpose our own home grown political poseurs for the Bushblairs of the world.

Essentially, Beyond the New Paternalism is a well-argued analysis of the reasons behind the decline and fall of the welfare state and a reinvigorated manifesto of the importance of and need for a decent system of social protection. Whilst Standing is cognisant of the importance of occupation in people’s lives, this book is no tired defence of the 20th century’s labourist tradition of either capitalism or state socialism. Several chapters describe in detail the difficulties that a preoccupation with the obligation to labour create for individuals and societies.

Standing looks at the rise of economic-fundamentalism in the United States and Europe and the subsequent “spread of labour insecurity” and “the crunch of income insecurity”. Standing is at his best when he is demolishing widely accepted myths such as the ageing time bomb or the absolute virtue of enforcing mutual obligations on those who need to rely upon income support. This is so because of the breadth and calibre of his historical analysis of the pressures on the social insurance system in Europe and the welfare state elsewhere.

When he comes to discuss income insecurity he notes (among many inequalities) that the world’s 200 richest individuals “have a total wealth greater than the combined income of the world’s poorest 2.5 billion people”. He argues “that there is no evidence that their income and wealth are necessary or even functional” before concluding “it is hard to imagine that the global problem of economic insecurity for the majority can be rectified unless the wealth and security of the elite are checked.” His Chapter 4, in which he describes the “Eight Crises of Social Protection”, should be mandatory reading for every Australian politician and media commentator before they open their mouths on welfare issues.

Whilst he seldom mentions Australia in this book, his Chapter 7 on the near universal consensus of paternalism is so real to Australian eyes. He might be quoting some US politician but I can hear Howard, Latham, Abbott, Vanstone, Gerard Henderson or Noel Pearson trotting out clichés about the feckless poor. This leads into his onslaught on “work for the dole” and “workfare not welfare” in Chapter 8. Anyone who finds themselves satisfied with the media grab bites, such as, “if they get social security then its only fair that they give something back in return” or “a job is the best form of welfare” would be disconcerted if they read this chapter.

Standing builds on Van Parijs’ Real Freedom for All in his chapter dealing with the need for a Basic Income and decent social protection in a most readable fashion. He brings a powerful linguistic logic to dissect the prevalent euphemisms used to disguise social compulsion. For instance, he points out that the notion of active labour market policy is disingenuous. “The word ‘active’ seems virile and strong, whereas its opposite, ‘passive’, suggests laziness, and lack of initiative. Who could possibly favour being passive if one could be active? In fact, active policy is little more than having the state telling people what they must do in order to receive some moderate state benefit, directing them to training or job schemes. By contrast, the much derided passive policy entails giving funds to individuals or families with minimal or no conditions, leaving them to make choices about how to conduct their lives and allocate their resources.”

I hope that all who want to understand how we got into our current socially-divisive predicament in this country and who would like to see Australia return to a more socially-just course will read Guy Standing’s book.

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Book Review – Social Policy in Australia: Understanding for Action

Social Policy in Australia: Understanding for Action by Alison McClelland & Paul Smyth 280 pages RRP $59.95

Australian Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 41, No. 3, Spring 2006: 375-376.

The first two sections of Social policy in Australia are disembodied versions of the Melbourne social policy debate. I was left with impression that anything South of Melbourne, West of Canberra or North of Sydney was regarded as being of little consequence. The book could confidently be taken into coffee shops in Lygon St or even Rose Bay without the risk of startling the customers. In their efforts to conceptually dissect social policy both Alison McClelland and Paul Smyth give components of the social policy process more brand names than readers will be likely to encounter on the shelves of their local supermarket. Perhaps the editors would be assisted by a quick reading of Naomi Klein’s No Logo.

McClelland has a long history in Australian Council of Social Service circles where she has a reputation for competence, attention to detail and caution. The first section of this book reinforces such perceptions. Both McClelland and Smyth have considerable exposure to the way governments determine policy and this may be one of the reasons the possible alternative scenarios they foresee are so circumscribed. If politics is the art of the possible and pragmatic policies take the path of least resistance then McClelland and Smyth are pragmapols: which is a new brand name (jargon) they might like to consider including in their next book.

This book would have more vitality had the editors condensed the four chapters written by McClelland and the three by Smyth into one chapter apiece. This is not to suggest that they have not presented a competent review of the social policy literature and I am sure that students in university level social policy courses will find much of their analysis a useful guide to current policy debates in Australia. But general readers and social policy aficionados may find the detail tedious which is a pity because these seven chapters do present some emerging ideas rather well.

In line with the Howard Government’s preoccupation with mainstreaming Indigenous programs and ignoring asylum seekers, the editors decided: “Rather than adopting a demographic approach that focuses on different groups (such as children and families or Indigenous Australians) we have chosen the key policy areas that contribute to the welfare of all groups (p. 144)”. If the editors had not taken so long setting out the basic social policy parameters, they could have had a chapter dealing with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander issues. There could have also been one discussing the treatment of asylum seekers. As it is, asylum seekers are virtually ignored and Aboriginal issues, when they are discussed in this book, appear as an afterthought.

The third section of Social Policy in Australia is where the book comes alive. Steven Bell and John Quiggin provide an excellent analysis of what has been a consistent failure of governments (since the mid-1970s) to solve the income / work related problems of people who find themselves jobless, underemployed or in precarious employment.

Steven Ziguras outlines the existing system of social (in)security and its inadequacies as an income support system. He does this well. When Ziguras considers possible future income support options (pp. 175-6) he dismisses the possibility of a guaranteed minimum income because of its high cost. The introduction of a guaranteed minimum income deserves more serious consideration, it was first suggested in Australia in the early 1970s. Ziguras totally ignores the extensive Australian and international Basic Income literature (Basic Income Guarantee Australia, Basic Income Earth Network).

Tony Dalton provides a reasonably comprehensive analysis of housing policy. He points out that the Higher Education Contribution Schemes (HECS) and compulsory occupational superannuation reduce the capacity of young households to purchase housing but then backs away from the logic of his own argument when he says; “Identifying these aspects of public policy should not necessarily be seen as an argument against HECS or compulsory occupational superannuation (p. 189)”.

Jenny Lewis describes the history of health insurance in a careful but critical manner. She points out that: “Abolishing the private health insurance rebate would lower cost overall, and slow the loss of health professionals from the public to the private sector, which is exacerbating shortages in the public sector (p. 207)”.

Jane Kenway dissects what these days passes for education policy in this country and reveals the extent to which neo-liberal market orientations have eroded decent educational outcomes. Clearly, it is a chapter which should not be read by vice chancellors with irritable bowel syndrome who would prefer to live relaxed and comfortable lives in John Howard’s Australia.

Deborah Brennan investigates the range of community services provided to children, older residents and citizens with a disability. Not surprisingly, given her background in child care studies, Brennan’s description of the extraordinary depth of involvement of Liberal Party heavyweights in the provision of commercial child care is where she is at her best and most passionate.

Alison McClelland concludes the book with a very useful and clearly articulated chapter describing the Australian taxation system. She revisits the widely-held myth that Australia is a highly-taxed country before going on to outline several alternatives which citizens would be wise to consider if they desired a fair and efficient tax system.

Bibliography

Basic Income Earth Network http://www.etes.ucl.ac.be/BIEN/Index.html
Basic Income Guarantee Australia http://www.basicincome.qut.edu.au/index.jsp
Bessant, J. Watts, R., Dalton, T. & Smyth, P. (2006) Talking Policy: How social policy is made. Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest.
Klein, N. (2002) No Logo. Picador, New York

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Book Review: How to argue with an economist

by Lindy Edwards, Cambridge University, Cambridge. 2002
In Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol.39 No.3 pp.362-363. 2004.

The first 8 chapters of this book convinced me I was holding in my hands a truly subversive text. Subversive in the sense that it is a remarkably readable explanation of the economic fundamentalist agenda. It is a book about economic policy without economic jargon. I could envisage this text being read by factory workers and discussed over the lunch breaks, by housewives in the suburbs, by senior school children and at tertiary campuses around the country. I saw it, at a minimum, providing Freirian ‘conscientization’ and perhaps even leading to the widespread development of revolutionary consciousness. Some of the midsections of the book started to pall and the last half was simply tiresome.

I was perplexed my mood swings as I proceeded through the book. Firstly I was excited by the fact that the author was an economist who had worked in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. She had known the economic fundamentalists who have helped transform this country from one that provided a reasonably caring social welfare system into a competitive society that is now turning on its most vulnerable citizens and (under the misnomer of ‘mutual obligation’) demanding they give something back in return for their welfare pittance. Edwards has taken the intellectual message of Paul Omerod’s The Death of Economics, Michael Pusey’s Economic Rationalism in Canberra, and Stuart Rees, Gordon Rodley and Frank Stilwell’s Beyond the Market and has made it accessible in the fine tradition of John Kenneth Galbraith. She acknowledges the dismantling which the economic fundamentalists have inflicted upon community support structures in the name of increasing social capital. These first 8 chapters need to be read by anyone who is struggling to understand how the economic fundamentalists have succeeded in eroding the basic humanity of everyday Australians.

Lindy Edwards provides at page 24 a very useful description of the mechanisms by which ideologies influence social policy. She has the capacity to explain complex phenomena simply. For instance, she encapsulates the concept of downward envy brilliantly when she writes:

The Coalition captured the ‘what about me? sentiment’. It cunningly devised the campaign slogan: ‘For all of us’. In its first term in office it made theatre of cracking down on the unemployed, Aborigines, immigration and minority groups. Unable to demonstrate any understanding of people’s aspirations, it settled for showing an understanding of their vices (p. 17).

Edwards quotes with approval (p.54) the classical liberal scholar, John Stuart Mills’ attack on the concept of self-interest when he wrote:

Each of these men has, no doubt, acted from self interest. But we gain nothing by knowing this, except the pleasure, if it be one, of multiplying useless words…it is idle to attribute any importance to a proposition which, when interpreted, means only that a man had rather do what he rather do.

In the middle of the book as Edwards attempts to explain the behaviour of the mandarins of the central co-ordinating agencies of the Australian Federal Government, she accords these bureaucrats a morality which I don’t think they deserve. Albeit it is a morality which grows out of their promotion of the notion of self-interested individuals acting to fulfil their self-interest as a way to make the world better for everyone. If that is morality I’d fail Ethics 1.

Edwards herself roundly criticises competition policy (pp.40-43, pp.66-67), the jargonised use of the concept of social capital (p.89), compulsory literacy training (p.53), market society (p.107, p.128, p141, p.157) as well as the non-explanatory power of ‘self-interest’, yet somehow is reluctant to stick it in boots and all to her erstwhile colleagues in Prime Minister and Cabinet.

My disenchantment with the last half of the book is essentially that it fails to utilise the insightful, indeed potentially revolutionary, analysis in the first part of the book. It is unlikely to incite its readers to leave their armchair for the streets. Lindy Edwards would have been able to substantially improve the usefulness of this book had she been able to put to one side her economic mindset and integrate a progressive political analysis into the later sections of her text. Perhaps if she was reluctant to ask people to throw themselves in front of the Prime Minister’s car, she could have urged them to throw themselves in front of their computers and start harassing our political leaders and their economic fundamentalist advisors.

Still the bulk of this book is a well reasoned and useful analysis of the problems economic fundamentalism creates for citizens wanting to live in a humane caring Australia. Edwards, if she were to undertake a revision of this text, would be well advised to read some progressive political and ethical tracts.

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Book Review: Social policy, public policy – From problem to practice

By Meredith Edwards (with Cosmos Howard and Robin Miller), Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2001.

Professor Meredith Edwards’ latest book written with two colleagues makes an important contribution to understanding the process of making social policy at the Federal Government level in Australia. It will find a place on the shelves of any serious student of Australian Government decision making, teachers of social policy processes, lobbyists and others interested in affecting the outcomes of social policy debates.

It is a remarkably readable book despite its propensity to slip into acronyms at every opportunity. In the book’s defense it does supply a “List of Abbreviations” immediately prior to the start of Chapter 1, as well as a useful “Glossary” of frequently used technical terms which beginning students in social policy will find particularly helpful.

Edwards, a one time Senior Public Servant and now an academic, has been producing thoughtful work on income support, household composition and the linkage between these issues since the early 1980s. This book is written in a much more accessible style than some of her earlier work. The authors describe four important changes in social policy undertaken during the Hawke/Keating period in office. It is an insider’s account of the policy debates.

The issues chosen “all started with a fairly simple idea: a single youth allowance, a child support levy, a graduate tax and a job compact”(p.10). “In these four cases,simple ideas were advanced that appear to have had a certain power of attraction and may have helped in the motivation to find a path through the problem of reform…. In each case, not surprisingly, the policy solution was not as originally proposed” (p.178).

The four policy areas which the book canvasses were extremely important developments at the time of their introduction and will continue to be of central concern for the next Australian Government interested in addressing equity. The issues Edwards and her colleagues chose to discuss in detail were: unifying income support schemes for young people, the introduction of the Child Support Agency, the imposition of the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) and ‘solving’ unemployment via Working Nation. Edwards was intimately involved in developing each of these policies.

The book has an introductory and a concluding chapter on the policy process in which the authors argue that good policy process involves identifying the issues, policy analysis, consultation, arriving at a decision, implementation and evaluation. In the final chapter she argues that the organisational structure and the character/skills of the players has considerable influence. Edwards et al. stress that in all these policy processes the values of the main decision makers and their advisors was a central ingredient. The authors note another determining feature of the policy process when they write; “A common overriding constraint on ministers was the budget ‘bottom line’” (p.181).

The major strength of the book is that it provides a clear rendition of what the Canberra policy insiders considered they were doing at the time of implementation. It stays remarkably true to the prevailing perceptions of the issues as they were interpreted at the time. The right wing Labor bureaucratic/political context in which these policy process occurred is the ideological construct which is imposed on this history of the process. Edwards is determined to present herself and many of the other inside players as concerned by equity /efficiency issues rather than trade-offs. In this sense it is a sympathetic history of Labor ministers, their policy advisors, their consultants and the senior ranks of the public service.

The major weakness of the book is that it largely ignores the way ‘equity’ debates concerning such things as: what constitutes a suitable amount of income and the imposition of ‘reciprocal obligation’ initiated by Hawke/Keating Labor paved the way for the Howard Government to compel: ‘Dole Diaries’, literacy training, ‘Work for the Dole’ and other ‘mutual obligations’. By adopting such an approach it avoids the criticism that the analysis is overly influenced by hindsight.

The text is interspersed with extracts from a diary, of activities, Edwards kept at the time. At its best this technique gives a sense of real life to the process of policy formulation but sometimes reads like “Dear Diary today DV was not nice to me” which is fine for those of us who were not fond of DV. But many, trying to remember who the inside players were, may find this technique is a bit of a drag.” I presume that the extracts from the Diary with the initials rather than the name is provided to give a sense of authenticity.  I found it annoying.

Given the likelihood of a Beazley Labor Government before the end of 2001, it seems certain that the political agenda will include: searching for an adequate income support system for all and particularly young people, finding a way to pay for post school education on the way to creating a Knowledge Nation, improving the system of child maintenance and creating full employment.  As the policy process proceeds in these areas analysts will be better informed if they have read Edwards, Howard and Miller’s history of the debates under the previous Labor administration.

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Book Review: The real worlds of welfare

Goodin, R. Headey, B., Muffels, R & Dirven, H. The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge University, Cambridge. pp.358.

Review published  Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol 35. No. 2, May 2000.

Robert Goodin and his fellow authors have succeeded in writing a very readable book which compares the social welfare systems of the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. Many Australian human service workers might think to themselves “How nice but what has that got to do with us?”

The book does indeed have considerable relevance to the situation on the ground in many Australian employment, training and welfare agencies. It should become a useful text in human service undergraduate and post graduate programs. This is particularly so as the current Government in this country is becoming increasingly preoccupied with “mutual obligation”, “social coalitions”, “social contracts”, its self created myth of “welfare dependency” and decreasing social welfare budget outlays.

The three countries covered in this book were chosen because there was a decade of comparable panel data available which allowed the authors to explore issues of economic growth, efficiency, poverty, inequality, social integration, stability and autonomy. In addition the United States welfare state represents the liberal form, the German a corporatist regime and the Dutch a social democratic style of welfare.

As this is not a review of a detective story I can reveal Goodin et al conclusions about their comparison of these different welfare states without spoiling your enjoyment of the book. They make the point that frequently in social policy debates it is asserted that there is an inevitability of trade offs between economic growth, efficiency, poverty, inequality, social integration, stability and autonomy. But what they found was the Dutch social democratic welfare regime equalled or exceeded the performance of the corporatist Germans and the liberal US system “across all these social and economic objectives.”

Such findings have considerable relevance to directions an informed Australian nation would choose to take as it sets out to change its system of welfare services. The Australian welfare state might once have had considerable social democratic aspects but has, in recent times (along with New Zealand), moved closer to the US liberal regime.

The careful cross country analysis of panel data presented by Goodin et al allows researchers to follow real people’s experiences of work and welfare. In the past cross country analysts have been forced to compare aggregated statistical samples. Importantly, the Goodin et al look at individuals has found that it is an exceedingly small percentage of people who remain on welfare indefinitely under any of the systems investigated.

This finding flies in the face of the current Australian Government and Federal Opposition’s preoccupation with “welfare dependency”. Those of us who have been researching social citizenship, Basic Income and unemployment have long appreciated that “welfare dependency” rhetoric as utilised by Newman, Howard, Swan, Abbot and Latham is just a verbal weapon with which to savage unemployed people and a useful tool in the struggle to delegitimise the Australian welfare state. Unfortunately “welfare dependency” as rhetoric will remain powerful because it provides the uncaring with a justification for their punitive treatment of the unemployed and other social security recipients.

The above is just one example of the usefulness of Goodin and his fellow writers analysis. There are many other insights to be gained from the numerous tabulations and graphs in this book by those interested in moving the Australian welfare state back towards a more caring and comprehensive regime.

But the really important message from this book is that whether one is seeking to promote economic growth and efficiency, stability, autonomy or to decrease poverty and inequality then the social democratic welfare state along the lines of the Netherlands exceeds the performance of the German corporatist or the US liberal regimes.

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Bullets not words

Written circa 2005
(after reading the Howard Government’s plan to cut welfare expenditure)

Your words wound with such dexterity,
creating a chasm of depressed enormity.
You mouth the platitudes of economic efficiency
about how you aim to abolish welfare dependency.
It fills our hearts with an intense despondency.
You speak as if I am to blame for my redundancy.
I can’t read. Does that mean I caused my illiteracy?
My mother’s lover left – so I caused my illegitimacy?
Forget the umbilical cord tight around my neck-
I, not the lack of oxygen, caused my deficit.
Forget unsafe work practices – what the heck,
my actions , not those of the boss, led to my disability.
as perpetuator and victim rolled into one
I must accept the full responsibility.
I acknowledge that it is a shame,

but…

it is the right of victims everywhere to accept the blame.
We cant expect government to help us shoulder the burden
so instead of expecting to be treated with dignity
we’ll have to learn to knuckle under, and with due humility,
be grateful for the imposition of your mutual responsibility.
Only the most ungracious would call it – tyranny.

But,

there are some among us who say that it’s not right,
some comrades claim the time has come to fight;

but…

we are not equipped with distorting words that lie
so if we enter into battle then some of us will die.
You might think us stupid, but we’ve done the sum
there are more of us than you when all’s said and done.
We want rapid fire social justice
and we want it on the run
and the best way to get that is
with bullets and a gun!!!!!

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Challenging the concept of participation income

Paper given at the NSW ASSID Conference at the University of Wollongong
5-6/7/2002

The themes of the Howard Government: ‘social capital, social conservatism, social coalition, mutual obligation and participation income’ all undermine the concept of rights and more worryingly erode previously established social security entitlements.  McClure (2000[a], [b]) heralded the extension of the breaching of 300,000 plus Centrelink clients annually (ACOSS 2001). Initially those breached were mainly young unemployed people and, to a lesser extent, single parents. But the Howard Government has signaled its intention to extend its imposition of mutual obligation to single parents and those with a disability.

The unifying constant in ‘social capital, social conservatism, social coalition, mutual obligation and participation income’ as it relates to policy outcomes for people with a disability, refugees, migrants, asylum seekers, Indigenous people, unemployed individuals and single parents is the replacement of rights with a benefit /obligation compact.

This paper will consider ways in which people with disabilities and their allies can:

  • build alliances with potential counter hegemonic forces,
  • learn from similar struggles of other denigrated and marginalised groups,
  • confront those who are working to undermine universal human rights and existing entitlements,
  • confound efforts to ensnare them in an obligatory envelope which will impede their liberation, and hopefully
  • join the fight for the rights of others and for themselves as a part  of their struggle for full citizenship.

The background

The Howard Government’s themes of: ‘social capital, social conservatism, social coalition, mutual obligation and participation income’ increasingly impact upon people with a disability. These themes have also surfaced in relation to Indigenous Australians, migrants, temporary refugee visa holders and asylum seekers.

Indigenous Australians survived the invasion, dispossession, genocide, protection, exclusion, assimilation, integration, self-management, and the promise of self-determination which was held out by the Keating Government as part of its plans for reconciliation. They have recently found out that Indigenous self-determination, in the opinion of the Howard Government, undermines ‘National sovereignty’. They have instead been offered the Howard/ Herron/ Ruddock’s (2002) prescription of ‘practical reconciliation’ provided they are quiescent about Indigenous sovereignty / native title and land rights issues.

The Keating Labor Government, with Gerry Hand as Minister for Immigration, introduced a six month waiting period before migrants could claim social security benefits. The incoming Howard Government extended this waiting period to two years. Hand also installed the policy of mandatory detention of asylum seekers who arrived on our shores without valid visas. This policy, which has been ruthlessly enforced by the Liberal Government, is in breach of a number of international agreements which Australia has signed and ratified. The Howard Government has also adopted the practice of issuing three year temporary visas to asylum seekers once they have been found to be refugees. This policy increases refugees’ uncertainty, prevents family reunion and is frequently socially debilitating (Lock, Quenault and Tomlinson 2002).

When the Whitlam Government came to office it raised the rate of payment for16 year old unemployment beneficiaries to the adult rate. During the early 1970s, with increased use of automated machinery and an economic downturn, there was a significant loss of jobs usually done by young people. By the last year of the Whitlam Government there was a considerable rise in the level of youth unemployment. Clive Cameron and Bill Hayden responded to this by suggesting that the young were becoming “dole bludgers” and “work shy” (Windschuttle 1981, pp. 180-190).  This attack on young unemployed people paved the way for the Fraser Government’s denigration of all unemployed people and particularly the young without work who were again paid youth level unemployment benefits. This inexorably led, during the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments, to Brian Howe’s increased tightening of eligibility across a range of social security payments from 1986. This has now led us to Howard’s onslaught on social security payments to the young (Horin 1998, p.10) culminating in his “Oh so” Common Youth allowance. Until the mid 1980s 16 year old people with severe and permanent disabilities were paid full adult disability pensions. In 2002 such a young person living at home  receives only 60% of the adult rate.

Few people with disabilities have been active in wider income support and citizenship struggles. When ‘work for the dole’ and other impositions of the ‘mutual obligation’ policy were seen to apply only to young unemployed people, people with disabilities and their agencies did little to resist the Government’s imposition of obligations upon the young. Now people with disabilities, previously unmindful of John Donne’s caution, find that ‘The bell tolls for thee.’

Part of the problem – part of the solution

In 1977, two posters in the shop front window of the Darwin Unemployed workers Union read “Hitler had the Jews, Stalin had the Kulaks, Fraser has the Unemployed.” and “Drive carefully 3,000 Unemployed People walk Darwin streets.” The first poster drew attention to the then Government’s negative stereotyping, marginalisation and persecution of unemployed people – the second to the extent of unemployment and the presence of unemployed people as community members.

In 2001, I was a member of a Brisbane Disability Scholars email network. I regularly circulated material on income security, community work and politics. A couple of days before the election I sent the group the following email:

I have just had a security update from The Office of National Assessment.  It would appear that John Howard has taken Janet and the kids up on to the roof at Kirribilli and is threatening to throw them off the roof unless the Australian people vote Liberal tomorrow.  Clearly Howard is presuming on Australian people’s humanity and compassion. Such offensive illegal queue jumping is to be resisted. There have been people waiting for years in third world countries for the chance to throw themselves off the roof at Kirribilli House. The Navy has been instructed to get him down and take him on a Pacific holiday to Manus or Nauru.

Several satire impaired scholars took umbrage demanding that the network concentrate on “disability issues”. Others in the group wanted a broader discussion of social issues  suggesting that you never know when the words of the prophet will be written on the subway wall – so please keep your eyes wide, open or shut is your choice.

It is important for all of us who want to inhabit a socially caring world to try to understand the interconnectedness between the specific issue with which we are dealing and other social forces. To misquote John Donne “no issue is entire of itself”.

Human rights versus utilitarian rights

Before investigating Howard’s contractual social insecurity system, this paper will provide a brief outline of what a social security system based on universal human rights might look like. I have elsewhere argued that only the provision of a universal Basic Income can prevent Australian Governments undermining unemployed people’s economic security and foisting socially destructive obligations upon them (Tomlinson 2002, 2001[a],[b]).

Whenever payment of income support is conditional upon the recipient fulfilling a particular social action then a government or its agents can use their discretion to determine whether the obligation to comply has been met. If the provider of the income support payment decides the recipient has failed to meet the imposed obligation it can withhold the payment. A universal system recognizes that targeted welfare benefits can never deliver benefits equitably even to those who meet all the eligibility requirements (Boston & St. John 1998). An Australian universal welfare system would, at a minimum aim to abolish Beveridge’s five giants of ‘squalor, want, ignorance, disease and idleness’ (Timmins 1995).

A fully universal Basic Income system would be a flat rate paid to each individual permanent resident of Australia irrespective of whether they lived alone or with others, irrespective of other income or assets and irrespective of their employment or other social status.

Stuart Rees (2000) comments that when a government “emphasises that rights have to be earned, that people can only insist on their rights if they have carried out their social responsibilities…It softens a general public for the idea that rights are conditional, not universal (pp.296-297).”

By contrast, the tradition of human rights which contributed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) advocates a universal standard to protect against the tyranny of the state….In the Rights of Man (1791) Thomas Paine identified a universalist tradition with reference to conditions which gave security to citizens and thereby facilitated a civil society….Advocates of universal rights do not reject the ethicists’ (Utilitarians’) regard  for duties and obligations but they do emphasise that duties and obligations serve to enhance rights; they are not a precondition for them. The universalist argument relies on the assumption that rights are accorded to people because they are human beings. In 1948 the universal declaration was designed to represent the highest aspirations of a common people (Rees pp.297-298).

Arguments which go to solidarity and inclusion are based on a universalist conception of rights and are centred around ideas of mutuality and reciprocity rather than reciprocal or mutual obligation. Universalists base their views on a far more optimistic understanding of humankind than that which informs those addicted to the idea that even the right to sustainable income support is conditional. Much of the motivation which underpins the Utilitarian view of rights revolves around the way risk is assessed (Sztompka 1999, Kemshall 2002). Conservatives have a belief in the inherent imperfection of human beings. This preoccupation with the alleged ‘propensity’ of social security recipients to ‘disappoint’ finds voice in the current ‘dependency’ debates.

The Howard Government’s addiction to an ethical or Utilitarian view of rights which is conditional upon first meeting obligations is a far cry from the form of rights expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the associated Covenants. For instance, Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognises “ the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living”.  Article 8(3)(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that “No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour”. Even allowing the qualification in section C(4) of this Article which excludes from the category of forced labour “work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations” much of the Howard Government’s ‘mutual obligation’ agenda is in breach of these international agreements which Australia has signed and ratified.

As people with disability have discovered – post McClure 2000[b] – the imposition of forced labour on one section of the Australian people undermines the citizenship of all citizens because it is uncertain when and to whom such compulsion will be extended. It downgrades the social and economic rights previously available to all citizens.  By ignoring the citizenship rights of those who receive income support it separates them from other citizens.

The requirement that people engage in certain specified activities before they will be paid income support ignores the contribution that many non-employed people already make to their neighbourhood, their families and their society. The Government devalues social security recipients’ voluntary contribution through the suggestion that only approved forms of participation constitute a contribution. It brands social security recipients as less valued whilst simultaneously forcing them to ‘perform compulsory labour’ thus undermining solidarity and civil society. Such compelled activity is the polar opposite of social capital.

Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the Australian Government’s imposition of ‘mutual obligation’ is that, as Rees (2000 p.297) points out, it reinforces the view that all rights are conditional and that universality has no place in the modern world.  This has the effect of delegitimising universal income support policies such as Basic Income. An unconditional universal Basic Income could prevent a government imposing ‘mutual obligation’ policies on the least affluent. A universal Basic Income is a policy which has the capacity to enhance the liberty and productivity of all citizens. This feature of Basic Income has been recognised for 80 years (Milner 1920 ch.1).

An indecent obsession

John Howard most clearly spelt out his economic liberal and social conservative agendas in his “Roundtable speech” in 1999 and his preoccupation with his form of conservative social coalition in a brief article in the Australian on 12 January, 2000.  Essentially the argument he put forward in May 1999 is that:

Economic policy liberalisation and modern conservatism in social policy share important common values and objectives. …Both recognise the role of markets and of government….Both promote opportunity, incentive and responsibility over dependence and welfarism. And both support the full realisation of individual potential as well as the reality of social obligation. (pp.3-4).

When he writes about his social coalition he employs a classically liberal vision of ‘a social contract’ in which those who receive a payment from the state are required to return something to the ‘society’. The Liberal Prime Minister’s determination to foist onto Australian people his social conservative agenda was an underlying theme in the Reference Group on Welfare Reform Interim Report (McClure 2000[a]). From page 47 to 51 the Report deals with Howard’s social coalition in terms similar to those Howard used. Howard in his 2000 article in The Australian says:

Put simply, it describes a partnership of individuals families, business, government, welfare and charitable organisations each contributing their unique resources and expertise to tackle disadvantage at its source ….  Most of all, the social coalition is firmly rooted in notions of mutual obligation (p.11).

Howard makes no bones about the Government’s attempt to promote conservative social policy administered by the churches operating in close association with business.  Howard’s obsession with ‘mutual obligation’ and ‘dependency’ has been extensively criticised  (Hammer 2002, Goodin 2001,Tomlinson 2001[b], Castles 2001).

The more things change the more they stay the same

Jocelyn Newman (1999), the Howard Government welfare Minister, who instigated the McClure Report set down the track on which the Committee’s train (of thought) was to run and on time. She outlined the Government’s position in her paper “The Challenge of Welfare Dependency in the 21st. Century”. The present Government would have citizens believe that the only way ‘the scourge of welfare dependence’ can be removed is by compelling recipients of social security to meet specified obligations to the State.

The McClure Committee dutifully reported to the Government in line with their riding instructions. “Participation income support” became the latest buzz phrase. Of course anyone who had studied income support policy in this country immediately recognised it as a simple restatement of the Brian Howe / Bettina Cass active society strategy with the addition of extra compulsion and more ruthless breaching. The Howe / Cass line, in turn, was a reworking of the 1947 unemployment benefit activity test.

At a more general level the thrust of ‘mutual obligation’ is a restatement of the 1908 social security requirement to be of “good moral character.” This was not new either but part and parcel of the less eligibility policy – designed to distinguish between the worthy and unworthy poor – explicit in the 1834 Poor Law. This Law was an updated version of the 1601 Elizabethan Poor Law, which was an attempt to codify the established charity practices of the parishes. As Goodin 2001, Stretton 1996 , Castles 2001 and Tomlinson 2001[a] point out there is a direct line between at least the 16th. Century English welfare policy and the current Howard Government’s welfare preoccupations. Joel Handler (2002) traces the legislative concern about the undeserving back to the 1348 Labourer’s Act with its express preoccupation with “the sturdy beggar”.

Ray Cassin, senior writer for the Melbourne Age Newspaper, responded to the McClure Report in an article neatly entitled “Let’s just call them leeches and be done with it” in which he makes the point that:

You can be ‘on’ social security in the literal sense of receiving benefits, but this usage does not carry the pejorative flavour of being ‘on’ welfare. The reason is not mysterious: we do not talk about social-security dependency, or social-services dependency because ‘social security’ and ‘social services’ are bound up with an older notion of entitlement, and an understanding of mutual obligation that goes beyond tit-for-tat reciprocity…..

The ideal of mutual obligation underpinning a system of social security is not one of reciprocity, but of obligation borne by all of us to contribute to the support of  people who would otherwise be destitute (The Sunday Age 27/8/2000 page 22).

This quotation from Cassin alerts us to the fact that there has been a significant change to the  legimitating mechanism which underpinned the Australian system of income support in the 1960s when compared to the present day. We have moved from Noblesse Oblige to ruthless compulsion.

The contradiction – a crisis

What the Howard Government fails to understand, primarily because their reading of Althusser (1977), Gramsci (1978), Poulantzas (1978) and Marx (1970) is deficient, is that the ideological apparatus of social control is far more powerful than compulsion  – even compulsion based on fear of starvation. They have sown the seeds of their own destruction and this is the basis that all those who wish to live in a non-censorious world will use to bring down this Government.

The Howard Government may presently have popular support for their slogans of ‘mutual obligation’, ‘work for the dole’, ‘social coalition’ and ‘participation income’ but that popularity is based on a mystification. These terms like ‘welfare reform’ and ‘social capital’ are marketed by the capitalist press to the public as warm, fuzzy and socially stabilizing concepts. This part of the ideological control mechanism is well oiled.

It is the job of the counter hegemonic forces to unpack this language. We need to demonstrate again and again the socially destructive nature of breaching hundreds of thousands of the poorest Australians. We need to point to the homelessness and poverty inducing features of these policies. We need to explain the actual impact on families when their only income is removed because one member did not meet every dictate of some Centrelink operative. We need to demonstrate the socially destructive aspects, the dislocation and the counter productive nature of such policies. Above all, we need to elaborate upon the sheer ruthlessness of policies which drive many to despair, exacerbate mental health difficulties and lead some people to suicide.

Marginalising the marginalised

Those disability scholars, agencies and activists who think that they can just work on disability issues without making links with the Indigenous, peace, union, unemployed, refugees, and other social struggles, succeed only in further marginalising the very issues which are most central to their developing the critical mass likely to force real change in the way people with disabilities are treated (Tomlinson 2001[a], Chapter 7).

Earlier in this paper I made the point that few people with disabilities have been active in the “other societal struggles for a better world” but some people with considerable disabilities have been very active. I will never forget the inspiration a young blind woman provided, as she strummed her guitar and sang, whist marching with other Aotearoan unemployment activists into police lines outside the Auckland Hilton in the  North Island of New Zealand. I was comforted by the fact that she could not see the fear in my eyes, though disconcerted by the realisation she sensed the dread in my heart. Friends in wheelchairs, colleagues with mental health difficulties, and people with limited intellectual capacities are involved in broader social struggles. They provide a model for us to follow.

Building a counter hegemony

Gaining acceptance for the breadth of change which many disability activists would like to accomplish will require that they contribute to the building of a counter hegemony. This will require they make links with progressive unions, political parties, and activist groups. That they become partisans in the struggle for a fairer world.

It was noted earlier that ruthless compulsion not Noblesse Oblige underpins the current system of income support. Whatever reformist gains might once have fallen, like crumbs from the rich man’s table, to humble petitioners will not be, if they ever were, sufficient to result in significant positive changes to the way in which this society responds to people with disabilities.

If disability activists are serious about getting their agenda incorporated into societal structures they will need to help build those new societal structures. It strikes me as a nonsense to suggest that people who say they are working to counter ableist interpretations can ignore racism, sexism, ageism, classism and urbanism. It was Lenin who said “The struggle for one is the struggle for all” but if Marxist Leninism is not quite your cup of tea; remember, that it was the American civil rights campaigner Eugene V. Debs who wrote “I am not free while any man is in chains”.

Bibliography

ACOSS 2001 New Research: hardship intensifies from rise in social security penalties. Media Statement, 13th. August.
Althusser, L. (1977)For Marx. (trans. Brewster, B.) Verso, London.
Boston, J. & St. John, S. (1998) “Targeting versus Universality: Social Assistance for All or Just for the Poor. in Boston, J. Danziel, P and St. John, S. (eds.) Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand. Oxford University, Auckland.
Cassin, R. (2000) “Let’s just call them leeches and be done with it” The Sunday Age 27/8/2000 p.22.
Castles, F. (2001) “A farewell to the Australian welfare state.” in Eureka Street. Vol. 11, No. 1, Jan- Feb.
Eugene V. Debs http://www.theosophy-nw.org/theosnw/world/general/ge-sams.htm  (16th paragraph).
Goodin, R. (2001) “False Principles of Welfare Reform.” Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 36, No.3, August pp.189-206.
Gramsci, A. (1978) Selections from Political Writings 1921-26, Hoare, Q. (ed. and trans) International, New York.
Hammer, S. (2002 forthcoming) The Rise of Liberal Independence and the Decline of the Welfare State. PhD Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane.
Horin, A. (1998) “Dole cut for thousands of young jobless.” Sydney Morning Herald. June,29th . p.10.
Howard, J. (2000) “Quest for a decent society” The Australian 12th. Jan, p.11.
Howard, J. (1999) “Building a Stronger and Fairer Australia: Liberalisation in Economic Policy and Modern Conservatism in Social Policy.” Address to ‘Australia Unlimited Roundtable.’ 4th. May Howard, J. (2000) “Quest for a decent society” The Australian 12th. Jan, p.11.http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/1999/AustraliaUnlimitedRoundtable.htm
Kemshall, H. (2002)  Risk, social policy and welfare. Open University, Buckinghamshire.
Lock, J., Quenault, M. & Tomlinson, J. (2002) Some Reasons Why Australia Should Abolish the Detention of Asylum Seekers. Occasional Paper No.02/1, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, Sydney.
Marx, K. (1970) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol 1. (trans. Moore, S. & Aveling, E., ed. Engles, F., Lawrence & Wishart, London.
McClure, P. (2000 [a]) Participation Support for a More Equitable Society. Interim Report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform, Department of Family and Community Services, Canberra.
McClure, P. (2000 [b]) Participation Support for a More Equitable Society. Report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform, Department of Family and Community Services, Canberra.
Milner, D. (1920) Higher Production by a Bonus on National Output: A proposal for a minimum income for all varying with national productivity. George, Allen & Unwin, London.
Newman, J. (1999) The Challenge of Welfare Dependency in the 21st. Century. Department of Family and Community Services, Canberra.
Poulantzas, N. (1978) State, Power, Socialism. Camilleri, P. (trans) NLB, London.
Ruddock, P. “Changing Direction.” Paper given at the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission’s Setting the Agenda Conference, 26/3/2002, Canberra.
Stretton, H. (1996) Poor laws of 1834 and 1996. Brotherhood of St Lawrence, Fitzroy.
Sztompka, P. (1999) Trust: A Sociological Theory. Cambridge University, Cambridge.
Timmins, N. (1995) The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State. Harper Collins, Hammersmith.
Tomlinson, J. (2002) “Income Support for Unemployed People: Human Rights versus Utilitarian Rights.” Journal of Economic and Social Policy  Vol.6 , No. 2, Winter.
Tomlinson, J. (2001[a]) Income Insecurity: The Basic Income Alternative.
http://www.geocities.com/ubinz/JT/IncomeInsecurity/
Tomlinson, J. (2001[b]) “ The Basic Solution to Unemployment.” Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 36, No.3, August.
Windschuttle, K. (1981) Unemployment. Penguin Ringwood.

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Choose Poverty: The poorest 2 billion people on this planet can’t be wrong – but they can be wronged

Published in New Community Quarterly 2013, Vol 11, No 4, Issue 44.

(A paper given at: The fish always smells from the head down: it’s not the poor but the stinking rich who are the problem. Seminar, Gold Coast Campus of the Southern Cross University on 3 October 2013)

After the 193os Depression and the Second World War there was a determination in Britain, New Zealand, Australia, many parts of Europe and to a lesser extent the United States of America, to abolish what Beveridge called the “Five Giants”, namely:  “Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness” (BBC 2013).  A serious attempt was made in Britain and Australia to expand the welfare state significantly. In 1964 United States President Lyndon Johnston declared a “war on poverty” but somehow these efforts have metamorphosed into a war against the poor (Tomlinson 2o13). Perhaps this is because, as the American community worker, Si Kahn, pointed out in 1970, we will quite happily spend $2o billion to put a man on the moon but won’t spend $20 to put a man on his feet.

The rich are getting richer, the middle classes are being hollowed out and the poor are sinking deeper into poverty throughout much of the Anglo-speaking world and the western world more generally. Despite the United Nations setting Millennium goals designed to abolish poverty in the Third World, famine, starvation and malnutrition still cause about 40,000 deaths every day of the year. Louis D. Brandeis has indicated that,

“We must make our choice. We may have democracy, or we may have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can’t have both (History of Giving)”.

Some conservative Christian fundamentalists suggest that there is little that can or even should be done about poverty and they justify such a view by quoting Jesus saying: “The poor will always be with us.” (Matthew 26:11)  However were they to read on and put the statement in context, they would see Jesus quoting (Deuteronomy 15:10-11): “Give liberally and be ungrudging when you do so, for on this account the Lord your God will bless you in all your work and in all that you undertake. Since there will never cease to be some in need on the earth, I therefore command you, ‘Open your hand to the poor and needy neighbour in your land’ (Humble Monkey 2009).”

If we made a cut of just one-tenth in the amount of money spent on defence forces and armaments in the world, we could feed, house, clothe, supply primary education and provide  primary health care to everyone in the world who currently misses out. But we won’t because rich people think they need such defence forces to protect them and their property from poor people.

George Monbiot writing in The Guardian on the 14th January 2013 noted that:

“In 2o12, the world’s 100 richest people became $241 billion richer.  They are worth  just a little less than the entire output of the United Kingdom.”

He suggested that the policies leading to this result included reductions in the tax rates paid by high income earners, failing to pursue tax payments from the rich, “government’s refusal to recoup a decent share of revenues from minerals and the land; the privatisation of public assets and the creationof a toll-booth economy… and the destruction of collective bargaining.”

“The Economic Policy Institute, a think-tank, calculates that chief executives at America’s 350 biggest companies were paid 231 times as much as the average private-sector worker in 2011” (JS. 2012). This same think-tank calculated that in the year 2ooo, these executives or their equivalents had been paid in the order of 40o times average private-sector workers: whereas in 1975 this ratio was only 20 times the average workers salary. At Walmart, the ratio between the pay of the CEO and their median workers is over 1,000 to one (CEO 2o13). “The average total remuneration of a chief executive of a top 50 company listed on the Australian Securities Exchange in 2010 is $6.4 million – or almost 100 times that of the average wage.

In September 2012 Gina Rinehart said “Africans want to work, and its workers are willing to work for less than $2 per day.  Such statistics make me worry for this country’s future… The BBC estimated that, while Mrs Rinehart was talking about pay rates for African workers she was earning $600 a second (Sydney Morning Herald)”.

Gina’s father, Lang Hancock, made most of his money from exporting iron ore but got an early start mining asbestos.  Wittenoom was named by Lang Hancock after Frank Wittenoom, his partner in the nearby Mulga Downs Station.

“ln 1943 mining began in Wittenoom Gorge. In 1947 a company town was built, and by the 19950s it was the Pilbara’s largest town. During the 1950s and early 1960s Wigttenoom was Australia’s only supplier of blue asbestos. The town was shut down in 1966 due to unprofitability and growing health concerns from asbestos mining in the area”(Wikipedia).

As Australian folk singer, Garry Shearston put it in the 1960s:

‘Australian Blue Asbestos don’t you ever forget
that as good as you give is as good as you get
and remember though the going may be hard
that a miner is a man not a number on a card.’

The workers got asbestosis, mesothelioma and other respiratory conditions. Lang Hancock got the profits. The original Indigenous owners of the land got left with the asbestos pollution.

The race war

Aborigines have had to bear 225 years of the race war. The NT Intervention is just the latest manifestation of that ongoing determination to take from the Indigenous community whatever the invaders want. Sometimes it was land or minerals, sometimes women, children or labour. And sometimes it was the need to deprive them of their dignity or to assert control or both. Anyone wishing to establish that the race war has ended needs to show that the contemporary Indigenous community is being treated on just terms and that just reparation has been made for past wrongs.

Many white Australians rather talk about ‘the Aboriginal problem’ than turn their mind to justice for the original owners of this land. Dennis Walker on numerous platforms declared ‘There is no Aboriginal problem there is only a white problem.’  It may well be that it is the excessive acquisitiveness of non-Indigenous people   which exacerbates Indigenous people’s health and socio-economic position – compare the returns which Lang Hancock received from Pilbara iron mining with the rewards the traditional owners received.

It may be the failure of non-indigenous society to come to a just accommodation with Indigenous Australians that is the problem. It may be the sheer bloody-mindedness of politicians and their public servants that is at least part of the problem. But integral to how this all plays out is the way mainstream Australians regard the provision of social security, health and educational services. In particular the way in which politicians happily attach a range of obligations to any assistance provided.(Tomlinson 2o11)

On Late Night Live on 2o/9/1999, Bee Campbell noted that the powerless and marginalised know much more about those who oppress them than their oppressors know about poor people – the problem is that there is little that poor people can individually do to address the totality of issues confronting the least affluent. There is an additional difficulty and that is that too many rich people don’t have any interest in changing the situation. In fact, their vested interests are designed to keep marginalised people subjugated.

The precariat

In Australia,  for most of the period 195o until 199o, most jobs were secure, the system of arbitration was reasonably fair, the majority of people who were looking for work found some form of employment within a few weeks and nearly everyone without income was entitled to some form of social security. These days, the eligibility requirements for social security have been tightened, the regulations are enforced more ruthlessly, and successful recipients find they have extensive obligations to meet if they are to continue to receive benefits. At the same time secure jobs are fast disappearing – casual and part-time employment is becoming the norm. The age of the precarious worker is upon us.(Standing 2011).

The free movement of money and a restricted movement of labour

There is a free movement of money around the world and that suits the super rich and allows them to extract profits ancl concessions from governments, particularly governments of smaller and developing countries. Restricting the movement of labour often is in the interests of the well-off; 457 visas help control the in-situ workforce and save employers having to train the local workforce.  Simultaneously, the 457 visa regulations constrain imported temporary workers.

Downward envy

It is not only the bourgeoisie but also some ordinary workers who can be conscripted to attack the unemployed, migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, disability pensioners and Aborigines. It is not only the rich who would deny welfare payments to many people living in poverty. Once the State can cut off a section of the working class or the unemployed from the main working class movement, it can set out to expand its wedging and politics of envy. Howard started with the young unemployed but it wasn’t long before all unemployed were metamorphosed into “dole bludgers” and “job slobs”. Asylum seekers became grist to the mill. Then Disability Pensioners found out they were a bunch of “malingerers” whose numbers had to be cut by a third.  Then came the turn of single parents and their children.  Subsequent Labor governments have followed suit.

Once people come to accept the corrosive belief that because they don’t get government assistance to help raise their children or cope with a disability then no-one should; and if they do then it should be doled out like charity from the parish poor box.  Such people forget that they get tax cuts and government superannuation subsidies, which the poor don’t get, nor do they seem to notice that they aren’t poor and that they don’t have a disability. (Tomlinson 2009)

Tough love

The ruthlessness of the super rich and their welfare apologists such as Lawrence Mead (1986o, 1997) is on open display. They happily talk about the need for tough love to assist people off welfare because they claim that it is what the poor need and in their hearts really want.  Such attitudes may have been unexceptional in mid-20th century male-dominated divorce proceedings, but in civilised society they are a thing of the past.  Apart from Indigenous or welfare policy areas where else would such arcane policies be tolerated?

Corruption

I’m now living in Sydney where they have the ICAC (a corruption commissioner), which has just handed down findings which indicate that an ex-Labor Party Mining Minister (Ian McDonald) had (without calling for tenders) granted a mining lease to a union official mate (John Maitland) that resulted in him gaining millions of dollars in profits when the ‘training mine’ was on-sold.  One of McDonald’s Labor politician mates (Eddie Obied) and his family gained $60 million after their farm was gazetted as a mine lease.  These three will probably go to jail in the fullness of time.  The ‘business men’ (pseudonyms for company directors and investors in Cascade Coal and Whitehaven Coal) who bought the mines – and who stand to make hundreds of millions from their shady dealings with Maitland and Obied – will probably walk free.

I hate seeing underutilised infrastructure and have long thought that if we were to hang one member of the bourgeoisie from every lamp-post in Australia we’d have a much more pleasant country in which to live.

Alternatively, Clive Palmer could load as many of the richest people in Australia as will fit onto his Titanic II and sail off to the depths of the Antarctic.  Once there, he should replicate the events of the original Titanic’s maiden voyage.

The mode of distribution

The mode of production is obviously weighted in the interests of capital and has for many centuries been thus. The mode of distribution could be designed along a number of alternative lines.  Karl Marx attempted to synthetise  both these modes in 1875 in his Critique of the Gotha Program when he proposed that the arrangement should be: “From each according to ability, to each according to need“. Such an arrangement might be an anathema to those economic fundamentalists who want desperately to  believe that the invisible hands of the market are the final arbiter of good taste and moral rectitude, and other capitalists would see such a system as ultra-left utopianism. It has to be admitted that beyond small-scale hunter-gatherer or anarchist communities this idea has never been fully implemented. Furthermore, because it too relies on the concept of need it has many of the weaknesses of targeted categorical welfare systems.

If we are to see how the rich gain exponentially from the various modes of distribution then we need to spend some time looking at the history of the welfare state and its modern construction.

The Poor Laws

The needs-based approach has been a central component of’ welfare relief since before the 1600 Poor Law was introduced in England. The concept of less eligibility lies at the heart of the method of determining who shall be assisted and who will be refused. Less eligibility refers to the principle enshrined in the English Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 that ensures recipients of state support should receive benefits at a level below the wage of the lowest paid labourer, so as not to deter them from efforts to obtain employment.

The desire to assist ‘all those in need’ is in effect a determination to refuse assistance to all those who do not fit into some societally approved, arbitrarily defined (albeit undeclared) and somewhat flexible set of rules.

Guy Standing (2002, pp. 173-174) makes the point that: “Although its adherents like to use the word ‘new’, workfare has a long tradition. It was enshrined in the English Poor Law of 1536 dealing with ‘sturdy vagabonds’ and in the French Ordonnance de Moulins of 1556. The most famous precedent was the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act in Great Britain, a targeted system designed to reach only the ‘deserving’ and desperate poor (italics in original)”. Joel Handler (2002, footnote No. 217) traces this distinction back to the Statute of Labourers in 1348 with its prohibition against the giving of alms to “sturdy beggars”. Such distinctions have probably been around since the concept of charity emerged.

Just how ruthless and desperate were the workhouses conducted under the auspices of the Poor Laws can be glimpsed from Charles Lamport (1870) description of them cited by Sanborn (1899):

Its practice is, that no destitute person, however meritorious, can benefit by this organization without having to pass under something very like the old Roman yoke. On the one side of the Caudine forks, a man stands erect, self-respecting and respected, and with name unstained; on the other side he crouches, a changed and degraded being. He has become a social pariah, hopes destroyed, spirit crushed, reputation gone. Society, before it yields what it dare not refuse, so embitters the morsel by contempt that neither giver nor receiver is blessed in the act.

Poor Laws dealt with the claims of the poor and destitute as distinct from the rights of citizenship and was only available “if the claimants ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word” (Marshall 195o, p.128).

Charity systems like those of the poor law era were underpinned by a concept of noblesse oblige… the obligation of the nobility to show generosity to the poor, but certainly not to be so generous as to bring those assisted to a point where they might be tempted not to work.  It did not treat every applicant for assistance equally, instead bestowing generosity on the most worthy and refusing the unworthy.

It would be possible to move to a mode of distribution based on citizenship or permanent residence. Such schemes are currently being advocated in many South American countries, Mexico city, several parts of Europe, Namibia, India and elsewhere. It takes the form of a universal income guarantee. It is called a Basic Income (BIEN). It would pay each individual permanent resident an above-the-poverty-line income irrespective of whether they work or not and irrespective of whether they live with a partner. Tax would be paid on any other income the person received from the first to the last dollar earned. The Australian advocates run a website (BIGA). But we are getting ahead of ourselves…

The existing welfare system

The Welfare State in Australia is allegedly run to assist the poor. It is based on the concept of deciding who is in need, oblivious of the fact that “need” is in the eye of the beholder. It is targeted, categorical and means-tested. It is really there to serve the rich… to control dissent. It does this in ways not dissimilar to a system of noblesse oblige. Age pensioners are paid more than unemployed people. Widow Pensioners have different rules applying to them when compared with lone parents. The categorical system, because of the way it interprets “need”, discriminates between applicants who are very alike… it is designed to divide and control… it utilises stigma, apportions blame, applies sanctions and imposes obligations upon recipients. It enforces a system of less eligibility with the mystification that it does so in order to assist the poor to avoid dependency.

Dependency and welfare cheating

Jocelyn Newman, Minister for Social Security, in the Howard Coalition Government, railed against the alleged dependency of welfare recipients. “She made her reputation as the minister who clamped down on welfare cheats.” (When she retired she received) “three taxpayer-funded super pensions”. (Her) own $77,500 a year superannuation, $63,000 a year parliamentary pension of her late husband and at least $25,000 (a year) from his time in the military”. (Megalogenis 2oo1 ).

It’s the same the whole world over
ain’t it all a blooming shame
it’s the rich what lives on clover
and the poor what gets the blame.

During the 1970s, several welfare leaders wrote papers calling on the government to ‘target the poor‘. They argued that social welfare operatives had a duty to concentrate their attention on assisting the poorest people. In 1986, in a paper entitled “Target the Rich Not the Poor“, I argued, “It is very important to oppose categorical and needs-based income maintenance payments and work towards universal incomes.  We must drag the idea of worthiness from its hiding place in the heart of every conservative and hang it by the neck until it is dead” (pps. 9-10).

Polanyi, sardonically reflecting upon those who, in the last quarter of the 19th century, wanted to replace all parish-provided welfare relief in England with private charity, wrote: “But once the indigent were left to the mercy of the well-to-do, who can doubt that ‘the only difficulty’ is to restrain the impetuosity of  the latter’s benevolence?” (1945, p.121). There are still rich right-wing libertarians who argue  that governments should withdraw from providing social security because philanthropists would provide better welfare assistance to the poor.  Adding a critical edge to Polanyi is the idea that “A philanthropist is someone who gives away  what he should give back (anon).

Basic Income : A way forward

A Basic Income does not assist according to need  but it does tax according to ability to accumulate other income. Because it avoids assessing need, it does  not control the least affluent nor does it divide permanent residents from each other. It provides the basis for social solidarity. It is paid to both rich and poor and so avoids imposing stigma on anyone. Because it is paid to each individual, it avoids intra-family repression. Because it is paid equally to all it avoids sexism, racism, disables, ageism or any other form of discrimination.   It encourages work but does not compel any form of reciprocity.  Because it is an above-the-poverty-line income, which can’t be garnisheed by government or industry, it allows workers to refuse to be conscripted into undertaking unsafe, undesirable or underpaid employment.  A Basic Income has the capacity to become, in extreme circumstances, a permanent strike fund (Offe 2008).  A Basic Income can’t be denied to any permanent resident, asylum seeker or citizen.  But best of all, because it is a universal payment, a Basic Income can’t be used by the filthy rich to set the working class against itself.  There would no longer be a need to have welfare officials scouring the country looking for welfare cheats because we would all have the same entitlement.  These welfare officials could be converted into tax officials and could spend their days happily pursuing stinking rich tax cheats.

Instructions to the little Aussie battler

Work harder.
Make someone else redundant.
This is efficiency.
Competition is our salvation.
This way we cost our betters less.
One day we’ll be internationally competitive
and get paid a dollar
for a fourteen hour day.
Then we’ll understand
what world’s best practice means

Acknowledgement

I wish to thank Penny Harrington for her editorial assistance.

Bibliography

ACTU (2013) “Executive Pay Watch.”
http://www.actu.org.au/Issues/ExecutivePayWatch/default.aspx
BBC (2013) “History – William Beveridge.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/beveridge_william.shtml
BIEN (2013) Basic Income Earth Network
http://www.basicincome.org/bien/
BIGA (Basic Income Guarantee Australia)
http://www.basicincome.qut.edu.au/
CEO (2013) CEO pay in Perspective.
http://www.payscale.com/data-packages/ceo-income
Handler, J. (2002) “Social Citizenship and Workfare in the United States and Western Europe.” BIEN 9th International Conference, Geneva, Sept.12-14.
History of Giving http://www.nptrust.org/history-of-giving/philanthropic-quotes/
Humble monkey (2009)
http://humblemonkey.wordpress.com/2009/07/01/the-poor-will-always-be-with-us/
JS. (2012) http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/05/ratio-ceo-worker-compensation
Kahn, S. (1970) How People get Power. McGraw-Hill, New York.
Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class. London: Pluto.
Mead, L. (1997) From Welfare to Work : Lessons from America. Institute of Economic Affairs, Health & Welfare Unit, London.
Mead. L. (1986) Beyond Entitlement: the social obligations of citizenship. Free Press, New York.
Megalogenis, G. (2001) “Newman to collect a super triple-dip.” The Australian. 8th November.
Monbiot, G. (2013) “If you think we’re done with neoliberalism, think again.” The Guardian, 14th January. This article in a fully referenced version entitled “Bang Goes the Theory.” http://www.monbiot.com/2013/01/14/bang-goes-the-theory/
Offe, C. (2008) “Basic Income and the Labour Contract.” Basic Income Studies. Vol. 3, No.1, April.
Polanyi, K. (1945) Origins of our Time: The Great Transformation. Victor Gollancz, London.
Sanborn, F (1899) “Pauperism.” in Lalor, J. (ed.) Cyclopoedia of Political Science.
Standing, G. (2002) Beyond the New Paternalism: Basic security as Equality. Verso, London.
Standing, G. (2011) The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. Bloomsbury, London.
Sydney Morning Herald (2012) “World’s media pan Rinehart’s $2 a day African miner comments.”
http://www.smh.com.au/business/worlds-media-pan-rineharts-2-a-day-african-miner-comments-20120906-25fpq.html#ixzz2eYhoEeav
Tomlinson, J. (2013) “How did the attempt to abolish poverty become a war against the poor?” 11th June
http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=15104
Tomlinson, J. (2011) “Needs must when the Devil drives.” On Line Opinion.18th January
http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=11494
Tomlinson, J. (2009) “Greed is (not) good.” On Line Opinion. 10th February http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=8524
Tomlinson, J. (1986) “Target the Poor”.  Paper given at the Filling the gaps…in our Education NSW social welfare student’s Conference, Sydney, July.
Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wittenoom,_Western_Australia

More Info

Christian Porter’s Centrelink

You’re 26thin the queue
and we’re ignoring you
we don’t care what you think
for we are Centrelink.

If you’re unemployed or poor
you can wait outside the door
if you drink or have a bet
we will get you yet
we’ll raise a robo-debt
making sure that you regret
annoying us with your woes
piss-off with your sorrows
but do it nice and quiet
and always be polite
or you’ll be in the shite.

Remember don’t be late
never show your hate
it would make us quite irate
and you’ll never wipe the slate.
If your life is in a mess
don’t share your distress
cause we don’t care
about your despair
best, you just disappear.

mid 2018

More Info

Comprehensive paternalism pursuing autonomy

Paper given at the 13th BIEN Congress in Sao Paulo Brazil June 30th – July 2nd 2010. John Tomlinson

Abstract

Many authors (Paine 1797, Milner 1920, Rhys-Williams 1943, van Parijs 1997, Standing 2002, Tomlinson 2003, Offe 2008) claim a universal Basic Income would promote autonomy. They argue that the poorest and most vulnerable residents of a country would gain the most from the sense of financial security and independence which a universal Basic Income would provide. Philippe van Parijs (1997) describes a universal Basic Income as ensuring Real Freedom for All by which he means a form of freedom which embodies security, self-ownership and opportunity (p. 22). Guy Standing (2002) sees such a Basic Income as a way of guaranteeing against the insidious undermining of economic and social protection which the emerging paternalism of late 20th and early 21st centuries foists on the least privileged citizens of Western English speaking countries. As he says, the reciprocity principle lies at “the heart of Third Wayism, and the New Paternalism which guided it (p. 168)”.

This paper will examine some of the contradictions surrounding the inherent paternalism of providing an unearned income to every permanent resident as a way of promoting autonomy. It will also examine how these contradictions impede the introduction of a Basic Income in Western English-speaking countries. It will look at the moral objections raised by supporters of participation income and their reciprocity-promoting colleagues to the introduction of a universal Basic Income. It will be argued that social solidarity or republican conceptions of society are a more fertile ground in which to plant the seeds of a Basic Income.

Paternalism and Basic Income

Ruben Lo Vuolo and Daniel Raventos (2009) assert that Basic Income is a guaranteed regular income paid (ideally above the poverty line) by the state, to each and every permanent resident irrespective of their income or assets, labor market attachment or cohabitation arrangements. It is paid without appending any reciprocal obligation. Raventos provides a more detailed discussion of what constitutes a Basic Income at Chapter 1 of his 2007 book Basic Income: The Material Conditions of Freedom.

If a government provides a Basic Income to every permanent resident, rich and poor, worker and non-worker, young and old, married and unmarried, urban and rural resident without requiring them to contribute in anyway, then this act, by its very nature, is paternalistic. Since the days of the Poor Laws, governments have acted paternalistically towards some residents who sought assistance, namely the deserving poor. A universal Basic Income extends the paternalistic act to all permanent residents and, in providing such an income guarantee, the government ensures that everyone has sufficient income to sustain him or herself.

Is there any difference in the paternalism of such universal payments that makes them less objectionable than the paternalism explicit and implicit in targeted categorical welfare payments or participation income schemes? I think the answer is an undeniable “Yes!” though it is true that under a Basic Income every permanent resident is, from birth to death, guaranteed an income entitlement to which they have not directly contributed. In that sense, the provision of such income support is clearly a benevolently paternalistic act of the government towards each and every permanent resident.

What makes the paternalism of a Basic Income less objectionable is the fact that the state does not require any reciprocal obligation. Under a Basic Income, as opposed to categorical welfare or participation income, the paternalism does not erode autonomy (Offe 2008). Each citizen is conceived of as receiving her or his entitlement from the common wealth (Paine 1797). Equally each permanent resident is considered to be contributing to the common wealth. So the state does not impose obligations on citizens because they are not considered to have obligations to meet. Rather, the state is meeting its obligation to those who are born (or who the state has accepted have a right to live permanently) within its territory.

The paternalism implicit and explicit in the relationship between the state and its citizens under a universal Basic Income is thus of a very different order from that which exists under a targeted categorical welfare system or a participation income scheme. In these latter schemes the reciprocal obligations which fall upon recipients are defined directly by the state and must be met or the benefit is withheld.

This paper will return to look in detail at the relative paternalistic impositions of targeted categorical welfare systems / participation income programs and universal Basic Income, but will first compare the relative paternalism of Negative Income Tax and Basic Income.

Negative Income Tax / Tax Credit: the libertarian solution

Milton Friedman (1962) proposed a Negative Income Tax as a way to abolish most welfare state programs. Friedman (1962, pp.191-194, 1968) saw in the Negative Income Tax an opportunity to pay the poor and only the poor and to dismantle much of the welfare infrastructure which sustained service delivery. He saw it as a way to rationalise the tax and social security systems and also justify the abolition of farm subsidies and transfers to the middle class.

Negative Income Tax and its tax credit variation have the potential to limit individuals’ involvement with their government. Only those individuals who wish to claim the Negative Income Tax or the tax credit component have to involve themselves with the government’s tax / welfare redistributive systems. So a country with a Negative Income Tax could have fewer citizens receiving the income guarantee than an equivalent country with a Basic Income. In this sense, a Negative Income Tax is a less comprehensive paternalistic form of income support than is a Basic Income. As such, the Negative Income Tax might appeal to conservative libertarians.

Whilst it is true, however, that a Negative Income Tax allows libertarians to escape the clutches of the government’s welfare redistributive system, it is hardly likely that they will escape involvement with the taxation system. If they earn enough not to need the income support offered by the government, they are likely to be earning sufficient to require them to pay income tax to the government. Because of their belief in the virtues of small government, such libertarians are likely to want to minimise their tax by claiming all the deductions they can. In many countries the rich get far greater tax concessions on “allowable” expenses and superannuation contributions than the poor get from the social security system. That is, the tax redistributive system is often far more generous to the well off than the welfare redistributive system is to the poor.

In another sense, a Negative Income Tax system and the tax credit variation of it are more like targeted welfare systems than is a Basic Income. People applying for a tax credit or a Negative Income Tax must make a more detailed application and have a greater understanding of their earnings, potential earnings, the tax system and economics generally. Many who would be eligible for payment were they to apply, fail to do so. The least bureaucratically sophisticated, who are generally the poorest citizens, make up the majority of those who fail to apply. Jonathon Boston and Susan St. John (1998) and Guy Standing (2002 pp. 96-105, 2008) have established that this is also the case with categorical welfare systems. The more complex the system and the greater the complexity of the application process, the less likely it is that all who are poor and eligible will receive their entitlements.

So, while a Negative Income Tax may well ensure that a lower percentage of permanent residents are reliant upon the paternalistic largesse of the government than would be the case under a universal Basic Income, this is an ethereal victory for conservative libertarians. It is a tenuous success because many, if not most, of those who are excluded will be eligible residents who are bureaucratically unsophisticated and impoverished. Because of this, Negative Income Tax schemes do not meet Friedman’s prime claim that Negative Income Tax is capable of providing an income stream to “the poor and only the poor”.

Even when governments do implement a tax credit system, what they introduce is not a universal tax credit. The tax credit is frequently targeted to specific categories of residents and may have elements of conditionality. For instance in Australia there are tax credits but they are only available to those who have children and in Britain and the USA the tax credit is only available to those who are employed for a set minimum number of hours each week.

Paternalism and participation income

In 2001, Robert Goodin wrote:

what clearly underlies welfare to work reforms around the world…is a view that work is intrinsically good, and welfare a second best. …
Sweaty brows are an old socialist icon, of course. That goes far towards explaining why parties of the left as well as the right have converged upon ‘active labour market policies’ as the solution to their welfare expenditure blow-outs. …
If we seriously believed that work is good for you and that it is the state’s legitimate role to force you to do it, then we would have no grounds for confining our paternalism to the poor. Paternalistically speaking, it would be equally important to make the rich work too (pp. 197-198).

Guy Standing (2002) traces the rise of the labourist tradition in the 20th century pointing out that “during the course of the century the balance of the rhetoric shifted from exulting over the rights of labour through demanding the right to labour and then ending up emphasizing the duty to labour (p. 9)”.

Goodin (2001) acknowledges that some advocates of participation income like Tony Atkinson (1996) define the form the expected contribution might take to include a very wide range of activities: from compelled labour, to study, to undertaking child care or community service. The wider the choice of activities available to those coerced into undertaking participation income activities the less oppressive are the requirements. As was seen in Australia during the last three decades, however, the reciprocal requirements demanded of those with little option but to rely on an unemployment or disability payment gradually became more oppressive until many, particularly the young, were forced to “work for the dole” or carry out other soul-destroying tasks.

A 2003 report entitled Much Obliged, commissioned by the Brotherhood of St Laurence and the St Vincent de Paul Society, asserted that people who became long-term unemployed have so much of their time taken up just meeting the obligations imposed on them by the government that they don’t have time to find work: the report concludes the “mutual obligation” regime “is failing the most disadvantaged job seekers. Overall the system operates…not as ‘welfare to work’ but ‘welfare as work’” (Ziguras, Dufty and Considine 2003, p.43).

In 2007 I wrote:

There is very little mutuality in the present Australian system of “mutual obligations”. The Government provides an income which, for most, is less than the poverty line but demands in return that recipients meet a series of enforced “obligations”. The Federal Government in recent years imposed its “work for the dole” policy, demanding young unemployed people who have literacy or numeracy difficulties attend classes on threat of having their benefits reduced, and increasing threefold the number of suspensions of payments inflicted on Social Security recipients in the three years to 2002. Centrelink imposed 386,946 breaches during the 2000–2001 financial year (ACOSS 2001, 2002, p. 2). Considerable numbers of those who have had their payments suspended have experienced homelessness and other life crises (p. 35).

Bettina Cass (1986, 1988) headed an inquiry into the Australian income support system for the Labor government of the day. She recommended the introduction of a form of participation income support which she called an “active” employment policy. Like Atkinson (1996), she included a wide range of “activities” from child care through study to work. Labor lost office in 1996 and the incoming conservative government determined to end what it saw as excessive reliance on social security.

In 1999, the Minister for Family and Community Services, Jocelyn Newman, decided to set up a full scale review of income support. Her riding instructions to the review were laid out in a monograph entitled The Challenge of Welfare Dependency in the 21st. Century. A year later, the review committee dutifully reported to the government that there was a need to insist that social security recipients met their obligations to work, study or engage in other “activation” activities (McClure 2000).

Standing (2002, p. 104) puts such “activation” policies into perspective when he writes that:

The notion of active labour market policy is equally disingenuous. The word “active” seems virile and strong, whereas its opposite, “passive”, suggests laziness, a lack of initiative. Who could be in favour of being passive if one could be active? In fact, active policy is little more than having the state telling people what they must do in order to receive some modest benefit, directing them to training or job schemes. By contrast, the much-derided passive policy entails giving funds to individuals or families with minimal or no conditions, leaving them to make choices about how to conduct their lives and allocate their resources.

Claus Offe (2008 p. 10) says that the enthusiasm for the euphemism of “activation” results in categorisations, caring for, managing, controlling, treatment, supervision and frequent stigmatization of recipients which in turn “reduces them to the passive status of sheltered, paternalistically regulated objects” who are denied meaningful choice in their lives.

Supporters of participation income foist “activation” activities on applicants for income support, presumably because they believe that unless there is some form of compulsion beneficiaries will fail to make any contribution to their self-development or to society or to both. I claim the reason welfare administrators and supporters of participation income are reluctant to trust others (to do the right thing) is because they do not trust themselves to do the ethical thing (2003, Ch. 8). Henning Melber (2009), echoing Standing (2002), defuses the participation income argument by explaining what a Basic Income actually tries to achieve.

He says:

It seeks to restore human dignity and (self-)respect through a modest but nonetheless enabling financial transfer which allows recipients to become active and to make spending options they otherwise would not have. In that sense, it also fosters ownership over matters and creates an identity of belonging and citizenship as opposed to isolated destitution. … (It) allows the marginalized to make use of opportunities to actively participate in the society.

In 2001 Goodin explained some of the mechanisms behind the contractions in generosity of welfare policies by pointing to:

  • moral panic even though “the panic is groundless”,
  • mean minded governments “engineering more hoops for people to jump through” and “clearing the rolls by tripping up some”, and
  • “bureaucratic disentitlement” adding “the more cumbersome the process, the more people will fail to satisfy some requirement (pp. 198-199)”.

It is obvious that there is a great similarity between participation income and a range of targeted categorical welfare programs. Many of the benefits and problems present in participation income share features with categorical means-tested benefits as well as a history extending back to the days of the Poor Laws and to earlier parish-run charities.

Embedded in all non-universal systems of income support are judgments about the needs and social worth of potential recipients. Robert Goodin makes the point that:

The basic problems with presumptions are…they are vulnerable to factual error, and they are vulnerable to social change. …

We presume, for purposes of social policy, that families will share income equitably, that families will stick together, and that people will respect court orders to support their children. But perhaps we are under no illusions about the empirical unreality of those propositions, in all too many cases. Perhaps we build those presumptions into social policy none the less because we want to try to alter social reality in those respects, and we think that building those presumptions into social policy will somehow help to do so (1992, pp. 20-206).

When the first Australian Commonwealth pensions were introduced in 1910, applicants were required to establish they were of “good moral character” before they could be paid. Such provisions remained in place until 1973. Guy Standing (2002, pp. 173-174) makes the point that: “Although its adherents like to use the word “new”, workfare has a long tradition. It was enshrined in the English Poor Law of 1536 dealing with “sturdy vagabonds”, and in the French Ordonnance de Moulins of 1556. The most famous precedent was the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act in Great Britain, a targeted system designed to reach only the “deserving” and desperate poor (italics in original)”. Joel Handler (2002, footnote No. 217) traces this distinction back to the Statute of Labourers in 1348 with its prohibition against the giving of alms to “sturdy beggars”. Such distinctions have probably been around since the concept of charity emerged.

Basic Income and the republican justification for avoiding poverty

So far in this paper I have discussed the failure of Negative Income Tax or its tax credit variation and targeted categorical welfare programs to abolish poverty because of their complexity which in turn makes it harder for the bureaucratically less sophisticated to lodge a successful application. I have not raised the issue of stigma which is part and parcel of welfare systems and which results in many people refusing to apply for welfare benefits. British workhouses, during the days of the Poor Laws, were the exemplar of such welfare systems. In 1996, Professor Hugh Stretton pointed to continuing similarities between the 19th century Poor Law regime and the Australian Social Security system (see also Tomlinson, Dee & Schooneveldt 2005).

As Raventos (2007, p. 21) notes: poverty is a pervasive phenomenon involving privation, material want, dependence on the arbitrary whims of others, lack of self-esteem and, frequently, social isolation. He notes with approval Robespierre’s many references to the importance of society guaranteeing ‘the material existence of all citizens’. This is what Raventos (2007, Chs. 3-6) terms the republican justification of a Basic Income. He writes: “Basic income is a proposal that seeks to eradicate poverty. However, from the republican standpoint, if this is a goal to be pursued it is precisely because eradicating poverty by guaranteeing the material existence of all citizens is a necessary condition for the exercise of freedom (p. 108)”. This justification of the Republican proposition and of Basic Income squares the circle from van Parijs’ analysis in Real Freedom for All via the French Revolution and back to the 21st century.

In 2007, Raventos justifies the payment of a Basic Income without requiring willingness to work or any other contribution from the recipient. He writes that in addition to promoting autonomy it would not interfere with willingness to labour (p. 81). Raventos argues that a Basic Income is necessary to enhance equity because many extremely wealthy individuals in Europe and elsewhere derived huge farm and other subsidies from the state (pp. 191-196). He justifies his belief that a Basic Income would not interfere with work effort because people who had won major lotteries in Europe continued to work (Marx and Peeters 2004) and from the elaborate Negative Income Tax studies carried out in the USA.

As far back as 1920, Dennis Milner argued that a Basic Income should be paid to all permanent residents without the requirement to prove that they were willing to work. Milner asserted that nearly everyone was eager to find employment, that fellow citizens would place pressure on unemployed people to engage in productive labour, and that, in any case, the few who were capable of working but who refused to would be unlikely to make much of a contribution to the economy. Claus Offe (2008) supports Milner’s assertion by pointing out that surveys on “‘happiness’ seem to suggest that the absence of opportunities to make oneself useful correlates strongly with a strong feeling of unhappiness (p.14)”and that coerced workers in German “activation” programs were not sought after by employers (p. 8).

Writing in the aftermath of the recent world-wide recession, Lo Vuolo and Raventos (2009) argue that if the USA and other countries are prepared to bailout the executives of finance houses who caused the recession, it is no longer reasonable to oppose the introduction of a Basic Income on the grounds that markets should not be regulated or that public monies should not be distributed. They assert that it makes much more sense to distribute money directly to poor people who suffered as a result of the economic down turn than prop-up those who caused the crises.

In the Otjivero-Omitara area of Namibia a Basic Income monthly grant of $100 (Namibian) is being provided by the Basic Income Grant Coalition to every person under the age of 60 who was living there in July 2007. Within one year of receiving the grant:

  • crime had decreased, as had poverty and child malnutrition,
  • the rate of those (above the age of 15 years) engaged in income generating activities increased from 44 to 55% of the population,
  • school attendance and visits to the health clinic rose dramatically, and
  • household debt had dropped significantly while household savings had risen
    (Haarmann, C., Haarmann, D., Jauch, Shindondola-Mote, Nattrass, van Niekerk and Samson (2009, pp. 12-15).

Bishop Kameeta, a strong promoter of the Namibian Basic Income Grant Coalition, reflecting upon the miracle of the loaves and fishes noted that working on the Basic Income trial in Otjivero-Omitara had led to a different understanding of the miracle. He writes:

The miracle lies in the sharing! The breaking of bread together. Jesus shared unconditionally, without saying: you look needy and you don’t, you are deserving and you are not, you need to stand in this queue and you must not. No, when you share bread you give to everybody, unconditionally, without so-called targeting – exactly like the BIG. And when you share, people open up, you create an opportunity and you create a community, and people start to give. The miracle is not about the arithmetic of dividing five loaves of bread among 5000 people, but the miracle is that if you break bread together, people start to open up and to share what they have. That is all. People started to contribute, and this is why you had more than you had before (Haarmann et al. 2009, foreword p. vi).

The eminent Australian jurist, Geoffrey Robertson, recalls that in 1938 “a small group of English writers and scholars led by H. G. Wells – J.B. Priestly was one of their number and A.A. Milne motored up from Pooh Corner to help with the draft – produced a universal declaration of human rights, a document that was based not on notions of natural rights but was based on human dignity (2009 p. 5).” This document suggested that people have an entitlement to human rights because they “come into the world through no fault of their own”.

Such a justification for basic economic security, as would be provided by a Basic Income, is certainly compatible with the republican rationale for a universal income guarantee and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This Declaration guarantees everyone “equal access to public service in his country” (Article 21 [2]), a “right to social security…in accordance with the organisation and resources of each State” (Article 22) and for all who have work they have the right to have their earned income “supplemented, if necessary by other means of social protection” (Article 23[3]). The 1938 declaration of human rights is also compatible with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 11[1]) which guarantees “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living…and to the continuous improvement of living conditions”.

Republican social solidarity beats targeted means-tested categorical benefits

Goodin, reflecting upon the morality of welfare officials forcing clients to meet ‘activation agreements’, says “the proposition that the welfare worker is putting to her putative ‘client’ is ‘Agree or starve.’ That is the same, in all essentials, to the proposition the highwayman puts to his victim ‘Agree or die (2001, p. 191).’”

Some say that we would have a better understanding of others if we were to walk a mile in their shoes. Some won’t want to do that for fear of developing cerebral blisters. Others reject the idea because they fear the burden of other people’s problems. And then there are others very keen to walk a mile in another’s shoes because they know they’ll be a mile away before the theft of the shoes is discovered. This probably helps explain why enforcing obligations on the poorest in return for a poverty line income is so attractive. It may even explain the antipathy which arises when unemployed people, lone parents and others who are struggling to survive financially get a poverty line income which the rich don’t get.

Once people come to accept the corrosive belief that because they don’t get government assistance to help raise their children or cope with a disability then no- one should; and if they do then it should be doled out like charity from the parish poor box. Such people forget that they get tax cuts and government superannuation subsidies which the poor don’t get nor do they seem to notice that they aren’t poor and they don’t have a disability (Tomlinson 2009).

Such downward envy, created by targeted means-tested welfare programs, places an enormous obstacle in the way of the introduction of a Basic Income.

This is a strange phenomenon because it would seem logical on the face of it to make the envied payments universal so that everyone is provided with social protection. Governments find, however, that it puts less strain on budgets to drum up hatred of the poor than to pay universal social benefits. Such downward envy increases the stigma associated with receiving welfare and this in turn causes some not to test their eligibility. It is this process of social division which weakens the bonds that unify society and which in turn creates obstacles to the introduction of a Basic Income.

The philosopher, John Rawls (1972), suggests that if we could get people to consider social questions under a veil of ignorance (that is, they don’t know where they will be placed in the final scheme of things) they might consider providing far more generous societal arrangements than when they think they know where and how they are and will be socially situated. The reality is that for the most part few, if any, of us knows what awaits us next week, next month or next year. Just around the corner might be a broken marriage, the sack, lung cancer, a horrific car accident or a plane crash on the way home from the next Basic Income Earth Network Congress. The recent recession should have reinforced the financial uncertainty principle in our minds.

Guy Standing (2008 pp. 5-6) lists five principles to help evaluate whether a social policy is socially just. The principles most relevant to this paper suggest that:

A policy …is socially just only if it improves the security of the least secure …only if it does not impose controls on some groups that are not imposed on the most free …if it enhances the rights of the recipient …and limits the discretionary power of the provider (italics in original).

Standing points out that: “A right is possessed by virtue of a person’s humanity or citizenship, and cannot be made dependent on some behavioural conditionality (2008 p. 5).

In 1997, Philippe van Parijs said in relation to the potential public good of a toll-free bridge that “You may have never crossed that bridge, but the tomatoes you eat are cheaper or fresher or both because the bridge exists (p. 103)”. Much the same point can be made about the importance of introducing a universal Basic Income. You and I may never need to receive that Basic Income to survive but the certainty of such a financial backstop would make our lives more secure.

As a socialist, I have always favoured making income distribution more equal. This position was not adopted without seriously looking at what happens when people are sharing and caring, and when they reject gross disparities in wealth distribution. I was fortunate enough to spend several years working with Indigenous communities in the Top End of the Northern Territory and in Brisbane. I also had the opportunity to observe the only trial of Basic Income carried out in Australia at The Brotherhood of St Laurence in Melbourne in the 1970s (Liffman 1978). These opportunities reinforced my belief that egalitarian societies are better societies. In 2009, Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson’s book The Spirit Level provided empirical support for the belief that egalitarian societies are better societies and such multi- country analysis has been reinforced by the experience of the Namibian Basic Income trial (Haarmann et al. 2009).

Conclusion

The Australia in which I grew up was far less affluent but much more egalitarian than the one I live in at the end of the first decade of the 21st century. Thatcherism, Reaganomics, supply- side economics, the “greed is good” mentality of the “dog eat dog” world, the Washington Consensus, neo-liberalism, economic fundamentalism and many Australian variants of such forms of meanness have washed away much of the social solidarity which existed in my youth. The “do unto others as you would have others do unto you” mantra which gave birth to universal or nearly universal income support policies for children, the old, widows and those with disabilities is less often heard. Yes, people who received unemployment benefits were expected to be fit, ready and able to work, but they could not be forced to take jobs paid below the award wage. Australians then had learnt the lesson of the 1930s Depression and understood, when they looked into the eyes of unemployed people, that “There but for the grace of God go I.”

I cannot foresee a compelling ethical justification emerging in my country or any other Western English-speaking country for the introduction of a Basic Income in the near future. It is for this reason I argue that Basic Income advocates in those countries would be wise to look to the republican justification for a Basic Income along the lines advocated by Raventos (2007). On the way to victory we need to acknowledge our debt to Thomas Paine (1797), Dennis Milner (1920), Juliet Rhys–Williams (1943) as well as to those lesser-known pioneers of Basic Income and to the more recent Basic Income advocates. But, for the foreseeable future, prospects for Basic Income are much brighter in continental Europe, South America and Southern Africa because it is there that the desire to guarantee the material existence of all is most clearly articulated and where the force of social solidarity is becoming ascendant.

I may be too pessimistic about the possibility of a Basic Income being introduced in Western English-speaking countries. There have been periods in Australia, Britain and New Zealand when considerable numbers of people struggled to implement the Marxist dictum ‘From each according to their ability to each according to their need’. Such an egalitarian (Marxist) policy, if implemented, exceeds what a Basic Income could provide. A Basic Income only guarantees to pay the same amount to each permanent resident – leaving other social policies to attempt to implement greater equity. Adopting a Basic Income would not be an inconsequential step, because it redistributes from the better off to the less well off, it would substantially enhance egalitarianism.

There may be writers about to provide justifications for a Basic Income in Western English- speaking countries who can convince the likes of the dour Browns and the dull Rudds to implement truly universal policies. Or it may be that we just need to rediscover the excitement and invincibility of our childhood.

In January 2009, Ken Robinson described how education systems train students to constrain their ingenuity and enthusiasm. He recounted the story of the young girl in an Art Class whose teacher asked what it was that she was painting and was told “The face of God.” The teacher responded “But no one has seen the face of God!” The girl replied “Well, they will soon.”

If we could recapture such naive enthusiasm we might be able to place social solidarity and Basic Income at the centre of social policy even in Western English-speaking countries. I fear, however, that the lack of trust and the fear that someone else is getting something for nothing will stand in the way. The “greed is good” mentality still lingers in the minds of the power elites. Too many of them think it’s all right for privileged individuals to get something for nothing – that is how they’ve lived their entire lives – but it is abhorrent that poor people should get justice, equality, decency, and humanity; let alone something for nothing. It is the rich who get the greatest advantage from government policies which stimulate the economy, provide short term government-backed loans to finance development projects or guarantee the survival of banks by guaranteeing deposits of up to $1 million (as occurred in Australia during the recent recession). Such policies are just unencumbered handouts which the rich expect governments to provide. They see no need for governments to attach reciprocal obligations to them.

I have always resented being told I must do something. It mattered little whether it was because someone, in a position of authority wanted it done or because they actually believed it was in my best interests to do it. Likewise, I have always resented seeing other relatively powerless people being forced to carry out instructions such as ‘work for the dole’, undertake a specified study program, or meet imposed obligations. I don’t know whether it is possible to separate anti-authoritarian attitudes from anti-paternalistic ones. I believe that at least the poor (and probably everyone) would be advantaged if we were to adopt a universal Basic Income because, as Goodin (1992 p 195) notes: “Schemes that pay everyone an unconditional basic income are also less presumptuous than more conditional programmes of income support…less prying and intrusive, and in consequence less demeaning and debasing (italics in original).” And if we are to even go close to Rawlsian notions of justice (1972) we must choose policies which disadvantage the poorest citizens the least. Introducing a universal Basic Income would be a good first step along the way towards ensuring that the poor are assured of receiving economic security without oppressive obligations.

Acknowledgement

I thank Penny Harrington for her encouragement and extensive editorial assistance.

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Compulsory contributions corrode community

ON LINE opinion – Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate

Posted Monday, 25 October 2004

From the earliest days of human existence when erect hominoids started to spread out from Kenya’s Rift Valley about 2 million years ago, communal activity has been an important component of human societies. Many animal species are successful because of the supportive communities they create. The concept of civilisation is reliant, at least in part, upon the idea that relationships beyond those of individuals and families are possible and are a viable option. The notions of country and sovereignty would be meaningless without the idea of community.

At moments of danger, people have come together to defend the collective since time immemorial. Both war and group defence would be impossible without a sense of belonging to some association larger than the family. In Europe, first the church and later the state, came to assist those members of the community who were in need of assistance. Following WW II, Western countries expanded and improved their social welfare programmes. In Australia, a concerted effort was made to ensure a coherent and comprehensive welfare assistance programme. The driving notion of the time was that you built decent communities by providing decent community services.

Despite concerted efforts in many countries to construct a social welfare state to support people in times of need, income support provided by government has come under sustained attack from neo-liberal politicians and economic fundamentalist writers for over half a century. The Austrian-born writer Friedrich Hayek was one of the early cabs off the rank with his 1944 book The Road to Serfdom. Many credit Hayek with reinvigorating modern liberal thought, but there have been many fellow travellers, including Ayn Rand, Milton Friedman, and Charles Murray all of whom glorify the individual and denigrate the communal. Neo-liberals are opposed to the communal liberal utilitarian tradition of Jeremy Bentham with his belief in the greatest good for the greatest number. They exhibit no interest in how non-affluent minorities view their treatment. Instead of turning to Bentham’s or John Stuart Mills’ 19th century versions of liberalism, they retrace the paths of early liberals.

The current incarnation of liberalism is far more reminiscent of Hobbes’ mid-17th century version of the natural state of man, where life is “solitary, nasty, brutish and short” where the struggle of each is against all. Hobbes considered such a natural state was in need of control by means of a social contract.

In the 1950s, the main adherents of neo-liberal philosophies were found lurking in economic departments of universities. Gradually, politicians started to embrace some of the economic fundamentalist and other ideas of the neo-liberals. Ronald Reagan in the US and Margaret Thatcher, the Iron Lady of the British Conservative Party, did more than any other politicians to popularise neo-liberal economic fundamentalism. Their ideas have percolated through the entire English-speaking Western world. In 1991, Professor Michael Pusey noted the ascendency of economic fundamentalism in the ranks of senior bureaucrats in Canberra. Across the Tasman, Professor Jane Kelsey recorded a similar phenomenon in 1995.

By the mid-1980s, neo-liberals had succeeded in persuading politicians to prune income support programmes in Britain, the US, New Zealand and Australia. The catchcry used to justify such cutbacks was that “welfare dependency” was sapping the lifeblood of the nation. This appeal to sort out the moral problem of welfare assistance was not accompanied with any evidence of the presence of “welfare dependency”. Its existence was simply asserted and accepted by politicians wanting to make cuts in budget outlays. In 1999, Professor Robert Goodin and others showed the assertion that welfare assistance automatically leads to “dependency” is false. However such is the strength of moral panic about “welfare dependency” in the English-speaking Western world that the myths have prevailed over the facts.

It was the British Conservative Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher who, in October 1987, said:

I think we’ve been through a period where too many people have been given to understand that if they have a problem, it’s the government’s job to cope with it. “I have a problem, I’ll get a grant”. “I’m homeless, the government must house me”. They’re casting their problem on society. And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first. It’s our duty to look after ourselves and then, also to look after our neighbour. People have got the entitlements too much in mind, without the obligations. There’s no such thing as entitlement, unless someone has first met an obligation.

Similar sentiments can be identified in the policy pronouncements of Bill Clinton’s welfare cutbacks and “workfare” policies, the Keating Labor Government’s increased targeting of social security, John Howard’s “Mutual Obligation”, Tony Blair’s “Participation Income/Social Inclusion” and Mark Latham’s “Learning or Earning” Third Way Tax and Family Policies. Noel Pearson’s unctuous pronouncements, about refusing social security to indigenous people on Cape York unless they first meet their responsibilities, are drawn from this same well.

An amazing feature of recent Australian life is that although we are richer on average than ever before in our history, we are no happier: the richer we get, the greater utility we demand from those less well off than ourselves. Howard has employed the mechanism of downward envy to insulate the affluent from their own humanity. Canberra economist, Lindy Edwards, notes that:

The Coalition captured the “What About Me? sentiment”. It cunningly devised the campaign slogan: “For all of us”. In its first term in office it made theatre of cracking down on the unemployed, aborigines, immigration and minority groups. Unable to demonstrate any understanding of people’s aspirations, it settled for showing an understanding of their vices (p. 17).

Howard’s Australia: they must give something back

In 1999, John Howard set out to describe the neo-liberal economic and socially conservative mixture of ideologies that drives his prime ministership. In relation to welfare assistance he said:

Another defining aspect of our modern conservatism in social policy lies in our strong support for the principle of “Mutual Obligation”. Just as it is an ongoing responsibility of government to support those in genuine need, so also is it the case that – to the extent that it is within their capacity to do so – those in receipt of such assistance should give something back to society in return, and in the process improve their own prospects for self-reliance. This is the principle that underpins the “Work for the Dole Scheme” which we have successfully introduced and expanded over recent years.

Here Howard is suggesting that those who are given a poverty-line income must “give something back to the community”. Howard would like to return to Australian family life of the 1950s, FJ Holdens and white picket fences. Latham would wish to revisit Green Valley with its working class desperate to get on and get out but this time with more “ladders of opportunity”. Whilst Pearson wants to revisit the reciprocity of the “real economy” of the mission days of the 1960s and 70s before there was social security. The conservative agenda of each of these figures amounts to an unrequited call for the return of their lost youth. Even they don’t want to replicate the past as it existed. Rather, they wish to insert particular economics or social aspects of which they greatly approve.

Changing the concept of community

The community has become transmogrified. Community used to be envisioned as collective support to which people would turn for assistance in times of trouble. Howard has redefined community to mean an agency that extracts a contribution from recipients of social security at the very time when they are in considerable need. Somehow we have lost the idea that people who have been helped by the community, will, once back on their feet, be likely to contribute to the wellbeing of their fellow citizens and to the community’s activities. The poor are expected to demonstrate their utility via a compulsory contribution and to do it NOW!

The Corporate Board of Howard and Co. has taken the concept of community, previously understood as a communal hearth where the poor might seek succour, and metamorphosed it into a debt-collecting agency.

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Dependency: An ideology chasing its tail

Basic Income News, 10th October 2011.
http://www.basicincome.org/news/2011/10/opinion-dependency-an-ideology-chasing- its-tail/

I graduated in Social Work in 1964 and back then, in Australia, we were three quarters of the way through the 23 years of unbroken conservative rule. The prevailing welfare ideology of the time was heavily influenced by the combination of providing assistance to those ‘in need’ whilst sifting out ‘malingers’ and others who could but wouldn’t work. There was a sense of noblesse oblige [nobility obliges one to assist others less fortunate than oneself]. Yet such ‘generosity’ was hedged around by a prevailing view that some people were ‘bludging’ on the system and this meant that social security officials were wary of being taken for a mug. Fortunately, the Labor Party had consolidated the social security legislation in 1947 in one Act and set out eligibility entitlements in clearly defined categories. The ideological biases of social security administrators only came into play at the edges. In church run and other not-for-profit organisations, which supplied many of the ancillary welfare services, such conservative ideologies were very much to the fore.

Competing welfare ideological circles

In tropical Australia on full and new moons [which create huge tidal flows] currents flow very strongly. Whenever such flows are constricted, for example, by the narrowing of passages between islands, ocean eddies are formed that are so powerful they can force boats off course. Such eddies form patterns which are as unpredictable as the turbulence created in a jug of boiling water. Whenever I listen to neo- conservative economic fundamentalists pontificating about the propensity of social security recipients to sink into the “mire of welfare dependency” I have a sense of deja vu. As I try to untangle the twisted amalgams of ideological thought, I am reminded of the turbulence of these ocean eddies. At the same time in my mind’s eye, I see a gatekeeper of an 18th century Poorhouse berating those who enter with warnings about impending ‘sloth and licentiousness’.

Some of the competing descriptions exhibiting such ideological constructions are:

socially approved/ deserving/ good moral character- including previously adequately supporting ‘his’ family. Married/ widowed/ unmarried mother/ separated/ divorced/ living in sin. Citizen/ permanent resident/ migrant/ refugee/ over stayers / asylum seekers/ boat people/ illegal arrivals. Worthy/ entitled/unworthy. Universalism/ individual/ targeted/ categorical. Able bodied/ disability /sick/ malingerer/ blind/ old/ worker/ unemployed/ skilled/ unskilled/ contributing/ productive/ unproductive/ dependent/ self-reliant/ adequate/ inadequate/ helpless / hopeless/ taxpayer/ dole bludger .

Many of these ideological conundrums and often several other arcane protestations pop up when neo-conservatives discuss welfare issues and they have been doing much the same for many centuries. Joel Handler (2002 p. 56, footnote No. 217) pointed to 1348 Statute of Labourers admonishing the provision of assistance to ‘sturdy beggars’. Guy Standing (2002, pp. 173-174) makes the point that: “the principles of workfare were enshrined in the English Poor Law of 1536 dealing with ‘sturdy vagabonds’, and in the French Ordonnance de Moulins of 1556. The 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act in Great Britain, was designed to reach only the ‘deserving’ and desperate poor (italics in original)”. Jennifer Mays (forthcoming) notes that similar ideological constructions prevailed in Australia throughout the 20th century and into the 21st. There is little doubt that those who wish to limit the scope or generosity of income support provisions find the frequent repetition of dependency rhetoric useful. However, it should be noted that the veracity of an idea is not established by its longevity nor by how frequently it is asserted.

The distinctions which neo-conservatives attempt to make in these dependency/ self reliance debates are based on distortions of reality. They are, as Joshua Holland (2006) notes, “a ‘zombie lie’ – no matter how many times you shoot it in the face, it keeps coming back to haunt you.”

Currently, in Australia, the favourite prevailing welfare myths are:

  • Australians pay high levels of taxation compared with the rest of the world,
  • asylum seekers without visas arriving by boat are entering Australia illegally,
  • Aborigines get exceedingly generous welfare payments compared with other citizens, and
  • there is such a thing as a ‘self-funded retiree’.

The reality is that:

  • “Australia has a low tax burden, both currently and historically. In 2003, Australia had the eighth lowest tax burden of the OECD-30 countries and has typically ranked in the bottom third of countries for the period since 1965” (Treasury 2003).
  • Because Australia has signed and ratified the 1951 Convention on Refugees asylum seekers have every right to enter this country to seek protection.
  • As a group, Aboriginal citizens are the least wealthy section of the society, who face the greatest health difficulties and they get less generous assistance than other Australians. This is sometimes because of the rural and remote regions in which they live. But mainly it is often due to Indigenous people’s lack of bureaucratic sophistication coupled with non-Aboriginal racism and governments’ determination to foist their ‘best intentions’ upon Indigenous citizens rather than to listen to Aboriginal peoples’ suggestions.
  • The statement that, unlike age pensioners, ‘self-funded retirees’ don’t draw on the public purse’ is a nonsense – they get exceedingly generous tax waivers on their superannuation and, provided their income is below $50,000 annually, get government subsidised medicines. Some of the recently beatified ‘self- funded retirees’ get more assistance from the government (by way of tax concessions) than age pensioners get from the pension.

The left is left behind

The absence of logic, in many of the arguments propounded by rightwing ideologues about the need to force recipients of social security to meet onerous obligations in return for payment of benefits, should make it easy to destroy their arguments. But in Australia, as elsewhere, this is not the case. As George Monbiot points out:

rightwing movements thrive on their contradictions, the leftwing movements drown in them. Tea Party members who proclaim their rugged individualism will follow a bucket on a broomstick if it has the right label … Instead of coming together to fight common causes, leftwing meetings today consist of dozens of people promoting their own ideas, and proposing that everyone else should adopt them.

Australia in the 21st century

After the economic fundamentalist and thirdwayism of the Hawke and Keating Labor governments in the 1980s and 90s. John Howard came to power, in 1996, promising even more economic fundamentalism coupled with conservative social policies. He set out, with alacrity, to fight the ‘Culture Wars’ it didn’t matter whether it was winding back the Native Title legislation ‘to give pastoralists more certainty’, removing industrial award protection, enforcing individual work contracts, setting up Star Chambers which compelled building workers to give evidence, tightening disability support pension eligibility, enforcing ‘work for the dole’ provisions on ‘job snobs’ (by which he meant people who were unemployed), expanding mandatory detention of asylum seekers, introducing temporary protection visas for refugees (which did not allow family reunion), excising offshore islands from our migration zone, sending those who did not reach the Mainland to be processed on Nauru or Manus Island and launching the Northern Territory Intervention in 73 Aboriginal communities. This Intervention involved suspending the Racial Discrimination Act, compulsorily acquiring leases of town areas, quarantining half of people’s social security pensions and benefits on a Basics Card that could only be used for government approved purchases (Altman and Hinkson 2007).

Monbiot (2010, p.59) quotes with approval Thomas Franks 2004 book What’s the matter with Kansas? whose thesis is that the new conservatism systematically erases economic explanations by blaming the trouble of the poor not on corporate or class power, wage cuts and so forth but on cultural factors. In 2001, Brendon O’Connor argued that George Gilder and Charles Murray’s “central claim (was) that welfare causes dependency and thus unemployment and poverty – and that welfare reform therefore needs to focus on changing the behaviour of welfare recipients rather than providing employment opportunities (p.221).

In 2007, Kevin Rudd led Labor to victory – promising to wind-back the worst excesses of Howard’s Work Choices legislation and ending offshore processing of asylum seekers but maintaining the Intervention and other conservative social policies such as continuing the suspension of the racial discrimination legislation whilst leaving in place the prohibition of same sex marriage and euthanasia. In 2008-9, almost all developed countries experienced recession. Largely through counter- cyclical spending, Labor managed to avoid it. Rudd tried to introduce substantially increased mining taxes. The billionaire miners launched a massive anti-mining tax campaign that somehow convinced average Australians that the increased mining taxes, which Rudd was proposing, were not in their best interests. Just prior to the 2010 election, his Deputy, Julia Gillard, rolled Rudd. She immediately decreased the amount the mining taxes would add to Federal revenue and limited the types of mining that would attract a tax.

The subsequent election resulted in a hung parliament. Gillard’s minority government rules with the assistance of the Greens and three independents. Opinion polls put support for Labor in the high 20s. Gillard promised 2011 would be the ‘year of delivery’ when what we needed was a year of deliverance. Gone are the days when it could truly be said “Hope springs eternal in the human breast” (such as in the run up to Gough Whitlam’s 1972 electoral victory) when it seemed that grand improvements in social welfare were imminent: or in early 1975, when it appeared that the government was about to introduce a guaranteed minimum income. But, that was before the Dismissal of the Whitlam government by the Governor General on the 11th of November 1975; when progressive Australians realised that “Man always is but never To be blessed” (Pope 1733).

What is on the Gillard government’s agenda is revealed when she speaks about: wanting everyone to have a job ‘for the simple dignity that work brings’, or wanting to process asylum seekers, arriving in Australian waters, in Malaysia, or increasing the hurdles which those with disabilities have to jump-over before they will be considered eligible for a disability support pension, or maintaining many aspects of the Northern Territory Intervention, or moving to be able to reinstate the Racial Discrimination Act by extending the quarantining of half people’s social security from just Northern Territory Aborigines to other disadvantaged groups in other parts of Australia (Tomlinson 2011) and at the same time increasing the compulsory superannuation levy from 9 to 12 per cent.

John Howard won the ‘Culture Wars’ and there is no-one in a leadership position within the Australian Labor Party with the ticker to take on the continuing conservative dominance of the of the ideological debate. The Parliament has literally become a coward’s castle. The words: equity, justice, equality, freedom, least restrictive, honour, decency, solidarity and ensuring everyone has an above the poverty line Basic Income have disappeared from the Australian lexicon.

Bibliography

Altman, Jon & Hinkson, Melinda (eds.) [2007] Coercive reconciliation, Arena, North Carlton.
Handler, J. (2002) “Social Citizenship and Workfare in the United States and Western Europe.” BIEN 9th International Conference, Geneva, Sept.12-14.
Holland, Joshua (2006) “Myth of the Liberal Nanny State.” AlterNet, June 8. http://www.alternet.org/story/36895/myth_of_the_liberal_nanny_state/
Mays, Jennifer (forthcoming) “Australia’s disabling income support system: Tracing the history of the Australian disability income support system 1908 to 2007 – disablism, citizenship and the Basic Income proposal.” PhD thesis Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane.
Monbiot, George (2010) “Bogus, Misdirected and Effective.” The Guardian, June 14. O’Connor, Brendon (2001) “The Intellectual Origins of ‘Welfare Dependency’”. Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol.36, No. 3, August pp.221-235.
Pope, Alexander (1733) “An Essay on Man, Epistle I”, Princeton. http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~rywang/berkeley/magic3/paris/singles/eternal_spring.ht ml
Standing, Guy (2002) Beyond the New Paternalism: Basic Security as Equality. Verso, London.
Tomlinson, John (2011) “Needs must when the devil drives.” On Line Opinion http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=11494
Treasury (2003) “International Comparisons of Australia’s Taxes.” Australian Government http://comparativetaxation.treasury.gov.au/content/report/html/05_Chapter_3.asp

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Depending on You: Lets get Basic about income and employment

Paper given at the 5th National conference on Unemployment, RMIT, Melbourne 1-2 Oct. 1998

The failure of the state to create enough jobs for all who want them or to share all the available jobs amongst the entire labour force has come to be defined as the ‘unemployment problem’. Various ‘solutions’ have been proffered by governments, welfare agencies, academics and others. My favourite ‘solution’ is the assertion put forward by those who are uninformed about the complexity of this issue. Relying only upon the fact that they are employed and have not encountered difficulty acquiring paid work they happily assert that there is not an unemployment problem: they claim there are plenty of jobs but some people just don’t want to work. They are blithely unconcerned when confronted by ratios between people registered as unemployed and notified vacancies. Nothing in this and, I presume, any other paper offered at this conference will convince them otherwise.

This paper will:

  • examine some of the proffered ‘solutions’ to the ‘unemployment problem’, and suggest why such ‘solutions’ are proposed,
  • describe why governments are intent on blaming the unemployed for their unemployment,
  • consider whether dependency is a problem for government or whether dependency rhetoric is the Howard Government’s ‘solution’ to the political odium which high levels of unemployment create,
  • suggest that concentrating on dependency as the problem does nothing to solve unemployment or provide income security, and argue that the introduction of an unconditional universal basic income would provide the first step towards providing a base from where we might start to identify the real employment/unemployment issues confronting Australia.

Throughout this analysis of both ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ I will argue that it is our failure to trust ourselves, which in turn leaves us unable to trust others, which causes us to identify bogus ‘problems’ and define unworkable ‘solutions’.

The market solutions

Unemployment, at least in the short term, is recognised by market economists to be a by-product of industry restructuring, micro and macro-economic ‘reform’, increased efficiency / competitiveness and globalisation. Some market economists choose to treat the resulting unemployment as an externality and therefore of little consequence. If they choose to comment upon it all, they assert that in the longer term due to a ‘trickle down effect’ employment demand will eventually pick up and in the long term everyone will benefit because of the increased prosperity (contra Omerod 1994, Langmore & Quiggan 1994). This is the look mum no hands approach where by the economy is left to find its own equilibrium. Jane Kelsey (1994) and Brian Easton (1997) have shown that in the country where this approach to unemployment was adopted with great alacrity it has not solved unemployment nor has it resulted in increased prosperity for the overwhelming majority of New Zealanders.

There is an even more vicious approach to unemployment than look mum no hands approach. That is the it’s their fault or blame the victim (Ryan 1971) approach. Which conveniently denies that globalisation is a game which only the super rich can win. This approach has been around in many guises in Australia since the invasion. Indigenes and convicts were the first to feel its lash. The it’s their fault approach suggests the reason unemployed people are not able to obtain paid employment is the result of a failure on their part. This approach underpinned the worthy / unworthy / less eligibility debates which have raged in welfare circles since the 1834 Poor Laws. It was a central feature of the post World War II “workers welfare state” (Castles 1994) with its work tests and targeting.

The it’s their fault approach has recently taken on a new virulence. Confronted by human service workers who suggest the problems which most pressingly need to be addressed are the absence of decent income support and employment opportunities. Governments in the United States, Britain, New Zealand and Australia assert the problem is dependency upon the welfare state. Defining the problem in these terms almost demands the solution arrived at is the removal of, or substantial reduction in, welfare assistance.

Whilst this it’s their fault approach is normally used as a weapon against impoverished individuals it can be utilised as a tool to denigrate groups of people: ‘welfare mothers’ in the United States, young ‘dole bludgers’ in Australia, and in Pauline Hanson’s Queensland it is employed to marginalise Aboriginal people. Without such a blaming mechanism and such finely tuned dependency rhetoric the Howard Government would not have been able to impose its ‘Dole Diary’, Work for the Dole Schemes and its oh so Common Youth Allowance. The last of these schemes reduced or abolished payments to 46,000 young Australians (Horin 1998, p. 10).

The Hawke/Keating solutions

In 1986 Cass acting on instructions from the then Minister for Social Security, Brian Howe, came up with the active society approach under this regime people who would not have passed the existing work test could still be paid unemployment benefit. Applicants needed to establish that by engaging in training or some other approved activity they were preparing themselves to escape unemployment. Cass (1988) and later Pixley (1993, contra Watts 1995) argued it was necessary to maintain the intimate connection between willingness to work and income support. They argued that this work willingness/income support linkage required the continuance of a targeted income support system.

In 1993 a Federal Government white paper entitled Restoring Full Employment declared “The loss of production through unemployment is the single greatest source of inefficiency in our economy. Unemployment is also the most important cause of inequality and alienation for individuals, families and communities.” (p.1) Langmore and Quiggan (1994) produced Work for All which essentially proposed a rediscovery of Keynesian economics and a massive expansion of job creation coupled with work sharing. The Government white paper Working Nation (1994) chose not to directly address the prime difficulty identified in Restoring Full Employment (quoted above), nor did it adopt the prescription outlined in Work for All. It opted instead to attempt to boost growth in the hope of creating more jobs and for increased training, case management of unemployed people and a job guarantee for a limited period for long term unemployed people. By the time Labor lost office in early 1996, there had been some lowering of unemployment to 8.5% (ABS 1996) and Working Nation seemed to have for the first time since 1974 actually reduced the numbers of people who were experiencing long term unemployment following a recession (Stromback, Dockery & Ying 1998).

Dependency rhetoric in full swing

The incoming Howard Government declared Working Nation to have been a failure and set out to demolish the training infrastructure of their predecessor. For good measure they privatised half of the Government employment service and dismantled the Skillshare network. For one month in its term of office it managed to have the officially admitted level of unemployment come in at below 8%. The Howard Government has opted for a combination of the look mum no hands and it’s their fault approach.

On both sides of the Tasman

What we are seeing is a partial globalisation of welfare policies occurring in English speaking countries since the mid-1980s. The Australian Child Support Agency was fathered in New Zealand and mothered in England before being shipped out here allegedly as an orphan. The welfare cutbacks in the United States and Britain of the late 1980s were replicated in New Zealand in 1990 and Australia in 1998. The workfare schemes of the United States have been translated into work for the dole schemes in Australia and New Zealand. The Clinton’s five years and you’re off welfare for the rest of your life coupled with wider Wisconsin ‘reforms’ are being pushed as part of the new Social Responsibility Code in New Zealand (O’Brien1998) and Howard’s mutual responsibility programs here (Tomlinson 1997).

Dob in a welfare bludger hot lines proliferate. In Australia there is an incessant search for the ‘fraudulent’ claimant (Nolan 1997). Dobbing in your neighbours has proved so popular in New Zealand that it is leading to gross inefficiencies in welfare policing.

Social Welfare benefits crime manager Joan McQuay says her team receives more than 670 calls and letters each week from people dobbing in others they suspect of benefit fraud.
Social Welfare announces only eighteen people have had their benefits reduced because they did not meet work tests during the first year of the programme. 29,000 people were subject to the work tests (The Jobs Letter (NZ) No.77, 27th April 1998 p.2).

Clearly, we know that economic rationalism is driving government economic policy in the countries mentioned above (Pusey 1991, Rees, Rodney & Stilwell 1993, Omerod 1994, Kelsey 1995, Easton 1997, Murray 1997). It would seem logical to argue that there is an intimate connection between the economic policies prevailing in the mode of production and those prevailing in the mode of distribution (Tomlinson 1989, Ch. 5). There have always been idea transfers between these countries. But something different is now happening compared with the late 1960s early 1970s. Then social scientists avidly read journals and books particularly from Britain and the United States with a view to finding out about the latest progressive ideas in order to attempt to improve welfare provision here. What is now happening is that governments on both sides of the Tasman are looking at reductions of the social wage in each other’s countries (which have been implemented without major disruption) in order they might duplicate social welfare cut backs in their own nation.

The assault upon social welfare, the social wage and industrial conditions being waged by powerful national and transnational corporations has been incorporated as current Australian Government policy. The Welfare State has also been criticised by human service and social policy critics of both the left (Gorz 1985, Stilwell 1993, Watts 1995, Tomlinson 1997, Rankin 1998)and the right (Murray 1997, Riches1997, Green 1996, Selbourne 1994 ). It is therefore likely that without some innovative thinking there will be a continuing diminution of the social safety net which is supposed to sustain the least affluent. “It’s time” to consider the implementation of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a replacement for the income support mechanisms which are now in place.

Basic income and citizenship

Many writers have argued that a minimum income guarantee should be a right of citizenship. Most, when questioned on this point, say that they would include all people who have permanent residency. As the Auckland Unemployed Workers Rights Centre puts it:

Our support for the (Universal Basic Income) UBI has always been on the basis that it should be a basic right of residency, a recognition that we are all stakeholders in society and that a UBI would provide choices and flexibility for people to participate in and contribute to society (1998, p.6).

I share the view that all permanent residents of a country should have an entitlement to a Basic Income and would argue that in a mature democracy in relation to the need for and the right to be provided with a basic income of both citizens and permanent residents are not significantly different.

Ensuring both citizens and permanent residents have a right to a basic income is an act of inclusion, even incorporation. Installing a UBI will be a small step not a panacea for all social ills. Even if we succeed in putting in place in our country a universal basic income this will only mean the removal of one obstacle (albeit an important one) to introduction of a socially just society. For as disability activist David Morell (1998), warns “Citizenship is more than ‘inclusion in the community’.” (p.16) He says:

‘inclusion’ in the ‘community’ is not enough. Indeed, the very concept does not make sense. The ‘community’ itself is so full of oppression, separation, exclusion, diverse interests and conflict for many of those who are already ‘included’ in it as to render the uncritical use of the of the concept positively misleading and the pursuit of the goal of inclusion disempowering (p.17).

A Basic Income is just that – an income floor guaranteed to all permanent residents. For it to be meaningful it has to be set at a level sufficient to ensure everyone sufficient to maintain them above the Henderson poverty line.

Economics of surplus: are we attacking the wrong problem?

It would matter little what level of unemployment existed in Australia if we were able to find a way to provide all permanent residents with a basic income sufficient to sustain them provided we were prepared as individuals and as a society to allow people to define their own social meaning outside the paid workforce and to be willing to recognise others evaluation of their importance to self.

Perhaps this is a pipe dream in a country where:

  • the Federal Government’s response to the High Court’s exposure of the myth of terra nullius and the Court’s determination that native title and lease holders rights could co-exist but that where the two conflicted the existing rights of leaseholders prevailed, was to remove indigenous people’s rights over property in order to “provide certainty to pastoralists and miners” (in fact to expand the existing property rights of national and transnational owners of capital),
  • the Prime Minister John Howard chose the National Aboriginal and Islander Day Observance Committee (NAIDOC) Week to push through Native Title Amendment Act in the Senate,
  • we participated in an eight year blockade of Iraq – the imposition of sanctions in that country resulted in the death of over 1 million Iraqi children (Arbuthnot 1998, Simons 1998), and connived with the Indonesian dictatorship in the subjugation of East Timor for 23 years,
  • we seem more intent upon negotiating Multinational Agreement on Investment (MAI) treaty (DEETYA 1998 p.10)than in meeting the United Nations foreign aid targets so as to help assist the 1,000 million people living on the brink of starvation,
  • the nursing home user pays regime which the Government imposed on frail aged Australians undermined the confidence of the majority of the elderly (Macklin 1998),
  • we display an uncaring attitude towards fellow Australians experiencing disadvantage and disability, and
  • we denigrate people excluded from paid employment reinforcing the impression that we as a nation are oblivious to the suffering of our less advantaged comrades.

If we are to build an alternative way of relating to our fellow citizens then we will need to jettison much of the economic rationalist ideas which now clutter our intellectual saddle bags.

Stripped of its finery economics is about how we exchange our surpluses, whereas as a science it has somehow been transformed into an economics of scarcity where everything is expressed in monetary terms. …We have created the shadow of scarcity, the polar shadow of which is greed. This is fuelled by the dominant world paradigm based on rationality and self-interest. … Fortunately we are not always rational and will cooperate when we really come to know and trust each other and have the power and resources to implement solutions. This is the foundation to an economics of abundance – of labour, goodwill and renewable resources (Fricker 1998, p.1).

The last part of this paper will examine the obstacles to the development of such trust.

The bludgers wouldn’t work in an iron lung

The most frequent response I have encountered when discussing the introduction of a Basic Income with people who have not thought a lot about Australia’s system of income support is: “If everyone could get ‘the dole’ for doing nothing then none of the bludgers would work they’d just go and lie in the sun on Surfers Paradise beach.”and when I ask: “Why do you think that?” They say “Well I wouldn’t go to work if I could get away with it.” Usually when pushed on this response people say that they’re bored with the work they are doing and would like to have time to write, read, do further study, spend more time with the family, do more interesting work or that they just need a break. But at the moment, they are working too hard or doing too much unpaid overtime (which they claim they to need to do either to keep their job or to do their job well). If pushed further many admit that going to work provides meaning in their lives and that they work, for reasons in addition to economic necessity. They may even agree they couldn’t manage anything like their current standard of living on an income at the Henderson poverty line and would work to maintain their current consumption level. Some accept that in large part their identity is tied to their conception of themselves as someone who works, who produces, who contributes to the society and even to the type of work that they do. Almost invariably, when they reach that point of analysis, they revert to their first statement “Yeah, I’d still work but if you had a Basic Income in place, we’d be overrun with dole bludgers and very soon there’d be hardly anyone working and the whole society would be bankrupted.”

The issue of work withdrawal and affordability has been debated ad nauseam and there is no compelling evidence to support the assertion that people provided with a UBI would desert work in droves. (See NZUBI Web Site, Van Parijis 1992, VCOSS and Good Shepherd 1995, Tomlinson 1989, Ch. 3, 1991, Watts 1995, contra Pixley 1993). Nor is there any evidence that a UBI is unaffordable (Rankin 1998, VCOSS and Good Shepherd 1995). There is an abundance of contrary evidence to the assertion that if a UBI were in place then people would leave work in large numbers and that a UBI would be unaffordable. The interesting feature is the resilience of such beliefs.

An explanation

The most compelling explanation of the resilience of these myths is that it is our failure to trust ourselves which in turn leaves us unable to trust others. Our reluctance to trust ourselves or to trust others to continue to contribute to the society derives from a central conservative ideological position which conceives of humans as inherently imperfect. The belief in the flawed nature of humans derives from either the concept of original sin or from the belief that though we might start off life without blemish on our journey we become corrupted -as we are sinned against we learn to sin. Robert Theobald (1998) suggests that “Today we are largely driven by a belief in original sin; we feel that most people, most of the time will behave destructively unless constrained by coercive power” (p.1).

The lack of optimism about fellow humans found in the ranks of those who oppose the introduction of a UBI, their conservatism, their need to blame and coerce the least affluent / advantaged, their denigration of the very people from whom they extract surplus capital and the those who constitute the reserve army of labour, is only matched by their fervent desire to exploit to the maximum the environment and their fellow humans for individual gain (Tomlinson & Lincoln 1995). The exploitative belief structure which seems to be driving both economic rationalist and anti-UBI agendas is a unique, sometimes contradictory, blend of classical conservative and market liberal thought. It takes unto itself beliefs in the sanctity of privately owned property yet can legislate to abolish indigenous people’s property rights (Native Title Amendment Act 1998).

The Benthamite principle of greatest good for the greatest number is supposedly arrived at as the end result of intense individualised competition. Liberty is, for economic rationalists, a freedom from restraint. Freed even from the restraint of tradition, good form or the ‘common good’. The promotion of the individual’s right to exploit, which economic rationalists define as freedom, reduces the ‘common good’ to the end results of trickling down prosperity – a urinary rather than a unified economic theory.

The promotion of ‘self provision’ over collective provision suits those with the capacity to provide for themselves but is a statement of intending neglect of those unable to afford to provide for themselves. Beyond this basic criticism of self provision several writers (ACTCOSS 1991, Pha 1992, ACOSS 1998)have pointed out that many of those who are allegedly providing for themselves are quite wealthy individuals who receive a considerable subsidy from the state. The better off superannuates receive far greater assistance from the state than do pensioners.

The very Governments (of the United States, Britain, New Zealand and Australia) who are flirting with an international treaty to guarantee international capital (MAI) protection are those engaged in removing existing rights of workers and welfare beneficiaries. They want industrial relations deregulated but want to maintain the highly regulated modes of distribution.

The adoption of economic rationalism and globalisation with its associated downsizing and job exportation, its user pays and self provision, its denial of citizenship (exemplified in Maggie Thatcher’s “There’s no such thing as Society” statement) coupled with the plunder by transnational corporations of the third world’s labour and ecological resources constitutes this celebration of extreme individualism. All of this goes under the name of world best practice. In the Australian context world’s best practice means:

  • cheapest: accomplished by non-unionised labour, long (12 hour) shifts, lack of environmental protection, gutting of award conditions, unsafe work sites-all of which add to the increased likelihood work place injuries, that is industrial murder,
  • deregulation,
  • competition,
  • individualised contracts,
  • low paid, casual / insecure of employment, in a word in immiseration.

There is an alternative and that alternative starts with the introduction of a Universal Basic Income.

Bibliography

ABS, Australian Bureau of Statistics (1996) Labour Force. Cat. No 6202.0. ACOSS, (1998) Budget Priority Statement 1998-99. ACOSS, Sydney.

ACTCOSS, (1991) The Super Tax Rort. ACTCOSS, Canberra.
Arbuthnot, F. (1998) “Dying of Shame.” New Internationalist. Jan/Feb, pp.12-13
Auckland Unemployed Workers Rights Centre (1998) “Common Misconceptions about the Community Wage (Workfare)” Mean Times. Vol. 9 Issue 1, June, pp. 6-7.
Cass, B. (1998) Income Support for the Unemployed in Australia: Towards a more Active System. AGPS, Canberra.
Castles, F. (1994) “The Wage Earners Welfare State Revisited.” Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol.29, No.2.
Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs ( DEETYA), (1998) “Cross-border investment: Rules of the Game.” News on Higher Education. Vol.1, No. 1, June, p.16.
Easton, B. (1997) The Commercialisation of New Zealand. Auckland University, Auckland.
Ficker, A. (1998) “Beyond Scarcity and Greed.” Paper given at the Beyond Despondency Conference, Wellington. 26 -28 th. March.
Gorz, A (1995) Paths to Paradise: On the liberation from work. Pluto, London.
Green, D. (1994) Community Without Politics. Institute of Economic Affairs, Health and Welfare Unit.London.
Horin, A. (1998) “Dole cut for thousands of young jobless.” Sydney Morning Herald. June,29th . p.10
Kelsey, J. (1995) The New Zealand Experiment: A World Model for Structural Adjustment. Auckland University & Bridget Williams, Auckland.
Langmore, J. & Quiggan ,J. (1994) Work for All: Full Employment in the Nineties. University of Melbourne, Carlton.
Macklin, J. (1998) Current House Hansard. [Australian Federal Parliament] 24th. March. pp. 1,004-1,010.
Morrell, D. (1998) “The Long View from Conferenceville.” Abstract. Vol. 2, No. 1, March, pp.16-19.
Murray, M. (1997) “…And Economic Justice For All”: Welfare Reform for the 21st Century. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk.
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Nolan, R. (1997) “Compliance and Control in the Newstart Program.” in Tomlinson, J., Patton, W., Creed, P. & Hicks, R. (eds.) Unemployment: Policy and Practice. Australian Academic, Brisbane.
NZUBI (1998) New Zealand Universal Unconditional Basic Income Web Site. http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Academy/3142/ubinz.html#ubinz.
O’Brien, M. (1998) Social Responsibility: Whose Agenda? Auckland Unemployed Workers Rights Centre, Auckland.
Omerod, P. (1994) The Death of Economics. Faber & Faber, London.
Pha, A. (1992) How Super is Super. Socialist Party of Australia, Surry Hills.
Pusey, M. (1991) Economic Rationalism in Canberra. Cambridge University, Cambridge.
Rankin, K. (1998) Keith Rankin Web Site http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Academy/1223/
Rees, S., Rodley, G. & Stilwell, F. (1993) Beyond the Market. Pluto, Leichhardt.
Riches, G. (ed.) (1997) First World Hunger: Food Security and Welfare Politics. Macmillian, London.
Ryan, W. (1971) Blaming the Victim. Vintage, New York.
Selbourne, D. (1994) The Principle of Duty. Sinclair- Stevenson, London.
Simons, G. (1998) The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice. Mcmillan, New York.
Stilwell, F. (1993) Economic Inequality: Who gets what in Australia. Pluto, Leichhardt.
Stromback, T., Dockery, M. & Ying, W. (1998) Labour Market Programs and Labour Market Outcomes. Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, University of Melbourne, Parkville.
The Jobs Letter (New Zealand) (1998) No. 77, 27th April, p.2.
Theobald, R. (1998) “A New Vision and How to Achieve it.” The Healing Century. 10th May, ABC. http://www.abc.net.au/rn/events/rttrans6.htm.
Tomlinson, J. (1989) Income Maintenance in Australia: The Income Guarantee Alternative. Ph.D Thesis Murdoch University, Perth.
Tomlinson, J. (1991) “Work and Income Guarantees.” Social Alternatives. Vol 10, No. 3, pp.5-8.
Tomlinson, J. (1997) “There but for the Grace of Wealth go I.” in O’Brien, M. & Briar, C. Beyond Poverty. Peoples Centre & Massey University, Auckland.
Tomlinson, J. & Lincoln, R. (1995) “Guaranteed Minimum Income and the Environment.” Just Policy. No. 4 September, pp.59-63.
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Watts, R. (1995) “Unemployment and Citizenship: Reconstituting Social Policy in the Twenty First Century.” in Hicks, R. Creed, P. Patton, W. & Tomlinson, J. (eds.) Unemployment: Developments and Transitions. Australian Academic, Brisbane.

 

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Developing a community which might accept people with disability

Paper given at the NSW ASSID Conference at the University of Wollongong
5-6/7/2002 by Michael Bleasdale and John Tomlinson.

Abstract

A number of programs have been developed by governments and welfare agencies which aim to supply services, prepare people for employment or study, create networks of support, and which claim to integrate people with disabilities into the community. There is a growing recognition by government departments of the need to fund individuals rather than services directly, in order to ‘better target’ individual needs. This brokerage funding has the potential to deliver more appropriate support but has yet to translate itself into the provision of services which enhance clients’ power to determine what is happening in their lives. Further, the concentration upon service delivery has led those responsible for the implementation of disability services legislation to take their eye off the broad goal of community inclusion.

So far, the incorporation into the community which has been achieved has been disappointing. Writers such as Morrell (1998) have provided important insights into why people with disabilities should be wary of such incorporation and should question closely the basis on which people with disabilities are offered inclusion. We propose that carefully designed community work programs which are directed by self advocacy agencies and by people with disabilities have the capacity to build community support structures which people with disabilities might find acceptable.

Clearly, there needs to be a substantial restructuring of financial arrangements available to people with disabilities, self advocacy groups, and systemic advocacy agencies before such community work programs could develop the independence necessary to work effectively.

Introduction 

The policy of community integration of people with disabilities began in earnest with the proclamation and implementation of the Commonwealth Disability Services Act 1986. This was followed by the complimentary legislation by states after the Commonwealth State Disability Agreement of 1992 which placed responsibility for a large number of services with the states.  The rights-based credentials of these Acts are not in question, however the effectiveness of seeking broad citizenship rights within the constraints of formal, specialist service provision is questionable, and will be a theme to which we return later in the paper.

Over the last four decades governments of all political persuasions at both Federal and State or Territory levels have moved from institutional to decarcerated disability service delivery. Governments have invariably claimed the best of intentions as the underlying basis for such a policy shift –denying that decarcerated service delivery was preferred because it was cheaper. They have not denied that they hope to save money but invariably claim that ‘the savings’ will be directed back into disability services.  Governments have chosen to term their decarcerated service delivery model ‘community based disability programs’.

This approach was grafted onto the predominant service delivery rhetoric of the time. This rhetoric grew out of theoretical approaches to ‘treatment’ including the Least Restrictive Environment/Alternative (Bachrach 1985), Normalisation (Nirje 1985), and Social Role Valorisation (Wolfensberger 1983). The Australian idea of ‘Community Living’ was based on these ideologies and principles of application.

The movement away from institutional care within large congregate care facilities, into smaller housing units located in the so-called ‘community’ (together with the development of day options to accommodate those who would otherwise attend programs within the confines of the large facility) weakened the degree of support people with disabilities, their families and advocates could garner for a move toward greater human rights for people with disabilities.  Rapley and Ridgeway (1998) have argued that the rights-based aims of the Community Living movement were co-opted by governments which recognised large total institutions were politically unpopular. They also saw Community Living as a mechanism used by governments to pursue economic fundamentalist goals.  In 1977 Andrew Scull in his groundbreaking text Decarceration warned that the real motivation of most governments engaged in deinstitutionalisation processes was to save money and was highly likely to end in the decarcerated receiving fewer services. If anyone has doubts about the accuracy of Scull’s prediction in present day Australia they should read the April 21 transcripts of Background Briefing (2002).

Since the mid 1980s governments in Australia have increasingly adopted an economic fundamentalist mind set (Pusey 1991, Edwards 2001). In welfare services this ideology has manifested itself as ‘fiscal rectitude’ which in turn translates itself as cutbacks in service provision and tightened eligibility for benefits and services. The Howard Government has become obsessed with the idea that recipients of welfare programs have ‘to give something back in return’ (Hammer 2002, Schooneveldt 2002). Post McClure (2000) such ‘mutual obligations’ are being extended to include people with disabilities.  The ‘mutual obligation’ strategy has been criticised elsewhere ( Goodin 2001, Castles 2001, Tomlinson 2001).  It is clear that ‘mutual obligation’ does not address four fundamental problems experienced by people with disabilities. For decades, people with disabilities have campaigned to end:

  • the paternalistic way in which the welfare system approaches people with disabilities by categorising them as in need of ‘care’,
  • the failure the community to make itself accessible to those who experience impairment;
  • the lack of entitlement to basic, specialist services for people with disabilities, and
  • the systems refusal to tie individual outcomes to the rights-based aims of the Disability Services Act(s).

This paper will address strategies that we think are necessary to shift the focus back onto community, by directly advocating progressive community work, and arguing for the adoption of funding mechanisms for specialist disability services designed to enable self-determination amongst individuals and collectives of people with disabilities.

Delivering support in the community

There continues to exist the quaint idea that if support is to be provided to people with disabilities who reside in the suburbs then in it should take the form of specialist provision, within staffed houses, special transport and so forth.  This idea is backed up by the common notion that such specialist provisions are necessary in order to include people who are essentially ‘different’ from the supposed norm. Such notions are constantly challenged by members of the disability movement who claim that the existing service provisions are rendered (unfortunately) necessary by society’s failure to provide equally for its citizens, both ‘disabled’ and ‘non-disabled’. In addition, they assert it is the ‘barriers’ that society puts in place which actively prevent access to both the physical and the institutional landscape of the community (Barnes, Mercer and Shakespeare 1999).  Reform needs to take place both at the level of the general community and within the specialist disability agencies if people with disabilities are to take their place in the community in a way that allows them to access their human rights.

The economic fundamentalist agenda, expressed through tightened eligibility requirements combined with the ‘mutual obligation’ strategy, is a clear signal that the present Federal Government is heading in the opposite direction to that which might enhance every citizen’s human, social and economic rights.

The tightening of eligibility invariably leads many people with significant disabilities unable to access services which (if provided) would assist them to become integrated into the community. They may also find they are without income support either because they don’t quite fit other income support mechanisms or because they get breached because they fail to meet some imposed ‘mutual obligation’. This further marginalises them. Too many people, living outside of institutional settings, experience community and government neglect at the very time they are told they are receiving community based programs.

We are entirely committed to the least restrictive community option whether that is in an institution or in a community setting. However, we don’t want people with disabilities, their agencies or the government conflating the concept of services provided to people living outside institutional settings with the idea that such programs amount to community incorporation.   The propensity of governments to term decarceration programs ‘community based programs’ has led them either to believe their own rhetoric or simply to mystify the public. Very few agencies supplying services to people with disabilities are supplying community services. They are not engaged in progressive community work either with their clients or with the surrounding community. For the most part they are community agencies only in the geographical sense – the agency is situated in a suburb and their clients are housed in that locality.

What is missing is the:

  • sense of community,
  • communication,
  • community co–dependency,
  • community interrelationship,
  • community acceptance, and
  • sense of place, which goes beyond locality to a feeling of belonging – to a sense of human incorporation.

Many members of the community with whom most clients of disability services interact are, at best, indifferent to the needs and desires of people with disabilities. Some community members are fearful of interactions and others are openly hostile. Just one example: four people with significant intellectual impairments were housed in shared accommodation. An issue which arose for the immediate neighbours was that ‘strange noises’ emanated from the household from time to time. The government disability agency discussed the issue with the neighbours on both sides and those at the back and the matter was resolved. However, a compassion impaired woman who lived across busy the four lane street complained to the Queensland Minister for Housing and he insisted that the four people with disabilities were moved despite opposition from the four people themselves and from the government disability agency. If the agency had been successful in instigating community programs then many members of the community would have ardently opposed such arbitrary ministerial actions. Neighbours would, if community incorporation was working, have ardently opposed the Minister’s disregard for human rights and his denial of natural justice to these four people with a disability.

This incident points to the level of ignorance about the nature of disability at the level of the community. Outmoded attitudes have not successfully been challenged and overturned. The resilience of such attitudes is, in part, due to the continuation of a ‘managed care’ approach to specialist support services coupled with an unwillingness on the part of successive governments to make available to people with disabilities the basic services that can be accessed by other members of the community (eg. legal aid, public transport, schools, employment, etc.).  For years, people with disabilities have highlighted the fact that government departments routinely ignore these issues. French (1994) put it this way:

It should be appreciated that the situation of disabled people in ‘normal’ society is frequently highly abnormal due to prejudice, adverse stereotyping, and the difficulty of adapting to an environment designed for non-disabled living.  For life ‘in the community’ to be successful, therefore, the wider social and economic environment, in terms of housing, employment, transport, education and leisure facilities, must change to accommodate disabled people (p.128).

Strategies to develop community networks that will facilitate inclusion have largely been left to inadequately funded service providers. Their limited impact must be understood within the context of the core activities of those providers.  Our contention is that the goal of inclusion, whilst a right, needs to be facilitated by groups which have a different purpose to formal service providers.

We therefore propose models of community work that can be controlled by disability self advocacy groups. If the community is to become involved, specific community projects (which do not have a direct relation with specialist disability services) will need to be instigated to attract funding from sources, government or otherwise. Self advocacy groups must decide the direction and pace of any such change process.

Inclusion

Our advocacy of programs which could lead to people with disabilities being included in their communities is not starry-eyed, rather we insist that the reasons people are included and the manner in which they are incorporated into communities is of central importance.

As early as 1972, Paulo Freire (p.47), citing Simone de Beauvoir, noted  “the interests of the oppressors lie in ‘changing the consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation which oppresses them’ for the more the oppressed can be led to adapt to that situation, the more easily they can be dominated.”  Freire goes on to suggest that welfare recipients:

are treated as individual cases, as marginal (people) who deviate from the general configuration of a ‘good, organized, and just’ society.  The oppressed are regarded as the pathology of the healthy society, which must therefore adjust these ‘incompetent and lazy’ folk to its own patterns by changing their mentality.  These marginals need to be ‘integrated’, ‘incorporated’ into the healthy society that they have ‘forsaken’. The truth is, however, that the oppressed are not marginals, are not…living ‘outside’ society.  They have always been inside – inside the structure which made them ‘beings for others’.  The solution is not to ‘integrate’ them into the structure of oppression, but to transform that structure so that they can become ‘beings for themselves’(p 48).

But he warns that “Such transformation, of course, would undermine the oppressors’ purposes” (p.48).

Many writers representing the views of groups marginalised from mainstream society are wary of inclusion. The standard advice such writers give to people offered inclusion is that they should ask: on whose terms, and at what cost, but above all they are advised to remember that inclusion is much more than being made complicit in an indecent act. South Australian disability activist David Morell (1998) considers:

‘inclusion’ in the ‘community’ is not enough. Indeed the very concept does not make sense. The ‘community’ itself is so full of oppression, separation, exclusion, diverse interests and conflict for many of those who are already ‘included’ in it as to render the uncritical use of the concept positively misleading and pursuit of the goal of inclusion disempowering (p.17).

Both Morell and French would concur with Armstrong and Barton (1999) when they contend that, “Inclusion necessitates the removal of the material, ideological, political and economic barriers that legitimate and reproduce inequality and discrimination in the lives of disabled people” (p.214). Armstrong and Barton go on to suggest:

pity and concern are directed at some groups… only rarely are issues relating to social exclusion and discrimination presented as ones concerned with human rights. Instead, a ‘needs’ discourse is adopted, suggesting that difficulties … can be overcome by technical solutions … a ‘needs’ discourse is disempowering because it focuses attention away from the possibility of individuals, groups and communities taking responsibility for undertaking action themselves to bring about change (p. 215).

The intensity of the inclusion debate within disability circles is a symptom of the way English speaking societies regard ‘normality’. Employment and being ‘able bodied’ are widely regarded as closely linked. The central requirement for payment of unemployment benefits is that applicants have to establish they are ‘ready, able and willing to work’. The eligibility requirement for sickness benefits is that applicants have to establish they are temporarily incapacitated for work and for Disability Support Pensions that one is more or less permanently incapacitated for work. Whether seeking work or income support it is necessary to establish one’s capacity to carry out employment tasks. The system of production and society more generally is geared around ‘ability’ or ‘capacity’ to labour. Disability activists assert that this ‘ableist’ ideology plays an important part in centring society around the ‘normal’, ‘able bodied’ lifestyle which in turn relegates to the margins those experiencing impairments in functioning.  In particular, Abberley (1999) contends that:

just because a main mechanism of our oppression is our exclusion from social production, we should be wary of drawing the conclusion that overcoming this oppression should involve our wholesale inclusion in it….

a society may be willing and in certain circumstance become eager to absorb a proportion of its impaired population into the workforce, yet this can have the effect of maintaining and perhaps intensifying its exclusion of the remainder. We need to develop a theory of oppression which avoids this bifurcation, through a notion of social integration that is not dependent upon impaired people’s inclusion (p.53).

One problem we have in many parts of Australia, including NSW, is that the rights of people with disabilities are articulated in the Disability Services legislation as a specialist service function.  To date there has been little real evidence of success in this field, as monitoring and evaluation of service outcomes has focused more on organisational mechanisms such as policies and procedures, rather than any systematic measurement of increase in the participation and inclusion of people with disabilities in many different aspects of their community – let alone their enjoyment of rights.

As the discussion above suggests, disability activists believe that the enjoyment of rights will only come about when the social landscape is rendered more accessible at all levels – environmental, structural and attitudinal – through the ending of discriminatory practices and the enactment of radical social policy that overturn assumptions about the incapacity of people with disabilities.  This does not mean that there is no role for the specialist disability system to play in facilitating inclusion and participation for people with disabilities who need and use such services.  Clearly the existence of such goals within the NSW Disability Services Standards (Standard 5) would indicate that there is very definitely a role to be played.

Funding

There needs to be some serious scrutiny of the methods that may be employed to achieve such outcomes, given both the resource constraints under which services currently operate, and the inability to date of government departments to evaluate services according to their capacity to achieve individual outcomes. The review of the NSW Disability Services Act’s operation supported a move in this direction (NSW Law Reform Commission 1999, Bleasdale and Kayess 2001).

The inter-relationship between participation and inclusion and other key outcomes for people with disabilities, such as choice and decision-making, can only be facilitated by mechanisms that lie outside the control of service providers.  For that reason we are advocating a radical shift in the delivery of formal support programs to people with disabilities. We wish to see a move from a system that provides block grants to disability agencies in return for their delivering a range of programs into which a person might ‘fit’; to one where funds are allocated to a person based on that individual’s assessed need. Agencies would have to deliver support according to what people wanted – or individuals would purchase the service elsewhere.

One of the advantages of utilising individualised funding is its capacity to purchase support services that lie outside the formal disability service system.  Instead of having the government contract with a specialist disability service provider to deliver services, such as the provision of meals and domestic assistance, we would prefer that the person with disability had control of their funds thus enabling them to decide whether to use the disability agency’s services or to purchase a variety of meals and to hire a local domestic cleaner.  This provides both choice and autonomy to the person within a system that is still fundamentally block-funded.  In states, such as Western Australia and South Australia, the allocation of funds for services is based on the assessed needs of the individual.  Issues which predominate are adequacy of levels of support and developing mechanisms to best allocate funds to services, so that they meet their obligations to the service user.  We view this sort of individualised funding as a productive way to meet the self-determination demands of people with a disability, as well as facilitating a relationship (albeit commercial) between them and other members of the community.

Advocating such a change, at least in part, contradicts a position taken by the authors some years ago (Bleasdale, Crumpton, Hardaker and Tomlinson 1996), where the introduction of individualised funding, as a model of support for people with disabilities, was criticised for its inequity of resource allocation, and its capacity to splinter an already fractured disability movement by promoting self interest and individualism over the spirit of solidarity which is needed to further the struggle for basic human and civil rights.

Many of these concerns remain, especially where individualised funding is introduced as one support ‘model’ within a system that is still fundamentally block-funded.  However, where the allocation of funds for services is based on the assessed needs of the individual, the argument as to inequity is not as valid. We view this type of individual funding paradigm as likely to result in a more productive way of meeting the self-determination demands of people with disabilities compared with large-scale lobbying for adequate ‘beds’ within a block-funded system.

Government fiscal stringency, eligibility tightening, economic fundamentalist mind set and ignorance about disability issues has invariably lead to people with impairments being excluded from programs which could assist them. Disability service and advocacy agencies may campaign for increased allocations but this is unlikely to sway government. Only when the broader community becomes sufficiently involved with those, who have a disability and who are excluded from service programs from which they would clearly benefit, will the political pressure on government be sufficient to force increased financial allocations to service agencies.

Lobbying by advocacy groups should shift from focussing solely on the amount of government funds provided to support specialist disability services and concentrate in some substantial degree upon the adequacy of such funding to provide satisfaction to the service user.  The strategy of utilising the experience and expertise within systemic advocacy organisations to secure individualised funding projects, and then to run those projects, has been demonstrated in British Columbia and in the United Kingdom where lobbying resulted in the passing of legislation that enables people with disabilities to receive direct payments with which to purchase their required support.

Our 1996 argument, as to increasing or maintaining solidarity, was probably utopian in a service system attempting to satisfy individuals, whose specific needs varied greatly, unless the service agencies were totally committed to incorporating client and self advocacy groups perspectives at all levels of the agency from service delivery to management. We don’t rule out the possibility of this occurring but the experience so far would seem to indicate that it is a relatively rare phenomena. It now seems to us that the community might be an easier site at which to attempt to build solidarity amongst people who experience a range of disabilities. This would constitute a sound basis on which to move towards inclusion with the wider community.

Society/community

The specialist service system will probably always have a significant role to play in developing specific support programs that aim to address the needs of people with disabilities. The discussion above advocates an approach to delivering such a system that simultaneously enables people with disabilities to exercise self-determination, and creates roles for community members to play within support networks developed by recipients of funds.  However, the main focus must still be upon the development of a community that is capable of really welcoming and facilitating the access of people with disabilities.  The prime feature of community life is interdependency. We all depend on others.

The most powerful political person in this country is surrounded by minders. We all rely on others: the butcher the baker and the candlestick maker. Part of the trade off we each pay for community membership is subjugation of some of our desires. Inclusion is important but we need to take Morrell’s (1998) advice and ask ‘on whose terms?’  The real community work issue for people with disability is not that they are:

  • dependent on the State for income support,
  • dependent on family, friends and paid staff for physical or emotional support, and
  • dependent on community work theory and/or paid community workers.

It is that they need to rely on themselves and comrades to build the sort of community structures which might go some way towards amassing the force necessary to help build the sort of community in which they want to live.

What is necessary to make this happen

The first step in developing a workable community integration program requires government at state and Federal levels to accept that their efforts to incorporate many people with disabilities into the community over the last decade and a half has been at best only a partial success. The next step is for disability agencies to come to a similar realisation. The reason they have not succeeded in gaining community acceptance is not hard to identify. The models of community work theory they have employed, the level of dedication, the amount of money committed to such projects and the ideologies which have underpinned their efforts are simply deficient.

We will deal with the last point first. What is required is the adoption of a liberationist ideology – part of which requires a commitment to confront some at least of the hegemonic forces which drive the construction of the State.

Liberation

It is possible to be orientated towards a liberationist world view in a social vacuum. But in order to operationalise such a propensity it is necessary to ask “What is it which oppresses?” What are the social structures which sustain that oppression and what are the ideologies which legitimate those structures? Australia is structured by race, gender, class, age, locality and the manner in which we respond to people with disabilities. The ideologies which support that structure are racism, sexism, classism, ageism, urbanism and ableism. Each of the hegemonic forces which control this country are imbued with some or all of these ideologies. Those who internalise these ideologies are in turn alienated from their humanity.

Since Gramsci (1977) we have understood that our liberation is dependant upon the development of counter hegemonic forces if we wish to escape oppressive structures. The development of a counter hegemony is dependent on our understanding of the negative impact that the reinforcement of oppressive structures has on those around us and our commitment with those who are oppressed. The first part of this process is analytical, the second is emotional and the third is enhancing our capacity to act in solidarity.

These are the central feature of the process of developing a liberating community work form.  The actual design shape of any liberating community process needs to contain a commitment to act in solidarity with those who are oppressed. The power to determine direction and pace must remain in the hands of those with whom we are acting in a spirit of solidarity.

The social model of disability and community work

In order to situate our proposed model of liberationist community work within a disability context we would want to incorporate the insights which the leading theorists of the social model of disability (Oliver  1996; Barnes et al. 1999; Morris 1991) have provided. We would want to incorporate Carol Thomas’ (1999) feminist insights of Oliver’s social model. We would want to overlay these insights with a rights approach such as is provided by Armstrong and Barton (1999) and would want to incorporate a class analysis similar to that enunciated by Gleeson (1999). In situations where people were working with Indigenous Australians with disabilities we would want the community work process to employ Indigenous workers, be controlled by the Indigenous community and to be informed by the wealth of progressive community work literature which exists in relation to involvement with the original owners of this country (Smeaton 1998, Day 1994, Tomlinson 1978).

There are a number of recent main stream community work texts (Peavey 2000, Kenny 1999) which might provide useful grounding in community work per se. But liberating community work with people with disabilities requires more than a simplistic adaptation of main stream texts. Whether one starts from Paulo Freire (1972) or from a more political critique of society; the central issue in liberating community work is not the creation of ideologues, academics, or technocrats. The issue is about solidarity with and on the terms laid down by those the community work process asserts it is there to assist. A liberating community work process, of necessity, will involve solidarity with individuals who experience disability and with their group self advocacy organisations.

Frightening though it may be, for many community workers, they will have to forego an increasing propensity to describe themselves as ‘empowerers’ and ‘social entrepreneurs’. Community workers who claim to empower others denigrate those they claim to be empowering (McArdle 1999 p.29). They intentionally or unintentionally distort the process in which they are engaged. Community worker can assist others to remove the obstacles to their taking power but they can not give people power. People have to take power for themselves. Those who want to describe themselves as ‘social entrepreneurs’ have so identified with the economic fundamentalist explanations of the world that they are part of the very problem which allows the Howard Government in the 2002/3 Budget to herald the fact that it intends to shift 180,000 disability support pensioners to an unemployment benefit paid at $52 a fortnight less than the pension. This is allegedly being done as a way of helping them back into employment.

People claiming to be working in the interests of people with a disability must build a counter hegemony to this sort of economic fundamentalist mindset if any sense of social and economic justice is be maintained in Australia. It is vital that people with disabilities, their neighbours, self advocacy and peak disability bodies become activists in the struggle to develop communities that facilitate social justice and the inclusion of people with disabilities.  This will involve a number of strategies beyond the political lobbying and policy consultation that currently take up a good deal of agencies’ time. It will necessitate forging alliances with other groups in the community whilst leading specific projects to build mutuality within specific localities.

Liberating community work is about engaging with others in an act of solidarity in an attempt to end alienation, exploitation, neglect and oppression. It is about developing a critique of the existing structures of society and the manner in which those structures  place obstacles in the way of all people developing their freedom, rights and capacity to act in order to enhance their liberty in ways which promote other’s civil rights.

Bibliography

Armstrong, F. & Barton, L. (1999) Disability, Human rights and Education: Cross-cultural perspectives. Open University, Buckingham.
Bachrach, L. (1985), “Deinstitutionalisation: The Meaning of the Least Restrictive Environment”. In Bruininks, R & Laken, K. (eds.), Living and Learning in the Least Restrictive Environment. Baltimore: Brooks, pp. 23-35.
Background Briefing (2002) “Mental Health Daze.” ABC Radio National
21 April.
Barnes, C., Mercer, G. and Shakespeare, T.  (1999).  Exploring Disability: A Sociological Introduction, Polity Press, Oxford.
Bleasdale, M. and Kayess, R. (2000).  Five Degrees of Separation: Why Standards will not ensure Quality in Disability Services.  In Abstract, Vol. 4, Issue 1, pp. 24-37.
Bleasdale, M. and Tomlinson, J. 1996.  “Holding the State Accountable – the Quest for a Bill of Rights”, paper delivered at the “Intellectual Disability and the Law” conference, Illawarra Disability Trust and Wollongong University, November 1996.
Castles, F. (2001) “A farewell to the Australian welfare state.” in Eureka Street. Vol. 11, No. 1, Jan- Feb.
Day, B.(1994) Bunji. Aboriginal Studies, Canberra.
Edwards, M. (2001) Social Policy, to Public Policy: From Problem to Practice. Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest.
Freire, P. (1972) Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
French, S.  (1994).  “Institutional and Community Living”. In French, S. (ed.) On Equal Terms: Working with Disabled People.  Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 119-135.
Gleeson, B. (1999) “Beyond Goodwill: the materialist view of disability.  Social Alternatives. Vol.18, No.1, Jan. pp.11-17.
Goodin, R. (2001) “False Principles of Welfare Reform.” Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 36, No.3, August pp.189-206.
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Hammer, S. (2002 forthcoming) The Ideal of Liberal Independence and the Decline of the Welfare State. PhD Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane.
Kenny, S. (1999) Developing Communities for the Future. Nelson, South Melbourne.
McArdle, J. (1999) Community development in the market economy. Vista, St Kilda.
McClure, P. [Reference Group on Welfare Reform] (2000 ) Participation Support for a More Equitable Society. Final Report. (July) Department of Family and Community Services, Canberra.
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Nirje, B. (1985),  “The Basis and Logic of the Normalization Principle”, Australia and New Zealand Journal of Developmental Disabilities, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 65-68
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Schooneveldt, S. (2002 forthcoming) Do the lived experiences of people who have been breached by Centrelink match the expectation and intent of the Howard Government? M.Soc.Sc. Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane.
Scull, A. (1977) Decarceration. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
Smeaton, T. (1998) Family Dreaming: Support programs for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people with disabilities. Ageing &Disability Department, Sydney.
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Disability is not a protection against bastardry

Published in Disability Abstracts 1998 and
Green Left Weekly
4th March 1998 p.15

Sectional interests can gain interim advantage over other less powerful sectional interests.  Disability lobby groups can succeed in getting government to advance the interests of those with a disability over the unemployed and perhaps lone parents in the short term.  The aged might gain a sectional advantaged over the young or those with a disability for a few years.  The mental health lobby might in some instances succeed in expanding services to their constituency at the expense of those with an intellectual disability.  But these are pyrrhic victories.  Such victories lay the foundations for counter attacks by competing interests.  Such advances for one group over the interests of others subjects the ‘victors’ to a siege mentality as they have to wage a rear guard action to defend their small gains against the predatory attacks of the very people who should be their greatest allies in the fight for social justice.  Governments fully understand and are delighted when sections of the welfare industry compete amongst each other because they know that the effort wasted on gaining sectional advantage deflect the citizenry from the major struggle to redistribute from the rich to poor

You’ve got to be blind not to see it

In Australia, since 1908, the Commonwealth Government has paid mean tested pensions to widows, the elderly and people experiencing severe disablement.  Asian Australians were excluded from receipt until the 1940s.  Indigenous Australians had to wait until the 1960s before they were considered suitable to receive such payments.  The ideological justification for making such payments was that the recipients were in need through no fault of their own.  Recipients were required to demonstrate they were in impecunious circumstances  and worthy.  Since the second decade of this century one category of disability pensioners – those who were blind were entitled to a pension even if they had substantial income and assets.  When I first became aware of this anomaly I assume that the preferential treatment the blind received at the hands of the Commonwealth was probably because determining degree of loss of sight was less contested than was determinations of other forms of disability, I also assumed that because by simply closing their eyes politicians could gain an understanding of what it was like to lose one’s sight, and finally I assumed that legislators considered the blind more disabled than quadriplegics.  But, after reading Social Security researcher Allan Jordan’s excellent 1984 report entitled Permanent Incapacity: Invalid Pension in Australia I found that the Government paid blind pensioners irrespective of means precisely because it thought those who had been assessed as having lost 85% of their sight were more likely to obtain employment than were others who determined to be 85% incapacitated from other causes.

So in Australia blind citizens received a basic income paid to them as a right once they were assessed as blind. Widows, the elderly and other citizens who were considered by Commonwealth Medical Officers to be 85% incapacitated were provided with a guaranteed minimum income.  The difference being that the blind received the total amount of the pension irrespective of their relationships with others, their income and their assets. Whereas widows, the aged and other people with a permanent disability had their pension substantially reduced in relation to income and assets and the wealth of partners was also a factor used to decrease the amount of pension income they received.

Benefits

In the aftermath of the Second World War a range of benefits were introduced designed to cover short term unemployment, sickness and other eventualities not covered by pensions.  Beneficiaries were subjected to greater surveillance than pensioners and paid at a lower rate. The unemployed had to pass a test. to establish they were fit, available and willing to work. In the five years I worked for Social Security I encountered many people who had a permanent disability but not of sufficient severity to have them adjudged permanently incapacitated.  They were not able to obtain work and often failed the work test.  Many of these people received no income support ; they were not sick temporarily, they were not fit, and they were not incapacitated within the meaning of the Social Services Act.  They had no support group, they were often described as malingerers or lazy they did not fit any pattern and apart from welfare relief agencies and shelters they received no support.  In a society bases on solidarity and mutual respect it would not have been possible to consign them to the scrap heap.  These were people with disadvantage and disability, yet in the absence of a basic income they often received no income support.  In the main they received no help from the disability movement.

Basic Income

I believe the income support regime provided for blind pensioners was the appropriate approach not just for the visually impaired but for all citizens.  Clearly the basic income which the blind received had no poverty trap, it accrued less stigma, did not interfere in the development of personal relationships, encouraged the blind to increase earned income and to accrue assets.  If it is appropriate to install such an income support mechanism for a group of people whom a Commonwealth Medical Officer determined were 85% incapacitated for work then surely it would be an even more rational policy to implement an identical scheme for unemployment beneficiaries who had to show they were fit available and willing to work.  As Keith Windschuttle in 1981, in his seminal work Unemployment pointed out governments did not do this because of their fear that the unemployed were work shy.  A lynch pin of the ideology of the economic fundamentalism which has infected every Australian Cabinet since Whitlam is that, if the desire is to increase productivity then, the rich have to be rewarded and the poor compelled.

Even if governments were constrained by their compulsive desire to believe that lone parents, the sick, the aged and the unemployed are so determined to live at or below the poverty line that they would avoid work once a basic income was in place it seems strange that they were willing to provide a basic income for blind disability pensioners but not every other disability pensioner.  If the argument for paying blind pensioners a basic income because it gave them an incentive to work then there is even a more compelling argument to provide that same incentive to other disability pensioners whom governments believed would encounter greater difficulties obtaining work.

The failure of the trade union movement and the organisations of the workless to unite and build into the social wage a basic income as the central plank demonstrates how easy it is for the powerful to deflect sections of the working class into pursuing sectional interests.  The aristocracy of the workers, understanding the disproportionate rewards which the rich got through tax subsidies on superannuation set out to joint the gravy train rather than derail it and replace it by a basic income for all irrespective of circumstance.  The welfare and disability lobby groups were busy protecting their sectional interests in what was left of the Australian welfare state from the ravages of the economic fundamentalists.  They too failed to understand that the main government game of shifting wealth from the less well off to the rich and the super rich was under way.

Instead of having a society in which the workers and the workless, the able bodied and those with a disability, where men and women , indigenous and non-indigenous, migrant and Australian born are united and harmonious, we have a society about to be torn apart by a race election, one which pretends the repression of asylum seekers is not occurring, where many workers reckon the unemployed are dole bludgers, where the clash between patriarchy and feminism is daily played out and where the able bodied are indifferent to difficulties of their fellow citizens with a disability.  What we have now is a society in which 8% are regarded by the Australian Bureau of Statistics as unemployed, a further 5-10 % are discouraged unemployed, over a third of the full time work force is working in excess of 50 hours per week, half the work force concerned their jobs are insecure, nearly every under 21 year old receiving unemployment benefit is forced forced to survive on an income well below the poverty line.  Young disability pensioners are also forced to live on an income well below the poverty line.  Until the end of the 1980s young disability pensioners received an income above the poverty line.  Then Brian Howe, as Minister for Social Security, decided to distort social justice by reducing the income of 16 year old disability pensioners to 44% of the poverty line to bring them into line with the starvation rates paid to the young unemployed.  Having a severe disability is certainly no protection against bastardry.

Brian Howe may have well been right that many young people in Australia who were adjudge by some eligibility tester at the CES to be eligible for an unemployment benefit payment may not have had very different income support requirements from another young person who received a disability support pension but even if this were the case then the just action would have been to raise the young unemployment beneficiary to the poverty line not to drive the young disability pensioner into poverty.  Australian governments have been extraordinarily successful during the 1980s and 90s diverting money from the poor to the rich and super rich.  The main vehicles for the transfer of funds are tax cuts provided to higher income earners or through share imputation.  Governments can forego collecting as much tax from the rich as a direct result of austerity measures imposed on the welfare and disability clients.  Governments get away with pandering to the rich because our sector is divided amongst itself and alienated from the wider working class.  If we learn nothing else from Lenin we need to understand that at least in relation to income support “The struggle for one is the struggle for all.”

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Disability on Howard’s ‘Animal Farm’

ON LINE opinion – Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate

Posted Thursday, 26 May 2005

The 2005-6 Australian Budget pronouncements about disability support pensions and parenting payments are flawed. From July 2006 Australians applying for either of these payments will be drawn into the Howard Government’s mutual obligation quagmire.

Presently, someone applying for a disability support pension has to establish that, because of a permanent incapacity, they are incapable of working 30 hours a week. They are then entitled to a pension for as long as their impairment continues. If they work part-time, their means are evaluated more generously than in the Newstart unemployment payment, allowing them to work full-time during periods when they are well enough to do so.

Currently, a sole parent caring for a child under 16 years and whose income and assets are under the specified amount can obtain a parenting payment. If they work part-time, their means are evaluated more generously than Newstart and it allows them to work full-time for short periods when they don’t have parenting responsibilities.

From July next year, applicants for a disability support pension will, if they are considered capable of working 15 hours a week at award rates, go straight to Newstart. If they are deemed to be incapable of working 15 hours a week at award rates they will be shifted on to the “enhanced” Newstart payment. The “enhancement of Newstart” is simply Orwellian double speak for the abolition of benefit continuity.

And for sole parents, once the youngest child of an applicant for parenting payment turns six, they will be shifted to the “enhanced” Newstart and be required to seek at least 15 hours work a week.

From July next year sole parents living on Howard’s “Animal Farm” with a child over six will be paid $20 less per week than at present, and new applicants for a disability support payment will lose $40 a week compared with present payments. Both sole parents and those with a disability will be subjected to all the subtleties that Centrelink’s “mutual obligation” enforcers can muster.

Because the evaluation of means for Newstart is calculated on fortnightly income and the evaluation of means for the other two payments are calculated over a considerably longer period, shifting sole parents and those with disabilities onto Newstart means they will gain less from any employment they obtain.

The Government has justified these changes on a number of grounds:

  • Paying people a poverty-line income because they are unemployed, sick, disabled or lone parents is becoming unaffordable;
  • it is better to be in work than be unemployed;
  • there is going to be a shortage of labour at some time in the future because of the ageing “time bomb”;
  • some people on disability payments are malingerers; and, many mothers now work.

The Government needs to explain:

  • What is so deficient about the 2005 economy that we can no longer afford to meet the social welfare bill that the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments paid?
  • Why do we need to have a budget surplus of $24.9 billion (the combined Future Fund and the declared surplus)?
  • Why did the bulk of the tax cuts go to the rich rather than the poor and why did the Government fail to adequately fund the social welfare system which is meant to protect the poorest Australians in times of need?
  • Why – given that the overwhelming majority of people want to work, and many are better off working even when they have disabilities or parenting responsibilities – did it choose to compel people to seek non-existent jobs rather than removing the obstacles to their getting work? That is, why is there no provision of sufficient community-based child care, no attempt to change attitudes towards employing people with disabilities and no assistance for people with disabilities to manage the impairments which inhibit their working?
  • Why – given that the labour shortage is generally a skilled labour shortage caused by the Howard Government’s failure to spend enough on education and training of unemployed people over the last decade – it is not prepared to admit that even in 2040 Australia’s age profile will not be very different from that of Europe in 2005?
  • Why, if it can be shown that someone is falsely claiming a disabling condition and is consequently immediately cut off benefits, it keeps pretending that malingering is rife among the ranks of Disability Support Pensioners?

Although many mothers, including sole parents, work more now than two decades ago, it does not mean that all parents should work. There are many reasons why it would be socially disastrous for some sole parents to work once their youngest child turns six. To work or to stay at home to look after children is one of the most difficult decisions that any parent makes. The reality is that in 2005 more Australians are working than ever before, but only 48.5 per cent of the labour force has a permanent full-time job. The rest enjoy all the certainty which casual, part-time and precarious employment provides.

The foresight of a blind worm and the hindsight of Mr McGoo

If the Government wants to increase the number of people in the workforce and believes that the differentials in payments between Newstart and disability support pension and parenting payments are causing people to opt for the latter, then there are options more viable than these draconian policies it is implementing. Rather than lowering the rate of payment for disability support pensions and parenting payments, it could raise the level of Newstart to make it commensurate with disability payments. This would combine these payments into a “guaranteed minimum income” (GMI) as Professor Ronald Henderson, head of the Poverty Commission, suggested in 1975.

If such a GMI were installed, there would be no financial advantage accruing to people wishing to “benefit shop”. Presently, for those on Newstart, the combined income tax and social security withdrawal rates applying to income from work are at least 62.5 per cent and can be up to 200 per cent of additional income. This causes poverty traps and perverse financial disincentives to earning extra income. The Government has announced it will slightly decrease the withdrawal rates in July 2006 – but it will by no means eliminate them.

A far smarter idea would be to introduce a basic income paid to all permanent residents at slightly above the single age pension rate. This would abolish poverty traps, income insecurity and perverse financial disincentives simultaneously.

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Do not mention the war or young people

Paper given at the Young People and Poverty Seminar, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, 23 May, 2002.

Australian society is structured in terms of age, gender, race, locality, class and by the way we treat people with a disability. Each of these structural features is underpinned by an ideology: ageism, sexism, racism, urbanism, classism and disableism respectively . Together these ideological forces constitute the prevailing world view of the politically powerful in this nation. They constitute the hegemonic ideological paradigm through which the powerful in this country interpret the world and provide the conceptual lens which informs the construction of social policy which the powerful then inflict on the rest of us.

Today I want to argue that the reason young people and young people’s issues can be so effectively marginalised is that there is an intimate connection between the ideological construction which the powerful in this country constantly impose on the relations of production and the outcomes which flow from the relations of distribution. Put simply, the powerful in this country have used the mumbo jumbo of economic fundamentalism to deceive Australians into believing that our country is now a more efficient society.

It may well be true that individual firms are able to produce product more cheaply – but at what cost?  In March 2002, 6.6 % of our workforce was officially recognised as unemployed. The real figure, if discouraged unemployed and underemployed people are taken into account, is, according to Professor Bob Gregory, in the order of 20%. Yet about half the full-time work force is working 10 hours a week unpaid overtime. More and more workers are employed at such low rates that even when in full time work they only receive a poverty line income. The current industrial system is exploitation not efficiency. If Australia is not utilising one fifth of its available labour force and over working half of its full-time work force, this does not amount to an efficient use of available labour.

The hegemonic forces have succeeded in imposing other socially undesirable outcomes on Australian society of which the following are but a few:

  • a preparedness to incarcerate asylum seekers – currently 600 of whom are under 18 (Lock, Quenault and Tomlinson 2002),
  • an excessive willingness to follow Uncle Sam round the world, meeting lots of nice people then killing them,
  • the continued stealing of young Indigenous children via the criminal injustice system (Cunneen 2001),
  • the ongoing denigration of young people, and
  • the constant enforcement of the loser pays principle in relation to nursing homes , education and community services.

I would like to briefly outline some of the methods which the powerful use to impose their world view. The prime focus is to divide and conquer.

Divide and conquer

Sometimes it is clearly in the short term interests of one relatively powerless group to attack another powerless group. Australian workers attacking migrants, refugees and asylum seekers may believe they are protecting their jobs. Such Australian workers are ignoring the fact that their long term interests may well be undermined by the division between the two groups. They may not realise that migrants tend to increase overall employment whilst at the same time taking some jobs from the little Aussie battler. Any division between workers and the reserve army of labour eventually undermines wage levels.

There are three major components in the divide and conquer process:

  • identification with the oppressor,
  • ambition, and
  • the closed circle of violence.

Identification with the oppressor

Several writers recognise Sigmund Freud as the modern originator of the concept of victims identifying with their oppressor. In more recent times, researchers studying domestic violence have found the concept a useful tool in their investigation of intra-family aggression. A lot of the early work on the mechanisms of identifying with the oppressor arose out of the experience of psychologists who had survived Nazi concentration camps. Paulo Freire (1972) explored the concept in considerable length, see also David Parker (1998).

At one level ‘identification with the oppressor’ is a self-explanatory concept – the people who are oppressed wish to escape that oppression and at least try to ‘be like’ their oppressor. But more is involved than simple imitation. Beyond the notion of identification is the idea of disassociation from the previous self. This often takes the form of denigrating one’s previous incarnation. In extreme forms, as the oppressed metamorphose into the oppressor they behave violently towards those who represent their past incarnation. In colonial situations many ‘natives’ might attempt to pass into the invader/settler society – some might become police or soldiers fighting against members of their own ethnic group.

Today I am using the concept of identification with the oppressor to mean any form of identification with the powerful which incorporates aspects of disassociation from those who are subjected to the direction or control by the powerful.

Ambition

Appropriate ambition tends to be defined by the powerful because they have the opportunity and desire to reinforce their message. They define what is success and what is failure. Individuals and less powerful groups might disagree with that definition but they find it very hard to disseminate their ideas.

A good current example of how economic fundamentalism has influenced community work is the number of conservatives (and even confused leftists) who are rushing to describe themselves as social entrepreneurs. Noel Pearson and the current priest heading the Brotherhood of St Lawrence are but two who wish to emulate the entrepreneurs Christopher Scase and Bondie.

Closed circle of violence

Franz Fanon (1967, pp. 243-250) in his famous book The Wretched of the Earth described why it is that much of the violence in poor communities occurs as a result of poor people attacking other poor people- he explained that much of the violence is a result of the psychological mechanism of displacement. Poor people feel unable to attack the real source of their oppression and repression because the real oppressor is seen as extremely powerful and is often distant. So powerless people displace their aggression onto those who are also powerless, who live close by and who annoy them.

For Howard to succeed he does not need to convince powerless people to physically or even verbally attack other powerless people. Howard succeeds when he gets one group of people to compete at the expense of the other. He does not even need to get people to compete. He succeeds the moment he can get one group of people to feel indifferent about the suffering of another individual or group of people. This is how the closed circle of violence enters most of our lives. That’s why Lenin suggested that if we are to escape such social division we need to realise: “The struggle for one is the struggle for all”.

If we don’t stand shoulder to shoulder with others the powerful pick us off one by one. We may not be a severely impaired 16 year old young person, who is unlikely to ever work, who won’t benefit from further schooling, and who would have received an adult rate disability pension until the early 1990s but who, if they live at home, now has to rely on 60% of the adult rate.

We may not be one of the approximately 200,000 young people who are breached annually by Centrelink for failing to meet some arbitrarily imposed obligation; some of whom find that, once breached, they are unable to afford to live in their existing accommodation and start on the slippery slope towards homelessness.

One by one they pick us off. One by one we become the victims only to find we are then blamed for the victim status they have assigned us. The union movement a long time ago realised that if we don’t hang together then we hang separately. But this is not a new idea. Aesop’s Fables include the story about a sheaf of sticks being harder to break than each stick individually.

Economic fundamentalism, class indifference, sexism, racial superiority, ageism, discrimination against people on the basis of their disability and the failure to ensure that country people have access to necessary goods and services on anything like the terms available in cities—all of these ideologies provide a point of divide, a point of departure and a point of separation. Each of these ideological manifestations separate the self from the other.

For example, in 1999 the young unemployed were divided between those who were literate and those who couldn’t read, between those who could count and those who were innumerate. Howard held those who had difficulty reading writing and adding up responsible for their own predicament. In the talk-back babble which followed there was little recognition that illiteracy and innumeracy derive in large part because the educational system has failed the student. In 2UE’s Laws and Parrot Land there was no recognition that compelling people to become literate or to achieve any other educational outcome is counterproductive. Any educator could have told Howard that compelling young people to become literate creates problems both for the learner and the teacher. Of course, such an analysis assumes the Liberal Coalition Government’s real intent was to help young people gain literacy skills. The real intent may have just been to cut budget outlays by forcing young people off welfare and/or if they stayed to further denigrate and intimidate them. His minister of social welfare at the time Jocelyn Newman (1999) has said “Good economic policy is welfare policy.” Her statement might alert us to one thrust of the powerful in this country.

How does it happen

 The powerful win when we:

  • fail to question what is success and what is failure,
  • confuse frozen anger with apathy,
  • don’t distinguish between feelings of impotence and indifference,
  • accept our indifference towards others,
  • tolerate greed, or
  • ignore mal-distribution.

The moment we avert our eyes from the malnutrition and starvation of 1,000 million of our fellow world citizens or ignore the incarceration of asylum seekers in concentration camps in Australia’s outback or elsewhere it becomes easier for us to turn our backs on Australia’s young people who are homeless. The moment we avert our eyes from the 25 million people in South Africa who can’t afford AIDS treatment it becomes easier for us to ignore the young person with a severe disability who’s trying to get a job. The moment we look away from the young woman who’s just been dismissed from her job we know that we can’t turn to her when we get the pink slip in our pay packet, when we get told to finish up on Friday or when we’re made redundant.

We refuse to listen to John Pilger’s statement that 6 thousand Iraqi children die each month as a result of the blockade of that country which Australia in early 2002 is proudly leading. Some people say that Pilger exaggerates. It may be that only 5,804 Iraqi children will die this month. It may only be 3203 kids who’ll die this month (about the same number of lives lost in the bombing of the World Towers in New York). So when you go home tonight sleep easily knowing that Pilger may have exaggerated – I’m sure that you will feel much more comfortable knowing that your country is only responsible for the deaths of  3203 Iraqi children this month. You might like to tell yourself that it’s not happening and that it’s only Pilger saying that. Unfortunately that is not true. The United Nations children’s organisation has been coming up with similar figures for years. But then again who wants to listen to the United Nations when they are critical of Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers and Indigenous Australians.

We can always find a place to hide behind the flag of patriotism. On that flag is inscribed ageism, racism, disableism, urbanism and sexism – so raise the patriotism banner high and salute.

I was going to sing “Advance Australia Fair” but we aren’t really being fair to many of the people who are desperately fleeing persecution, rape, war and poverty.

Yeh, Australia’s the land of the fair go
ah, were it so –
we give refugees a fair go
provided they go somewhere else.

If cowering close to “the last refuge of a scoundrel” does not appeal to you, you might fall back on argument that:

  • “The problem is too big I can’t look after all the young people.”
  • “The problem is too big I can’t look after all the old people.”
  • “The problem is too big I can’t look after all the starving people.”

The reality is that you individually are not being asked to look after everybody in the world. You are just being asked to care and to do what you can. As American community worker Si Kahn wrote:

It’s not what you were born with
it’s what you choose to bear
it’s not how large your share is
but how much you can share.
It’s not the prize you dream of
but the ones who really fought
it’s not just what you’re given
it’s what you do with what you’ve got.

What’s the use of two good legs
if you only run away?
And what good is the finest voice
if you’ve nothing good to say?
What good is strength and muscle
if you only push and shove?
And what’s the use of good two ears
if you can’t hear those you love?

Between those who use their neighbours
and those who use the cane,
between those in constant power
and those in constant pain,
between those who run to meet us
and those who cannot run,
tell me which ones are the cripples
and which ones touch the sun.

The short term aim

The social support systems in our country have for too long done things to and for people. Often this has meant the real beneficiaries of such ‘helping’ have been the ‘helpers’ themselves. We need to change our focus and start doing things with people, on their terms. Above all, none of us can do it alone – we need to do it together.

We can’t at this stage hope to overthrow the hegemonic forces of economic fundamentalism, capitalist globalism, war, famine and misdistribution.

The best that we can hope for in the short term is to help build a counter-hegemony which might usher in a new world in which:

  • country people get a fair crack of the whip,
  • old people are worried about what happens to young people,
  • every person is concerned about what happens to people with disabilities whether they are old or young,
  • gender becomes a point of identification rather than a point of division,
  • Indigenous people worry about what is going to happen to those who have come here by one means or another in the last two centuries, and
  • those of us who have arrived more recently are determined to see that Indigenous people are respected, that their rights are not transgressed, that their land is not stolen, that their children are not separated from them.

In this new world, Australians will act with determination to ensure that a fair percentage of the world’s refugees and displaced people are welcomed here however they arrive on this shore.

Let’s hope that today is the first day in the struggle to build that new world – for you and for me. It will involve building mutuality – not sameness. We don’t want to build a world that’s drab or censorious – we want to build a world that’s vibrant. A world that celebrates diversity – that knows and acknowledges the other.

Bibliography

Aesop’s Fables “The Bundle of Sticks.”
http://www.pacificnet.net/~johnr/cgi/aesop1.cgi?1&TheBundleofSticks
Cunneen, C. (2001) Conflict, Politics and Crime: Aboriginal Communities and the Police. Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest.
Fanon, F. (1967) The Wretched of the Earth. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
Freire, P. (1970) Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
Lock, J., Quenault, M. & Tomlinson, J. ( 2002) “Some Reasons Why Australia Should Abolish the Detention of Asylum Seekers.” CPACS Occasional Paper No. 02/1, March, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney. Sydney.
Newman, J. (1999) The Challenge of Welfare Dependency in the 21st. Century. Department of Family and Community Services, Canberra.
Parker, D. (1998) Anthropology in a Revolutionary Moment: Miskitu Resistance, Anglo Affinity, and the Limits of Gramscian Theory.
http://eserver.org/clogic/2-1/parker.html
Pilger, J. (2002) “ Breaking the silence: war, propaganda and the new empire.” Speech 1st March at Sydney Town Hall, Sydney.

Suggested further reading for those who want to discover an alternative to Australia’s petty-fogging targeted income support system:
Income Insecurity: The Basic Income Alternative is an E-Book and can be found on the New Zealand Universal Basic Income web site the direct link is http://www.geocities.com/ubinz/JT/IncomeInsecurity/

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Don’t be despondent about ‘dependency’

Green Left. Wednesday, March 28, 2001 – 10:00
https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/25401 also on the BIGA web site.

Some people in Australia are concerned about the painful brain condition called dependency. However, the only people who contract this condition are those who believe that the only possible welfare system is a targeted one.

The usual justification for targeted welfare is that it directs the greatest assistance to those in greatest need. Its advocates claim further that it is only being in need which justifies being paid assistance. The attached assumption is that the amount of assistance provided actually meets the recipient’s needs. The argument is more than a little circular and less than convincing, but it has been used in Australia since at least 1908 to justify paying income support.

The main claim of the targeted welfare system was that it assisted all who were in need through no fault of their own. This qualification on eligibility has a long lineage, stretching as far back as the Elizabethan Poor Laws of 16th century England. Under all such welfare systems since, someone has to adjudicate, to judge the difference between the deserving and the undeserving poor, to apportion blame or righteousness to the applicants for assistance. That has been the role appropriated by the targeted welfare system itself. Targeted welfare is a mid-point in Australian welfare debates, positioned between two diametrically opposed views: one view rejects the idea of paying income support to anyone, while the other view upholds the idea that income support should be universal and available to all.

Those who reject income support do so on the basis that if people can’t support themselves, they are a drain on the rest of us and that, if you pander to such people, it drags the rest of us down. Adherents of this view do not support targeted welfare because they claim it leads people to distort their circumstances so as to fit the definition of needy. They claim that providing unemployed people with income support, for example, encourages them to delay seeking work. That is, they argue, targeted welfare rewards the dreaded dependency.

Since the 16th century, those holding this view have largely accepted that leaving people to starve to death in the crossroads is bad form. This position therefore may have some utopian intellectual appeal, but it has little practical use. Advocates of this view therefore tend to claim that they back a targeted welfare system, only one which is even better targeted and discriminates even more sharply between the deserving and undeserving.

Both those who favour abolishing welfare (for the poor) and those who favour targeting claim that universal welfare is too expensive. They also suggest that universal provision is inefficient, because it provides assistance to many who are not in need. Those attached to the abolish assistance position sometimes argue that universalism creates the worst form of moral jeopardy because it ushers in the nanny state which confines all, irrespective of their means, to dependency.

Supporters of universalism claim that their system at least ensures that no-one in financial need is denied the opportunity to survive. No-one is dependent, they argue, because those who have no income besides the universal income guarantee are simply asserting their rights as citizens to the minimum income. The income support they receive is identical to that which all other residents receive. In this way, universal policies are the epitome of an inclusive social policy. Universalists point out that, because there are no means tests, there are no poverty traps and no financial disincentives which discourage engagement in paid work. Further, there is no invasion of people’s privacy and no compulsion. Under universal welfare, there is, in short, more freedom, not less.

An income guarantee is affordable. A universal payment ensures that all in financial need are provided with a minimum level of income, which is surely the base promise (rarely delivered) of the existing welfare system. The amount of income support likely to be paid is about survival level. In Australia it is likely that the rate of assistance would be at about  the official Henderson Poverty Line.

The provision of a sustaining universal payment avoids the flow-on costs which accrue in any society which marginalises some of its residents by relegating them to an impoverished existence.

Supporters of universalism suggest governments require only the taxation system to tax those whose income levels are such that they don’t need the assistance. Such a system does away with the confusing and inefficient
dual taxation and social security means testing withdrawal rates. Further, the Australian welfare budget is allocated out of what is left once government has done all the important things, like subsidies to industry and purchases of the latest military toys. There are certainly savings which could be made by ending these real forms of dependency, namely, the dependency of business on government handouts.

One further question which universal income support answers is how do we keep it simple? Most Australians don’t want all the complexity of the existing welfare system. They want the government to come up with an income support system which even the least sophisticated in this community can understand. John Howard, just after he became opposition leader in the early 1990s, said families should know what their entitlements are. At present families don’t know, social workers don’t know, academics don’t know, even most of the bureaucrats in social security don’t know the amount of income support to which residents are entitled.

The reason we haven’t got an income guarantee is very simple. In Darwin I sat at the feet of a long-term unemployed person, a wise man called Strider, who told me that the reason the government refuses to have a universal income guarantee is because it suffers from a lack of faith in people.

Strider said that governments believe the unemployed wouldn’t work in an iron lung. I agree with him.
There is no evidence that supports such conclusions about those Australian people who are confined to the reserve army of labour. People don’t want to work in dangerous jobs, or in situations where they are sexually harassed, or in a whole range of situations where they are exploited, but that doesn’t mean they don’t want to work.

A universal income guarantee would provide an opportunity for people to participate in a whole range of ways, either in the paid labour force or by undertaking voluntary work. John Howard’s federal government, whilst claiming to be in the vanguard of the push for smaller government, has tied its fortunes to the mutual obligation masthead. This system requires massive intervention in the lives of those who receive income support. The work for the dole scheme and compulsory literacy training are just two obnoxious features of the Howard government’s mutual obligation policy. This socially conservative government compels people to participate in an approved activity in return for receiving income support. This is a long way removed from people voluntarily involving themselves in a community activity. It is like having to sing hymns for your supper in a church-run soup kitchen.

The absence of universal income guarantees is explained by a failure of trust; dependency rhetoric is just a mystification. People should trust each other and be prepared to say, I’m prepared to pay 50% of what I earn in tax, providing that I’ll know that no-one else in this country is without food, housing, education and decent health care. If such a system were to be installed, most Australians would go to bed happy.

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Don’t get despondent about dependency

Published in Green Left 28/3/2001 p.10

 Some people in Australia are concerned about dependency.  Dependency is a particular painful brain condition that can only be contracted by those who believe in targeting welfare benefits.

The usual justification for targeting is that it directs the greatest assistance to those in greatest need. Claims are then made that being in need justifies the payment of assistance and that need also explains the basis on which aid is given. One assumption attached to such an analysis is the idea that the amount of assistance provided actually meets the recipient’s needs. The argument is more than a little circular and less than convincing yet it has been used in Australia at least since 1908 as a justification for paying income support.

Targeted welfare is a mid-point in Australian welfare debates, positioned between two diametrically opposed views listed below. The main claim of the targeted welfare state was that it assisted all in need through no fault of their own. This qualification on eligibility for assistance has a long lineage stretching as far back as the 16th Century Elizabethan Poor Laws. Someone has to adjudicate, in order to apportion blame or righteousness to the applicants for assistance. The discretion exercised, at least on the boundaries, is fraught with uncertainty and imprecision (with regard to the application of the deserving template). Some, in almost identical situations, are more capable of articulating their worthiness than are others.

If you don’t believe in targeting you have two main choices.

  • Firstly you could, reject the idea of paying income support to anyone on the basis that if they can’t support themselves they are a drain on the rest of us and that if you pander to such people it could drag the rest of us down to their level. Adherents of this view do not support targeted welfare because they claim it leads people to distort their circumstances so as to fit in with need definitions in order to obtain benefit. They claim that providing unemployed people with income support encourages them to delay seeking work. That is, it rewards the dreaded dependency. People attracted to this view, tend since the 16th Century to accept that leaving people at the crossroads to starve to death is no longer regarded as good form. In short though the position may have some utopian intellectual appeal but it has no practical use. I find this amusing because the every essence of this abolish assistance proposition is a demand that all people have utility.
  • Secondly you could, make all income support universally available.

Supporters of the abolish assistance position and of targeting claim that universal welfare is too expensive. They also suggest that universal provision is inefficient because it provides assistance to many who are not in need. Those attached to the abolish assistance position sometimes argue that universalism creates the worst form of moral jeopardy because it ushers in the nanny state confining all, irrespective of their means to a state of dependency.

Supporters of universalism claim that their system at least ensures that no one in financial need is denied, at least, the opportunity to survive. No-one is dependent because those who have no income (apart from the universal income guarantee) are simply asserting their rights as permanent residents. The income support they receive is identical to that which all other permanent residents receive. In this way universal policies are the epitome of an inclusive social policy. Universalists point out that because there are no means tests there are no poverty traps and no financial disincentives to discouraging engagement in paid work. There is no invasion of people’s privacy and no compulsion. Universalists generally claim that an income guarantee is affordable on three grounds.

  • Firstly, the amount of income support likely to be paid is about a survival level – in Australia it is likely that the rate of assistance would be about the Henderson Poverty Line.
  • Secondly, the payment of a universal payment ensures that all in financial need are provided with a minimum level of income. Which is surely the base promise of the existing welfare system which claims it assists all in need though sometimes with the qualification that the need has to come into existence “through no fault of their own”.
  • Thirdly the provision of a sustaining universal payment ensures the community avoids the flow on costs which accrue in any society which marginalises some of its permanent residents by relegating them to an impoverished existence.

Supporters of universalism suggest governments require only the taxation system to tax those whose income levels are such that they don’t need the assistance. Such a system does away with the confusing and inefficient dual taxation and social security means testing withdrawal rates.

Dependency, so it would appear, if one were to follow much of the welfare dependency rhetoric emanating from both Labor and Coalition Ministers since 1986, can only occur amongst the poor.

But if the government was really concerned about the most pressing dependency issues that confronts our economy then it would turn its attention towards the:

  • $14 billion annual hand-out from the Government to industry to subsidise its research and product development,
  • tax breaks and other inducements to assistance industry,
  • provision of transport  and other infrastructure to assist industry,
  • government’s attempts to limit workers’ wage rises to assist industry,
  • provision of police to help smash union pickets to assist industry,
  • tax breaks and other inducements to assist industry,
  • refusal to lower the level of unemployment  though job creation, reduced working hours, etc. which allows industry to maintain (at no cost to industry) a reserve army of labour,
  • $3 billion annual subsidy to the private health insurance industry, and
  • dependency of the insurance industry, whose extreme dependence on the superannuation contributions of Australian workers amounts to an intense addiction.

A failure of trust helps explain the absence of universal income guarantees; dependency rhetoric is just a mystification

The reason we haven’t got an income guarantee is very simple.  In Darwin I sat at the feet of a long-term unemployed person, a wise man called Strider, who told me that the reason the government refuse to have a universal income guarantee is because it suffers a lack of faith in Australian people. Strider says that governments believe the unemployed “wouldn’t work in an iron lung”.  There is no evidence that supports such conclusions about Australian people who are confined to the reserve army of labour. People don’t want to work in dangerous jobs, or in situations where they are sexually harassed, or in a whole range of situations where they are exploited, but that doesn’t mean they don’t want to work.  A universal income guarantee would provide an opportunity for people to participate in a whole range of ways, either in the paid labour force or by undertaking unremunerated work.

The Howard Government whilst claiming to be in the vanguard of the push for smaller government has tied its fortunes to the mutual obligation masthead. This system requires massive intervention in the lives of those who receive income support. The Work for the Dole Scheme and compelled literacy training are just two obnoxious features of the Howard Government’s mutual obligation policy. This socially conservative government compels people to participate in an approved activity in return for receiving income support. This is a long way removed from people voluntarily involving themselves in a community activity. It is like having to sing hymns for your supper in a church run soup kitchen.

Indigenous people, with their Community Development Employment Program, get paid a not dissimilar amount to unemployment benefits. What a wonderful thing that’s doing for them!  It’s turning them into overnight millionaires, solving their health problems, their infrastructure difficulties, their land ownership issues and their commercialisation problems.  Australians don’t have to worry about Aborigines now because now they are “participating” and avoiding dependency simultaneously.  Doesn’t it make you feel good that your country can ignore such problems like the provision of clean drinking water.  The absence of adequate drinking water is the number one health problem in remote Australia. The average age at which Aboriginal people are dying has remained remarkable constant for most of the last 100 years.

In the last decade people coming to settle permanently in this country have found that migrants had to wait 6 months before they were entitled to receive income support equivalent to that of other Australians. The Howard Government extended this waiting time to 2 years. This cut back occurred in the face of evidence that the time when most people are likely to need assistance, whether they migrate from one town to another town or one country to another country, is in the first two years following the shift.

Australians need to trust other Australians and say, “I’m prepared to pay 50% of what I earn in tax, providing that I’ll know that no-one else in this country is without food, housing, education and a decent health system”.  If such a system were to be installed, most Australians would go to bed happy.

One question which universal income support answers is  “how do we keep it simple”?  Most Australians don’t want all the complexity of the existing welfare system. They want the government to come up with an income support system which the least sophisticated in this community can understand. They don’t want to have a system which only the bureaucratic elite can understand.  John Howard, just after he became Opposition Leader in the early 1990s, said families should know what their entitlements are. At present families don’t, social workers don’t, academics don’t, most of the bureaucrats in Social Security don’t know the amount of income support to which permanent residents are entitled.

At present the Australian  welfare system is reductionist. The existing system is driven by a determined ethos, the basic planks of which are:

  • what is it we don’t have to give poor people, and
  • what is the minimum we can get away with politically?

The Australian welfare system’s budget is allocated out of what is left once we have done all the important things – such as provide subsidies to industry and purchase the latest military toys for the boys.

On top of the attachment to outmoded constructions of a poor law welfare state, the welfare system finds itself in reduced circumstances as a result of the rise and consolidation of economic fundamentalism. One of the major planks of economic fundamentalist theory is the trickle down effect. This is the idea that the rich get richer first and some how they create jobs, which the poor eventually take-up, and in this way wealth eventually spreads throughout the community. Of course the trickle down effect does not promise a move in the direction of equality or equity. Anyone who has a leaking bladder can tell you that their thighs are always wetter than their feet. Alan Anforth, a past Director of ACT COSS, denies that the trickle down effect works. He suggests that an alternative mechanism is in play. He calls it the Suck-up Effect: the rich suck up the money and we suck up to them.

Finally, one of the greatest obstacle to the introduction of a guaranteed universal minimum income in this country is not the economic rationalists.  It is not the politicians.  It’s the social welfare industry with each of the various sectors fighting, not for a unity based on what all poor people have in common, but for the maintenance of minimal economic advantages that some sectors have over others, eg. pensioners versus beneficiaries. This destroys the possibility of a potential unity amongst all those who would be advantaged by the introduction of a universal income guarantee. Social welfare practitioners seem oblivious to the advantage which solidarity amongst all sectors of the least affluent would herald. Each sector is divided from the others by the receipt of minuscule advantages. This denies the capacity of all poor people to present the government of the day with a powerful voting block which could not be overlooked and which would provide a unified rallying point around which to organise. The targeting of welfare not only divides welfare recipients from each other – it drives a wedge between low wage workers and those forced to survive on welfare benefits. If low waged workers and income support recipients accepted their essential unity, they would constitute a very powerful voting block. Such a unity has the capacity to lay the foundation stone for the development of a decent welfare state.

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Economic rationalism or rational economics

Paper given at State Youth Housing Conference, Sydney 4.12.1992

I have heard it suggested that economic rationalism is simply a form of economics based on the work of Adam Smith. The more extreme exponents of economic rationalism have suggested it is a comprehensive rational explanation which if we were to adopt it totally would ensure economic prosperity for all. It is after all the major intellectual underpining of the Liberal’s Fightback program. It was the basic analysis which gave rise to Reganomics, Rodgernomics and Thatcherism.

Economic rationalism is far more than an economic theory: it is the political agenda of the wealthy in this country and in Britain, New Zealand and the United States of America. It is the vehicle by which the powerful are intent upon transferring wealth from poor and middle classes to the rich.

The essential elements of economic rationalism are profit, micro economic reform, deregulation, removal of state control, free play of market forces, creation of allegedly level playing fields, competition, productivity/efficiency, privatisation, user pays principles, trickle down wealth, and personal provision.

What is missing from the dogma of the monetarists, supply-siders and others who gather under the rubric of economic rationalism is any conception of solidarity, mutual support, common ownership, altruism, social justice, and sharing the common wealth in the common good.

The inherent flaw in economic rationalism is that its enthusiasts deal with only half of the economic equation they concentrate upon what Karl Marx called the mode of production but, leave to one side the mode of distribution.”(1) That is, they deal with the processes of creating profits but leave to one side how those profits might be, distributed. With the exception of Milton Friedman” (2) who did some early work on guaranteed minimum incomes, they are content to suggest that wealth will be distributed throughout the economy by means of a trickle down effect. Well, any incontinent person can tell you your thighs are always wetter than your boots.

Just ask yourself, how can any country hope to maximise productivity or be efficient when it excludes from the workforce 25 percent of its citizens of working age.

Privatisation is the taking of that which we all own and selling it to one or a lesser number of individuals. The rationalisation usually given for doing it is that private firms are necessarily more efficient than governments. Those of you who believe that private firms are necessarily more efficient should read Julian Le Grand (3) but if he’s a bit heavy then have a look at Bob Hudson’s paper which examines at who pays and who profits when government community services are privatised.(4) Those of you who can’t be bothered doing that might just like to think of Pyramid, Elliot, Bond, Skase, Herscu and crew.

Like the family jewels, our common assets can only be sold once. A poet in England at the time of the enclosures realised this :

The law locks up the men and women
Who steal the goose from off the common
but leaves the larger villain loose
who steals the common from the goose.

Deregulation simply means the removal of government control. In the banking industry it led to Westpac losing one and a half billion dollars this year: the loss of the Victorian State Bank, a three billion dollar loss by the State Bank of South Australia. It did, however, make it easier for major drug dealers to ship their profits offshore for laundering. In industrial terms deregulation makes it easier for employers to exploit you.

The free play of market forces economic rationalists tell us is essential for wealth creation, productivity, competition and liberty. There is just one problem at this point in time: there are inequalities in power, wealth, capacity, etc. between firms and between countries; and, despite the Bible, no two people are equal and so there cannot be a level playing field, in the absence of regulation, which will not always advantage those with wealth and power.

Competition

Question:  What is the difference between competition and duplication?

Answer:  Competition is an essential ingredient of the capitalist system, it is the very foundation of commercial practise. It is to be found in every free enterprise system. It ensures consumers have a choice, and is the market’s way of making sure that inefficient enterprises either lift their game or go out of business. It is to be highly applauded.
Duplication occurs in the health and welfare systems. It is totally unnecessary, costly and inefficient. It is to be abhorred wherever it occurs.

In Australia when economic rationalists talk about personal provision they mean increasing the accumulation of most of the wealth in the hands of the top one percent of the population. When the working class talk about private provision they are talking about buying a home or superannuation. The increasing spread of superannuation down the income scale will impoverish the least well off and ensure the extinction of the aged pension at a rate which could sustain older people in modest comfort. Superannuation is a fraud perpetuated on the entire working class. It would not have been possible without the rise of an economic rationalist mentality.

Economic rationalism has brought us an economic miracle. We’re seeing the loss of full-time jobs replaced by low paid part-time jobs in the service industries – like tourism. We have 11 percent unemployment and a further 10 percent either under-employed or discouraged unemployed, the bulk of this unemployment circulating amongst the bottom 30 percent of the income scale. We have one of the lowest federal government international debt levels in the world, but maintain private foreign debt at dangerous levels. One in eight of our children live at or below the poverty line. Many people without any income are no longer guaranteed basic income support. The user pays principle has brought us tertiary fees. At ACTCOSS we call it the loser pays principle. The youth income support is paid at as low as 44 percent of the poverty line and just to make sure the young get a good dose of poverty, Hewson and the Liberals are promising those young Australians who do get a job a youth wage of $3 an hour. Yes,’ this is an economic miracle. It’s a bloody miracle we’ve let the economic rationalists do it to us.

Economic rationalism omits any commitment to social justice.

It’s the armless and the harmless
the senseless and the lame
who always pay the social cost
who always get the blame.

It’s the snivellers and the chisellers
the swindlers and the vain
ripping off the profits,
and it’s always been the same.

When I speak of social justice
you ask, ‘What will it cost us?’
Advance Australia fairly,
Advance Australia squarely,
and let us reach the further shore in the best way that we can.

 

References

(1) Tomlinson, J. ‘In Praise of Dry Economics’ in The Hunger of the Many fills the Bellies of the Few, ACTCOSS, Canberra, 1990.
(2) Friedman, M. with assistance of Friedman, R. Capitalism and Freedom, Uni of Chicago, Chicago, 1962.
(3) Le Grand, J., & Robinson, R. ‘Introduction’ in Privatisation and the Welfare State. George Allen & Unwin, London, 1984, pp.5~14.
(4) Hudson, R., Privatisation: Who Pays? Who Profits?, VCOSS Monograph 1992.
(5) Gregory, B. ‘The Future of Work, Paper given at ACOSS Congress, 1.10.92, Canberra.

See also
Manning, I. Maximising Employment: Report of an employment Task Force. Monograph John Langmore, Canberra, 1992.

 

Further reading

Vintila, P., Phillimore, J. & Newman, P. (eds.) Markets Morals & Manifestos, Institute for Science & Technology Policy, Murdoch Uni, Perth, 1992.

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Evidence to House of Representatives Standing Committee on Community Affairs

Reference: Social Security advice on pensions and benefits, Canberra, Wednesday, 18 May 1988

(OFFICIAL HANSARD REPORT)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STANDING COMMITTEE ON COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

Members:
Mr O’Keefe (Chairman)
Mr Connolly (Deputy Chairman)

Mr Blunt Mr Cadman Mr Dubois Ms Fatin Mrs Harvey
Mr Johns Mr Katter Ms McHugh Mr Sciacca Mr Wilson

The Committee is to inquire into and report to the Parliament on:

  1. The effectiveness of current methods of providing information to clients and potential clients of Social Security entitlements;
  2. the effectiveness of methods currently used by the Department of Social Security to provide face to face contact with clients and potential clients; and
  3. any proposals to enhance awareness and ‘take-up’ of entitlements by persons who qualify for assistance under Social Security programs.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CANBERRA Wednesday, 18 May 1988
STANDING COMMITTEE ON COMMUNITY AFFAIRS (Subcommittee)
(Reference: Social Security advice on pensions and benefits)

Present

Mr O’Keefe (Chairman)

Mr Dubois Mr Johns Mr Katter
Ms McHugh Mr Sciacca

The Subcommittee met at 9.16 a.m. Mr O’KEEFE took the chair.

REPS STANDING COMMITTEE ON COMMUNITY AFFAIRS 18 May 1988

TOMLINSON, Mr John Richard, Director, ACT Council of Social Service, PO Box 195, Civic Square, Australian Capital Territory, made an affirmation and was examined.

CHAIRMAN – Welcome to the Committee, Mr Tomlinson. The Committee has received your submission and has authorised its publication in a separate volume of submissions. Do you wish to make a short statement further to that contained in the submission, or do you wish to make any amendment to the submission?

Mr Tomlinson – I would like to make an apology for the repetition on page 1 about the existing system of income securities imbued with sexism, ageism, racism, and urbanism. I know it is an important point, but that is probably going over the top.

CHAIRMAN – You wish to delete the second use of that text?

Mr Tomlinson – Yes. The other thing that is important, coming after this morning’s evidence from the Department, is that I noted that the Department’s improved office procedures for the office counter staff were a major point of discussion. The officer from the Department said that it is now planning five days of training and that it also had 4,000 pages of manuals. Even if only one quarter of those related to benefits, I cannot conceive how you could hope to make counter staff competent in those sorts of basic manual issues. That is perhaps central to the very thrust of our submission, that is, the complexity of the system and the interrelationships between that system’s complexity and the other five departments that also are involved in income maintenance delivery. The other things that flowed from that were issues such as the suggestion that the offices were full because people spent their days sitting around in them when they did not have any reason to be there. I know of no person who is homeless who would do that – if you had nowhere else to sleep you might sleep in a library, a hospital or an office somewhere where you can sit down – and that seemed a very strange suggestion to me. On the issue of how you handle people who are aggressive, when I worked in the Department, mainly in the Brisbane office—-

CHAIRMAN – You are a former employee?

Mr Tomlinson – Yes, I am a former employee of the Department. I worked probably a total of about six years with that Department. I was a social worker. We would get people brought up or sent up from downstairs, but by the time we got to see them the situation was one of real crisis. You get all those sorts of aggressive things happening at the counter and that puts a lot of pressure on counter staff because they do not understand the system. They cannot give answers effectively. I think these were the issues that Mr Katter was raising this morning about age. I do not accept Mr Volker’s assurance that if you send some young people to pensioner organisations, they will suddenly say, ‘What nice people – they probably have grandmothers, too’. Old people can be stroppy, they feel they have a right to be stroppy and they want someone who has some knowledge of the world when they are talking to them.

CHAIRMAN – The point has been made to us by the Australian Pensioners Federation that it is not just having skilled people, but also having people who are mature, and who are seen to be mature. Do you think that is important, particularly when dealing with the older groups?

Mr Tomlinson – Yes, and particularly while they cannot give direct answers that delegitimises them in the eyes of anybody they see. The other thing that I would like to comment on is the rural area. One of the problems is that in Australia there are over 240 Aboriginal languages or dialects – depending on how they are classified. At Elcho Island there are 19 clan groups. You could not produce a video, or any other form of information, that would take in those 19 languages. The video this morning was for Aurukun. You have people at Aurukun who have come there all the way from Normanton right up to Bamaga and Thursday Island. So that would solve the problem of one group of people, but the problem of multilingual staff is a real problem.

When the Northern Territory Education Department decided to adopt multilingualism, it operated at Maningrida in Barada because it had had an anthropologist who Ys a linguist who had studied the Barada language and who had written it down in a form. The problem vas that the traditional owners at Maningrida in the Northern Territory were people of the Gungavidgi clan and they found that a tremendous insult to have another language as the official language in the school. So multicultural issues in Aboriginal communities are very complex. It is only a part of the solution to present it in one language in that community. The more complex the system is, the less functionally literate people are, the more difficult it is for people to understand, generally.

The other thing that came up this morning was the Tennant Creek office with two people. That is a good 300 kilometres from Papunya. There are 800 people in the surrounding area of Papunya and another 500 surrounding Kintore, which is even further out near the Northern Territory-Western Australian border. If you have a problem at Kintore, or even at some of the out-stations near Papunya, and you are waiting for the Aboriginal liaison officer to come out, you might wait for three months or six months. The liaison officer has to come in at least 300 and maybe 600 kilometres. Those things are real problems for those officers. No matter how effective those officers are, they cannot understand 4,000 pages of manuals. There are 127 different income maintenance programs operating in this country. It may be more appropriate for them to go to another department than to go to Social Security anyway. The system is just so complex that it is horrific. When you put that together with other language or functional literacy problems, you have real issues that need to be addressed. The only way that I can conceive of their being addressed is by way of simplicity. Mr Volker referred to the Cass review – the Social Security Review – and said that he hoped that would simplify things. I would like to just give you our review of the 300- odd pages of the Cass review on unemployment, in which she suggests a number of different categories inside the unemployment benefit category, which will make the system far more complex.

CHAIRMAN – Could I just interrupt there for a second. I want to make the point for the record that Mr Tomlinson has tendered to the Committee the response of the ACT Council of Social Service to the Social Security Review. I should point out, just for the record, that this Standing Committee does not have a brief in policy determination or policy areas. We will be touching on these areas, and to the extent that your response touches on administrative processes, we can take account of it. Other than that, we can certainly ensure that the Minister is aware of the points you raise.

Mr Tomlinson – Has he received a copy of that?

CHAIRMAN – The Committee has received that as an exhibit.

Mr Tomlinson – It was particularly the relevance of the suggestion that the review would make life simpler for recipients. Those recommendations, if they were accepted, would not, and that is the importance of it.

CHAIRMAN – You might like to comment on the point that Mr Volker did make the claim that for time immemorial, so to speak – ‘for the last 20 years’ I think were his words – that successive Ministers and secretaries of the Department have set off with the ambition of making the system simpler. It would appear to me that specially targeted benefits actually make it more complex all the time. Have you, as a former employee and now in your present capacity, any ideas for – at least from the client’s perspective – making the system simpler? Do you have any suggestions in that area?

Mr Tomlinson – Yes. I would take the suggestion of Bill Hayden on 15 March 1973 when he indicated that the Government was about to introduce a guaranteed minimum income. That was also a suggestion that arose out of the Henderson poverty inquiry. Don Grimes, when he was in the shadow ministry, declared his support for guaranteed income, Minister Howe, on the day he took up his appointment as Minister for Social Security, also said that he was interested in guaranteed income. To some extent, the family assistance supplement is a form of guaranteed income – admittedly, only for those with families. It is very similar to the Nixon HR1 proposal that was defeated in the US Senate. I see no other way than to remove the income maintenance process from the social needs process.

The similarities between a widow and a supporting parent who is female are tremendous, yet we have two different provisions. The distinction between someone who is 50, Aboriginal and unemployed and someone who is 50, Aboriginal and on an invalid pension – both are probably in rural areas and are likely to do hard labouring – is very small. They cannot do lighter work often because of functional literacy problems. In order to get unemployment benefit you have to be ready, fit, able and willing to work. To get sickness benefit you have to be 85 per cent incapacitated temporarily. To get an invalid pension you have to be 85 per cent incapacitated permanently. You can get people who fall into those gaps. No school of medicine teaches invalidity on a percentage system. The Marr report which was done by the Department and Alan Jordan’s own work with the development branch of the Department show the stupidity of the invalid pension processes. Those people often have very great similarities in a whole range of areas, yet they are paid quite different benefits. That is because of the backlog of issues about whether someone is an invalid.
In 1908 and 1909, when that vas introduced, age and invalidity were the two forms of benefit that were seen as important to introduce at the Commonwealth level. Those have been extended in different ways. They have grown in an ad hoc fashion. People have pointed out gaps and governments have tried to plug them – to use the words of Don Grimes or Margaret Guilfoyle – ‘to create a safety net which people will not fall through’. There are many people who do fall through. The only time I can see it operating is when we have a guaranteed income that is based simply on financial capacity to support oneself. If the income level is set at the pension level, you then have to have a rate of withdrawal tied hopefully to the tax system so that it is fully integrated, you abolish means testing and you just have a tax rate. At the moment you have people on unemployment benefit who, after they earn $70, do not get another cent from working until they pass $150. You have at least a 100 per cent tax rate there. If you had a system with a clear rate of withdrawal right the way through, that would advantage everybody.
The major group of people who would not be covered by that, who have no other income, would be those who live with someone who has an income and who are deemed to be dependent on them. I would argue, and my Council would argue, for a system based on the individual and not on the family, for a number of reasons. One

reason and not the least, is the problem that the bona fide domestic basis has raised for the Department. It has never solved that. The suggestions by Meredith Edwards and others for a living alone allowance have not solved that. If you have a system which financially disadvantages people living apart, it is a financial incentive to break up a family home. There has been a lot of talk about support for the family which is ill- founded. I want to see families supported because I see that as a major way we can cheapen a whole range of things. But I have seen families destroyed by the social security system when it was the only way that women and children could be supported – a man had done things which had got him offside with either the law or Social Security and had gone off so that his family could be supported on a supporting parent benefit. If we are really going to be serious about supporting families then we have to pay individuals in the same way as the tax system operates, from an individual structure. There are some complications with the dependent spouse rebate, which needs to be eliminated and put towards paying people as individuals.

CHAIRMAN – We have probably gone a lot beyond our brief; a lot of the things you have addze6Bed, albeit sensible administratively, are also major policy considerations. But it is probably worthwhile for members of the Committee to talk to you in those terms anyway.

Ms McHUGH – I think we have a bit of a problem because you are very anxious to talk about policy direction and your submission directs itself mainly to that. If we try to say that that is a policy matter rather than the brief of the Committee, which is an inquiry into pensioner and beneficiary information, you will of course say that it is all tied up and that the very complexity of it makes the delivery of information more difficult. 1 think that you and the Committee are going to have a bit of a problem in separating the two, but I am still going to ask you to try to separate them. I would like to ask you for a start why you think it is that, if a guaranteed minimum income assistance scheme would be a so much simpler system and would so simplify the giving of information, and when it has received over the years so much support from so many different people, many of whom you have quoted, the schema has not been brought in. I put to you that it might be that it is not as simple as it looks. I was a member of a policy committee in the State Labor Party which grappled with how you would bring it in and the complexities of it for about 18 months before we gave it away. I put it to you that that may be the reason, rather than that the current Minister is guilty of all the things you have chosen to accuse him of – lack of vision, forgetting his ideological commitment, and so on. I throw that back to you because I think you have made a most unjustified personal attack on the Minister, as well as using a very problematical way of discussing the issue at hand, which is the provision of information. I think it is fair enough for me to ask that because that really is the tenor of your submission.

Mr Tomlinson – When I last talked at any length with the Minister about the reasons why he was not moving in the direction of a GMI, particularly moving to the individual as an income unit, was in 1985. He said that it would cost at least another $5 billion.

Ms McHUGH – Do you think by that he meant to bring the guaranteed minimum income to the level that people are able to obtain through a specific pension?

Mr Tomlinson – Yes, and covering all those who are now dependent spouses of people who have income from non-social security sources. There are other problems with an income guarantee based on the individual; the public generally has accepted

the rhetoric about families without looking at the implications of adopting the family as the unit of payment.

Ms McHUGH – Why do you think that? Why do you dismiss the Social Security Review? Why do you think the Henderson review of poverty was enough and 25 years later should still be enough? Why do you so easily dismiss the review?

Mr Tomlinson – I dismiss the review as a result of discussions I have had with several officers of the review, including Professor Bettina Cass and her reluctance to look at the issue of guaranteed income, separating income from the other issues which surround the social welfare system. The other issues about a guaranteed income would mean, if it was done the way I want it done, that the Department of Social Security would cease to exist and it would be paid through the tax system.

Ms McHUGH – With an identity number I think you said or—-

Mr Tomlinson – Yes.

Ms McHUGH – Do you wish we had gone ahead with the ID card?

Mr Tomlinson – I certainly do, but only on the basis that it was part and parcel of a guaranteed income. I said to the Minister at the time that I thought I was the only secretary or previous secretary of a Council of Civil Liberties that would come out and support that, but I told him what the price of my support was.

Ms McHUGH – I think you probably were.

Mr Tomlinson – I was concerned that there were many people forced to become liars and cheats on the system because of the way the system is structured, and often because they do not understand. The information that gets to them they do not understand. They do not know if they are just over the line when they are a long way over the line, or whether they are on the right side of the line.

Ms McHUGH – So it is all relating back to the provision of information and the ability to have information about the system.

CHAIRMAN – Mr Tomlinson, it is worth you knowing that Ms McHugh is the chairperson of the Government’s caucus policy committee in this area. There are no Opposition members around are there, but this is on the record, that is right. Many of your approaches are worthy of discussion with Ms McHugh privately as I am sure you will find that you share a lot more common ground than you may feel, but that is not for me to say.

Ms McHUGH – Did I sound too hostile?

CHAIRMAN – Yes, but anyway—-

Ms McHUGH – I am sorry.

CHAIRMAN – Albeit that the Government of the day has in place a targeted system, and that does require the officers of the Department to have specific knowledge, I personally question the need for applicants to come along having that specific knowledge about what it is they are supposed to be applying for. In concept anyway I see no reason why a person should not be able to come to the Department of Social Security and say, ‘This is my difficulty. I need money because…How can you help?’. That would mean a simplified application process and you would be relying then on the officers of the Department to find the most appropriate targeted benefit: for the person. That is an idea.

We have received a number of submissions which have said to us that people have come to the Department thinking, for instance, they should be applying for unemployment benefit when they qualified instead, say, for sickness benefit and therefore got some extra benefits. They have been sent away because they did not qualify for unemployment but then someone else has said to them two weeks later,

‘You had better go and apply for sickness’. So we have had submissions put that ask that question of who should be sorting out how you qualify—-

Mr Tomlinson – When I first went to work with the Department the senior social worker in the Brisbane branch at the time – who later became the senior Australia-wide social worker, Ella Webb – said to me, ’Now John, we can only assist people in this office who are beneficiaries of the Department or potential beneficiaries. If anyone ever comes through this door and you do not assist them then I will have your hide’. She said, ‘Everybody in financial need must be able to be got onto something’.

CHAIRMAN – Right.

Mr Tomlinson – Now that then puts the onus on the workers to find that system that can pay them. That is okay, but what is happening is that people are now going away as you said. They do not qualify for this benefit because of this one thing or they do not qualify for that or something else. They do not understand why they have gone away or why they have not got it. When I had paranoid clients who were applying for an invalid pension I used to suggest they read Franz Kafka’s The Trial, where Joseph K. is accused of some crime but it is never specified what it is and he has to establish his innocence. Trying to get someone with a psychiatric disability onto an invalid pension is very much a Kafkaesque nightmare.

CHAIRMAN – Can I intervene there for a second. To some extent bear in mind also the truth of the submission to us by the Department this morning. It has a large range of clients. It handles a lot of benefits and people such as yourself in the forefront of the access agencies are in fact helping the most disadvantaged. As politicians, we have to evaluate what is the reality and what is focusing ns the chief problem. You tend to see the problem areas all the time, and that builds up a perspective that there are all these problems all the time. How would you evaluate what you heard this morning from the senior policy and administrative heads and their perception that the changed processes are filtering through and starting to occur at the regional office level? Are you seeing evidence of those changes taking place? I would assume that if it was anywhere, it would be here in the Australian Capital Territory.

Mr Tomlinson – I am in the process of area management that they are moving onto. One of the people who vas working to implement that process at a fairly senior level has been blowing in my ear about that for some four years and about what a brilliant scheme it is. I think to some extent it does get rid of some obstacles to a proper service for clients. I do not want to appear to be hostile to the Department. I think it is probably the one department that l have worked in where everyone tries to do the right thing within the limits of their capacity. I am saying the Department is given a job to do which is too difficult. I am not hostile to Brian Howe. I think he is doing an extraordinarily difficult job, too, in a system that is forcing him to make decisions. But having said that, I think there is and there has been for at least 10 years an effort to increase the training in that department for its staff to try to ensure that people got the benefits that they were entitled to. I have been critical of Mr Pat Lanigan in other circumstances but I have never doubted his commitment to training and trying to ensure that most people get: the benefits they are entitled to.

Ms McHUGH – Unless you are a Greek with a back injury.

Mr Tomlinson – You mean the Greek conspiracy—-

CHAIRMAN– You saw the experience of that in Sydney, did you not? Ms McHugh was making the point that the Department adopted a pretty hostile attitude towards the Greek population in Sydney which led to that whole inquiry, the Greek conspiracy thing. Is that still ongoing, Ms McHugh?

Ms McHUGH – It is all over; of course it is all over now. I just could not help making the remark. I should not have, but I just intervened, jokingly, except that it was no joke at the time, about Pat Lanigan. That is all.

Mr Tomlinson – That is the kind of thing about which I have been most critical.

Ms McHUGH – That is a context in which you would be extremely critical.

Mr Tomlinson – I have been most critical, yes.

CHAIRMAN – Your comments are almost at odds in some ways with fairly significant views put to us – and strongly held views put to us – by groups we met with in Sydney last week. Where you are saying that the general attitude within the Department is one of trying to assist, they were saying their perception is that people have this view that it is their money and they are not letting it out unless they have to, and you really have to prove your right to it before you get a cent of it. Again, that is– —

Mr Tomlinson – I certainly hold the view that the Department attempts to get people benefits in line with their entitlements, with the exception of the Greek community at that period of time and with the exception of Karen Green, the school- leaver about whom I have also been critical of the role of the Department. But what I am saying is that the Department also, on page 99 of its annual report last year, stated that there were more unemployed people, but fewer people on unemployment benefit. It has achieved that simply by taking away by legislation people’s right to payment. It has lengthened the time that people have to wait. It has put in place a whole range of administrative processes which have limited the number of people who actually receive benefit.

CHAIRMAN – A qualifying period.

Ms McHUGH – When was that statement?

Mr Tomlinson – That statement is on page 99 of the Social Security annual report of last year.

CHAIRMAN – It is making the point that because of the qualifying period you will have people in periods of unemployment who would have got benefits before. At any one time they are there, they should be getting benefits if there was not that qualifying period. They will not get them now and, in fact, they may even get a job before they get them.

Mr Tomlinson – On page 70 of that same report you will see a graph which shows the Department of Social Security expenditure rising to 1983 and dropping since that time. That is not only because the number of unemployed has dropped but also because the number of people entitled to unemployment benefit has been restricted by administrative and legislative changes which have acted against the interests of the unemployed people.

Short adjournment

Mr Tomlinson – To go back to an issue which you raised and which we were discussing while you were out of the room, perhaps the Department should accept its obligation, if someone came in and established an income below a certain point, to find that person the appropriate payment rather than to make the statement, ‘No, you do not qualify for that benefit or that pension’. The suggestion was that perhaps a special benefit might do that and certainly a special benefit would catch a lot of people who are currently rejected, who may not know about it and who might take some time to get informed about that. There are some problems with the structure of the special benefit because it was set up as a discretionary payment.

CHAIRMAN – Yes.

Mr Tomlinson – As I understand the legislation and the number of rulings that have flown from that, it is not possible for the Department to say, ‘We will pay everybody whose income falls below that in these categories’; it has to make a specific determination in relation to an individual. However, the Department certainly could undertake to guarantee that it would not just send out a notice saying, ‘You do not qualify’, but would ask people to come in and would set aside officers who were across Education, Aboriginal Affairs, Veterans’ Affairs and Primary Industries and find the appropriate payment for them. Some department needs to do that – there needs to be some coordination.

CHAIRMAN – I think that at least in our minds there is a temptation to say, ‘Do we need the Department of Social Security to do these things? Should Aboriginal Affairs do them? Should Ethnic Affairs do them?’. Then you come to the logistics of just how you provide the service across Australia. Obviously, the one-stop shop is the most sensible approach, if we can do it and the DSS is trying to be that. I certainly take the point that there is probably merit in us looking at benefits being available through other departments. Are they?

Mr DUBOIS – Yes.

CHAIRMAN – I know the expertise resides in those departments, does it not? But, for instance, can the Department of Aboriginal Affairs authorise payment to anyone for anything through itself?

Mr Tomlinson – And Primary Industries, Education and Veterans’ Affairs.

Ma McHUGH – Education has Austudy.

CHAIRMAN – Yes, but did that not go over to DSS? Is it the Austudy authorities or is it just DSS that makes the payment? I thought Susan Ryan lost the payment process to Social Security last year, because there was a debate about it at one stage, was there not? I have just been informed that it is totally authorised by Education. In that case, there may be a case to say that the whole payment process ought to go through the one-stop shop and that ought to be resourced with more people with broader knowledge. I am just teasing that as an idea.

Ms McHUGH – I think it is a problem, is it not? It is like a guaranteed minimum income concept, if you like. It sounds as if it would be so much simpler and easier if it was just a one-stop shop, as you said, but there would be terrible complexities and perhaps unfairnesses within in. I remember when the Government was trying to solve the problem or to look at the idea of a common age-related allowance, with the best of ideological motives, to try to encourage people to stay at school, to try to avoid any discrepancies between those on unemployment benefit and those at school, to try to provide incentives and do away with disincentives, and so on. But it became extremely difficult. We used to sit down there with the bureaucrats from the Education Department and welfare department bureaucrats to come up with an idea, and then the bureaucrats would go away and work out how many winners there would be under this scheme and how many losers there would be under this scheme. It is extremely difficult, even with something that sounds as simple as a common age related allowance,

CHAIRMAN – I think there is a prospect too that, with the on-line benefits processing or whatever it is called that was described this morning, we ought to be able to come to a formula where, for instance, an interviewing officer could key in soma basic information like your name, your age and so on and to the question, ‘Why are you here?’ The answer would be, ‘Because I have been away from work sick and I have no money’. The program ought to be able to search out the options that fit a person like that.

Mr Tomlinson – I think the problem with that is that the on-line computer program being talked about simply has people’s history of claims of benefit, their addresses and details of dates of births and relationships they have been in.

CHAIRMAN – Is it a client file rather than a resource base?
Mr Tomlinson – Yes. There is nothing stopping the development of a resource base except 4,000 pages of manuals in Social Security and probably 3,000 in Education and Aboriginal Affairs. It is a huge problem but you could take the situation where a department said, ‘We will undertake to ensure that nobody who is below a level of income will not be found the appropriate benefit’. That would then mean that you could set up anywhere, Canberra or somewhere else, the people who were the experts in the field. The difficult cases could have all that referred to Canberra by telex or fax machines or whatever, and you could get answers back within minutes. The technology is there to do that.

CHAIRMAN – So you are saying that, compared with the number of people that come to the counter, there are not so many of these cases. I was thinking that you would have to have your counter staff familiar with all the benefits but you are saying no, we should work by the general rather than by the exception and treat the exceptions separately.

Mr Tomlinson – We just say that for those that do not qualify here—-

CHAIRMAN – We will find something,

Mr Tomlinson – We will find something for them, and those details get transferred to a central clearing place.

CHAIRMAN – Do you feel that that process and attitude would change the perception of the Department from the client’s point of view?

Mr Tomlinson – That would certainly be seen as a helpful action, instead of just getting a rejection notice saying, ‘You do not qualify for that benefit’. I would argue that if you have a determination to get somebody a payment, with the exception of 8omeone who is in an industrial dispute or someone who is in a relationship with a person who has income there is no person in Australia that I could not get a form of payment for.

Ms McHUGH – What about someone waiting for permanent residence status?

Mr DUBOIS – He gets a special benefit.

Ms McHUGH – We actually took that away from them last year.

Mr Tomlinson – Yes, you took that away last year.

Ms McHUGH – We did try to bring it back in certain circumstances, particularly for refugees who were left absolutely with nothing. There was absolutely nothing that could be got for people who, say, had been rejected and were appealing. We did amend it and we put in a safety clause because what was happening to certain individuals was just appalling. They are not citizens and they have no status of any kind; they have been rejected and they are on appeal. We took the special benefit from them but we have given it back in certain circumstances. I am just adding that as another case of someone who was specifically excluded. We had some very sad cases in our office of people who were literally destitute, and the only hope they had was from agencies like the Salvation Army or St Vincent de Paul or, in some cases, their own ethnic groupings if they had community organisations who could help. But they cannot help forever.

Mr Tomlinson – Yes, that is certainly another category.

Ms McHUGH – It is a difficult one to cover by a guaranteed minimum income, by the way. I too would support the idea of a guaranteed minimum income if it could be implemented fairly.

Mr Tomlinson – It is in the Labor Party platform.

Ms McHUGH – It is in the Labor Party platform to keep looking at it. This comes up every year and, as I say, many people have looked at it but there would be unfairnesses in it too. That may be an example.

CHAIRMAN – We came across this proof of identity problem. For instance, in Sydney it was raised with us in real examples at the counter. As Mr Volker said to us this morning, there are procedures. In the submission they have set out what are the relaxed procedures. But the real life tales to us of what those relaxed procedures mean, as interpreted at that particular Sydney office, were that very sensible identifiers or personal referees were discarded and people were sent around on wild- goose trails looking for JPs and people like that who did not know them. They could not establish themselves that a JP, a police constable or someone like that in authority could verify their identity. That is an example of a gap between the information and understanding at the senior levels and what actually happens on the ground.

Mr Tomlinson – I would argue that that is a problem which could be solved very simply by saying, ‘We will pay for a period of two weeks and we will work with you to determine those sorts of things’. The amount of money involved is insignificant and the feeling that a client gets from the Department is one of help. You need people to sit down with them. Aboriginal people lose their identification all the time. I have run around and, chased up people who could come in and say, ‘Yes, this is Freddy, I went to school with him’, and that sort of thing. I had a copy of the stud book, which was supposed to be destroyed. I had instructions to destroy it.

CHAIRMAN – What is the stud book?

Mr Tomlinson – That was what the Department of Territories or the Department of the Interior, whichever it was at the time, published on Aboriginal people born in the Territory. It was supposed to be destroyed. I did not destroy my copy because it was very useful. I could ask people whether they knew the skin name of someone and they would tell me. That clearly established that he was there at that time in that community, so I would sign declarations that I could identify him.

CHAIRMAN – So you are really saying that, with a will, there is a way to—-

Mr Tomlinson – With that other exception: people who are specifically excluded and who do not have permanent residency status, people who are in industrial disputes or people who live with someone who has an income.

CHAIRMAN – Having worked in the Department, do you have any comments about the view that was put to us on the problem of the counter staff versus assessment staff behind the walls? Do you feel that the move to reclassify the industry that is being negotiated to allow multi-skilling and more flexible use of people around an office is a move in the right direction?

Mr Tomlinson – Yes. The counter staff always felt hostile. They were the ones who got their heads punched in and some assessor could sit back there, sucking his cigarette and drinking his coffee, and say, ‘No, do not pay him until he produces so- and-so’. They were the poor bunnies who had to go out and say, ’You have to come back with this or that or the other thing’. For people who do not have a quid in their pocket and who have spent their time and effort getting to the Social Security office, it is not a matter of calling up a cab and saying, ‘Would you run me home? I seem to have forgotten my passport’. I think that puts tremendous pressure on the people at the interface. Certainly anything that gives them the right to make decisions and to break down that wall that hides that is a good thing.

It was the same sort of mentality that allowed people to apply electric shocks beyond a point which would kill people. There was an experiment in America in which a professor of psychology said to people, ‘These people have done terrible things and I want you to apply what you think is a fair shock’. They would turn the machine up beyond a point that would kill people because they could not see them. He did the same experiment with a glass petition and an actor pretending he was getting shocks. They stopped applying the shock a lot sooner when they could actually see the person they were supposed to be hurting.

CHAIRMAN – Do you feel that there is scope in the system for more use of the special benefit – that might be a way to describe it. You were saying that we should be paying someone an amount and continuing it subject to their coming back with that information, or something like that?

Mr Tomlinson – And helping them. If you look at the people who create the problems, they are usually the poorest people who lead the most disorganised lives. If you tell many of the people I know that they have two weeks to find their birth certificate, they will not find it. In two weeks time they will be in exactly the same crisis. But they have got to be helped, and for some people you may have to get it for them. Those sorts of things could be done. It would create a whole different atmosphere between them and us. It would be some sort of togetherness.

You said this morning that your Petrie office got only a few complaints. The point needs to be made that the level of competency and determinations should be determined not by the level of complaints, but by the level of accuracy. The Auditor- General’s reviews of the Department of Social Security reveal quite considerable discrepancies between what people should get and what people do get.

Mr JOHNS – But how does the Auditor-General test it, I wonder.

Mr Tomlinson – Originally, the Auditor-General’s Office was called in to look at the suggestion that the Department was paying too many dole bludgers who were actually working. It went in to do that and found that certainly some people continued to get benefits after they had started work. But then the people from Auditor-General’s looked at a whole range of claims to see how accurately people had got the benefits and the level of payments, and they found that there were some people who were not paid enough and some people who were paid too much. I think that is a more accurate measure of the level of determination competency. I do not blame the officers who made those mistakes because, again, it is very hard for them to get the information, let alone to get it across to people. As the waiting time has increased, people do not quite know when their payments are due to start or finish, and most of the things that the Auditor-General picked up were a matter of a week over or a week under.

Mr JOHNS – It was not a matter of someone getting the wrong benefit—-

Mr Tomlinson – I do not think the Auditor-General had the competence to determine that. He would have been going on written records. If you look at the determination of invalid pensions, the chances of getting an inadequate determination are extremely high because of the variations in number of grants in particular States, number of grants between different doctors, and the different appeal rates in different places. Alan Jordan summed it up when he said that there are people who get an invalid pension for a condition they deny having, but who get refused a pension for a condition they claim to have. It is just a mess. If the doctors who are given the right to make that determination cannot be given adequate information, then how does Joe Blow ever expect to know that. That is why you need some sort of office of last resort where claims from those people who do not have an income at least are picked up and sorted through to see whether or not they do have an entitlement to something. You might come to the conclusion that their only hope is the Smith Family or the Salvation Army, but at least the decision would be made by competent people.

When I rang the benefits control headquarters here in Canberra about a young woman who had been refused social security and asked whether her entitlement was through Austudy or the Department of Social Security, I was told that it was Austudy. I asked whether they were sure, because Austudy had said that it was through Social Security. The person I spoke to went to check with somebody else, and came back and said that I was quite right, and that it was Social Security. That was an expert in the field. How can the person at Tennant Creek, Port Augusta, Broome, Derby or Kununurra be expected to know those sorts of questions?

CHAIRMAN – Mr Tomlinson, I will ask you when we formally conclude to give the reference to the Secretary of that Auditor-General’s report – we are interested in tracking that down. On behalf of the Committee, I thank you for making the presentation to us and the submission, act for enlarging on it in the way you did. I suggest you might like to take up the discussion of the specific policy issues with various people, as suggested.

Resolved:

That, pursuant to the power conferred by paragraph 14 of the Committee’s resolution of appointment, this Subcommittee authorises the publication of the evidence given before it at public hearings this day.

Subcommittee adjourned at 4.17 p.m.

More Info

Faint praise for a chimera: Selectivity versus universalism in social policy

First published in the proceedings of the 12th National Conference on Unemployment Coffee, University of Newcastle 2005 http://www.usbig.net/papers/141CofFEE2005Tomlinson.pdf
Tomlinson, John (2005) In Wrightson, G (ed.) Creating a Culture of Full Employment incorporating the 7th Path to Full Employment Conference and 12th National Conference on Unemployment Proceedings, 8-9 December 2005, Australia, New South Wales, Newcastle.

also published in
New Community Quarterly, Vol 4 No.1 Autumn 2006, pp.54-60

This paper will investigate current Australian social policy directions by looking beneath the stated intent of the Government’s programs in order to reveal the purpose of what is a murky policy process. In recent years, the Federal Government has announced:

  • the “work till you drop” policy which is supposed to stave off the demographic tyranny of an aging Australia,
  • an expanded mutual obligation program which would, in Minister Mal Brough’s (2001) words, “flush out dole bludgers”,
  • compelling single parents to work instead of staying home to look after their children,
  • slashing the Community Development Employment Program (CDEP) combined with forcing young Aborigines to leave their remote homelands to get training (Karvelas 2005), and
  • plans to stamp out ‘malingerers’ from amongst the ranks of disability support pensioners.

This paper will interrogate the ideological, metaphorical, mythological and the present-day aspects of this Government’s social policy chimera. It will use the insights gained to argue for a Basic Income supplemented with a Job Guarantee.

Introducing the chimera

The Macquarie Dictionary (Delbridge, et al 1987) defines ‘chimera’ as “a mythological fire-breathing monster, commonly represented with a lion’s head, a goat’s body and a serpent’s tail. An alternative meaning proffered by the Macquarie is “a horrible or unreal creature of the imagination; a vain or idle fancy”. The Macquarie Thesaurus (Bernard 1986) offers a number of synonyms for ‘chimera’ in line with this latter Dictionary meaning; “mirage, myth….dream world, castle in the air, cloud-cuckoo-land (169 [1]).” As we review the way the Howard Government conducts social policy debates each of these meanings of chimera will become apparent. Although the chimera in its Howard Government incarnation still appears as a fire-breathing monster to poorer citizens, it more closely resembles one with the hide of a rhinoceros, the arse of a hippopotamus and the head of a gnat.

Changing social policy

In the early 1960s following a demonstration organised in a vain attempt to prevent the deportation of Chinese chef, Willy Wong who had overstayed his visa by 18 years, I was part of a delegation which went to speak with Alexander Downer’s father (who was Minister for Immigration in the Menzies Liberal-Country Party Government at the time ). Neither our placards declaring “Two Wongs don’t make a White” or asking “What did Willy do Wong?” nor our ardent advocacy suggesting Mr Wong be allowed to stay in Australia impressed the older Downer. It was clear that changing social policies as ingrained as the White Australia Policy was no easy task.

Since that time I have been involved in many attempts to change social policy in relation to issues as diverse as the rights of Indigenous peoples, freedom for East Timor, fair treatment of unemployed people, attempting to stop wars, improving the generosity or scope of social security, improvements in community welfare services, justice for refugees, promoting civil liberties and safeguarding prisoners’ rights. The successes along the way have been few and far between. I have worked inside government, in community services, with unemployed workers unions and in less structured ways. Receiving a firm but polite rejection from a minister is less painful than being battened unconscious by an overzealous Queensland policeman, but such setbacks mean a decision has to be made to keep fighting or accept defeat. No social change process I have been involved in has been simple or straightforward. Getting social change always involves a lot of hard work.

Each campaign I’ve been associated with has involved researching, writing, marketing, engendering support and advocacy. Demonstrations, street marches and sometimes violent confrontation with the police were frequently part of the action. Every time a campaign starts to generate considerable public interest, government spin doctors are brought in to deflect the public’s interest onto some other priority of the government. Previously, many ministers were sufficiently competent at spin doctoring to do it themselves.

The changing of policy direction through spin doctoring is becoming more professionalised. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair had Alastair Campbell, Howard had Lynton Crosby and Mark Textor and some unkind observers have suggested Karl Rove is Bush’s brain. The art of good spin doctoring is to show politicians how to pull some basic levers of human emotions. A good example of this, in the wake of the destruction of the World Towers and the arrival of the Tampa with its human cargo of asylum seekers, was John Howard’s speech at the launch of the Liberal Party’s 2001 Campaign when he said “we will defend our borders and we’ll decide who comes to this country” This appeal to racism and its associated xenophobia worked a treat.

There have been two periods in Australia when progressive ideas flourished and when gaining government acceptance of progressive social policy initiatives was assisted by prevailing political spin. They were the mid to late 1940s with the imagery of Chifley’s “Light on the hill” and following Gough Whitlam’s “It’s Time” election victory. The first period saw the Labor Government commit to a full employment policy (Commonwealth of Australia 1945) and to consolidate and improve social security provisions (Kewley 1973). The second period witnessed a revitalisation of many social welfare policies (Kewley 1980, Tulloch 1979, Tomlinson 1978).

But, for most of Australia’s history, the primal levers (available to be pulled) have advantaged the forces of reaction because they are connected to the issues which divide citizens of this nation, namely: race, class, locality, gender, age and the way we treat people with a disability. The forces of reaction don’t appeal to our altruism, our finer aspirations or our hope. They appeal to egotism, self-interest, our disillusion and our desperation (Campbell 1999).

The dog whistle disguises the policy chimera

Campaigns against the introduction of progressive policies are often run at a subliminal level (Emerson 2003) and it is important for progressives to name what is happening in unambiguous terms. When Howard tried to run his anti-Asian immigration line in 1986, Labor leaders named him a racist and he failed. Spin doctors rely heavily upon subliminal or half hidden messages. This is why it is sometimes referred to as dog whistling (Emerson 2003). It is analogous to using a whistle pitched at a level above human hearing but capable of being heard by dogs rounding up cattle or sheep. It takes the form of a political leader saying something mildly critical of asylum seekers or some other out-group which is heard by racist followers as justifying racial abuse or even attacks. This was very much a part of the Conservative anti-immigration campaign during the 2005 British election. Where the ‘nudge, nudge, wink, wink’ was “Are you hearing what I’m hearing?”

The art of wedge politics relies not on direct statement but on suggestion (Wilson and Turnbull 2001). Howard did this brilliantly when setting out to introduce ‘work for the dole’ and other ‘mutual obligations’. At first, such obligations only applied to young unemployed people and it was suggested young people had yet to develop a work ethic. This allowed Howard to present himself as helping the young by forcing them to do what was in their best interests. Such mystification is a common aspect of the rationalisations for participation income and ‘workfare” policies (See Mead 1997, 1986). It was not long before other ministers were talking about unemployed people being “job snobs’ (Abbott 1999) or “flushing out dole bludgers” (Brough 2001). Within a couple of years such ‘obligations’ were extended to nearly every Centrelink recipient with the exception of age pensioners. Age pensioners and those approaching pensionable age have been put on notice that if they don’t ‘work till they drop’, paying their pension might become unaffordable (Ryan 2005).

The latest groups to be enmeshed in the ‘mutual obligation’ quagmire, as of July 2006, will be applicants for the disability support pension capable of working 15 hours per week and single parents whose youngest child is at school (Perry 2005, Tomlinson 2005[a], Galvin 2004).

Corrosive language feeds the chimera

The Howard Government’s assault on welfare provision has depended on selecting target populations which can be prised off the working class and held up to critical scrutiny. It used to be that Liberal and Labor ministers would claim that the aim of the welfare system was to assist “everyone in need”. This was too much for the current leadership and it is now common to hear ministers saying that welfare efforts should be directed at those who are “genuine”.

The Howard Government’s social policy has sought to define “the genuine”, as in the sense of “the genuinely needy” or those who are “genuinely looking for work” or “those who have a genuine disability” more narrowly. This process has developed such a momentum that “the genuine” are about to become an endangered species facing imminent extinction. Until the 2005/6 Budget, a person with a disabling condition who is unable to work 30 hours a week could apply for a disability support pension. Presumably such a person was “genuinely disabled”. As of July 2006 a person capable of working 15 hours (but fewer than 30 hours) per week will be placed on the Newstart unemployment benefit (Perry 2005, ABC News Online 2005) By making it harder for people with a disability to qualify for a disability support pension, the number of people whom Coalition ministers consider to “have a genuine disability” is dramatically decreased.

Likewise for most of the period from 1945-1996 those who were unemployed, registered with the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) and who passed the work test were regarded as “genuinely unemployed”. Nowadays, there are so many obligations, reporting requirements and restrictions placed upon applicants for unemployment benefit that the process has become a nightmare. The Howard Government’s policies in relation to forcing people into work have all the sophistication of moral panic induced by self-delusional wedge politics. The searing breath of the social policy chimera vaporises the last traces of humanity in social policy through the imposition of such onerous obligations (Goodin 2001, Kinnear 2000, and Schooneveldt 2004). The Brotherhood of St Laurence and St Vincent de Paul 2003 report entitled Much Obliged asserts that people who become long-term unemployed have so much of their time taken up just meeting the obligations imposed on them by the Government that they don’t have time to find work: the report concludes the mutual obligation regime “is failing the most disadvantaged job seekers. Overall the system operates…not as ‘welfare to work’ but ‘welfare as work’” (Ziguras, Dufty and Considine 2003, p.43).

The Government’s playing with the meaning of words is somewhat akin to joining Alice in Wonderland:

`Do you mean that you think you can find out the answer to it?’ said the March Hare. `Exactly so,’ said Alice. `Then you should say what you mean,’ the March Hare went on. `I do,’ Alice hastily replied; `at least–at least I mean what I say–that’s the same thing, you know.’ `Not the same thing a bit!’ said the Hatter. `You might just as well say that “I see what I eat” is the same thing as “I eat what I see”!’ `You might just as well say,’ added the March Hare, `that “I like what I get” is the same thing as “I get what I like”!’ `You might just as well say,’ added the Dormouse, who seemed to be talking in his sleep, `that “I breathe when I sleep” is the same thing as “I sleep when I breathe”! (Carroll 2005 online).

Standing (2002 Chapter 4) investigates this distortion of meaning phenomena which he contends exacerbates what he calls the “Eight Crises of Social Protection”: fiscal, moral, legitimisation, social justice, social dumping, governance, work and linguistics. He says:

The safety net is a candidate for the most influential euphemism of the turn of the century. Who could be against a safety net to catch all those poor victims falling off the globalising economy? The reality is that it is a disembedded notion that is actually about giving conditional crumbs to the poor (p.104).

Earlier he had noted:

Low take-up rates are unlikely to be random, and are likely to be lowest for those most in need or least capable of operating the system…In spite of all the evidence about the failure to reach those in need, the march to means-tested selectivity has continued – a triumph of euphemism over fact. Low take-up and the reasons for it have created immoral hazards for policymakers and for those wedded to selectivity (p. 98).

The essential duty of progressive policy analysts is to delve beneath, unpack, critique or deconstruct such euphemisms so that they are in a position to expose to public gaze the actual workings of the policy mirage. This is necessary in order to outline the impact the social security system has upon those who have no alternative but to avail themselves of whatever assistance is offered. For progressives the search for a more in-depth understanding of the workings of the social welfare system is not just a search for ‘truth’, rather it is to assist in the elaboration of critique in order to facilitate change to more humane approaches towards the least affluent (Galper 1975, Chapter 5). One of the first tasks in developing progressive change is to expose the contradictions between what governments claim to be the aims (and effect of their policies) and what are the actual outcomes. This part of the process is designed to elaborate and work towards alternative agendas and to demystify this vain and fanciful chimera.

The real agenda of Australian unemployment policies: The art of deflection

CofFEE (2005) asserts that there are presently more than three and a half unemployed people for every job vacancy and that since 1974 the average of that ratio is eleven available workers for each available job. Were the Government to admit these figures it would have some difficulty arguing the need for the range of compulsions it foists on jobseekers. There is not enough work and that situation is the fault of government and industry – not unemployed people. Therefore, if we must compel and abuse sections of Australian society, it is to government and industry we should turn our attention.

By seeking to make unemployed people responsible for unemployment, the Federal Government may well be aiming to deflect attention away from those with the capacity to create sufficient work for all the available labour; namely: government and industry. Hutchinson (2005) claims that when a government refuses to install “a culture of full employment” this amounts to “a failure of governance”. In 1945, the Labor Government accepted its responsibility to work with industry to create full employment and governments of both political persuasions did just that for 30 years.

The Howard Government has a very different agenda from the 1945-75 period. It has successfully shifted the responsibility from the government on to individuals and families in many areas of life (Tomlinson 2003). Some of the ways in which responsibility is deflected on to individuals and families are:

  •  ‘work till you drop’ policies for older Australians (Ryan 2005),
  •  ‘work for the dole’ for unemployed people,
  • the proposed industrial relations changes (criticised by the Seventeen academics 2005, see also Kelsey 1995),
  • work requirements for people who would in the past have been considered to have a disability or parenting responsibilities (Perry 2005, Tomlinson 2005[a], Galvin 2004, ABC News Online 2005),
  • unconscionable breaching regimes of social security recipients (Schooneveldt 2004, Kinnear 2000, Goodin 2001),
  • increased obligations imposed on Indigenous Australians engaged in CDEP schemes in rural and remote areas (Karvelas 2005, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [DEWR] 2005),
  • the suggestion that Indigenous families could have their social security withheld if they don’t comply with government dictates (contra Debelle 2005, Gordon 2005, Tomlinson 2005[b]), and
  • the forcing of young Indigenous CDEP workers from remote communities to leave their communities to get western training in cities (DEWR 2005, p. 11).

It is useful to compare the Howard Government’s preferential treatment of affluent and non-affluent Australians. Perhaps the most easily comparable examples of this are provided by the generous tax concessions provided to wealthy Australians when the GST was introduced and in the 2005/6 Budget. As Graham Ring (2005) notes: “The gravy train hath many carriages”. But the most obvious example of the differential treatment between rich and poor in Australia is in relation to the social indicators which compare Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare [AIHW] 2005, Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision 2005, Tomlinson 2005[b]).

Seventeen academics (July 2005) who have specialised in labour market research reviewed the Howard Governments proposed Industrial Relations policies. They concluded:

On all the evidence available … there is simply no reason to believe that the federal government’s proposed changes will do anything to address these complex economic and social problems. The Government’s proposals will:

  • Undermine people’s rights at work
  • Deliver a flexibility that in most cases is one way, favouring employers
  • Do – at best – nothing to address work-family issues
  • Have no direct impact on productivity
  • Disadvantage the individuals and groups already most marginalised in Australian society.

The proposed industrial relations program of the Howard Government which the analysis of the Seventeen academics and my reflections upon “the individuals and groups already most marginalised in Australian society” suggest an agenda which involves coercing more people into the labour market, staying longer at work, decreasing the conditions of employment and conscripting the reserve army of labour to accept precarious, casual and part time work or into workfare type programs in an effort to ensure the quiescence of organised labour. At the very time when a greater percentage of the population is now part of the labour market and as a nation Australia is more affluent than at any previous time of our history (Halton 2004), the Government is demanding that all (even those most marginal to productive process) demonstrate their economic utility and self-sufficiency. This is the real agenda of the Howard Government social policy chimera.

It is worth noting that when the Productivity Commission (2005, Chapters 1 & 8) reported on the Economic Implications of an Ageing Australia they did not envision that substantial economic productivity would be derived from getting people to work past 65 or forcing more disability support pensioners back into the workforce. They foresaw far greater productivity gains emanating from innovation and technological advances. Clearly, the economic advantage the Liberal Coalition Government is seeking will come from slashing the generosity of income support provisions. The self-serving presumptions of the Government is that either such reductions in the social wage can be imposed without inflicting difficulties on the “genuinely needy” or that those who will have their social security reduced or removed have no entitlement to assistance. No evidence has been provided which would support either assumption. Perhaps in the cloud-cuckoo-land of Australian social policy debates evidence is no longer necessary in the social policy process.

An alternative agenda to the Howard Government’s social policy chimera

It would be possible to implement many alternatives to the mean-spirited, socially divisive, downward envy generating and conflictual policies of the present Federal Government. I will set out just one possibility and explain why this scenario is my preferred choice. At a philosophical level: egalitarian, universal, liberating and enabling social policies are more likely to create a form of society which inspired Chifley’s “Light on the hill” and Whitlam’s “It’s Time” victory. Such policies are likely to “Build a land that’s fit for heroes and you and me as well” (Song writer Eric Bogle). Such policies are likely to enhance social justice and to improve the quality of life of ordinary Australians. Those Australians living at the margins would, for the first time, be assured of sufficient income to live their lives in austere dignity.

We could implement a universal Basic Income, set at a rate above the Henderson poverty line, supplemented by a Job Guarantee (for all who wish to work). The universal Basic Income would need to be set slightly above the single age pension rate (Tomlinson 2005[c]). In the initial phase, children living at home under 16 years of age might need to be paid a lower rate. It would be paid to each person as an individual. The Basic Income would be a right of citizenship (or permanent residence) it would have no means or assets test. It would not attract income tax but all other income would be taxed. Such a proposal is quite different from the system of participation income and targeted social security which form the base of the Howard Government social policy chimera.

I do not advocate a Job Guarantee which compels anyone to work on pain of having their right to income support withheld because I believe that the overwhelming percentage of both employed and unemployed people want to work (Widerquist 2002, Tomlinson 2003, Standing 2002). Raventós (2005) portrays the argument in these terms:

The objection that “people would not work with a BI” seems to have a special quality: once launched, it is taken as self-evident. This is a mistake which, albeit obvious, is serious. We know that in our societies overtime work is commonplace and, by definition represents extra hours over and above those specified for the working day. Neither is it any secret that some of the biggest banks and companies offer (as they say) early retirement to people of just over fifty and in perfect physical and mental health. And we also know that many of these people, with some limitations imposed by the law, take on other jobs shortly after their early retirement. In other words, we have overtime work performed by people who already have a salary, and there are people who start working again immediately after early retirement (in all cases, with retirement benefits that are significantly superior to those appearing in the different BI proposals). Nonetheless, the assumption still persists that, with a BI, “nobody would work”. A strange way of understanding the matter. Is it not closer to prejudice than reasoning? Moreover, studies presented at the last BIEN congress (September, 2004) which followed up, for over a year, people in the EU that had received a salary-for-life prize (a much more generous amount than the BI proposed in the studies I shall mention below), have shown that few of them left their jobs; and those who did took jobs that were more compatible with their preferences or abilities. With a BI people would stop working? The evidence makes this look like bigotry (p.2).

A universal Basic Income has no work requirement. Whereas, a Job Guarantee scheme’s minimum demand is that applicants must be willing to do the work on offer under the program (Mitchell and Watts 2003). Since Milner (1920), many Basic Income advocates have held that the populace, with few exceptions, wants to make a contribution to society. This is not the same thing as arguing that all people are equally productive – clearly people have different productive capacities.

My argument goes directly to intent. I argue that in a society which claims to treat people fairly, if people are intent on making a contribution to the extent of their abilities, it is wrong to punish them simply because they fail to be as productive as the most productive worker. In much production speed may be important but in others it is insignificant. The song written in the shortest time may not top the charts. The most speedily written paper at this conference might not make the most useful contribution. Some of the most important contributions to human advancement have taken years to evolve to the point of discovery or implementation. For example, the idea of Basic Income has been evolving for over two centuries (Cunliffe and Erreygers 2004, Polanyi 1945, Part 2). In many places the quicker the plains are cleared and irrigated, the sooner salination makes the land unproductive. The list of such examples is potentially endless.

Since 1973, I have consistently suggested that Australia’s system of targeted, selective, means tested social security should be replaced by a universal income guarantee and I have been critical of the way that clients of social security are prevented from making a contribution to the economy and society in ways which they find appropriate. A Basic Income, particularly if it were supplemented with a Job Guarantee (for all who wish to work), would enhance our concept of citizenship, provide security for many presently denied it and would, as well as reinvigorating the social fabric of this nation, remove many of the impediments to greater productivity (Van Parijs 1997, 1992, Tomlinson, Harrington and Schooneveldt 2004). There is no need for the compulsion and coercion of the participation income and selective social security mirage of the Howard Government.

I take the point made by some Job Guarantee proponents that their first aim is to ensure work for all who want it, paid at award rates and their wish to keep their schemes as cheap and productive as possible is to encourage government support for a Job Guarantee. I accept their assurances, given at many CofFEE conferences, that they envisage that those who aren’t accepted as being suitable for Job Guarantee schemes would be able to apply for targeted social welfare schemes (Mitchell and Watts 2003).

This means that any such Job Guarantee scheme will be accompanied by inordinate discretion. Some bureaucrat will decide who is suitable, amongst the available Job Guarantee participants. That bureaucrat or some other will then determine who amongst the rejected Job Guarantee applicants is worthy to receive the targeted social welfare payment and who is to be denied any assistance. It has to be acknowledged that the Howard Government has been able to remove many people in desperate financial need from the social security system. An interesting session of the Basic Income Earth Network Congress in 2004 entitled Basic Income and the Right to Work hotly debated many of the issues pertinent to the present discussion (See Noguera 2004, Standing 2004, Watts and Mitchell 2004, Harvey 2004).

A Job Guarantee would pay for some of the necessary functions and activities (particularly in the areas of environmental, educational and community services) which are currently unremunerated. This would of itself have some good outcomes. If a Basic Income alone was in place some of these civic duties might not be carried out, or they may not be done in the manner prescribed by the architects of the Job Guarantee because, once a Basic Income was in place, people could not be conscripted to do such work. People would need to be convinced that whatever work is available is worth doing and is sufficiently well remunerated. Those who undertake the Job Guarantee could, of course, be directed to do the work designated by their superiors. Essentially what a Basic Income brings to the workplace is greater industrial democracy because a Basic Income provides the worker with the opportunity to opt out in the knowledge that although their income will reduce it will remain above the poverty line.

People willing to engage in what ever work was available under a Job Guarantee would be provided with a secure income. Those who were not willing to engage in that work or who were judged by the Job Guarantee managers to be unsuitable would not be assured of a secure income. Mitchell and Watts (2003 p. 188) state “the State would be evading its social responsibilities by providing an unconditional Basic Income or other form of benefit.” Basic Income advocates argue that applying such conditions to income support erodes freedom and that there is an ever present danger that some people will be unjustly excluded in any conditional scheme (Standing 2002, Boston, Danziel and St. John 1998).

Professor Bill Mitchell and others have suggested that they see nothing incompatible with a Job Guarantee supplemented by a “living income” for those unable to work (Mitchell and Watts 2003 pp.187-188, Watts and Mitchell 2004). At one level, it may seem a chicken and egg semantic debate as to whether the introduced scheme was a Job Guarantee scheme supplemented by a Basic Income or a universal Basic Income supplemented by a Job Guarantee (for all who want to work) but I think it is more important than that.

My central concern is that if the Basic Income is not the first of equals then the Job Guarantee becomes the driving ideological force. This leaves the labourist / production ideological position in the box seat (Standing 2002). We have witnessed how the Howard Government has used the ideology of the work ethic to justify the exclusion of some very poor Australians from the social security system. The ideological message can be distorted by the suggestion that work has to be compelled if the central focus is on work and the Job Guarantee. Whereas, with a Basic Income, the emphasis is on income security provided as a right of citizenship then quite different ideological forces come into play. Thomas Paine’s Agrarian Justice published in 1797 gave birth to the idea that the right to a Basic Income stems from our right to use the commons (Reprinted in Cunliffe and Erreygers 2004, pp.3-16). The ideological emphasis which a Basic Income brings is that of an inclusive citizenship: the duty that each of us owes to all and the equally pressing duty that all of us owe to each.

Conclusion

I would prefer to see a universal Basic Income supplemented by a Job Guarantee (for all who want to work) introduced over a Job Guarantee supplemented by a Basic Income. However, either of these schemes would be a huge advance on the current social policy chimera of the Howard Government which has eroded our income support and industrial relations systems to such an extent that Professor Castles (2001, 2004) no longer describes Australia as having a “Workers’ welfare state”.

Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge Penny Harrington’s valued editorial assistance and to thank the anonymous reviewer for helpful suggestions.
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Farewell to alms

Paper given at the Beyond Despondency – The UBI Alternative to the Welfare Meltdown Conference, Wellington,  New Zealand  26-28 March, 1998

Prologue

Whether we are speaking about a Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI), a Guaranteed Adequate Income (GAI), a Negative Income Tax (NIT), a Universal Basic Income (UBI) or any other form of social payment which is available to all citizens, and hopefully all permanent residents, we are conceiving of a system of income support which in Lady Rhys-Williams'(1965, p. 163) words puts a floor below which income cannot fall without installing a ceiling beyond which income cannot rise.  In all these  schemes there is a universal right to apply for payment.  Under a UBI there would be a universal payment; whereas with GMI, GAI and NIT the amount of payment received by the individual would be in inverse relation to other income (and in some cases assets) received by that individual.  Some income guarantee schemes use the family, others the individual as the unit of income.

Much of the literature on the subject of income support has compared income guarantees with targeted social welfare payments.  There is a plethora of articles which have dealt with rights/obligations, stigma/or lack of it, work incentive/or work discouragement. Some writers (Gorz 1985, pp.40-47, Gorz and Jordan cited in Van Parijs,1992 p.24) have argued that a fixed number of hours work per lifetime should provide an entitlement to UBI.  Pixley (1993) opposed UBI because it would not ensure people were encouraged to work.  Cass (1995) was more circumspect in her opposition to UBI; she does not insist that income support be dependent upon peoples preparedness to seek employment;  she argues that eligibility rules should insist people become part of the ‘active society’.  Her ‘active society’ incorporates a wider definition of ‘making a productive contribution to the economy’ by engaging in education, training, employment or community service.

Robert Goodin (1992) has argued for a non-presumptuous income guarantee, that is one which requires no specific contribution by the individual.  Such a proposal is opposed by those on the right of the political spectrum because they claim it creates “dutiless rights”(Green 1996,  Selbourne 1994).  Such claims can be viewed as part of a citizenship debate or alternatively as integral to the worst of the welfare worthiness diatribe- either way such claims amount to an enunciation of the writer’s fear that somehow some ‘bludger’ is going to get something for nothing.  Those on the right are content to keep in place privileged windfalls as a result of birth, good luck and innate intelligence.  One of the personal features those on the right would include, as a basis for disproportionate rewards, is hard work (despite the fact that no poor person can get rich by working hard).

On the left there is a tendency to over glorify the importance of contribution / participation [in the current jargon of the faded pink ‘expanding the social capital’ (Cox 1995, Putnam 1993)].  Exactly how enforced participation in the ‘active society’, compelled employment, or meeting some vaguely defined ‘societal obligations’ in return for receiving a basic income improves the functioning of society is unclear.  Experiencing imposition / repression is unlikely to provide the best foundation from which to develop truly liberated citizens.

I share with Goodin (1992), Watts (1995) and several NZ UBI writers (Ritchie 1997, Bradford 1997, Rankin 1997, Goldsmith 1997) the desire to see introduced a universal income guarantee sufficient to sustain all individuals, at least in modest dignity, without attaching obligations to such a payments.  If, as I believe, people want to contribute to the welfare of the collective and through that participation they benefit, the task then becomes one of  removing obstacles to participation rather than compelling people to participate through fear of starvation.  For instance, the provision of affordable child care would allow many with young children the opportunity to participate more broadly in community life.

For too long, many of us in ‘human services’ have suspended our critique of the welfare state as we sought to defend it against the onslaught new right econocrats.  We need to resurrect and intensify our critique of the welfare state for its unnecessary complexity, targeting, constant repressive desire to compel, its ubiquitous search for the unworthy, its marginalisation/delegitimisation of those it calls worthy, and its failure to lift those it ‘assists’ out of poverty.  We need to discover a way to ensure the tax and income support systems receive “from each according to ability” and deliver “to each according to need.”

We need to look beyond the straightjacket of the market economists, reject the parsimony of the welfare state and confront the need for an adequate universal income guarantee not just to escape poverty but to enhance liberty and mutuality as we move towards solidarity and equality.

As those who have been involved in efforts to introduce universal income programs know there are no sound economic affordability arguments against their introduction but there are some major ideological obstacles which we need to surmount.  In this paper I discuss many of these obstacles which we encounter on both sides of the Tasman Sea.

Economic fundamentalism and politicians use of dependency rhetoric

There are some revealing linkages between politicians’ promotion of ‘need’ as the basis of receipt of income support from the state and their adoption of the jargon of economic fundamentalists.  For without the mystifying nomenclature of ‘self provision’, ‘user pays’ and ‘dependency’ to deflect the public’s attention from the real social wage issues, politicians might have to explain why they are not prepared to introduce a universal basic income.  The alleged ‘necessity’ of economic austerity has led to welfare cutbacks, targeting of benefits and redistribution of income of people from lower socio-economic levels to the rich.  

Since the days of the British Poor Law administrations some people without income have been refused help on the basis that “they were not worthy to gather up the crumbs from the rich man’s table”.  The modern welfare state’s reliance upon targeting (either in terms of the categories of those entitled to receive assistance or the eligibility rules which apply within a category) is simply a ploy to limit social welfare expenditure in a manner not dissimilar to the way ‘less eligibility’ has been employed since the 18 th century.

Hand in hand with the assault by economic fundamentalists on public provision of income support and services Australian and New Zealand Governments have promoted the expansion of privatised welfare.  They argue that private superannuation, private unemployment or sickness insurance and private medical insurance lifts an ‘intolerable burden’ from the shoulders of the tax payer.  Governments and economic fundamentalists in these two countries claim that those citizens who pay for such private programs are ‘self providers’ implying that those who don’t privately insure are bludgers on the system.  Many writers (ACTCOSS 1991, Pha 1992, Tomlinson 1995, McAulay 1993, Kelsey 1995) have pointed out these alleged ‘self providers’ receive massive poorly disguised tax-payer funded subsidies.  Such publicly funded handouts go, in the main, to those who least require assistance from the state.

A sleight of hand

Goebles, the head of Hitler’s propaganda machine, understood that it was very much easier to get people to believe the big lie than to accept smaller distortions of the truth. People entering debates tend to accept the context of debates with or without acknowledging that such contexts are set by powerful figures. They then bring their reasoning to bear on the elements of the debate rather than defiantly questioning the foundation on which the debate rests.  Marxists (Marx and Engles 1971, p.31) understand that prevailing ideologies cloud debate in the sense that powerful ideologies lead people to rule some ideas in and others out.  Gramsci (1977, pp. 53,170-172, 185-189, and 1978, pp. 233-235, 255-266, 443-459) developed the concept of ‘hegemony’ to explain the mechanisms by which the powerful ideas of the day constrain the limits of debate.  He suggested that hegemonic ideas tend to be accepted unquestionably whilst simultaneously making other ideas verboten.  Once we accept the earth is flat we know that if you go too far you’ll fall off the edge.

Building the welfare state

During the first 50 years of this century there were two world wars, a world wide depression, major technological changes and somehow in the midst of all this the perquisites of the existing elites came under challenge. Keynesian economics emerged and we witnessed the development of the modern welfare state.  Some socialists argued that the welfare state was the price of peace which the working class had extracted (Mandell 1975 ); others argued that the welfare state was a new form of containment (Cloward and Piven 1974, Piven & Cloward 1971, Galper 1975); whilst still others suggested it was both simultaneously (Gough 1979, p. 55, Miliband 1973, p. 242, Tomlinson 1989, Ch. 5 & 8).

In Australia, Britain and New Zealand the establishment of the presence of ‘need’ was the basis on which goods, services or cash were provided to the poor thus maintaining an intimate connection with the ideologies which informed the practices of the British Poor Law administrations.  Notions of worthiness and less eligibility pervade the administration of welfare.  Since the first decade of this century, there have been attempts in Australia to define categories of eligibility, for example: aged, widowhood and invalidity.  A person who could establish they met such criteria could (provided they were in impecunious circumstances) receive a payment. Yet to receive an age pension a claimant who met these other conditions still had to show that they were of ‘good moral character’.  Even as late as the early 1960s, when I worked for the Department of Social Services, alcoholics were refused an invalid pension on the grounds that they “..were not worthy to receive a pension.”  Married women with children who had “..been deserted without just cause” for 6 months provided they had taken and enforced maintenance action against their husband were eligible for a widows pension. But married men with dependent children in similar circumstances were not entitled to payment.  Nor were women with dependent children who had not received the nuptial blessing from a priest or registry official.

By the late 1970s all lone parents with dependent children who could establish they were not “..living in a bona fide domestic relationship” were eligible for support from the Federal Government.  Efforts to remove tests of virtuousness in relation to social security payments reached their zenith in the first term of the term of the Hawke Labor Government. This loosening of the charity belt had been a gradual process pursued by Labor and Liberal administrations from Chifley to Fraser.  The Fraser Government introduced for families a form of guaranteed minimum income the (Family Income Supplement) which the incoming Hawke Government expanded under the name of the Family Allowance Supplement.  We had finally reached a point in Australian social welfare where for families the absence of income was of itself sufficient grounds to justify the state providing income support.  Income security for families based simply on the absence of other income rather than some moral imperative had arrived on our shores.

The assessing of eligibility for unemployment benefits stood out as the area which retained all the old fears.  In order to receive a payment the applicant had to pass a work test establishing fitness, ability and readiness to work.  Applicants who were involved or whose union was involved in industrial disputation were rejected (Barwick 1997).  Despite the evidence that there were insufficient jobs available for all who wanted work governments behaved as if they believed there were thousands of ‘dole bludgers’ out there somewhere and they had to be found.  Every Australian government since federation has shared with British Poor Law administrators of earlier centuries an overwhelming fetish to compel the unemployed to work.

Despite the way it treated the unemployed, the Australian welfare state, though inordinately complex, had by the 1980s become quite comprehensive in coverage.  Ministers for Social Security repeatedly claimed that ‘no one in need through no fault of their own’ would be refused assistance.  This claim, of course, was exaggerated (Raper 1995).

The economic u-turn

In most developed English speaking countries the 1970s and 80s saw Keynesian economics gradually delegitimised by a resurrected form of economic fundamentalism.  After its emergence from the Economics Department of the University of Chicago, the economic ideology of the greedy took many names supply side economics, monetarism, economic liberalism and in Australian circles economic rationalism.  It was the ideological basis for the greedy to win back the gains made by the needy.

A central thrust of this ideology was that if the goal was increased productivity, then the rich had to be rewarded whilst the poor (read lazy) had to be coerced.  Altruism, cooperation, humanity, solidarity, empathy, equality, mutuality were derided and replaced with competition, survival of the fittest , downsizing, and market efficiency.  Welfare was an anathema to these free wheeling economic libertarians.  Whilst writers such as Castles (1985) had pointed out that, in Australia, we had established a ‘workers welfare state’ – the economic fundamentalists wanted the existing benefit system demolished, suggesting the poor would benefit in the long run as a result of a “trickle down effect”.  They ignored the fact that the poor still needed to eat every day.  That without other assistance a rising tide only lifts ships which are capable of floating and waders who are stuck in the mud, drown.  These econocrats were indifferent to the experience of every incontinent person who could have told them “their thighs are always wetter than their feet”.  As Jane Kelsey (1995) in New Zealand, Richard Titmuss (1976, pp.140-141) and Paul Omerod (1994) in Britain have shown that the rising tide of economic growth does not assist many confined to the lower levels of the labour market nor without other interventions does it assist those excluded from the labour market (Langmore & Quiggan 1994).  Only government apologists and economic fundamentalist ideologues ever believed that economic growth eventually assists everyone.  The most succinct critique was the slogan “Economic rationalism does not trickle down – it sux.”

The claims of the economic fundamentalists to have the answer to each and every question were extreme.  Not only were they experts in economic matters; but taking a lead from Adam Smith their intellectual mentor – whose writings they selectively read (Agyrous  & Stilwell 1996) – they claimed expertise on moral matters.  Their proposed solutions included leaving all questions to the unfettered ‘morality’ of the market.

Liberty became, for the economic fundamentalists, an extreme libertarian freedom. The individual was freed from all constraint by the collective so as to be able to exploit whoever and whatever for ever – subject only to market forces.  Gone was any concept of liberty as the freedom to achieve within parameters set by society and ecology.  Gone also was the concept that people, without adequate means of support, could have their security and liberty assisted as a result of receiving income support from the state.

The debate initiated by the economic fundamentalists raged on throughout the 1980s and 90s as if discussion of the need to remove the five giant obstacles:

  • want,
  • disease,
  • ignorance,
  • squalor, and
  • ignorance

which underpinned the construction of the modern British welfare state (Marshall 1979, p.84) had never occurred.

The interplay between economic fundamentalism and welfare

By the end of the 1980s, as Michael Pusey (1991) demonstrated, the senior ranks of the Australian Public Service had become dominated by right wing econocrats who spoke fluent managerialism.  They set about installing regimes where the user pays mentality, downsizing, and targeting welfare benefits became the order of the day.  Driven by a fear that someone might get something they were not entitled to or that a welfare recipient might refuse a job as a blood taster in an AIDS clinic they substantially increased the surveillance of the unemployed and lone parents.  Egged on by the then Minister for Social Security, Brian Howe, eligibility for payment of unemployment benefit was restricted.  In 1986, though more people were unemployed than in the previous year fewer applicants received unemployment benefits due to changes in eligibility conditions (Social Security 1987, p.99).

In a return to the 1960s, lone parents applying for income support were compelled to take and enforce maintenance payments against non-custodial parents.  Similar schemes prevailed in Britain and New Zealand.  The Tax Office became the collector of maintenance payments.  As governments in Britain, New Zealand and Australia found they had not the wit to find or create sufficient jobs for all who wanted work nor to share the available work amongst the entire labour force, they increased their attacks on the unemployed.  Governments are so determined to compel the unemployed to work they refuse to recognise that post industrial capitalism does not require all the available labour (Murray 1997). In New Zealand, as in Australia, the cutbacks of welfare benefits was begun by the Labour(Labor) Party.   New Zealand then elected a National Party Government which slashed welfare payments across the board.  Australia, under Labor and even a Howard Liberal Party, has simply reduced entitlements in a concerted relentless fashion.

.Still in 1998, Australia has retained much more of the social wage than has New Zealand.  This has been due to three factors:

  • neither the Hawke nor Keating Labor Governments set out to discipline the workless with anything like the alacrity of their New Zealand counterparts,
  • unlike New Zealand, by the time conservative forces captured the treasury benches, the public’s desire for a dose of radical ‘liberal’ economics had started to wane,
  • the Australian trade union movement remains more united and stronger than the New Zealand union movement.

However, the welfare state and the associated social wage in Australia has been diminished.  Coupled with the attack on the workless has been a reduction in the employment conditions of workers.  This was done under Labor in Australia through the accord. The incoming Howard Government opted for a more direct attack on working conditions, favoured by the conservatives in New Zealand, through implementing employment contract legislation.  Governments in Britain, New Zealand and Australia have recognised that unless the reserve army of labour is mobilised as a threat to those in work then a solidarity between workers and workless might develop.  The solution proposed by governments in both countries has been to reinstigate the 1930s ‘susso’ schemes which are compulsory work for the dole programs.

The ideological attractiveness of introducing compulsory work for the dole schemes derives from the economic fundamentalist desire to reward the rich and compel the poor.  The suggestion is made that under existing social demogrant type unemployment benefits the workless are claiming “dutiless rights” (Green 1996, Selbourne 1994).  In New Zealand, Social Welfare Minister Roger Sowry announced that he intends in 1998 to refocus social welfare policy “…away from rights and looking at responsibilities for the first time.” (The Jobs Letter 30/1/98).  Similar ideological pronouncements can be identified in the jargon of the Australian Prime Minister John Howard who claims social demogrants prevent the unemployed “being allowed the opportunity to demonstrate they are meeting their mutual obligations to the community”.  What they really mean is “dole bludgers are getting something for nothing”.

The political attraction of work for the dole to governments in these three countries is similar to that of the United States where ‘workfare’ schemes have been in place for a few years.  Ill informed voters object to their tax dollars being wasted on welfare recipients and the unemployed.  They either don’t know or refuse to acknowledge that creating workfare jobs lessens the demand for labour.  This process is called displacement.  They have little understanding that it might be their job which is displaced (Adams 1997). They don’t understand many of the subtleties of this complex issue: they are looking for a simple solution and they simply accept what their political masters tell them.  There is also an attractiveness in these schemes for the mean who feel that they are getting a return on their taxes by forcing the unemployed to work for a pittance, in one sense they are getting ‘something for nothing’ or next to nothing – well at least they are not paying directly for it.

The average voter is unaware that, in the United States, there are major industry contracts being let to companies which not only to use ‘workfare’ employees but also prison labour.  If such compelled labour does not take their job it might undercut their next contract to supply goods or services.  It is perplexing that voters who fear that welfare recipients and unemployed people might be ‘getting something for nothing’ support programs where the voters hope to ‘get something for nothing’ at the expense of the unemployed.

There is a further ideological attraction in compelling those without paid work to undertake work for the dole programs and that is, as Gorz warned us in 1985 (pp.34-38), it helps reinforce the expectation of full time work as the norm thereby ensuring the powerful “maintain the relations of domination based on the work ethic.” (p.35 italics in original).

The sick and disabled were, in Britain, Australia and New Zealand, initially excluded from many of the welfare cutbacks.  In more recent times their benefits have also been more tightly targeted.  In the name of equity and simplicity the payment rate for young people with a severe disability in Australia was drastically reduced under Labor.  The same style of econocrat double speak was utilised when Labor linked unemployment and student allowances.

In Britain, New Zealand and Australia, during the last three months of 1997 welfare and disability payments came under attack by governments.  The Blair (new right) Labour Party in Britain demonstrated its true colours when it substantially cut the payments to lone parents in December 1997.  This resulted in 47 of its members crossing the floor to vote against the Government. The planned cutbacks in disability payments saw the first resignation, in protest, by a Minister in the Blair Labour Government.  The stated reasons for cutting welfare payments or wages in these three countries have been economic necessity. Jane Kelsey (1995) points out that it was the alleged need for economic austerity, which in turn led to the economic cure in New Zealand, which resulted in many years of economic downturn and social disaster (Bradford 1997).  In Australia the economic miracle promised by the Hawke, Keating and Howard Governments has not yet achieved an unemployment rate under 8%.  Yet the Blair Government is setting out to cut welfare benefits in order to comply with the economic discipline ‘imposed’ on countries wishing to join the common European currency.  It is interesting that English speaking politicians always seem to find it easier to cut welfare expenditure than military expenditures or industry subsidies.

The recent nursing homes debate

Australia still has a head start when it comes to proving its economic fundamentalist credentials.  The blind obedience to economic dogma over humanitarian concerns or even smart political tactics was revealed, in the last quarter of 1997, by the way the Howard Liberal Government handled the changes to entry into nursing homes.

The Howard Government earlier in 1997 had used its numbers to overturn Northern Territory legislation allowing voluntary euthanasia for terminally ill people.  When the Howard Government came to decide the basis on which it would allow the frail aged to enter nursing homes it declared that adherence to a ‘user pays’ principle was all important.  Ignoring the fact that most people entering a nursing home die within six months (often within three), it determined that nursing homes could charge any fee they liked (one privately owned home was charging a $250,000 entry fee).  The Government also decreed that people with few assets other than a family home would have to sell it in order to enter a nursing home.  Many elderly became confused and depressed.  Two elderly people in Western Australia suicided leaving a note which linked their death to their uncertainty as to their capacity to be able to afford to enter a nursing home.  One wit at the time suggested that the Howard government was opposed to voluntary euthanasia for the terminally ill but supported compulsory euthanasia for the frail aged who required nursing home care.

The present

In Britain, New Zealand and Australia the economic fundamentalists have had great success in redistributing income and wealth from the poor, the working and middle classes, to the rich and super rich (Stilwell 1993, Cassidy 1997, p. 24, Kelsey 1995). We have also seen some convergence in these countries in relation to welfare policies concerning unemployed people, lone parents and people with disabilities.  The language of conservatives in New Zealand and Australia is not very different from that of the Blair new right Labour Party in Britain.  Resonances of Rodgernomics in New Zealand, Thatcherism in Britain, Reganomics in the United States can be identified in the speeches of Labor’s Paul Keating or John Howard in Australia.  Shipley, Howard and Blair all utilise the dependency rhetoric when it falls to them to describe the behaviour of lone parents and the unemployed.  They claim the central issue in relation to welfare policies is the need to move people away from welfare ‘dependency’ to independence from welfare.

Each of these prime ministers is being disingenuous in attempting to suggest that they are really addressing the issue of: ‘dependence’ on welfare or independence from welfare. These prime ministers are attempting to mystify by engaging in this false debate.  They do this because they are not prepared to engage in the real welfare debate – the income security / insecurity debate.  This attempt to deflect attention from core welfare issues has not escaped the attention of poverty activists.  Early in 1997 at Massey University, the Auckland Peoples’ Centre sponsored an alternative conference to the New Zealand Government’s Beyond Dependency Conference.  The Peoples’ Centre Conference was entitled Beyond Poverty.  In October 1997, the New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services published a discussion paper on work for the dole schemes in which they exposed many of the flaws in the ‘dependency’ arguments and went on to strongly reject the need to compel welfare recipients to work (Adams 1997).

Independence from welfare equates with aloneness or separation from a shared citizenship.  ‘Dependency’ equates with subjugation to the state or the welfare bureaucracy of the state.  The manner in which the ‘dependency’ debate is carried out in these three countries ignores the complexity of the debate: it allows no consideration of the desire of most people for reciprocity of contribution, mutuality, solidarity, cooperation, nor their desire for a shared humanity.   At the Beyond Poverty Conference I asserted that if ‘dependency’ was the real issue which governments were attempting to address they could abolish ‘dependency’ by introducing a non-presumptuous universal income guarantee (Tomlinson 1997).

Conservatives conduct the debate about ‘dependency’ from the standpoint of the stereotypical unidimensional fully self-serving economic ‘rational’ man (sic).  Feminists have long pointed to the fact that ‘dependency’ is seldom a desired state of being and this in part explains the desire of women to increase their participation in the paid workforce.  When it comes to welfare benefits many female lone parents find that “The state is a more jealous husband than the man the woman has just left.”(Glassman 1970, pp. 102-103).  It is true that those who have no alternative but to rely on income provided by the state depend on that income to survive.  But to extrapolate from this fact to suggest that reliance on publicly provided income ipso facto equates with ‘dependency’ stretches the logic of the argument to beyond breaking point.  Even if one were to accept that behavioural choices are dictated by self-serving ‘rational’ economic choices, there is a need to question why anyone behaving in a fully rational self-seeking manner would choose subjugation to the state’s welfare bureaucracy over aloneness or separation from the interference of welfare bureaucrats.

Clearly politicians in Australia and New Zealand have been impotent in their attempts to solve unemployment.  They have not had the wit to create sufficient jobs for all who want them, nor are they willing to shorten the working week so that the available work might be shared by the entire workforce.  They have been so intent upon ensuring less eligibility imbues the spirit of income support policies that they have not been prepared to put in place a secure income floor for all people.  They have been so preoccupied with the economic fundamentalist dogma that the poor need to be compelled to work, they have not looked for alternatives (Murray 1997).  On top of this they are conscious that the welfare budget is a big ticket item and have become so fearful that costs might escalate if they seriously addressed the issues facing poor people.  Politicians response has been to:

  • denigrate the poor with their ‘dependency’ rhetoric, and
  • employ economic fundamentalist mean minded tinkerings, such as  increased targeting and surveillance.

There are alternatives:

  • walk away from the repressive and outmoded insights which inspired the 1834 Poor Law legislation in Britain,
  • realise we are about to enter the 21 St. Century,
  • accept that there is no necessary link between work and income support, and
  • introduce a universal basic income which makes no presumption about people (Goodin 1992).

Conclusion

If our political leaders were not intent upon deflecting us from examining the real issues in income support they would discuss the way a universal basic income or even a guaranteed minimum income would free every citizen from ‘dependency’. After all, citizens enjoying their full entitlements provided by the state can hardly be described as ‘dependent’.  Rather they are simply asserting their right to receive income from the collective in much the same way as a shareholder relies on dividend income provided by private companies.  At its most basic, economic citizenship is a twofold process which requires the citizen to pay taxes in relation to income gained and to receive income in line with government distributional processes.  Citizens relying on the state to honour its commitment to them could only be described as ‘ dependent’ by those who deny the legitimacy of the state’s role in ensuring that all in a society are prevented from living in poverty.

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O’Brien, M & Brair, C. (1997)Beyond Poverty: Conference Proceedings. Peoples Centre, Auckland.
Omerod, P. (1994) The Death of Economics. Faber & Faber, London.
Pha, A. (1992) How Super is Super. Socialist Party of Australia, Surry Hills.
Piven, F. & Cloward, R. (1971) Regulating the Poor. Vintage, New York.
Pixley, J. (1993) Citizenship and Employment.  Cambridge University, Cambridge.
Pusey, M. (1991) Economic Rationalism in Canberra. Cambridge University, Cambridge.
Putnam, R (1993)Making Democracy Work: civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton University, New Jersey.
Rankin, K. (1997) “Social Wage Tax Credits.” in O’Brien M. & Briar, C. Beyond Poverty: Conference Proceedings. Peoples Centre, Auckland.
Raper, M.” Wrestling the Octopus – Complexity and Confusion in the Social Security System.” in Victorian Council of Social Service & Good Shepherd,  Income Support in An Open Economy: Basic Income Revisited. Victorian Council of Social Service & Good Shepherd.
Rhys-Williams, J. (1965) A New look at Britain’s Economic Policy. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
Ritchie, I. (1997)”The Need for a New Approach to our Society which Includes a Universal basic Income.” in Tomlinson, J., Patton, W., Creed, P. & Hicks, R. (eds.) Unemployment: Policy and Practice. Australian Academic, Brisbane.
Selbourne, D. (1994) The Principle of Duty.  Sinclair -Stevenson, London.
Social Security (1987) Annual Report 1986/87. Social Security, Canberra.
Stilwell, F. (1993) Economic Inequality: Who gets what in Australia. Pluto, Leichhardt.
The Jobs Letter. No.72, 30/1/9
Titmuss, R. (1976) Commitment to Welfare. George Allen & Unwin, London.
Tomlinson, J. (1989) Income Maintenance in Australia: The Income Guarantee. PhD. Thesis, Murdoch University.
Tomlinson, J. (1995) “Income Maintenance: Targeting Destroys Initiative.” in Victorian Council of Social Service & Good Shepherd,  Income Support in An Open Economy: Basic Income Revisited. Victorian Council of Social Service & Good Shepherd.
Tomlinson, J. (1997)”There but for the grace of wealth go I.” in O’Brien M. & Briar, C. Beyond Poverty: Conference Proceedings. Peoples Centre, Auckland.
Van Parijs, P. (1992) “Competing Justifications of Basic Income.” in Van Parijs, P. (ed.) Arguing for Basic Incomes. Verso, London.
Watts, R. (1995)”After the White Paper: Renovating Social Policy in the 1990s.” in Hicks, R., Creed, P., Keogh, D. & Tomlinson, J. (eds.) Unemployment: Challenges and Solutions. Australian Academic, Brisbane.

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For whom mutual obligation tolls

Published by QCOSS CIRCA 2000

Senator Jocelyn Newman released the interim report of the “Reference Group on Welfare Reform” entitled Participation Support for a More Equitable Society on the 28th. March this year. It duly received considerable hype from right wing media pundits describing it as the way forward for a modern caring and efficient Australia in which everyone would pull their weight. The language of the title like so many recent Howard Government papers barely disguises a confused moral / economy contradiction. Anyone wanting to tease out the implicit conundrum should read Judith Bessant’s (2000) analysis of work for the dole.

The morning after the release of the interim report of Senator Jocelyn Newman’s Reference Group on Welfare Reform Prime Minister Howard said “People want the needy looked after but they don’t want an explosion in welfare spending.” Patrick McClure, CEO of Mission Australia and the head of the Newman’s Reference Group, in an interview on Life Matters a few minutes later was asked about sanctions that might apply to income support applicants if they did not “participate” in the Government’s plans to extend mutual obligations provisions applying to unemployed people to single parents and disability pensioners claimed that there was only one reference to sanctions in the 75 page report. This comment was presumably made in an attempt to assure a frightened recipient population they were not about to lose their benefits. Those Life Matters listeners who had watched the 7.30 Report two days previously would have put McClure comments along side the fact that in the previous 12 months Centrelink had issued 200,000 notices of breach to social security recipients in the previous year. Anyone who bothered to read the Reference Group’s report would have found scattered throughout pages 51-61 references to “compelled participation”, “requirements to participate”, “sanctions…to ensure compliance”, “explicit direction”, ruling out “open choice” in relation to how people participated and to “mutual obligation”.

McClure claimed the idea of extending mutual obligation through participation arose from the Reform Group’s review of New Zealand’s income support system and of Tony Blair’s labour market initiatives. This ignores the fact that:

  • in New Zealand the Clarke Labour Alliance Government, supported by the Greens, announced shortly after gaining office its intention to revisit in 2000 the entire National Party Government ‘compelled activity’ programs for income support recipients,
  • on the 9 March the relevant NZ Minister, Steve Maharey ended “work-testing for people on invalids benefits. He says the evaluation of the trial held last year showed the policy was ‘completely useless’. He says that people with disabilities want to work and he prefers to put money into positive programmes that remove barriers to their employment. (The Jobs Letter 27 March, 2000, p.3),
  • the Blair Government acknowledged its indebtedness to the Keating Government’s Working Nation document (1994),
  • in relation to unemployed beneficiaries there has, since the 1947 Social Security legislation, been a work testing eligibility requirement, and
  • work relief programs (the Susso) during the 1930’s demanded actual work for sustenance prior to the supply of unemployment relief.

The recent history of ‘compelled activity’ in relation to income support in Australia reveals that the preoccupation with ‘activity / participation’ was very much a part of the previous Labor Government’s approach to unemployed people. Professor Bettina Cass in the mid to late 1980s headed the Review of Social Security recommended in a number of reports that the Department should insist the applicant for unemployment benefits engage in some form of ‘approved activity’. Cass claimed in a number of consultations she undertook that such ‘activity testing’ was designed to assist those most marginal to the labour market retain their benefit. Cass argued that in times of high unemployment the most marginal were likely to fail a strict application of the ‘work test’. Some present at these consultations in Melbourne and Perth argued that, in the absence of universal income guarantees, compelling activity could be potentially detrimental to the interests of the most vulnerable.

In Cass’ defence it should be noted that she was privy to much of the thinking that went on inside Brian Howe’s, the then Minister of Social Security, Office. At the time he was in the process of articulating Labor’s social justice principles of:

Equity
Access
Equality of rights
Participation

These social justice principles came to be issued as part of the Budget Papers and as a consequence came to be widely interpreted as:

  • the right to participate,
  • right to have equitable access, and
  • to enjoy equality of rights.

Throughout the nineties social welfare advocates relied on such principles to assert clients’ right to participate in a range of decisions which affected their lives. The release of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform interim report heralds the metamorphosis of participation as a social right into participation as obligation.

The reality is that the Reference Group has not produced a document which has anything to do with reforming the welfare system, nor was it meant too. The Reference Group’s document is about changing the way the welfare state is constructed.

If you consult your Macquarie Dictionary you’ll find that Change means “to alter” whereas reform used as a noun means:

1. the improvement or amendment of what is wrong, corrupt, etc: social reform.
4. to restore to a former and better state; improve by alteration, substitution, abolition, etc. to cause (a person) to abandon wrong or evil ways of life or conduct.
6. to put an end to (abuses, disorders, etc.).
7. to abandon evil conduct.

If the Government was attempting to usher in a major, significant, radical change which would, if implemented, substantially improve the conditions for members of the community then, and only then, should it talk about reforming the welfare system.

The reference Group’s report does none of those things it is a simple rendition of the of the Howard Government’s ideological position on social constraint as exemplified in Howard’s Australia Roundtable Speech in late 1999 and his 12th.January 2000 “social coalition” article in the Australian.

For those human service workers who have watched in horror as Abbot’s statements about “job snobs”, Howard’s schemes of Working for the Dole and compulsory literacy training, and Newman’s ruthless intrigues of Dole Diaries, Dob in Dole Cheats phone lines, and the cutting of thousands off benefits with the oh so Common Youth Allowance (Horin 1998) or through breaching (ACOSS 2000, 7.30 Report 27th. March 2000) proliferated the thrust of the Reference Group’s document would have come as no surprise. McClure’s Group replicated much of Jocelyn Newman 9th. November paper, “The Challenge of Welfare Dependency in the 21st.Century.” which she described as designed to inform submissions to her announced review of Australian social security.

My 14 November submission to this Reference Group noted:

The intention is to cut welfare outlays. The Minister claims the government will not cut the level of specific benefits. If the welfare bill is to be cut then the number of people receiving benefits or the length of time people will receive benefit must decrease. In fact this is a foreshadowed option in relation to lone parents payments and disability support pensions.

When this denigration of the workless started in the mid 1970s official unemployment was less than 4% it now stands at over 7% and a greater percentage of the Australian people than ever before are labour market participants. However we are still asked to believe that the ranks of the unemployed are swelled by those unwilling to work.

Conservatives have an overwhelming need to compel the poor, unemployed, the sick, those with severe disabilities, and lone parents to work or make some other contribution to society if they are to avoid moral jeopardy. Belief in the moral inferiority of the poor is a fine old conservative tradition, such beliefs inspired the 1834 poor laws and were prevalent in 16th century parish relief efforts in England.

The fact that such arguments (about lesser eligibility, the poor’s fecklessness, the associated need for coercion and the importance of increasing the huge differentials in income between the owning and labouring classes) are a nonsense, does not make them any less valued by Minister Newman. John Kenneth Galbraith ridiculed such arguments by pointing out that “It always boils down to the highly improbable case that the rich are not working because they have too little income and the poor because they have too much.” [Cited in Boreman, Dow & Leet (1999) p.104]

So attached to the view that the poor need to be compelled, this Minister feels herself constrained to suggest that “mutual obligation” needs to be extended to those who the Commonwealth Medical Officer believes cannot be got “back into work or successfully retrained within 2 years”. The same team of incompetents, who dredged up the 1930s susso style “work for the dole scheme” have now turned their sights on those with severe disabilities. The same sanctimonious certainty which allows this Minister to assert that people in receipt of income support need to be compelled before they will make a contribution to their community prevents her witnessing the contribution which many now make without her “mutual obligation” police.

On the first page of the text of Newman’s November “discussion” paper appears the unsubstantiated claim:

“On many indicators, Australia’s welfare system compares well with those of other countries. It combines comprehensive coverage with efficient targeting and effective poverty alleviation.”

It is uncertain as to which countries Minister Newman has chosen to compare us but certainly we don’t compare well with the bulk of OECD countries. Boreman, Dow & Leet (1999) base their comparative study on 16 OECD countries and conclude:

Australia’s spending on social security transfers involving pensions, unemployment benefits and other disability allowances is lower than any of the other countries in our study. A comparative view of total expenditure on the ‘welfare state’ – social security, health education and housing – also locates Australia among the countries least supportive of the welfare needs of their citizens. If the burden of the welfare state is a factor in unemployment, it is a very limited burden indeed in the Australian context (pp.52-53)

At p.7 Newman’s “discussion” paper asserts the objectives of “the modern conservative approach to welfare” is to “assist people appropriately when they are in genuine need, to provide an adequate safety net…(and) to stop people becoming dependent”. No one has ever been able to successfully explain how anyone, without other means of support, is not in “genuine need” of income support.

At p.9 of the “discussion” paper Newman claims that “maintaining equity, simplicity, transparency and sustainability” are her key principles. Yet two paragraphs later she asserts “Simply providing payments to everyone who fits into a particular category fails to recognise the different capacities and potential people have to contribute to their own future.” This is from the woman who at page one of her text praised the efficiency of Australia’s categorical targeting system. The real reason behind such contradictory statements is revealed on the next page when she writes “In short, good economic policy is good welfare policy.”

This Minister’s suggestion that public servants discriminate between different applicants who meet the set eligibility requirements overthrows the entire ‘rights’ basis of Australian social security law since the introduction of the Age pension in 1908. It also confounds the principles of bureaucracy as set down by Max Weber and upheld on a daily basis by the Commonwealth’s own Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

Instead of creatively thinking about innovative solutions, the paper sets out with the untested assertion that there is widespread “welfare dependency” and that it is a problem which can only be solved by a combination of “mutual obligation”, making the obtaining of income support more difficult and where people can be found relying in income support removing it by placing time or age limits on receipt or shifting them to less secure forms of income support.

Dependency and “mutual responsibility”

The words ‘welfare dependency’ have taken on connotations of abuse, of failing to meet legitimate responsibilities, and something just short of cheating or defrauding the State. There is nothing mutual or responsible about the Howard government’s concept of “mutual responsibility”. Like dependency it has become jargon, it is political shorthand for saying to those who are seen as politically expendable ‘you wont get the income support to which you were entitled unless you give us something in return’. We all did too little when governments started attacking working conditions and awards of the more vulnerable workers. Now the majority of workers feel insecure in their employment. Too many aged, lone parent and disability pensioners did nothing when “work for the dole” only applied to young unemployed – now that system is being extended to every social security recipient, except the aged but even they should not get too relaxed and comfortable. Yes, mutual responsibility tolls for you.

If living in a compelled, constrained, mutually obligatory society is not your idea of nirvana check out some of the alternatives in the many papers on Basic Income and other forms of income guarantees listed at the New Zealand Basic Income Web Site.

Selected Bibliography

ACOSS (2000) Social Security Breaches: Penalising the most disadvantaged. INFO 204, ACOSS, Sydney.
Bessant, J. (2000) “Civil Conscription or Mutual Obligation: The Ethics of ‘Work for the Dole.'” Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 35, No.1, Feb.
Boreman, P., Dow, G. & Leet, M. (1999) Room to Manoeuvre: Political Aspects of Full Employment. Melbourne University, Carlton.
Horin, A. (1998) “Dole cut for thousands of young jobless.” Sydney Morning Herald. June,29th.. p.10
Howard, J. (1999) “Building a Stronger and Fairer Australia: Liberalisation in Economic Policy and Modern Conservatism in Social Policy.” Address to ‘Australia Unlimited Roundtable.’ 4 May www.gov.au./media/pressrel/AustralaiUnlimitedRoundtable.htm
Howard, J. (2000) “Quest for a decent society” The Australian 12 Jan, p.11.
New Zealand Basic Income Web Site
http://www.geocities.com/~ubinz/

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Franklin D. Roosevelt

“The test of our progress is not whether we add to the abundance of those who have much.
It is whether we provide enough to those who have little.”

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From paupers to citizenship

Mike Dee, Simon Schooneveldt & John Tomlinson, New Community Quarterly, Vol. 3, No.3, 2005 pp. 41-45.

They make no differ twixt the absentee swell
And the clerk that cut from a “shortage”—
Oh! there ain’t no pauper funer-el,
And there ain’t no “impressive cortege.”
It may be a chap from the for’ard crowd,
Or a member of the British Peerage,
But they sew his nibs in a canvas shroud
Just the same as the bloke from the steerage —
As that poor bloke from the steerage.

Henry Lawson The Briny Grave (Written in 1900)

Introduction

There was a time when voting rights were the perquisite of male property owners. Now in most countries women and even the poor, who are over 18 years of age, have the vote – although there are still writers who advocate that those who receive more in benefits from the government than they pay in tax should lose the franchise (Hazlitt cited in Van Parijs 1996, p. 110). Modern citizenship is conceived of as embodying a more complex collection of features than the franchise or even broader political rights. After Marshall (1950), it now includes social and economic rights. These latter rights are outlined in United Nations conventions and find elaborate expression in the works of Basic Income advocates (Van Parijs 1992, 1997, Standing 2002, 2004, Murray 1997). In Britain, the main Basic Income advocacy group calls itself “Citizens Income”. Yet in many parts of the world residues exist of an earlier conception of citizenship which are closely tied to notions of economic self sufficiency. In this paper we will contrast the ideologies which underlie the treatment of paupers and those which underpin Basic Income.

Social citizenship

T.H. Marshall’s analysis of citizenship has, until relatively recently, been “the dominant paradigm” (Mann 1995, p.42, see also Roche 1992, Held 1995 and Bynner and Furlong 1997). Marshall (1950) delineates three broad stages of evolving citizenship rights. Civil citizenship in the eighteenth century concerns rights to personal freedom and equality before the law, political citizenship emerging in the nineteenth century, centres on the franchise and social citizenship is marked in the twentieth century by the growth of the welfare state. For Bulmer and Rees (1996) Marshall’s paradigm still holds contemporary relevance:

T.H. Marshall’s original distinctions, for all their imperfections, still have a robust usefulness. Their deployment, moreover, throws into stark relief, just as it did in Marshall’s day, the contrast between inequalities of class, income, race and gender, and the egalitarian aspirations – however they may be constructed – embedded in the concept of citizenship (p. 283).

Central to his analysis is the importance of the relationship between the citizen, the state and the systems of health, education and social welfare (Marshall 1950, 1975, 1981). For Marshall, William Beveridge’s milestone 1942 report, Social Insurance and Allied Services or, as it is usually referred to, the Beveridge Report, was central to “the modern drive towards social equality” (Marshall 1950, p. 28). The creation of the modern welfare state was “the latest phase of an evolution of citizenship in progress for some 250 years” (Marshall 1950, p. 11).

Marshall was writing at a time of great optimism in the fledgling post Second World War welfare state. Beveridge had proposed a system of family allowances, comprehensive health service and an end to mass unemployment, alongside state provided education and local government housing programs. This confidence in the capacity of the welfare state to deliver improvements in social status over the long term may now seem somewhat misplaced, but for Giddens (1996) such confidence was understandable:

Marshall wrote at a period during which it seemed to almost everyone, supporters and critics alike, that the welfare state would continue its upward trajectory. Hayek was thought of by most as an eccentric and marginal thinker; neoliberalism, as it later became, might have been a gleam in his eye but was hardly even dreamed of by anyone else (p.67).

Social citizenship, a key element of Marshall’s theorem, developed throughout the course of the twentieth century encapsulates economic security and access to health and education. In Marshall’s (1950) own words, it is:

The whole range from a right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in a civilized society. The institutions most closely associated with it are the education system and the social services (p.12).

The defining principle informing the development of the modern British (and Australian) social security system is that of “less eligibility”. This principle is extant in the way current recipients of certain benefits are viewed by others (including claimants). Less eligibility refers to the principle enshrined in the English Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 that recipients of state support should receive benefits at a level below the wage of the lowest paid labourer, so as not to deter them from efforts to obtain employment (Checkland and Checkland 1974). The workhouse test was central to a process of degradation and humiliation so that the lowest paid work might be attractive, when compared to getting ‘indoor relief’ in the parish workhouse (Alcock 1997). Images of the workhouse were immortalized in Charles Dickens’ tale of Oliver Twist (1883) wherein all possibility of human existence was extinguished. For Bauman (1998, p. 13), “whoever agreed to be locked up inside a poorhouse must indeed have had no other way of staying alive”. The prospect of the workhouse was sufficiently grim for Thomas Paine in his Rights of Man (1791) to observe:

When, in countries that are called civilized, we see age going to the work- house and youth to the gallows, something must be wrong in the system of government. It would seem, by the exterior of such countries, that all was happiness; but there lies hidden from the eye of common observation, a mass of wretchedness that has scarcely any other chance than to expire in poverty or infamy. Its entrance into life is marked with the presage of its fate; and until this is remedied, it is in vain to punish (in Pierson and Castles 2000, p.11).

The Poor Laws explicitly sought to nullify the citizenship rights of claimants whose civil rights were forfeited in exchange for the dubious social rights of welfare (Delanty 2000). This finding accords with Marshall’s conviction that the Poor Laws dealt with the claims of the poor and destitute as distinct from the rights of citizenship and only available “if the claimants ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word” (Marshall 1950, p.128).

The Basic Income support system

A Universal Basic Income Guarantee, concisely referred to as Basic Income, is an unconditional regular cash payment to individual citizens sufficient to meet their basic living needs (Universal Basic Income New Zealand [UBINZ], 2003). Thus, it is important to discuss the concept of citizenship in relation to any system of welfare distribution. In its simplest form, Van Der Veen (1998) described Basic Income as a proposal “to disburse a tax-free subsistence income to every adult citizen, whether he or she is employed or unemployed, wealthy or poor, healthy or sick, active or idle, and…young or old, with basic incomes for children replacing existing child benefits” (p.141). Payment would be unconditional, without a work requirement or means test (Watts, 1996).

There is nothing new about the idea of Basic Income. In 1920 in England, Dennis Milner wrote a book length proposal for a minimum income for all. Cunliffe and Erreygers (2004) discuss even earlier versions of the Basic Income idea. Echoing some of earlier contributions Juliet Rhys-Williams argued for a guaranteed minimum to provide an income floor below which people’s income would not fall (Rhys- Williams, 1943, p.163). Watts (1996) reported that an Australian civil servant, Frederick Wheeler developed an argument for it in 1942. T. H. Marshall (1950) theorised that there were three stages in the historical struggle towards civil, political and social citizenship and he believed that citizens have a right to welfare. By 1975 he went further concluding a Welfare State should be equitable rather than adequate, citing Titmuss’ comment that:

The goal is the optimum satisfaction of needs; all operations undertaken in pursuit of the goal must be governed by the principle of fairness: the reduction of inequality is an expected consequence of this and is always present (Marshall, 1975, p. 203).

In the same year Professor Ronald Henderson gave the idea of income security currency in Australia in his Main Report for the Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (Henderson, 1975) when he argued for a Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI). The idea stalled because historically welfare had been paid to households, rather than individuals and was generally subjected to means and assets tests (Watts, 1996).

Furthermore “the belief in the virtuousness of work…[actually] does a great deal of harm” (Russell, 1935, pp.10-11). This is not well understood in Australia. The idea of paid work is often thought of as relating to the protestant work ethic, and even Labor governments in Australia have succumbed to this ideology. The ‘blaming’ of welfare recipients, particularly the unemployed is not new. Concern to avoid fiscal blow-outs and a belief that unemployed people are not trying hard enough to find jobs unsettles governments of Liberal and Labor persuasions alike as unemployment grows (Edwards, Howard, & Miller, 2001; Giddens, 1998). Windschuttle (1980) noted Labor Ministers in the 1970s casting slurs about unemployed people being “work shy lion tamers and dole bludgers” (pp. 180-190).

The Hawke/Keating Labor Government utilised the concept of ‘reciprocal obligation’. Unemployed people continue to be portrayed by Government Ministers as ‘dole bludgers’ (Brough, 2001), ‘unwilling to accept work’ (Vanstone, 2002a, 2002b), ‘job snobs’ (Abbott 1999) and ‘welfare dependant’ (Newman, 2000). Welfare recipients are thereby labelled ‘undeserving’ and in need of ‘coercive authority’ to return them to an obligatory state of worthiness (Kinnear, 2000). Similar justifications lay behind the construction of the British 1601 and 1834 Poor Laws (Stretton, 1996). In Europe, however, Philippe Van Parijs, the doyen of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), wrote “A basic income is an income paid by a political community to all its members on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement” (Van Parijs, 2000) (p.3, italics in original).

In Australia Sleep (2001) argued that because it is not ideologically acceptable that “deserving” welfare could apply to all people in need, systems of blaming the undeserving, selectivity and categorisation are used by governments as methods for social control and welfare cost reduction. The economic fundamentalist welfare agenda of the Coalition Conservative Government’s 2005/2006 Budget obliges single parents to seek work when their last child is of school age. Similarly new applicants for the disability support pension, deemed capable of working 15 hours per week, will from July 2006 be placed on a unemployment benefit (paid at a lower rate) that also carries with it “mutual obligations” and severely punitive income reductions for minimal ‘breaches’ (Heywood, 2005, p.5, Moses & Sharples, 2000; Sleep, 2001, Galvin 2004, Tomlinson 2005). Offe (1992, p. 62) offered three reasons as to why the semantics about a ‘correct’ welfare distribution are endless: many causes of distress are beyond individual’s control, the foundations on which ‘blame’ might be apportioned have eroded, and society wide influences play a part in impoverishing many.

Australia has not introduced a Basic Income and persists with an ever tightening categorical welfare system. The prime reason for supporting a universal Basic Income is that it is the most socially just way of ensuring social protection (Standing 2002, Van Parijs 1997, 1992). In an ideal world one might strive to ensure that everyone has their needs fully met. Essentially, in the post-Second World War period, the Australian welfare state was meant to do just that. Australia’s social welfare system, due largely to under-funding as a result of constant attacks from economic fundamentalists, is less capable of ensuring social protection for the most vulnerable than in the late 1970s /early 1980s. Many of the family support structures, which were the first port of call for help in earlier times, have been eroded; full-time work at a rate above the poverty-line is harder to find, resulting in a new class of the ‘working poor’.

Tomlinson (2001), favours a Basic Income over the means-tested and targeted Australian income distribution system which he believes denigrates people who are unemployed and represents a return to the Poor Laws of centuries past. He argues a Basic Income is more efficient because it:

  • requires least interference in people’s lives
  • supplies all with equal assistance,
  • is the most inclusive form of income support payment and the most secure, thus enhancing citizenship,
  • provides sufficient income to allow people to explore their creative capacity,
  • removes many of the obstacles to a reinvigoration of the industrial and technological infrastructure, and
  • allows the State a fuller understanding of the impact of its other social wage policies (p.245).

(See also Citizens income, 2002, Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), and Basic Income Guarantee Australia (BIGA) websites).

Goodin (1992) argued that Basic Income support is less presumptuous as a system of welfare distribution than other forms of government-provided income support. This is because Basic Income is unconditional; there is no need for government to pry on individuals to establish entitlement. There is no need for government to make assumptions as to the deserving or worthy status of the person receiving the payment. It is that unconditionality that prompted Tomlinson (2003) to argue that Basic Income can alleviate income insecurity, which would in turn eliminate pauperism.

The origin of pauperism

Polanyi (1945) states:

It was in the first half of the sixteenth century that the poor first appeared in England…while the poor in the middle of the sixteenth century were a danger to society, on which they descended like hostile armies, at the end of the seventeenth century they were merely a burden on the rates (p. 108).

He had pointed to the self-serving explanations of 18th century writers that “pauperism and progress were inseparable…The greatest number of poor is not to be found in barren countries or amidst barbarous nations, but in those which are the most fertile and most civilised” (Polanyi 1945, p. 107, see also Sanborn 1899).

The term “pauper” has had many meanings over the last few centuries. It has sometimes been used to denote only the poorest people and at other times been used to describe all dependent on the parish, church or the State for their livelihood (Polanyi 1945, pp 83-87, Trevelyan 1967, pp.483-497, Catholic Encyclopedia 2005). With the greater acceptance of social security and social insurance, coupled with the demise of the Poor Laws workhouse system in the first part of the 20th century pauperism came to mean those without funds or access to social services. The large mental asylums and prisons which buried their impoverished dead within their grounds prolonged the Poor Laws work house meaning of paupers well into the 20th century (Stevens, Stevens and Dunlap 2001). Unlike the English Poor Laws system which was paid by the parish, the system of welfare relief in Scotland in the 1830s early 1840s “was largely based… on voluntary giving. ….Indeed in some places the title pauper was one of status; it allowed a person the licence to beg” Levitt (1988).

The 1834 English Poor Law attempted to abolish “outdoor relief” and expand the workhouse system of institutional relief. As Polanyi (1945) notes: “The workhouse test was reintroduced, but in a new sense. It was left to the applicant to decide whether he was so destitute of all means that he would voluntarily repair to a shelter which was deliberately made into a place of horror” (p. 106).

The distinction made between the worthy poor and the unworthy poor enshrined in the principle of less eligibility of the 1834 Poor Law lies at the heart of much of the debate surrounding pauperism.

The …poor were divided between the physically hapless paupers whose place was in the workhouse, and independent workers who earned their living by labouring for wages. This created an entirely new category of the poor, the unemployed…..While the pauper, for the sake of humanity, should be relieved, the unemployed for the sake of industry, should not be relieved (Polanyi 1945 p. 219).

Whilst stigma is a problem embedded in every targeted welfare system (Boston and St. John 1998, Tomlinson 2003 Chapter 2), it is in relation to 19th century English workhouses that it is most clearly observed. Sanborn (1899), cites Charles Lamport (1870) to support this point:

Its practice is, that no destitute person, however meritorious, can benefit by this organization without having to pass under something very like the old Roman yoke. On the one side of the Caudine forks, a man stands erect, self- respecting and respected, and with name unstained; on the other side he crouches, a changed and degraded being. He has become a social pariah, hopes destroyed, spirit crushed, reputation gone. Society, before it yields what it dare not refuse, so embitters the morsel by contempt that neither giver nor receiver is blessed in the act.

The significance of paupers’ unmarked graves

Or may I slave in prisons,
In mental misery,
And no one write a letter,
And no one visit me!
And may I rot with paupers,
A ditch without a stone,
My work be never quoted,
And my grave be never known.
Henry Lawson I’d Back Agen the World (written 1900)

In Melbourne in the last half of the 19th century:

Paupers did not have funerals but were packed into graves and covered with a thin layer of dirt. In one grave up to three or four bodies would be interred but in the graves of children and infants there were no limits to the numbers. Clergymen were contracted by the Government to come and read a short service over the grave before it was finally covered. It was rare for the families to attend the services as it could be some time before the minister came…..Few of these graves were given a tombstone. Generally they were left as simply unmarked graves showing an iron plate with the plot number stamped on it. Some had terracotta borders or wooden crosses with the name painted on them; many simply had no markings at all. In contrast to the other sections in the Cemetery, the paupers graves were generally left neglected and overgrown with moss and plants (Melbourne University 2005 p, 6).

Throughout many parts of the world, the poor who died in mental health asylums, prisoners, and others who died without sufficient funds to pay for their funerals had their remains buried in unmarked graves. In 1882, a Victorian woman Anne Bon wrote to Chief Secretary’s Department campaigning to let Aborigines retain the 4,800 acres of the Coranderrk Aboriginal Mission. She pointed to the failure of the Aboriginal Protection Board to manage Coranderrk or to look after the interests of Aborigines. She noted that many had been taken from the mission and had died in distant hospitals, “They have not even been provided with a small portion in God’s Acre but have been put into paupers’ graves wherever convenient without even Christian burial” (Australian Women’s Archive 2005). Throughout this continent Aborigines met a similar fate well into the 20th century.

The significance of being buried in an unmarked grave is that it divorces the deceased from the rest of society and is a convenient way of hiding the fact that the State has failed to find a way to include the deceased as a normal citizen. In the words of Polanyi “The very burial of a pauper was made an act by which his fellow men renounced solidarity with him even in death” (1945, p. 106).

Burial arrangements for Queensland paupers 2005

In Queensland, the Department of Justice and Attorney-General operates a web page entitled “Arranging burials for paupers” which sets out the assistance to which paupers their family and friends are entitled. Clearly, cost containment is a major feature of this Department’s operations for in the first paragraph it states:

The Department of Justice and Attorney-General is responsible for organising the burial or cremation of impoverished people who die in Queensland. This responsibility extends only to those people who have no means of paying for the funeral themselves, or have no family or friends who can arrange and pay for the funeral for them.

The last paragraph in this first section sets out the raison d’etre for the Department’s involvement: “The service is provided essentially for health reasons. Bodies must be properly disposed of in the interests of public health.” This statement has all the subtlety of a highway clean-up firm explaining why it removes the carcasses of dead animals from the roadway.

The Department rules out subsidising a funeral or reimbursing the costs of a funeral, noting:

An officer of the Department will interview you to determine your financial status and to check that there is no other relative who can finance the funeral. If it is discovered after the funeral has been paid for by the Department that the deceased person, or their family, actually did have sufficient funds to pay for the funeral, the Department may recoup that money.

Family and friends are not totally excluded:

If the Department does decide to arrange and pay for the burial, it is possible for family and friends to attend but no church service is provided. This also applies to headstones; if family or friends would like to provide a headstone, this has to be done at their own expense…. in the case of a cremation, the ashes can be handed over to family or friends if a private ceremony for the scattering of the ashes is preferred.

There is no choice of cemetery:

The Department’s contract with funeral directors also stipulates that they are not to advertise the burial or cremation. However, family or friends can place a death notice only in the classifieds section of the local newspaper, at their own cost.

These extracts from the Queensland Government’s website convey an impression that those dying without sufficient funds to pay for their own funeral are less than full citizens.

A pauper’s legacy or bureaucratic malfeasance

The Weekend Australian 23-24 April 2005 ran a page one story about the grandmother of Aboriginal Olympic legend, Kathy Freeman, being buried as a pauper in 1950 and noted that the Protector of Aborigines had not paid the two pound and five shillings for the grave at the time which meant that the family had to pay $495 (the 2005 equivalent of two pound and five shillings) for the plot before they could bury another family member in the same grave (Koch 2005 p.1). The spokeswoman for the cemetery trust involved was quoted as saying “most of those not paid for were pauper’s graves and if they are not paid for people cannot put a monument or headstone on the grave until it is purchased” (Koch 2005, p. 6).

The Freeman family’s experience of the failure of the Protector of Aborigines in 1950 to pay for the burial plot provides an interesting insight into the mentality of a State government whose predecessors were responsible for the nonpayment of over at least $500 million, in today’s value, of wages to Indigenous workers. The current Queensland Government has made an offer of one-tenth of that amount as final settlement for all the missing money from Indigenous accounts (Stolen Wages Campaign 2005).

The challenge for the 21st century

Perhaps the term “pauper” is imbued with such demeaning connotations that the best choice for those interested in building an embracing and inclusive form of citizenship in this century is to hope the word disappears from the lexicon. But even in that event, it is likely that “indigent” or some other word would replace it. And whilst the word may wound or cause offence, it is such practices as are outlined on the Queensland Department of Justice and Attorney-General web page entitled “Arranging burials for paupers” which undermine the citizenship of impoverished people and their families. It seems inconceivable to speak about solidarity or inclusive citizenship in Queensland whilst such practices remain.

Polanyi, sardonically reflecting upon those who in the last quarter of the 19th century wanted to replace all parish-provided welfare relief in England with private charity, wrote: “But once the indigent were left to the mercy of the well-to-do, who can doubt that “the only difficulty” is to restrain the impetuosity of the latter’s benevolence?” (1945, p. 121).

Clearly, a society in which the concept of pauperism sits alongside inordinate wealth differs markedly from a social system committed to providing to all permanent residents a universal Basic Income. The real challenge facing Australia is to put in place a system of income support such as a Basic Income which, because it is paid universally, has the capacity to abolish pauperism because it alleviates poverty. The solidarity, which a Basic Income could help engender, would then make it much easier to develop the political pressure to force state governments, like Queensland’s, to adopt more enlightened policies, not only in relation to the burial of people who die without sufficient funds to pay for their funerals, but also with regard to other social policies which impact adversely upon low income earners.

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From the Basic Wage to Basic Income: Work, unemployment and justice

In Carlson, E (Ed.) The Full Employment Imperative. 5th Path to Full Employment Conference and 10th National Conference on Unemployment Proceedings: Refereed Papers, 10-12 December 2003, The University of Newcastle, Newcastle, New South Wales

During the first couple of decades of the 20th Century, European visitors to this country described the combination of the Arbitration system and the Age and Invalid Pensions [1908] and maternity allowances [1912] as “socialism without doctrines” (Roe 1976, p.4, Kewley 1973 Chapter 2). It was the combination of the 1907 Harvester Judgement that installed the Basic Wage in association with the social security system that constituted the foundation stones of  “the workers welfare state” (Castles 1985).

The social security and industrial landscapes of Australia in the first decade of the 21st Century, with its regimes of self provision, breaching, mutual obligation and enterprise bargaining, individual contracts and deregulation (Castles 2001, LHMU 2003), could accurately be described as “doctrines without socialism”.

The best hope of providing income security for both those in employment and those without work is a universal Basic Income. This paper will interrogate the history and the near future of these issues in terms of security/insecurity and justice.

Why start with the Basic Wage and early Social Security provisions?

This paper will first look at the Basic Wage because the 1907 judgement did more than any previous arbitration decision to provide white male workers and their families with a secure income. It is also important to consider the early social security provisions because they provided the first Federal income support payments to some of those who weren’t in work. Each of these forms of income have strong resides in the 21st century. The Indigenous population of Australia is discussed in some detail because, though they constitute only 3% of the total population of this country, they experience inordinate levels of poverty and unemployment. Past and present governments have failed to ensure Indigenous people’s access to a secure income, adequate health services or decent job prospects (Hunter, Kinfu and Taylor 2003).

Grounds for payment

When it comes to deciding whether or not to make a payment to an individual, similar questions occur in both the mode of production and the mode of distribution, namely:

  • Who would we pay?
  • Who won’t we pay?
  • Why would we pay?
  • Why won’t we pay?

When it comes to the Basic Wage there is a myth that the Harvester Judgement meant employers had to pay a living wage to all workers but did not pay non-workers. Employees were paid because they work, whereas non-workers weren’t paid because they didn’t work.

But we did not pay women workers the full Basic Wage. Women were paid only 54-75 % of male Basic Wage for 60 years [Equal Wage Case 1967]. We did not pay Aborigines anything like the full Basic Wage – many we did not pay at all until after the Second World War (Kidd 2003, 1997, Berndt 1961, Rowley 1970, 1971, Tomlinson 1974 Ch 2). To add insult to injury even when Indigenous workers were in paid employment the bulk of ‘their wages’ were paid to their white ‘protectors’. A significant proportion of such money disappeared. The current “Stolen Wages” campaign is aimed at obtaining some recompense for this (Kidd 2003). The Protection Acts were in place in the Northern Territory and mainland states for the greater part of the last century – in Queensland from 1898 until the mid-1970s.

Again it was 1967 when the Arbitration Commission looked at equal payment for Indigenous workers in Australia. Even after the Commission could no longer justify paying Aboriginal workers less than other employees, there were many downsides experienced [particularly by Aboriginal pastoral workers] (Tomlinson 2003  Ch 6).

Even in 2003 the majority of Aboriginal people living on Indigenous communities don’t have access to employment. As the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, Tony Abbott, in 2002 reminded Australians that  “without the Community Development Employment Program (an Indigenous ‘work for the dole’ scheme started by the Fraser Government), the unemployment rate in many remote Aboriginal communities would approach 90 per cent.”

Since the earliest days of the colonies young workers have usually been paid less than adult workers. The prime justification offered for such discrimination was that they were learning their trade or occupation. Salary structure of apprenticeships and traineeships reflects such justifications. Young workers today are frequently paid in line with their age rather than their skills. In some forms of work those who are new to the job may well be less efficient than those who have been at it for a longer period. But many of the service industries employ a predominately younger workforce and the efficiency gains made from spending years doing the same tasks are, at best, marginal. There is widespread employer reluctance to accept the idea that a wage/skill parity should replace the current system of youth wages. Such reluctance raises questions about the sincerity of employers’ claims that existing wage differentials are necessary because of skill deficits in younger workers.

Social Security

If we apply the same questions asked in relation to the Basic Wage to social services we find that in relation to payment systems based on categorical eligibility we would get the following answers: “we pay all applicants who can establish they meet the eligibility requirements.” This answer does not address the rights to payment of those who don’t apply even though they might be eligible for payments were they to apply. Clearly there are two hurdles: first application and second proving eligibility. Those who might meet all the requirements but can’t establish they meet all the requirements often find they aren’t paid. Clearly, those who are found not to meet all the eligibility requirements wont be paid.

When we ask “Why do we pay?” a further answer often proffered is that “people are in need.” This is a particularly interesting answer because it meshes so well with a frequent answer to the last question, “Why don’t we pay”. Namely, “We need to distinguish between the ‘needy’ and the ‘greedy’.” This answer is sometimes expressed in terms of “We need to prevent ‘welfare dependency’ to ‘weed out rorters’ ‘stop dole bludging’ or ‘prevent malingering’.” The architects of the social coalition (Howard 1999, 2000, Newman 1999) who have done so much to promote downward envy provide the further rationalisation that if people receive social welfare “then it is only fair that they give something back in return”. Such alleged cures for “welfare dependency” are not unique to Australia (Atkinson 2002, Mead 1997, Murray 1984, Green 1996). The efficacy of such “cures” is equally ardently questioned (Standing 2002, Handler 2002, Mink 1998, Lerner, Clark & Needham 1999, Van Parijs 1997).

This paper will not elaborated upon compelled non-standard work, “welfare to work”, or “workfare” or the like promoted by Lawrence Mead (1997) and others in the United States or David Green (1996) in Britain. I have discussed such schemes in detail elsewhere (Tomlinson 2003 , 2002[a]).

Boston and St John (1998) have established the impossibility of ensuring all who qualify for categorical welfare receive it. They point to the presence of discretion as a major reason. Such discretion is widespread in the present administration of current Centrelink policies (Ziguras, Dufty and Considine 2003, ACOSS 2003, 2002, 2001, Schooneveldt 2002) and impacts most heavily on the most disadvantaged.

Stigma

Whether one wants to go back to some of the classic writers (Polanyi 1945, Piven and Cloward 1971, Jordan 1973, Sennett and Cobb 1973, Waxman 1977) or to move forward to the writings of Standing (2001, 2002) there are similar lessons to draw. Those who want to cut the amount spent on welfare will want to return to the less eligibility provisions of the poor laws to divide the world into the good and the bad, the worthy and the unworthy. Less eligibility reinforces the sense of stigma experienced by those who are forced to rely on welfare. Hence it is likely to discourage many from applying even though they have an entitlement should they have any other alternative. The classic writers have shown that a significant percentage of people choose hunger in preference to welfare. Those who want to ensure that no one goes to sleep hungry will move towards universal provision or at least broad categorical assistance efficiently delivered (Boston and St John 1998, Goodin and Le Grand 1987).

By the early 1970s Australia had come to embrace a progressive European approach to those who found themselves in need of social services and much of the stigma previously associated with receipt of benefits evaporated. There was a significant effort made to improve services to clients, expand eligibility, increase consistency of determinations and decrease poverty from this time under both Labor and Liberal administrations until the late 1980s / early 1990s.

A more jealous husband

The Howard Government’s 1996 election and its determination to win “the culture wars” have seen this nation return to earlier welfare attitudes. There has been a shift towards American welfare values (Standing 2001, Hutton 2002). In recent years the Howard Government has stepped up its dependency rhetoric in a determined effort to delegitimise the claims of many social security recipients. It has coupled this assault on pre-existing entitlements with a rigorous breaching regime designed to enforce what it alleges are “mutual obligations”. This has created situations very reminiscent of those that the American social critic  (Mink 1998 p.35) described when she said:

Across the decades, a principle aim of welfare fixers has been to restore the system’s moral levers….Despite their broadsides against ‘dependency’ welfare reformers have been less concerned that poor single mothers are economically dependent than that they have been dependent on government. They expect that mothers will be dependent but insist that they be dependent on men.

All this is reminiscent of the earlier feminist assault upon the excesses of the imposed obligations of the welfare system when Glassman (1970 pp. 102-103) suggested that the State is capable of becoming “a more jealous husband than the man the woman has left”.

Some forms of income support

Participation Income

Participation Income, sometimes referred to as active labour market policies, is very widespread in the present Australian system of income support. Essentially participation income means if you don’t participate then you are refused assistance. Participation income is a euphemism for the chance to impose an obligation on people who receive government or government-subsidised payments coupled with the paternalistic belief that imposed obligations will assist the recipient to improve their life. Many researchers have described the philosophical underpinnings of participation income as unethical (Kinnear 2000, Goodin 2001, Hammer 2002, Tomlinson 2002[a], [b]) because the only choice offered to welfare recipients is comply or starve. The practical outcomes for those who are breached are socially disastrous (ACOSS 2003, 2002, 2001, Schooneveldt 2002, Ziguras, Dufty and Considine 2003). Evidence is emerging from the United States suggesting that having one’s social security reduced or removed creates increased health difficulties for children of beneficiaries who are breached (Cook, Frank, Berkowitz, Black, Casey, Cutts, Meyers, Zaldivar, Skalicky, Levenson and Heeren 2002).

Professor Robert Goodin (2001 p.198) makes the point that:

If we seriously believe that work is good for you and that it is the state’s legitimate role to force you to do it, then we would have no grounds for confining our paternalism to the poor. Paternalistically speaking, it would be equally important to make the rich work too.

Guy Standing, Director of the Socio-Economic Security Programme of the International Labour Organisation, notes that governments around the world are increasingly using social policy terms to convey false or misleading ideas. He wrote:

The notion of active labour market policy is equally disingenuous. Who could possibly favour being passive if one could be active?  The word ‘active’ seems virile and strong, whereas its opposite, ‘passive’, suggests laziness, and lack of initiative. In fact, usually active policy is little more than having the state telling people what they must do in order to receive some moderate state benefit, directing them to training or job schemes. By contrast, the much derided passive policy entails giving funds to individuals or families with minimal conditions, leaving them to make choices about how to conduct their lives and allocate resources. It could more fairly be described as liberating (Standing 2001 p. 14 [italics in original]).

The Job Guarantee

A job guarantee can only exist when a government is prepared to commit itself to becoming an employer of last resort. In the last thirty years there have been two forms of limited job guarantee provided by Australian governments. The first in the 1970s, under the Whitlam Labor Government, was the Regional Employment Development Scheme, colloquially named the Red Scheme; and the second was the job offer, after 18 months unemployment, under the Keating Labor’s Working Nation package in the mid 1990s. The Centre for Full Employment and Equity (at the University of Newcastle) is promoting the most detailed current Australian proposal for a job guarantee (Mitchell, Cowling and Watts 2003, see also Watts 2002).

Those who are available and capable of doing the work on offer under the job guarantee will be assisted by such a scheme. But the reasons that prevent those who cannot find suitable child care, those who have a disability and those who are discouraged from seeking work under the present employment regime will also prevent them taking up a job under the job guarantee, unless such issues are addressed by the architects of the job guarantee or potential employers.

There is nothing incompatible with making such accommodations under a Job Guarantee program, however deciding who is “disabled” and who is “malingering” creates similar bureaucratic discretionary power as occurs in categorical systems.

Negative Income Tax, Tax Credits, Guaranteed Minimum Income 

Major difficulties in terms of determination/fairness are embedded in each of these systems of income distribution/redistribution. What’s more, the difficulties in relation to fair outcomes, in terms of poverty traps, determination/discretion/discrimination, allocative and redistribution aspects of each of these systems face many questions of a similar nature to those in categorical social security systems. One possible improvement of these systems over categorical income support is that the discretion of bureaucrats to consider social features is more limited in Negative Income Tax, Tax Credit and Guaranteed Minimum Income schemes. Each of these schemes is discussed in detail elsewhere (Tomlinson, Harrington and Schooneveldt 2003).

What is a Basic Income?

A full Basic Income is a universal payment paid to each permanent resident, as an individual, irrespective of their personal or social circumstances.

The idea of a universal Basic Income is not new. The first fully elaborated book-length Basic Income proposal, in the English language, was written by Dennis Milner in 1920. Walter Van Trier (1995) provides a comprehensive account of the history of that proposal and competing ideas for improving the system of income support.

In order to ensure that no-one supported by the present social security system is disadvantaged by the change from social security to Basic Income, the adult rate of the Basic Income would need to be at the single (living alone) age pension rate. This rate would be maintained as at present by indexation with full-time average weekly earnings.  The rate of payment for children will be dependant upon what other income support payments remain after the introduction of a Basic Income (Tomlinson, Harrington and Schooneveldt 2003).

Most existing forms of government-provided social security would be abolished and replaced by the Basic Income. Payments made to meet specific needs, such as allowances paid in respect of caring for a child with a disability, would not be abolished because they are designed to compensate for a specific disadvantage or the extra costs associated with experiencing a disability or both.

Macroeconomic impacts

It is worth noting that the introduction of a Negative Income Tax, Tax Credit, Guaranteed Minimum Income, Job Guarantee or a Basic Income scheme would have considerable macroeconomic consequences. Each of these schemes would transfer considerable income to poorer sections of society and would most likely increase consumer spending. As poorer people save less of the money they obtain than do rich people there would be a net boost to the economy.

The extent of that boost to the economy would depend on the generosity of the payments involved, the extent of universalism of the payment and the income tax rate. Clearly the most universal payment, such as a Basic Income, would transfer income to more poor people than would a Job Guarantee, which would only increase the amount of income obtained by those who accept the Job Guarantee. A Job Guarantee may result in substantially increased production (depending on how it was designed) that might have economic multiplier effects, which a Basic Income would not necessarily create. Some of the stimulus to the economy might be dampened by the rate of income tax imposed as a part of the introduction of any of these schemes. The Government in Ireland believes that it can afford a Basic Income with an income tax rate of 43 percent (Healy and Reynolds 2002, Tomlinson, Harrington and Schooneveldt 2003).

How secure is the system of income support in your country?

In Australia the system of social security is paid for out of consolidated revenue raised from all forms of taxes and charges levied by the Federal Government. Some people have the idea that the taxes they pay throughout their lives is used to pay their age pension when they retire, or their unemployment benefit when they get the sack, or their disability support pension should they become disabled. But their money that Joe Blogs pays in taxes does not sit around somewhere in the Federal Capital slowly gathering dust until Joe become old, unemployed or disabled. Monies that come in to the Federal coffers in 2002/2003 pay for the social services provided by the Federal Government in 2003. There are no earmarked taxes from which social services are paid. During the 1940s and 1950s there was a Welfare Fund but the Menzies Government abolished it in the early 1960s (Smith 1993 pp. 54-55). The taxes raised today pay the social services today.

In Europe government controlled social insurance funds ensure the majority of full time workers against major income loss in the event of non-voluntary unemployment. But again, the bulk of money paid out to unemployed workers in 2003 is raised by workers’ contributions to “unemployed insurance” in 2002/2003, though some money may be drawn from existing insurance reserves.

Most Australians in work are, apart from paying their taxes, required to pay into private superannuation. The major players in the insurance industry control such funds. Claims are in substantial part paid out of reserves. At least 10% of superannuation funds are as safe as the shareholdings in the, now bankrupt, insurance company HIH. Paying into privatised superannuation funds is as fulfilling as becoming a late joiner in a pyramid selling scheme: “Amway your way to happiness”. There is no guarantee that the majority of contributors to privatised superannuation schemes will receive anything like a reasonable return on their investment. Many will not recoup the monies they paid in and a significant number may not get any money from their superannuation on retirement (Hayes 2002 p.1). The majority of superannuation funds lost money in 2001/2 and the majority of “non-industry” funds lost money in 2002/3.

If private superannuation schemes were such a brilliant idea the politicians would insist that their government guaranteed superannuation funds were transferred to the private sector. The unions were sold a pup when they agreed to trade off salary increases for an expansion in the social wage. Privatised superannuation was just a part of that trade-off. I warned about the insecurity of privatised superannuation over a decade ago (ACTCOSS 1991). Howard has dismantled much of the social wage the Hawke/Keating Governments offered the unions as a trade off for reducing their wage demands. Medicare is no longer universal, there have been cutbacks in social security provision, the Arbitration Commission, like many other industrial safeguards, has been placed on a tight leash. The industrial landscape is now dominated by individualised work contracts, enterprise bargaining agreements and deregulation in increasingly casualised, part-time and precarious employment (LHMU 2003).

Employment is the most common way of avoiding poverty; yet, it is a decreasing option for many who find themselves marginalised in the labour market. There has always been a reserve army of labour but these days its ranks are swelled by those recently compelled by more stringent enforcement regimes of activity testing, “mutual obligation” and “participation income”. At the same time, more and more people are working full-time and living in poverty as a result of “workfare”, traineeships and such like employment options.

In Indigenous communities a form of “work for the dole” the Community Development Employment program  (CDEP) has been operating since 1977 (Coombs1994 pp.162-170). In many communities real unemployment levels are in the order of 80 to 90% once the CDEP is recognised as a form of welfare rather than an employment option. Underdevelopment, disillusion and poverty are a common consequence in many Indigenous communities (Tomlinson 2003 Ch. 6). If CDEP is the answer then we are asking the wrong question. Like workfare and “work for the dole” programs in the wider community CDEP can’t help people escape poverty for the very reason that in such remote areas there are few, if any, full time award rates jobs available (Borland, Gregory and Sheehan citied in Cowling, Mitchell and Watts 2003 pp.2-3). People on the CDEP are paid at poverty line levels and in the absence of alternative income sources that is where they remain.

Social security and social insurance systems in many parts of Europe, in Australia and elsewhere have, as a result of the neo-liberal onslaught, been increasingly targeted, eligibility conditions tightened, obligations added and stigma increased (Standing 2001, Hutton 2002, Handler 2002).

No form of social provision can absolutely ensure security, or even consistency, over time. Governments change and subsequently alter entitlements. This is increasingly happening in Europe with limitations on the conditions of entitlement for unemployment insurance (Standing 2001). Even so, government provision of income support has to be substantially more secure than private provision partly because it is capable of spreading the risk (that there will not be funds available to pay income support) over an entire population. Universal Basic Income schemes are more secure than categorical social security because every one gets the payment so everyone has at least some interest in maintaining the value of the payment (Le Grand and Goodin 1987).

An interesting dilemma

Much of the literature dealing with the concept of Basic Income notes that a Basic Income severs the nexus between income and work. A recent Centre for Full Employment and Equity Working Paper (Cowling, Mitchell and Watts 2003), which sets out to compare the virtues of a Job Guarantee with a Basic Income, was entitled “The right to work versus the right to income”. This paper argues that a full employment strategy, beyond generating sufficient hours of work to satisfy the preferences of the labour force, requires that full employment: “not threaten the distribution of real income”, “have inflation control mechanisms built in”, be accessible to the “disadvantaged” and “must not violate the social attitudes towards work and non-work” (pp. 8-9): a very conservative agenda indeed.

The social prescription explicit in the current participation income system in England (Atkinson 2002) has a lot in common with the present Australian participation income system. Both governments coerce unemployed worker to accept any available work. Neither of them guarantees a job to those eager to work as does a job guarantee. A Job guarantee, which refuses to pay income support to those who wont accept available jobs on offer, shares features with the present Australian Government’s breaching of those they deem to have failed to meet their “mutual obligations”.

Australia has experienced the captains of industry gaining disproportionate rewards – the ratio between Chief Executive Officers’ salaries and those of workers has risen from 3 times workers’ salaries in the 1970s to 74 times workers’ salaries – (Shields, O’Donnell and O’Brien 2003). It is disconcerting to find job guarantee advocates arguing that the job guarantee should “not threaten the (existing) distribution of real income”. In Australia in 2003, where John Howard has imposed his very own form of “mutual obligation” on unemployed people and is moving to envelop lone parents and those with disabilities in similar compelled activities, I would have thought it important that progressive advocates use every opportunity to question the current “social attitudes towards work and non-work”.

Hopefully, this country might adopt measures that would usher in what Claus Offe (1992) calls “non-productivist” social policies, or what the feminist writer Sibyl Schwarzenbach (2002) describes as “reproductive” social policies and thereby end 400 year long obsession with a Lockean production model so that civil and individual satisfaction might be placed in advance of the production of things.

One of the prime motivations that I felt was driving Cowling, Mitchell and Watts’ (2003) paper was the need to ensure that all who wanted paid employment were provided with the opportunity to obtain it.  If I am interpreting the motivations of the authors correctly, this suggestion itself confronts a widely held view about work and non-work in Australia. Namely, employers choose which and how many employees they want to work for them and that those potential workers who are surplus to demand should find other ways of surviving.

An examination of the preoccupation with employment and, particularly, the work income nexus reveals that this work income nexus is linked to a wider ideological debate. This nexus is a metaphor for a far broader collection of social preoccupations about desert. One might ask is it work or income that is the just desert?

Certainly the implementation of a fully universal Basic Income would succeed in relegating to the dustbin of history the work income nexus but it would do much more. It would sever the connection (at least in relation to fundamental income support) between income and worth. Those Basic Income advocates from Milner (1920) through to more recent supporters (Van Parijs 1997, Lerner, Clark and Needham 1999, Murray 1997, George 2002, Handler 2002, Standing 2002, Tomlinson 2003 ) have set out to erase the stigma-inducing stain of the poor laws’  system of less eligibility with its distinction between who is worthy and who is unworthy.

Basic Income advocates are not unmindful of the necessity to produce sufficient goods and services so as to develop the capacity to pay all, including those who don’t directly add to productive capacity, an income sufficient to sustain them. Milner (1920) specifically addressed the issue of those, whom he indelicately termed, “slackers” (in Chapter 6) and inefficient workers in Chapter 3. Like most, if not all, Basic Income advocates he did not think that work disincentives created by the presence of a Basic Income were likely to cause widespread work avoidance or productivity problems. It is interesting how many “participation income” proponents (Atkinson 2002), “job guarantee” supporters (Cowling, Mitchell and Watts 2003), “tax credits” for workers supporters (Phelps 2000) are troubled by the spectre of Philippe Van Parijs’ (1997) “free loading surfers”. Such an analysis drives the Howard Government’s preoccupation with “welfare dependency” and “mutual obligation”. Joel Handler (2002) points out that these concerns can be traced back to the possibility enshrined in the 1348 Labourers Act that welfare relief might assist “sturdy beggars”. Concepts such as “mutual obligation”, “participation income” and the “deserving/undeserving” dichotomy have a very long history indeed.

The fact that arguments (about “welfare dependency”, lesser eligibility, the poor’s fecklessness, the associated need for coercion and the importance of increasing the huge differentials in income between the owning and labouring classes) are a nonsense, does not make them any less valued. John Kenneth Galbraith ridiculed such arguments by pointing out “It always boils down to the highly improbable case that the rich are not working because they have too little income and the poor because they have too much (Cited in Boreham, Dow & Leet 1999 p.104)”.

It is one thing to assume that work is such an unmitigated blessing that governments have a duty to provide the opportunity to work to all those without employment. But proponents of participation income (Howard 1999, Newman 1999, McClure 2000) engage in an interesting twist of logic. They suggest that when governments are incapable of providing, or unwilling to provide, the opportunity to work to all those without employment but are prepared to pay a social security benefit then those who are not able to find suitable employment have an obligation to accept any available employment or to make some other government approved contribution in return for this pittance. This is a transfer of obligation from the government to the unemployed individual. There is nothing mutual about such “mutual obligation”.

Cowling, Mitchell and Watts’ (2003) paper seems to be asserting that if Government were to provide a guaranteed job that those who claim unemployed benefits must accept such an offer. At last years’ conference I argued that once a Basic Income was in place, a sensible additional social wage component would be to supplement the Basic Income scheme with a job guarantee scheme (Tomlinson 2002[b]). Then there would be income for all, as well as work for all who wanted it.  Under such a system, people could not be coerced to work on the threat of starvation (Goodin 2001).

If there is going to be a significant effort to provide jobs for all who want paid work, then many of those jobs will be in the educational, community, education and welfare sectors, as was suggested by Langmore and Quiggin (1994). In each of these sectors, the prime requirement of any worker is that they are committed to serving the interests of their clients. Coerced workers could not be usefully employed in such sectors.

Conclusion

The increasingly casualised and precarious nature of employment means that it alone cannot be relied upon as a way to ensure an income above the poverty line. The increasingly targeted social security system with expanded breaching and imposed obligations has removed any security from the social welfare safety net. Private provision, whether by unemployment insurance, superannuation, or employment, cannot ensure income security for the bulk of the population. A job guarantee cannot, on its own, ensure that all are lifted beyond poverty. Only a fully universal Basic Income is capable of ensuring that all permanent residents are provided with an income above the poverty line.

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From the Poor Laws to welfare wars

Following his 1996 election victory, Prime Minister Howard set out to sculpture the social landscape of Australia.  In 1999 in his Roundtable Speech Howard clearly laid out his prescription of economic fundamentalism and social conservatism. To many on the left, this speech evoked memories of FJ Holdens and white picket fences. Few had any idea of how far back this Prime Minister would go for a model of his ‘social welfare safety net’.

In 1996 Hugh Stretton gave the Fifteenth Sambell Memorial Oration entitled ‘Poor laws of 1834 and 1996’.  He opened his address by saying ‘Both meanings of the title are intended: laws to deal with British and Australian poor at different dates, and also laws of poor quality.’

In the early 1960s I undertook a social work degree and was told by the lecturers that the Australian social security system eschewed the British system of poor law relief and in particular the division which the poor law system made between the deserving and undeserving poor. My lecturers suggested that, in place of such a stigmatising categorisation, the Australian social security system attempted to discern those who were eligible for legislated benefits and those who weren’t. That, whilst our system had some continuities with Britain, the Australian social security system had been influenced by Bismarck’s social insurance reforms in Germany, the labour movement’s ideas about egalitarianism and universal rights. Certainly such relatively progressive ideas were part of the intellectual underpinnings of the system of social security at the time. These ideas were to become a central component of the Whitlam Government’s efforts to reinvigorate the welfare state between 1972-75.

In 1965 I went to work for the Department of Social Services as it was then called. It was not long before I was to encounter homeless men being refused ‘Invalid Pensions’. Their letters of rejection read, ‘You are not deemed worthy to receive a pension on account of your alcoholism’. The Act and associated regulations specified that applicants for pensions had to be ‘of good character’ to receive a pension. This wording remained unchanged until Bill Hayden became Minister for Social Security in the Whitlam Government. The system of emergency assistance and eligibility for most of the ancillary welfare services accessed by my clients distinguished between the deserving and undeserving at every turn.

In 1975 the Australian Journal of Social Issues published an article of mine entitled ‘The Importance of Being Worthy’. This article pointed to the frequent use in Australian social welfare of the distinction between the deserving and the undeserving applicant. Clearly whilst some social security payments, for example Child Endowment, were universal and without asset or means tests, most were available only to limited groups of people. Indigenous Australians living on missions and settlements were excluded from many social security payments.

1975 was the year that the first main report of the Henderson Poverty Inquiry recommended that Australia adopt a guaranteed minimum income. It was also the year of the Whitlam Government’s dismissal.

The politics of division

The political party system of government, by its nature, creates schisms in the body politic. The parties set out to establish their differences from each other. Sometimes the differences between the parties are a matter of style (tweedledee and tweedledum Labour and Liberal policies on asylum seekers in 2002) and sometimes there are ideological chasms dividing the various parties (Communist and Liberal Parties in the 1960s). Political parties consciously attempt to attract supporters for their policies and to denigrate those who are attracted to the other party’s platforms.

In recent years John Howard and his colleagues have intentionally set out to divide sections of the population from other parts of the society. His first really successful campaign was to change the Native Title Act in 1998 in the wake of the Wik Judgement.  In that campaign he drove a wedge between Indigenous Australians and non-Indigenous Australians and succeeded in pushing through the Parliament legislation which took the ownership of land which the High Court had found to reside with the traditional owners and transferred elements of that ownership to pastoralists, miners and farmers (who the High court had found did not have title). His most successful campaign, that which undermined the rights of asylum seekers, occurred in the run up to and aftermath of the 2002 election.

In addition to both these campaigns there have been two less racist, but equally relentless struggles being waged  to divide the population. The first is the constant assault upon the trade union movement and the second is the denigration of welfare recipients.  It is to the later of these two struggle to which I will return shortly.

The essence of the politics of division is to alert people to aspects of difference, to suggest that presence of difference equates to the existence of a threat, and finally to create in the minds of both sections of the recently divided that in relation to this particular issue there can only be one winner, that someone has to lose, and that the struggle is important – if not crucial. It is always easier to drive in the wedge if there are distinguishing features in the two groups; race and gender work a treat. It can be helpful if there are historical residues present, say in relation to Indigenous and non-Indigenous people or bosses and workers. But any potential divide will do. One component usually present in such division is envy. Clearly every worker can conceive of being envious of his or her over-paid CEO. Howard’s greatest success is that he has managed to get the better off to become envious of any benefit poorer Australians obtain.

Downward envy

The Howard Government, in 1996, started its attack on welfare recipients by targeting young unemployed people. It began by suggesting that young unemployed people were not interested in finding employment and lacked job skills. Howard’s solution was to impose a ‘work for the dole’ scheme upon them. In many ways this scheme was a reimposition of a 1930s Depression program that had forced unemployed men to do civic works in return for providing them with sustenance. During the Depression the scheme was given the nickname of ‘the susso’. There was a similar scheme the Community Employment Development Program (CDEP) that had been instigated on Indigenous communities in 1977 as a way of avoiding paying unemployment benefits.

At the time of the introduction of the ‘work for the dole’ program I wrote:

Chain Gang

Work for the dole
well ‘Bless my soul’
what an interesting idea.
You would have thought
that someone ought
to have thought of that 
before this year.

Didn’t they try to do it in 1929?
Wasn’t it then the susso scheme?
When men had to leave their families
to go the great out back?

It was the stamp of feet
on the dusty street,
which ensured that they would eat.
The Susso was what it was called
and civilised folks were quite appalled
that men were forced from town to town,
with a swag on their back
and an old corn sack,
as they headed for the great out back.

They have a scheme just like it
for those who are born black;
they work from home,
aren’t forced to roam,
’cause they live in the great out back.
Of course we only pay a pittance,
a charitable remittance,
but what do you expect in the country
when you live so far from town.

The one good thing I have to say
is the Government has promised  it will pay
three dollars an hour for a twenty hour week.
Now that’s the going rate.
Dole bludgers don’t be late!!!
It will only apply to the young,
and of course the rural poor,
and the run down areas of cities
where unemployment is a running sore.

I expected Liberal Party stalwarts and other bourgeois elements to applaud this imposition upon young people who were unable to find work but was amazed by the widespread working class support that such policies evoked. Even some pensioners and older unemployment beneficiaries joined the chorus of approval for the song sheet which read ‘make all the young dole bludgers work, don’t let the young dole bludgers shirk’. Some of us tried to remind them of Angela Davis’ call for solidarity

‘If they come for me in the morning, they’ll come for you at night’. We pointed to experience of Pastor Martin Neimoller, who suffered Nazi persecution, and who had written:

First they came for the Communists,
but I was not a Communist so I did not speak out.
Then they came for the Socialists and the Trade Unionists,
but I was neither, so I did not speak out.
Then they came for the Jews,
but I was not a Jew so I did not speak out.
And when they came for me,
there was no one left to speak out for me.

Solidarity eluded us. It was not long before the Howard Government succeeded in abolishing unemployment payments to the 16-18 year old Australians not at work and not in training. It also extended the ‘work for the dole’ program to older unemployed people. It is now in the process of extending, to lone parents and disability support pensioners, their very own forms of mutual compulsion.

And all the while the denigration of those reliant upon social security payments grows shriller. The Howard Government claims it is assisting social security recipients to avoid the scourge of ‘welfare dependency’. Part of such ‘assistance’ included the imposition of 386,946 breaches on social security recipients in the financial year 2001-2. This left many without any form of government income support for periods of up to 6 months (2).

The Government claims that it is generating public support for the ‘genuinely needy’ in our community by expressing such ‘tough love’ towards those who might commit such heinous crimes as being late for a Centrelink appointment or not filling in their dole diary properly.

The opposite is now true. Those lucky enough to have paid employment are increasingly questioning the desirability of paying unemployed people a benefit because by doing so it means their taxes go to pay for it. Many people are now applauding Howard’s suggestion that if disability support pensioners, lone parents and people who can’t find employment are to be provided with poverty line income support that ‘it is only fair that they give something back in return’. This is downward envy. This is socially divisive. More importantly, those working class ‘battlers’ who complain the loudest are acting against their own long-term best interests. They are the workers most likely to be displaced from employment by the increasingly globalised and casualised industrial arrangements that are sweeping Australia. They are the very people who stand to gain the most from a secure, universal and generous income support system, such as an unconditional Basic Income (3).

Those opposed to living in such a socially divided society or who abhor the extent of downward envy in their neighbourhoods need to act. They must examine the genealogy of such values so as to be in a position to explain them in order to combat them.

From where does support for the imposition of obligations upon welfare recipients derive?

Given the link to the poor laws division between the deserving and undeserving poor which was present in many aspects of income support in the Australian system I went back to Karl Polanyi’s classic 1945 text The Great Transformation.  There are certainly similarities between the Polanyi’s description of the 1834 and 1601 Poor Laws and the system of welfare administration under the Howard Government. Polanyi’s elaboration upon the 1795 Speenhamland system of outdoor relief also echoes through the current debates (4). In Before the Welfare State, Ursula Henriques describing the 1601 Poor Law discusses secular Puritanism concluding that:

The association of words which implied that the destitute, especially those who could be called “able bodied”, were destitute by their own fault quietened the conscience of those who suffered from or feared the growing cost of poor relief…the whole moral justification of the deterrent workhouse was that it would drive those able to work into finding employment (p. 23).

Henriques suggests that in the run up to the introduction of the 1834 Poor Law ‘harsh attitudes were commonest amongst the lesser ratepayers…This “petty bourgeoisie”  had the strongest temptation to repudiate those whom the cost of helping was high (p. 24)’.

Cambridge historian Anne Digby in her book Pauper Palaces investigated the 18th and 19th centuries poor law administration in Norfolk. She concluded that there was considerable variation over time and from parish to parish: from the gentry’s benevolent paternalism to ‘local farmers (who) administered poor relief to further there own ends as employers (p.229)’. Digby argues that the poor and the landholders generally favoured out door relief to indoor workhouse (some times called the ‘house of industry’). The reason being that, though the food was often of a high standard in the workhouses, the authoritarian regimes imposed in such places demolished the freedom and dignity of the inmates. Digby does acknowledge the widespread and prolonged unrest in many parts of Norfolk, and in many workhouses, and the general resistance of people to become pauper inmates of such places, yet the thrust of much of her analysis is aimed at demolishing the picture of such workhouses painted by East Anglian poet George Crabbe in the late 18th century:

Your plan I love not, with a number you
Have placed your poor, your pitiable few:
There, in one house, throughout their lives to be,
The pauper palace which they hate to see:
That giant-building, that high-bounding wall,
Those bare worn walks, that lofty thund’ring hall!
That large loud clock, which tolls each dreaded hour,
It is a prison with a milder name,
Which few inhabit without dread or shame. (5)

Conclusion

Australia may not have reached the stage in its welfare wars that present practices rival the stigma of the workhouse. But the terror inflicted on asylum seekers and their children by locking them up for indefinite years behind razor wire in the desert or on some pacific atoll, where they are addressed by numbers not their names, subdued with guns and teargas and where many guards show indifference to their plight has strong residues with the workhouses of 17th –20th Century in England.

The current treatment of Australian citizens who have committed the dastardly act of failing to remain employed may not have sunk to levels of depravity inflicted upon out of work labourers in 18th and 19th century England but the Howard Government refuses to provide income support for many who fail to meet every letter of the raft of obligations imposed upon them.

Many employed citizens gleefully envy the poverty line income support provided those struggling to survive unemployment, precarious or part-time employment in an increasingly uncaring world. They happily dob in their neighbours to Centrelink enforcers as several Howard Government Ministers have encouraged them to do.

Indigenous Australians die on average 20 years younger than other Australians (6). About 80 percent of Indigenous Australians living in rural and remote Australia have few opportunities to obtain any award-waged work. They can at best hope to get a CDEP job paid at welfare benefits rates (7).

Stigma is again a frequently used tool to ration access to welfare benefits. The solidarity between worker and workless, city and country people, Indigenous and non-Indigenous citizens, refugees or asylum seekers and other Australians that remains exists in spite of the Howard Government.

It’s the armless and the harmless
the senseless and the lame
who always pay the social cost
who always get the blame.

It’s the snivellers and the chisellers
The swindlers and the vain
ripping off the profits
and it’s always been the same.

When I speak of social justice
you ask ‘What will it cost us?’
Advance Australia fairly,
Advance Australia squarely,
and let us reach the further shore
in the best way that we can .(8)

In 2003, Liberal and Labor politicians proclaim the virtues, in an increasingly competitive world, of the ‘social coalition’, ‘social capital’ and ‘third way entrepreneurial’ adventures as a way to expand ‘human capital’. Such jargon distracts attention from the failure of Australian governments to provide health, social security and educational policies of a sufficiently comprehensive nature to create a caring, socially just society which would allow all the opportunity to achieve their full potential. The rhetoric of ‘reciprocal obligation’, ‘mutual obligation’ and ‘participation income’ deflects Australians from the need to provide an unconditional Basic Income which has the capacity to revitalise our social citizenship by ensuring that no permanent resident in this country is forced to live on a below poverty line income.

Footnotes

(1) The use of the term ‘welfare wars’ derives in part from the title of a recent social welfare text: Mendes, Philip. ‘Australia’s Welfare Wars.’ Sydney, University of New South Wales, 2003.
(2) ACOSS. Jobless fines hold up welfare reform, Australian Council of Social Services. 15th July, 2002.
http://www.acoss.org.au.info/2002
(3) Information on the campaign to introduce an unconditional Basic Income in Australia can be found at Basic Income Guarantee Australia
http://www.basicincome.qut.edu.au/index.jsp

This site also provides links to many International Basic Income sites.
(4) Marshall, John Duncan. The Old Poor Law 1795-1834. London and Basingstoke, Macmillian, 1968 concurs with Polanyi’s analysis.
(5) Crabbe, George. Cited in Digby, p.1.
(6)Australian Bureau of Statistics & Australian Institute of Health and Welfare ‘The Health and Welfare of Australia’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait Peoples.’ Canberra, ABS Cat. 4704.0, 2003.
(7) Abbott, Tony. “Bridging the Incentive Gap.” Australia Unlimited Conference, May 4, 1999. http://www.tonyabbott.com.au/speech/Incentive%20Gap.
(8)  Tomlinson, John.

Works Cited

Davis, Angela. If they come in the morning… London, Orbach and Chambers and Angela Davis Defence Committee, 1971.
Digby, Anne. London, Pauper Palaces. Henley and Boston,Routledge,1978.
Henderson, Ronald. Poverty in Australia: First Main Report. Vols. I & II Canberra, Australian Government, 1975.
Henriques, Ursula. Before the Welfare State: New York, Longman, 1979.
Howard, John. ‘Building a Stronger and Fairer Australia: Liberalisation in Economic Policy and Modern Conservatism in Social Policy.’ Address to ‘Australia Unlimited Roundtable.’ 4th. May, 1999.
http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/1999/AustraliaUnlimitedRoundtable.htm
Niemoller, Martin. Poem 1939
http://scott.hayes.org/thoughts/niemoller.html
Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation. London, Victor Gollancz, 1945.
Stretton, Hugh. Poor Laws of 1834 and 1996. Melbourne, Brotherhood of St Laurence, 1996
Tomlinson, John  ‘The Importance of Being Worthy’, Australian Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 10, No. 3, August 1975.

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Globalisation will save the nation

“Globalisation is what makes the world go round”
this chap in a suit told me as I sat on the ground.
Why then are billions starving?” I replied.
“Come now it’s not that bad” and then, in an aside
he suggested, “They are not starving, they’re waiting.
Waiting for wealth to slowly trickle down to them.
As the rich get richer they they’ll create jobs and then
and then we’ll all live happily ever after.”

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God on our side

During the latter part of the Second World War, once the tide had turned had turned against Japan, the Chifley Labor Government became concerned that Australian troops might return home not to a hero’s welcome but to unemployment. There was wide spread concern that the very people the Australian Government had trained to kill might, if confronted with the widespread unemployment many had experienced during the 1930s Depression, start culling surplus Labor politicians. Chifley’s response was to attempt to ensure job creation, expanded tertiary educational opportunities, setting up a Commonwealth employment finding service (which became known as the CES) and paid unemployment benefits. Ex-service personnel who had suffered disabling injuries were found jobs operating lifts in Department stores or as clerks in government departments.

The dismantling of the CES is now complete. If all that had happened was that one agency of government with its contradictory roles had been replaced by an improved bureaucracy there would be little concern. However, what we are witnessing is the end of the secular welfare state. We saw in the first round about 40% of the old CES clients staying with the government owned Employment National. This has been reduced to 1%. In the first round of contracts for profit companies got the loin’s share. but now the largest job agency in the Job Network is the Salvation Army’s Employment Plus. Closely followed by the Anglicans’ Mission Australia. The Catholic and United Churches also have been awarded a significant stake in the carve up. These Christian churches have extensive investment in nursing homes hostels, schools, child care, disability and other social welfare agencies.

Reports in the 29th December Sydney Morning Herald and in Johnathan Singer’s 19th January Green Left reveal these churches are demanding new employees have a Christian commitment. Australian welfare services are being returned to the pre-Whitlam period where conservative church agencies dominated much of the charity, emergency relief and service delivery. They did it on the cheap and the results they produced are revealed in reports of the

  • Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission’s report into the stolen generations entitled Bringing them home,
  • the abuse of the Nearacol and other orphanages
  • forced adoptions,
  • the brutal treatment of unmarried mothers who were not allowed to see their babies in many Salvation Army and other church run maternity units,
  • the incarceration of young women who were sexually abused by their fathers on the grounds that they were in “moral danger”, and
  • the pitifully small contribution the churches were able or willing to make to poverty alleviation.

The reinforcement of ‘Christian’ attitudes amongst employees of these agencies will produce the next round of silent, compliant accomplices to the denigration of those most marginal to the interests of the government. Since the mid 1970s they were likely to find advocates amongst secular human services workers, union delegates and other officials of good will who used to be able to rely on due process, natural justice, whistle blower legislation, public service regulations and union protection.

The abuse of children in orphanages, schools and other organs of the church by nuns and priests, was witnessed. It was known about but just like in the case of police observing police bashings there too a code of silence replaces the code of conduct.

 

Written circa 2002

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Greed is (not) good

ON LINE opinion – Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate

Posted Tuesday, 10 February 2009

Governments around the world are falling over themselves to engage in a Keynesian-style pump-priming of their economies. Until the mid-1970s Keynesian economics dominated fiscal thinking in Australia and much of the English-speaking world. Then came the neo-conservative economic fundamentalist-drive, led by Milton Friedman: Thatcherism in Britain, Reaganonomic supply-side economics in the United States, Rodgernomics in New Zealand and John Howard’s fiscal conservatism in Australia. In Australia, there were some promoters of economic fundamentalism whose grip on reality was so loose that they called their beliefs “economic rationalism”. There was no shortage of overpaid economists prepared to deride counter-cyclical pump-priming of the economy or anything else which sounded reminiscent of Keynesian thought.

There were always a few, like economic journalist Kenneth Davidson and Economics Professor Frank Stilwell, who clung tenaciously to a belief that Lord Keynes had a substantial contribution to make to modern economic thinking. But throughout the 1980s and 1990s the “greed is good” crowd, as aptly portrayed by Gordon Gekko, in the 1987 film Wall Street, proliferated. In the run-up to the 1993 election, John Hewson, who led the Liberal Party to defeat, repeated the mantra that “greed is good”.

The problem, which the elevation of greed to a moral virtue creates, is not so much the intense personal rivalries, or excessive competiveness it engenders as the lack of solidarity and downward envy (see Tomlinson, J. (1999) “The Politics of Envy.” Union Song Site) which emerge in the minds of those who are attracted to such a debilitating philosophical position. It matters not one jot whether it is:

  • President Clinton enforcing time-limited welfare assistance on supporting parents;
  • John Howard introducing “Work for the dole”, with more severe breaching regimes for supporting parents, or restricted eligibility conditions for Disability Support pensions; or
  • Jenny Macklin’s Intervention in Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory.

Once people come to accept the corrosive belief that because they don’t get government assistance to help raise their children or cope with a disability then no one should. And if they do then it should be doled out like charity from the parish poor box. Such people forget that they get tax cuts and government superannuation subsidies which the poor don’t get, nor do they seem to notice that they aren’t poor and they don’t have a disability.

It is not so long ago that our Treasurer was running around telling anyone who would listen that the inflation genie was out of the bottle. Then he argued that, because of the resources boom, Australia was well placed to avoid the worst of the world’s recession. In the wake of the downturn in international trade and the slowing of demand for our minerals, it would now seem that we may not be as well insulated as we once thought. Share and house prices are falling, unemployment is rising, inflation is falling, we are heading for budget deficits, business confidence is low and ordinary workers are worried about the coming economic downturn. Those with private superannuation investment accounts have seen the value of their savings shrink. They look at an older generation of retirees who have indexed superannuation pensions and wonder how it is that many of the recently retired were conned into investing in accumulation accounts. Worse off still are those who have invested in developers or retailers who have gone into receivership.

In 1976, the Hancock Committee recommended to the Australian Government a national superannuation scheme which would have been a taxpayer-funded social insurance superannuation scheme similar to that of New Zealand and several countries in Europe. Hancock’s idea was not embraced and superannuation was put on the back burner until the Hawke/Keating government introduced a compulsory private superannuation scheme. Many of those currently seeing their private superannuation savings dribble away might reflect on the advantages of universal payments over individual investment accounts.

During the Howard years those who looked closely at the social security system in Australia witnessed just how easily various categories of recipients could be scapegoated. First it was the young unemployed who were subjected to the euphemistically named “Mutual Obligation” regime. Eventually all recipients were subjected to the regime. The many categories of social security benefit with their differing rates and eligibility conditions make it nearly impossible to generate solidarity across the entire range of recipients. Downward envy was cleverly employed by Howard and his associates to divide those in paid work from those outside the labor market.

During times of war and economic depression/recession many learn or relearn the lesson of Aesop’s fable about the four oxen and the lion and remember that “united we stand, divided we fall”. Instead of having many types of welfare payments, retirement incomes, student allowances, family payments, privatised superannuation, tax cuts and rural assistance schemes, all with their different levels of payment, we could have a system of Basic Income which paid every permanent resident an above poverty line income. This would ensure there was a financial floor beneath every individual and family in Australia without imposing a ceiling beyond which no one could rise.

In addition to ensuring economic security, because a Basic Income is an equal payment which is paid unconditionally as a right of residency/citizenship, such a universal payment enhances egalitarianism and feelings of social solidarity.

Whether it is President Obama calling on the US Senate or speaking to the population at large he is asking all Americans to make a sacrifice in the common interest. Similar mechanisms are in place in the Australian context when Prime Minister Rudd speaks about fiscal stimulus measures to support the economy. Leaders around the world when they speak to their people about the need to work together to escape the current recession are evoking the spirit of Aesop’s fable. President Obama explicitly criticised Wall Street banking executives for awarding themselves $20 billion in bonus payments at a time when the tax payer is bailing out failing banks.

Greed does not even seem to be good for rich banking executives. They don’t seem to understand that it has been their behaviour which has, at least in part, led to the current economic meltdown. Unless a more egalitarian solidarity begins to emerge then the chances that US bankers and their physicians will heal themselves is slim indeed. Alaska has a small Basic Income scheme in place and it is the most egalitarian of the states of the United States.

The idea of introducing a Basic Income for every person on the entire planet seemed very optimistic a couple of years ago, but if the US is going to cure its Wall Street bankers of their excessive bonus problem then it could find that a worldwide Basic Income might help. Bankers might just come to see that humanitarian ideas are productive rather than being an obstacle to sustainable growth and capital accumulation. The real advantage which a worldwide Basic Income delivers is healthier populations which could increase production of more tradable products and more self-sustaining food production. This would increase world trade and with that help lift many nations out of this recession.

I fear, however, that the lack of trust and the fear that someone else is getting something for nothing will stand in the way. That is, the “greed is good” mentality still lingers in the minds of the power elites. Too many of them think it’s all right for privileged individuals to get something for nothing – that is how they’ve lived their entire lives – but it is abhorrent that poor people should get justice, equality, decency, and humanity; let alone something for nothing.

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Guaranteed Minimum Income: Obstacles to income guarantees

Published in ACTCOSS News Nov-Dec 1987

The Main Report of the Poverty Inquiry was published in April 1975. It made many suggestions for improving the lot of the poorest Australians. The majority of those suggestions consisted of plans to extend the existing welfare system in terms of both amount and coverage. Amongst the many recommendations which have been implemented are the introduction of the Supporting Parents Benefit; a Zone Allowance for isolated areas; the conversion of tax deductions into increased Family Allowances; increased income relief for poor farmers; the extension of home help services; the liberalisation of the Supplementary Assistance means test and the setting up of a federal emergency assistance program. But other suggestions have not been adopted, and of these the most notable was the recommendation to introduce a guaranteed minimum income (GMI).

The political obstacles to any form of universal income guarantee are different from impediments in the way of most other social welfare policy changes in Australia. Because universal income guarantees would involve a major restructuring of the welfare and tax systems, it could not be tacked on to the existing system of welfare delivery as was the Family Income Supplement. It would necessitate an increase in government outlays (most of which would be recouped through the income tax system). It would remove the concept of charity and replace it with a rights orientated approach to income maintenance. It would abolish the worker/welfare recipient divide in a way which the Family Income Supplement could have done, but failed to do because of the low take-up rate.

Income guarantees herald the possibility of a major redistribution downwards. A universal program would affect everyone; it is a move in the direction of promoting equality in a most inequitable society. The scope of changes required is bound to create, in the transition period, considerable debate.

Whilst governments maintain the myth of the stereotypical nuclear family with its presumed equitable intra-family transfer of income, they can avoid addressing the frequent inequalities which are prevalent inside families. If governments were to accept that massive intra-family inequalities often occur, they would be forced to recognise that, if equity or equality was the intended goal of social welfare policy, it would be necessary to create policy based around the individual, rather than the family.

Ideological barriers

Certain ideological or political incompatibilities can be found to exist between parts of conservative, liberal, social democratic and Marxist perspectives on the one hand, and truly universal income guarantees on the other. Only in relation to conservative thought is the disjunction judged to be of central importance. That is, no obstacles, by their very nature, present to other than conservative ideologues a compelling reason to reject the concept of a guaranteed income to all citizens.

Income guarantees are a move in the direction of promoting equality in a most inequitable society.

Universal income guarantees are tailor-made for social democrats but provide some difficulties for liberals. There was a recognition that both the Australian Labor Party and the Liberal-National Parties have come to be considerably influenced by monetarist economic policies in their decision-making in relation to other parts of the economy. Universal income guarantees are ideally suited to such a form of economic analysis in that they constitute a deregulation of the relations of distribution.

Other barriers

If there are only peripheral objections to universal income guarantees which can be located in the articulated philosophies of liberals and social democrats, then it may be that the substantial obstacles are located within or associated with racism, ageism, urbanism or patriarchy. Were this found to be the case, then it would help explain the seeming contradiction presented by the fact that writers from the far right such as Friedman, through liberals like Galbraith, Tobin and Theobald, to Marxists such as Westerguaard, all support the concept of universal income guarantees and the fact that such guarantees have also been supported by conservative political leaders such as Nixon and Heath as well as by the Australian social democratic leader, Gough Whitlam.

Whatever past institutional racist impediments to the introduction of universal income guarantees existed, these are fast disappearing in Australia as migrant inflows are decreasing and the overwhelming majority of migrants and Aborigines are either becoming part of the workforce or are already covered by existing social welfare payments.

Urbanism, with its concentration on the supply of goods and services to city dwellers, is starting to be confronted by both Labor and Liberal-National Party governments. This has been in part due to the recognition that in the past there has been a failure to deliver welfare services in the more remote areas of Australia and also as a result of the unprecedented political unrest amongst rural producers in the 1980s. This rural neglect represents a lack of knowledge about the needs of rural communities rather than a positive determination to discriminate against country people. As such it does not, of itself, constitute an insurmountable obstacle to the extension of universal income guarantees.

Ageism is undoubtably the most obvious impediment to the introduction of a truly universal income guarantee. At one end of the spectrum are children and teenagers and at the other are the elderly, Teenagers who have not found jobs are evaluated far less highly than are the old who are generally seen to have earnt a “decent” pension during their past working lives. Because the young are paid at a lower rate than adults in the workplace, it is highly likely that a lower level of income guarantee would be offered the young.

But perhaps the greatest obstacle to the introduction of a GMI is that used by patriarchy with its assumptions about dependence of spouses and children.

Patriarchy and the unions

The conservative view of appropriate family structure relies on the man the house to provide sustenance for his wife and children. This idea of family life has been compromised by the introduction of Child Endowment (now Family Allowance), Family Income Supplement and other social welfare payments made to families. Underlying all such payments is the concept of the state taking some responsibility for the upkeep of children and even spouses. A GMI would go some way towards ensuring, as John Ruskin advocated in the middle of the nineteenth century, “the first duty of the state is to see that every child born therein shall be well housed, clothed, fed and educated till it attains the age of discretion.”

Another feature which needs to be taken into account is the mechanisms which men might use to articulate opposition to income guarantees in a politically sensible manner. The trade union movement has been used throughout this century to promote patriarchal working class views and is still the most likely organised force capable of articulating the opposition of Australian men who want to oppose income guarantees being paid to individuals as the basic unit, even though its attitudes have softened in the past ten years.

However, it might not become involved as a protagonist. Much would depend on how the issue of the income guarantee was seen, if it was seen as a welfare issue independent of industrial matters then it is likely that general acceptance would follow after initial suspicion. The money would be seen to be going in the main to support the needy, the old, widows, children, the “genuine” unemployed, the sick, etc. Unions covering low paid and regular part-time workers would be conscious of the help that a negative tax or guaranteed minimum income would be to their members. The presence of the Family Income Supplement has alerted the more progressive unions to the need to ensure that their membership is informed of its availability and they have come to recognise that the division between workers and welfare recipients is narrowed by such provisions.

If the payment of income guarantees was made in the social dividend mould this would also increase union acceptance because it, would be seen that everyone was treated equally. The fact that the payment was income tested would increase the perception of equality of treatment and the poverty-alleviating aspect of income guarantees would be obvious to all.

However, if the unions perceived the issue as intimately tied up with industrial conditions, or even if the debate concentrated over much on redistribution rather than welfare, then the unions might well become heavily involved. This would not automatically mean they would be opposed but it would create a situation in which opposition was likely at least from those unions whose members are in receipt of the average wage or better, and therefore least likely to need the provisions of the income guarantee.

Were the income guarantee perceived as a replacement for widespread minimum wage legislation or workers compensation or even superannuation provisions, then this would cause these unions to be at least very wary and most likely opposed.

Clearly, it would be easier to get a family-based income guarantee adopted than it would to install one which used the individual as the unit of payment – but the latter approach is not impossible. Only an individually paid income guarantee has the capacity to address existing inequalities within families.

The likelihood of change

There has been a continuing rationalisation of levels of assistance of the many benefits and pensions supplied by the Commonwealth Government. As payments, and the fringe benefits associated with them become more equal, the logic of the categorical approach is undermined. The next step in such developments would be to make all benefits and pensions payable at exactly the same rate with exactly the same means test applying.

But this would still not herald the introduction of a universal income guarantee. What it would do is underline the fact that some people (those poor who have a current eligibility for a benefit or pension) are considered worthy of assistance and those who do not qualify are deemed unworthy. The ideology of less eligibility would still inform such a welfare benefits structure.

A universal income guarantee will only become a reality when the Australian Government finally comes to accept a pure economic definition of individual need – “a person has an entitlement for assistance provided his or her income is below a certain point”. Such a shift in emphasis would require the Government to do away with the idea of assistance being provided on the basis of some social need, which has been used to both limit the amount and quality of welfare services and to legitimise considerable inequalities in wealth and incomes.

When most Australians speak about the welfare system, they call it the social welfare system. This is not just an insignificant naming process but recognition of the social features embodied in the eligibility requirements, the aims of the relief measures, and the values which they see underlying the entire distributional mode.

The Hawke Labor Government has made many moves to deregulate the productive sector of the economy and has explained its actions in terms of economic pragmatism. Economic rationalism would suggest that deregulation of the distribution system would be compatible with such an approach.

Despite the continuing attachment which many Australians have for a conservative/liberal view of the poor, their attraction to conservative views about the role of the family, their limited understanding of their own racism and ageism, their failure to look at the needs of people living in rural areas and their circumscribed attitudes towards gender relations, there are signs of change.

Apart from the rationalisation of levels of benefit payments, there are other alterations to the Australian political system which could be seen to be a move in the direction of introducing universal income guarantees. One of particular interest is the split off from the Department of Social Security of its subsidy programs, emergency assistance section, and other areas which deal with services into a new Department of Community Services. This reorganisation would make any future move to amalgamate the Taxation and Social Security Departments easier. Before such a move could solve the problem of unifying the positive and negative tax functions of the government, the 127 different income maintenance payments would have to be rationalised,

There have also been considerable changes in the breadth of groups covered by Social Security provisions during the last forty years. Many Aborigines, migrants and unmarried lone parents were specifically excluded when the Social Security Act of 1947 was proclaimed. But they are now included in the 127 different income maintenance programs mentioned above.

We have already seen the introduction of lone parent payments, irrespective of marital status, but we still retain the Widows Pension. The Sex Discrimination Act is intended by the Hawke Government to be extended in its coverage and, were it to include the Social Security Act, then such an alteration would necessitate the adoption of the individual as the unit of payment, the standardisation of the age at which Aged Pensions are paid, and a general streamlining which would involve the abolition of at least some categories of benefits and their replacement by more general ones. This would remove the gaps in cover for the last remaining large group excluded from the provisions of the Social Security Act – those deemed dependent on a spouse.

The extent to which a GMI has the potential to move Australia towards a guaranteed adequate income should not unduly worry liberals and- conservatives. A GMI can and should be seen as a step in this direction, but it is a very small step. There is nothing inherent in the Henderson type proposal which necessarily means further developments will occur. Any development towards a guaranteed adequate income would necessitate a major change in the direction of prevailing ideologies.

The forces which are arraigned against a guaranteed adequate income would be strengthened by the installation of a GMI in the sense that they would be able to point to the GMI as an adequate, economic, rational, humane response to welfare needs. They could adopt Lady Rhys-Williams’ point, arguing that they had provided a line below which no-one fell and could “justifiably” oppose imposing a ceiling above which no-one could rise.

The social background for an alteration in income maintenance policy has been prepared through other changes such as the more humane response to those in economic need; the revolution in attitudes towards women and Aborigines, rural militancy, and the presentation of their real economic needs by youth and pensioner organisations.

Yet the movement in social attitudes has not been unidirectional. The Liberal Party’s commitment to deregulation and privatisation, the mining lobby’s anti-Aboriginal campaigns, and the attacks by business interests on the union movement, are attempting to push Australia towards a more conservative future.

Conclusion

Though there are no insurmountable impediments to the introduction of universal income guarantees within the articulated tenets of a range of political ideologies, there are other ideological impediments affecting the holders of quite diverse political views which constitute important obstacles. These arise out of discrimination based on gender, race, age and locality and can be identified in current and past Australian income maintenance policy and practice.

The techniques on which the welfare system relies in delivering welfare payments include a complex and inadequate safety net, dependency (in both its actual and

implied forms), work incentives, selectivity, categorical payments and the individualised assessment of needs. These techniques are designed to directly control the workless and, indirectly, those in the workforce. It ensures the atomisation of the least affluent, the control of the underclasses and support of the status quo in relation to wealth and income distribution.

That is, the control of the workless and workers acknowledged by poor law administrators in the nineteenth century as a necessary part of the system of welfare relief is still very much a part of current income maintenance policy. This practice and ideology of less eligibility has links going back to the earliest days of welfare relief and, at the moment, constitutes a major obstacle to the installation of universal income guarantees.

While “need” for such a mechanism to control the workless and workers has disappeared or is disappearing, (witness the Supporting Parents Benefit and Sex Discrimination Act), the power of such ideologies (because they pervade most, if not all, aspects of our lives) is still great and as such will need to be confronted by a widespread information campaign before there will be a general acceptance of universal income guarantees.

This continuing discrimination coupled with conservatism, constitutes the main ideological obstacles to the introduction of universal income guarantees.

 


GMI Revisited

This is an edited version of a paper given by Peter Saunders of the Social Welfare Research Centre, University of New South Wales at the ACOSS Congress, September 1987

The main income support recommendations made by the Commission of Inquiry into Poverty were intended to improve the adequacy of payments, to enhance equity in the tax-transfer system, to improve co-ordination between income support and income tax arrangements, and to simplify administrative procedures.

Many of these recommendations – notably the replacement of tax rebates by family allowance cash grants and the extension of supporting mother’s benefit to supporting fathers – were implemented in the years following release of the Report. As a framework for reform of the Australian income support system, the analysis in Chapter Five of Poverty in Australia was an important contribution and it had a significant impact. Many of its arguments are as convincing (indeed, relevant!) today as they- were twelve years ago.

However, the Poverty Commission saw these proposed improvements as a step towards implementation of its main income support recommendation, the introduction of a guaranteed minimum income (GMI) scheme. A central feature of its proposed scheme was the complete integration of income support and income tax arrangements. The GMI payments would be universal and automatic, with a flat rate

income tax designed to maintain an income-tested system by clawing back payments from those with private incomes.

Such a scheme had much to recommend it in the Australian context. The tradition of income tested income support provisions, combined with the non-existence of social insurance contributions and associated earnings-related benefit entitlements provided an ideal environment for the introduction of an integrated income related tax- transfer mechanism of the GNI type.

Considerations of cost prevented the Poverty Commission from recommending a full non-categorical GMI scheme which would set the GMI payments for all above the poverty line. The tax rate required to finance such a scheme was estimated to be about 50 per cent. The GMI proposal preferred by the Commission was a two-tiered arrangement, with a lower GMI payment for those not eligible for pension or benefit, and a poverty line payment for those in the eligible categories. This scheme thus maintained the principle of categorisation and the implied eligibility tests required to administer it. The tax rate implied by this two-tier proposal was 40 per cent.

Despite the Poverty Commission’s support for GMI and the existence of a system which facilitated its introduction the proposal has not featured subsequently in the income support reform debate in Australia. I have been unable, for example, to find even a passing reference to GMI in any of the documents produced to date by the current Social Security Review. Indeed, the three identified areas for focus of that Review – income support for families with children, social security and workforce issues, and income support for the aged – combined with the Review process itself, effectively served to eliminate consideration of GMI proposals from its deliberations.

One of the major reasons for the disappearance of GMI from the policy agenda is, paradoxically, the successful implementation of many of the Poverty Commission’s proposals to improve the existing income support system. In the last ten years, the income support system has shifted away somewhat from the simplified and rationalised vision contained in Chapter Five of Poverty in Australia. This is no doubt due to the continued budgetary restraint and fiscal policy climate of the last decade, combined with the length and severity of economic recession. These economic developments have implications for the financing and consequences of GMI schemes.

Financing GMI

As they are normally proposed, GMI schemes are self-financing in the sense that the tax rate is set so as to raise sufficient revenue to finance the GMI payments at the desired level. The total cost of the GMI payment is equal to the product of the number of people receiving it and the average GMI payment level. If the GMI payment is specified as a proportion of average income, then the tax rate is simply equal to the ratio of the GMI payment to average income. Thus if the GMI is set at 40 per cent of average income, the required tax rate will be 40 per cent, and so on.

In this simple GMI scheme, the breakeven income level is equal to average income. A person on average income will receive a proportion of their income as GMI payment and pay the same proportion of their income in tax to finance the scheme. For those with incomes above the average, tax payments exceed GMI payments, while the reverse occurs for those with below average incomes. Thus the scheme redistributes income from the former to the latter, the extent of redistribution depending upon the tax rate, or the ratio of the GMI payment to average income.

The above simple relationships become more complex once it is acknowledged that the income tax system must also finance other government activities. In this case, the overall tax rate is equal to the sum of the rate required to finance the GMI payments and that required to finance other activities. This was what led the Poverty Commission to reject the full non-categorical GMI proposal in favour of a two-tier system. Under the two-tier proposal the tax rate depends upon the level of the lower GMI payment paid to everyone, the extra payment made to those in favoured categories and the proportion of the population in the categorical group. If 20 per cent of the population are in this group, a tax rate of 30 per cent will finance the two-tier scheme.

The proportion in the categorical group has increased considerably since the time that the Poverty Commission costed its GMI proposals. Despite a fall in recent years, social security pensioners and beneficiaries increased from 10.6 per cent of the population in 1973 to 17.8 per cent in 1986, a relative increase of 68 per cent.

This increase largely reflects the increase in unemployment since 1973. Furthermore, the reliance on income tax as a source of revenue to finance other Commonwealth activities has also increased over the period, For these reasons, the tax rate required to finance even a two-tier categorical GMI scheme would now exceed the 40 per cent estimated by the Poverty Commission in 1973. Recalling that recent tax policies have reflected the political judgment that income tax rates should be lowered, particularly at the top end, it is not implausible that the tax rate now required to finance a two-tier GMI scheme would be close to, if not in excess of, the current top marginal rate of 49 per cent. Thus, while tax policy is attempting to flatten marginal tax rates from the top down, the GMI scheme would in effect flatten them from the bottom up!

Because GMI schemes are designed with a tax rate sufficient to cover all guaranteed income payments, they are self-financing in the sense that there is no net impact on the budget deficit. They do, however, have a major impact on the overall levels of government expenditure and taxation, and are thus not revenue neutral in the conventional sense. Government expenditure increases for two reasons: first because the categorical GMI payments are normally set above prevailing pension and benefit rates; and second because the lower-tier payments extend coverage of the income support system. Combined with a linear tax schedule, income redistribution occurs in favour of those at the bottom of the income distribution and, depending upon the GMI payment level and thus the tax rate, also to those at the top of the income distribution.

There is a danger here that proponents of GMI may suffer from a form of fiscal illusion, favouring the scheme precisely because it is not revenue neutral, because it raises taxes to finance higher income support payments and extended coverage. It is easy to favour such an arrangement in principle, but does it have any practical relevance given the politics and economics of current budgetary policies? Proponents of GMI need to pose (and answer) the question of why it is that the population will be any more willing to finance an expansion of income support provisions under a GMI than they are prepared to finance under existing arrangements.

Relevant comparisons of GMI schemes thus need to be made within a revenue neutral, rather than a deficit neutral, context. This is, however, an extremely difficult comparison to make, precisely because the fundamental principle of GMI – the

extension of income support to all as an automatic right of citizenship – necessarily implies a radical and costly departure from the existing income support system.

Despite this difficulty, it is worthwhile exploring what a revenue neutral GMI scheme might look like. There is a sense in which the current system can be conceptualised as a two-tier GMI scheme in which the lower tier payment is equal to zero. Under this arrangement, however, the social security and tax systems are not fully integrated, as they would be under the GMI.

Integration

One straightforward means of achieving integration would be to simply abolish the social security income test, leaving the tax system to clawback payments from pensioners and beneficiaries with private income. (Consistent treatment might also suggest an extension of the assets test to all citizens in the form of a wealth tax or some variant thereof.) Poverty traps would be eliminated, although the cost of this income test relaxation would be substantial and some increase in taxation would thus be required.

But this proposal is unlikely to find much favour among the proponents of GMI. Neither, incidentally, would the Poverty

Commission itself have seen it as a priority, since they argued that “…maintenance and increase of the basic pension rate (has) priority over easing the means test” (Poverty in Australia, p.57), More generally, problems would remain because of the different definitions of unit for tax and income support, while pensions and benefits would still be taxable. Finally, there would be no concept of a universal right to a guaranteed income, a central feature of GMI proposals.

The GMI concept requires freeing all income support payments from tax, combined with a lower tier GMI payment which is positive. It thus inevitably involves large additional revenues to finance it. In effect, this extra revenue is obtained through abolition of the tax threshold, which is cashed-out to pay the lower tier GMI payments. Once the tax threshold is removed, the need for a separate social security income test also disappears, since the tax system now operates from the first dollar of private income. This would almost certainly imply some easing of the present income test (again particularly for beneficiaries), although the current free income zone would also be removed. Combined with the linear income tax, the GMI scheme thus involves some shuffling of effective marginal tax rates within the income distribution, particularly at the lower end.

As already explained, the two-tier GMI scheme described above retains the principle of categorisation embodied in the current system. To the extent that such categorisation reflects different needs among disadvantaged groups, this can be seen as more equitable than a scheme in which categorisation is abandoned entirely. It would also have a considerably less detrimental effect on incentives to work than a scheme which imposed no eligibility test other than the rights of citizenship. Under the two-tier scheme, eligibility for the higher level of payment would be subject to a work- test, or other eligibility criteria such as old age or invalidity. The lower payment level would not be work-tested and its effect on the incentive to work would depend on the level at which the payment was set.

The scheme would also have other effects on incentives to work. For many of those pensioners and beneficiaries who currently work part-time, the abolition of the free income zone would be of more financial significance than the lowering of their effective marginal tax rate. Against this, their pension or benefit would be freed from tax, so that the net impact on their financial position is uncertain, although many of those with lowest incomes would most probably be worse off than currently.

For those in full-time work, the incentive effects of a two-tier GMI scheme would vary according to the level of private income. However, even if in aggregate the higher tax payments exactly offset the lower tier GMI so that there would be no net income effect, there would still be a substitution effect associated with the overall increase in marginal tax rates, thus producing a disincentive effect. This is an important point, because even though the overall redistributive effect of a GMI scheme depends on the net outcome of both the GMI payment and the associated tax rate, the disincentive effect depends upon the gross rate of tax, which is relevant to decisions at the margin.

These proposals serve to illustrate one final and fundamental aspect of all GMI proposals. This is that they do not avoid the basic conflicts and tensions between competing objectives which any system of income support must inevitably face. More emphasis is given in GMI schemes to the goal of simplicity, but while this has much to recommend it, it is achieved at the cost of sharpening the tensions between equity and efficiency objectives.

It would be foolish to argue that the current Australian social security system does not have its deficiencies. But it has shown a quite remarkable degree of resilience during a decade of major economic and social change, and in an environment where expenditure restraint has increased the conflicts between competing income support policy objectives. Of major significance in this context has been the enormous pressures placed on the system by the high level and persistence of unemployment since the mid-seventies.

None of the fundamental challenges currently confronting income support policy will be resolved by the introduction of a GMI scheme. Indeed, some of them would be exacerbated by its introduction. The concept of a GMI is appealing to many who champion the cause of the disadvantaged, and for them its failure to make any headway on the policy agenda may well signify a paradise lost. For others, it may continue to burn as a guiding light, but the problem with continued gazing towards the heavens is that one can get distracted from the very real problems faced down here on earth.

Peter Saunders

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How dare we?

Published in: Carlson, Ellen (Editor). Path to Full Employment, The. Callaghan, NSW: University of Newcastle, Centre of Full Employment and Equity, 2002: 227-236.

Abstract

Australia has experienced almost continuous economic growth throughout the three terms of the Howard Government, yet it has only succeeded in decreasing the officially recognised unemployment level by two percentage points. This Government has attempted to decrease the level of unemployment by continuing to rely on economic growth, imposing labour market flexibility, watering down unfair dismissal legislation and discouraging unemployed people from applying for benefit. The main tactic, which this Government has utilised in ‘solving’ the unemployment problem, is to attack the social reputation of unemployed people. This paper considers the ethical justifications provided by the Howard Government for the manner in which it handles the unemployment problem.

This paper will conclude by briefly discussing an alternative to the Howard Government’s unemployment policy; namely the Government becoming an employer of last resort in association with the provision of a Universal Basic Income.

Where are we now?

When the Keating Labor Government lost office in 1996, the officially recognised unemployment rate stood at 8.6%. By March 2002, that rate had only declined to 6.6%. Throughout most of the period of the Howard Government unemployment has hovered around 7.0% and in some states and Territories unemployment has remained over 8%. Estimates of ‘real’ unemployment levels, if underemployed and discouraged unemployed people are taken into account, are in the region of 20%. In most of Indigenous Australia, if the Community Development Employment Program (CDEP) is properly recognised as a form of ‘work for the dole’, rather than employment, the ‘real’ unemployment levels for Indigenous Australians are in the order of 50 –80% (HREOC 2002 Ch.2, ATSIC News 2001 pp.1-31).

Many alternatives, to the present Government’s approach towards unemployment, have been presented during the last decade in Australia: Langmore and Quiggan’s (1994) Work for All, the Keating Labor Government’s 1994 Working Nation, Boreham, Dow and Leet’s (1999) Room to Manoeuvre, Stilwell’s (2000) Changing Track, at this and at all previous eight National Conferences on Unemployment. Yet, in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary (Omerod’s The Death of Economics 1994, Kelsey’s 1995 The New Zealand Experiment, Goodin, Headey, Muffels and Dirven’s The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 1999, Jamrozik’s Social Policy in the Post Welfare State 2001, Hutton’s The World We’re In 2002), the present Government perseveres with the economic fundamentalist line that growth (coupled with berating the unemployed for failing to find non-existent work) will abolish unemployment.

The conservative agenda

Perhaps the first thing to ask is how did this country get to this sorry state? Australia has never been wealthier yet, over the last couple of years; the Government refused social security to more poor people than ever before. This refusal to pay benefits is achieved by breaching (ACOSS 2001, 2002), imposing unconscionable ‘mutual obligations’ (Goodin 2001, Hammer 2002, Kinnear 2000, Schooneveldt 2002, Tomlinson 2001[a], 2002), extended family means tests and by further tightening eligibility requirements. The short answer is that Australians swallowed the economic fundamentalist prescription hook, line and sinker. Whether one endorses Susan George’s (1997) explanation of the reasons for the rise of economic fundamentalism or prefers a less conspiratorial account (Hutton 2002), it is clear that (within the Australian social welfare system) there has been a major ideological shift from a social democratic noblesse oblige to a compelled conservative compact.

The present Prime Minister has never attempted to disguise his social conservatism. In May 1999 and January 2000 Howard spelt out his prescription for Australia’s unemployed. Minister Newman (1999) elaborated the Government’s position in her paper entitled The Challenge of Welfare Dependency in the 21st Century, which was issued to guide to the McClure Committee’s deliberations.

The McClure Report (2000) obsequiously recommended that not only were unemployed people be compelled ‘to participate’ but that single parents and people receiving Disability Support Pensions should also be compelled ‘to participate’. The 2002/3 Budget foreshadowed transferring 180,000 Disability Support Pensioners, who worked 15 or more hours a week, to an unemployment benefit paid at $52 a fortnight less than the pension. This is allegedly being done as a way of helping them back into employment. Such a claim flies in the face of the fact that there have been no net full-time jobs created in Australia in recent years (ABC 2002, Gregory 2000) and that anyone, who has a significant impairment, makes a substantial contribution to society and the economy by managing to work the equivalent of 2 full days each week. The Budget proposal blithely ignores the fact that income received by pensioners is more generously means tested than income received by unemployment beneficiaries. Introducing such a change would decrease the financial incentives for people currently receiving Disability Support Pensions to maximise their hours of work. The extra “mutual obligations”, reporting responsibilities and the present breaching regime imposed on unemployment beneficiaries would invariably lead to many of these 180,000 Disability Support Pensioners experiencing increased income insecurity.

The Howard Government’s justification

The Government rationalises its reliance on growth in a number of ways:

  • The prime rationalisation provided for relying on growth rather than job creation is that “good economic policy is good welfare policy” Newman (1999 p.2).
  • Another is the suggestion that the Howard Government has set out to pay ‘the needy not the greedy’ (contra Goodin 2001, Tomlinson 2001[b]).
  • It is frequently suggested that there are plenty of jobs, it is just that people are too fussy, earning Abbot’s “job snobs” label.
  • That too many people are in fact working and claiming benefits illegally and that is why there has to be more onerous testing, ‘mutual obligation’, increasing surveillance, ‘work for dole’ and breaching – “Compliance is a strong motivator and it alsoflushes out dole cheats (Brough 2001 p.2).”
  • Then there is Newman’s ‘tough love’, suggesting that the government knows what is in people’s best interests even if recipients themselves don’t – so government should force them to comply. Howard’s compulsory literacy and numeracy program is one example. ‘Work for the dole’ is another – which allegedly gets people job ready, in case a vacancy should occur.
  • There is the rationalisation that breaching is necessary, not only to force compliance and to assist people retain job readiness, but that it will assist them to avoid being breached in the future (contra Schooneveldt 2002 Chs.5 and 6).
  • Another rationalisation is that by increasing compliance, tightly targeting benefit eligibility, and being ready to impose harsh penalties on unemployed people, the Government will increase public support for paying ‘real’ unemployed people. The last Labor Government suffered a similar delusion (Edwards 2001, Chs. 3 and 5). Public attitudes towards unemployed people have hardened since 1987 when Brian Howe began talking about unemployed people becoming ‘welfare dependent’.

Some of the ethical problems which the Howard Government ignores

At last year’s Conference I set out the main ethical distinctions between universal and utilitarian concepts of rights (Tomlinson 2002). O’Connor (2001) has described some of the origins of the concept of ‘welfare dependency’ as interpreted by the present Australian Government. Kinnear (2000) and Hammer’s (2002) work has substantially added to the debate. Robert Goodin (2001) provides a sustained articulate analysis of the failure of ‘mutual obligation’ and increasingly targeted income support to achieve justice for the least affluent Australians.

Goodin (2001) points to the propensity of governments to assert an implied consent, for changes in income policy between welfare recipients and the State, through the widespread use of the language of the social contract. He conjures the image of a highwayman declaring that even if one had parted with one’s money in return for one’s life no court would enforce such a contract. He goes on:

The proposition that the welfare worker is putting to her putative ‘client’ is: ‘Agree or starve.’ That is the same, in all essentials, to the proposition the highwayman puts to his victim: ‘Agree or die.’(p.191).

Just as we still have an obligation to feed people even after they have committed heinous crimes so too we have an obligation to not let people starve even if they have committed mortal sins against the labour market …Welfare recipients have not agreed to those new arrangements at the macro-level; and such consent as they give at the micro- level, in ‘agreements’ negotiated under effective duress with welfare caseworkers, has no moral standing (p.195).

If we seriously believed that work is good for you and that it is the state’s legitimate role to force you to do it, then we would have no grounds for confining our paternalism to the poor. Paternalistically speaking, it would be equally important to make the rich work too (p.198).

The intellectual context

There has been a concerted effort at least since Daniel Bell’s (1965) The End of Ideology to present the argument that the socialist challenge has failed and the West prevailed (Fukuyama 1992). Some would date this effort as commencing with Hayek’s (1944) The Road to Serfdom. The backers of the rise of economic fundamentalism have clearly played a part in this quite successful attempt at mystification (Hutton 2002, George 1997), as have many of the ‘public choice’ theorists (Stretton and Orchard 1994). In addition, post modernism – particularly with its end of grand narrative and moral relativity – has played a part in creating an intellectual climate in which defence of left analyses is presented as quaintly old fashioned (Windschuttle 1994). In such a climate, Blair’s ‘third way’ and Latham’s (1998, 2001) social entrepreneurs attract adherents. In Australia, this has led to a conflation of the concept of social entrepreneurship with Howard’s ideas (1999, 2000) about ‘mutual obligation’ in the writings of Pearson (1999). With rare exceptions such as Cook, Dodds and Mitchell (2001) critique this conflation is unthinkingly applauded.

The connection with rights

Running in parallel with economic fundamentalists’ obsessive denigration of socialism, altruism, humanism and any form of Freirian (1972) liberation has been a conservative attack on welfare provision and human rights. An early articulation of this position was provided by Culpitt (1992, Ch. 1). Howard (1999), in his round table address, clearly sets out his amalgam of economic liberal and social conservatism. The fervour with which human rights and universal welfare provision are attacked by the right wing ‘dependency’ ideologues is only matched by almost religious attachment to market ‘liberty’. They have to some extent succeeded in convincing many that the market should be the ultimate determiner of fairness, social justice and good taste (Pusey1991, Rees, Rodley & Stilwell 1993, Stilwell 2000). There is remarkably little recognition of the central contradiction in relation to ‘liberty’ inherent in economic fundamentalism. That is – the increased liberty (enabling the rich to pursue their market desires) denies, weakens or ignores the social and economic liberties of poor people.

The social context

It would count for naught if the struggle only impacted at a conceptual level – it doesn’t. It has long been acknowledged that low income, unemployment, and the associated stress have adverse social stability and health outcomes (Turrell 2001, Feyer and Broom 2001, Watts 1997, Patton and Donohue 1997, Dury, Creed and Winefield 1997). The imposition of ‘mutual obligation’ coupled with a harsh breaching regime has intensified the pressures upon unemployed people. It has dramatically increased the likelihood of homelessness and social dislocation (ACOSS 2002, Schooneveldt 2002). Evidence is emerging which establishes that having one’s social security reduced or removed creates increased health difficulties for the children of beneficiaries who are breached (Cook, Frank, Berkowitz, Black, Casey, Cutts, Meyers, Zaldivar, Skalicky, Levenson and Heeren 2002).

American style globalisation, ‘free trade’ rather than fair trade, privatisation of public assets, business deregulation, labour market flexibility, enforced self- provision, ‘mutual obligation’ and lowered taxes all impact adversely on workers and unemployed people. It has led to grossly unequal outcomes between rich and poor nations and to increasing inequality between rich and poor people within all of the English speaking developed countries (Hutton 2002). In Australia and elsewhere, this has led to increasing income insecurity for those relegated to the fringes of the labour market. About 30 percent of workers are now engaged in some form of precarious employment (Stilwell 2000, Jamrozik 2001, Tomlinson 2001[b] Ch. 4). As Castles (2001 p.31) notes:

From the time of the Hawke Labor government onwards, the situation of welfare beneficiaries has been changing for the worst. There has been increasingly more policing of benefit eligibility, with the strongest element of forced compliance an unemployment work test which has become increasingly onerous to fulfil. Under the Howard government, the conditions of this test have become extremely strict, with an increasingly explicit moral justification that recipients must return something to society in return for their benefit.

In an attempt to justify the economic fundamentalist onslaught on social security recipients, academic and political apologists for ‘mutual obligation’ have mounted a ceaseless tirade against what they call ‘welfare dependency’ (Selbourne 1994, Mead 1997, Green 1999, Newman 1999, Pearson 1999, McClure 2000, Sullivan 2000).

Such denigrators of poor people ignore the reality that in Australia:

The welfare dependency explanation for the persistent unemployment since 1975 fails when confronted with the evidence. With the Unemployment to V acancy (UV) ratio averaging around 11 since that time, it is a fallacy of composition to consider that the difference between getting a job and being unemployed is a matter of individual endeavour. Adopting welfare dependency as a lifestyle is different to an individual, who is powerless in the face of systemic failure, seeking income support as a right of citizenry (Cook, Dodds and Mitchell 2001 p.24).

Using long-term panel studies, Goodin, Headey, Muffels and Dirven (1999 pp.260-261) have demonstrated that the overwhelming number of poor people – in Germany, Netherlands and the US – do not remain poor indefinitely and that the Dutch welfare system, which is the most generous of the three, is:

  • best at minimizing inequality,
  • better at reducing poverty,
  • equal with Germany in promoting stability,
  • best at promoting autonomy, and “…the Netherlands-managed to sustain economic growth at a rate certainly on par with (and in ways higher than) the other countries”.

The lesson which Australians should take from this study is one that we once knew – but, since 1986, have forgotten. That is that Australia can have a generous welfare system, social stability, humanitarian inclusion and economic efficiency simultaneously.

Governments in Australia since 1975 have relied mainly on economic growth strategies to create jobs and such a strategy has not created sufficient work for all who want it. As Cook, Dodds and Mitchell (2001 p.1) succinctly state “The pro-market agenda has failed to restore full employment.” In the face of 27 years of governments’ abject failure to create full employment, the Howard Government has a choice. It could:

  • adopt policies such as becoming an employer of last resort, as in Sweden,
  • legislate to reduce working hours, as in France,
  • introduce a universal basic income, as is being considered in several parts of the world (BIEN website),

or it can persevere with its present strategy of continuing to denigrate unemployed people – thereby hoping to continue defusing the electoral problem which high levels of unemployment creates.

There are alternatives

Governments, most famously that of Maggie Thatcher, would like the public to believe in ‘TINA’, that is, There Is No Alternative to the one which the government is presenting. On the contrary there are sensible, practical and affordable alternatives to the Howard Government’s compelled conservative compact which imposed on some of Australia’s poorest citizens an estimated 386,946 breaches in 2000/2001(ACOSS 2002, Schooneveldt 2002).

For over 40 years critics (Tomlinson 1975) have railed against the prevalence of noblesse oblige in social security policy because of its elitism, moral judgementality and the arbitrary nature of decision-making. Y et a system of noblesse oblige is preferable to the present ruthless disregard being shown for the well-being and even the survival of many of Australia’s most vulnerable citizens. “Aristocracy contained the notion of noblesse oblige – literally, ‘nobility obliges’ …their privilege (is) subject to their recognition of their obligations to the social whole (Hutton 2002 p.69)”. Howard (2000) has inverted the notion that the affluent are obliged to assist, by asserting that ‘mutual obligation’ means that if people without access to income are assisted, then they are obligated to give something back to the Government. Kinnear (2000 p.23) declares:

The policy of Mutual Obligation is a distortion and a reversal of the basic values of reciprocity. It could also be argued that the call of those in a position of advantage for those less advantaged to nevertheless make social repayments under threat of the withdrawal of their only means of support is itself evidence of the moral crisis of ‘taking without giving’.

On any day there are thousands of Australians enduring reductions in, or total cancellations of, social security payments because of some minor breach of conditions – such as being late for a Centrelink interview. The Howard Government has been very successful at convincing the electorate that it has no obligation to pay even poverty line income to people who fail to meet increasingly punitive ‘mutual obligations’. Kinnear (2000 p.23) points out that “taking without giving” utilises the mechanism of downward envy to justify such thinking. This phenomenon has moved well beyond social security recipients. Recent cutbacks to public liability, medical negligence and workers compensation insurance jeopardise the financial security of any victim of misadventure. What started as an attack on the social security eligibility rights of young unemployed people has expanded, within 6 years, into a full-scale assault upon the social and economic rights of all Australian people.

It is clear that Australia has become a less equal society since the 1970s and moved closer to the US work/welfare arrangements (Watts 2001[a]). More and more Australians are engaged in precarious, part-time, casual, low paid employment (Boreham, Dow and Leet, 1999, Jamrozik 2001, Stilwell 2000, Watts 1997). Howard has promoted the concept of our becoming a nation of shareholders in line with the US. Australians would be wise to note Hutton’s (2002) research into that share owning society:

64 per cent of American households own less than $5,000 worth of shares (p.124). [The] richest 1 percent of the population holds 38 percent of its wealth (p.149). [Increasingly many are working long hours in low paid jobs] – Americans, in short have created a treadmill for themselves and hailed it as an economic miracle (p.169).

If Australia is able to escape from a mentality that is: untrusting, socially divisive, anti-Indigenous, lock-up the refugees, xenophobic, increasingly constrained, downwardly envious and anti-welfare (which has descended upon this country like a mist since 1996) citizens might be able to give serious consideration to constructing a liberating, inclusive, humanitarian and just social policy agenda.

There are far more exciting alternatives to the present Government’s policies than a return to noblesse oblige; namely the introduction of a universal Basic Income for all permanent residents of this country (Tomlinson 2001[b]). Ideally such an incomes policy would operate in association with a commitment to:

  • generate full employment,
  • create a less unequal society, and
  • develop fairer health, education and community services.

I have written extensively about Basic Income (Tomlinson 2001[b]), as have many others (BIEN and NZUBI websites). Surprisingly many consider the concept recent and radical. On the contrary, the first English language full- length book devoted to entirely to State provided universal income guarantees was published in England in 1920. Dennis Milner wrote it. Basic Income is essentially about the provision of an above poverty line universal payment to all permanent residents. Whilst this runs counter to prevailing Government views, there is nothing radical about the idea. President Nixon and the conservative economist, Milton Friedman, promoted compatible ideas in the1970s, as did the Liberal economist Lady Rhys-Williams in 1943 (Tomlinson 2001[b] Ch. 9).

Conclusion

The introduction of a universal Basic Income would not abolish unemployment. It would simply provide a sound social and economic basis from which to develop full employment. It would however forever abolish the moral aberration of ‘mutual obligation’ because people could no longer be compelled to do anything in return for the payment of the social security pittance. Their entitlement to at least poverty line income would be a right of their citizenship.

Van Parijs (1992 p.229) claims that because a Basic Income is paid, irrespective of all other sources of income, it can be used by those who desire work as a wage subsidy; yet, because it provides sufficient income on which to live, it does not compel any potential worker to work under conditions which that worker finds unacceptable. He concludes that “Whereas a rising means-tested benefit makes it increasingly difficult for unskilled people to find a job, a rising basic income makes it increasingly feasible (Van Parijs 1992 p.229)”.

At last year’s Conference, Martin Watts (2001[b]) considered both the job guarantee and Basic Income proposals. He concluded the job guarantee superior on the grounds that “It is a collectivist solution in that the government assumes direct responsibility for employment and income generation (p.27)”. The introduction of a job guarantee might take many forms but would presumably take a couple of years to fully implement. A job guarantee for all who wanted work might in the short term require a shortening of the working week. Though the introduction of a 35 hour week in France did not create as many new jobs had been predicted – it did create over 200,000 and it did not result the economic downturn the economic fundamentalists predicted (Flutter 2001, Lichfield 2001). Guaranteeing every person who wanted paid employment the opportunity to work would significantly alter Australians’ perception of unemployed people if for no other reason than that it would amount to an admission by the Government that the past policies did not create enough jobs for all those seeking work. Beyond that it would involve recognising that “The loss of production through unemployment is the single greatest source of inefficiency in our economy (Committee on Employment Opportunities 1993, p. 1)”.

A universal Basic Income paid at above poverty line levels would ensure every individual, irrespective of her or his connection with the labour market, sufficient income on which to survive. A Basic Income provides income security for all – those who can work and those who can’t. I consider that once such an income base was in place that even a government as ego centred and anti- altruistic as the Howard Government would recognise the advantage of doing all in its power to find work for all without employment in order to boost production. In some ways this is a chicken-and-egg debate. Australians need a universal Basic Income and full employment as well as improved health, education and community services. Because when Australia is compared with other OECD countries it is clear that Australia is currently among “the countries least supportive of the welfare needs of their citizens. If the burden of the welfare state is a factor in unemployment, it is a very limited burden indeed in the Australian context (Boreham, Dow and Leet’s 1999 p. 53)”.

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Castles, F. (2001) “A farewell to the Australian welfare state.” in Eureka Street. Vol. 11, No. 1, Jan- Feb, pp.29-31.
Committee on Employment Opportunities (1993) Restoring full Employment. AGPS, Canberra.
Cook, B., Dodds, C. & Mitchell, B. (2001) “The false premises of Social Entrepreneurship.” Paper presented on 21st November Workshop Social Entrepreneurship: whose responsibility is it anyway? at CofFEE, University of Newcastle.
http://e1.newcastle.edu.au/coffee/workshop/ workshop2001.cfm
Cook, J., Frank, D., Berkowitz, C., Black, M., Casey, P., Cutts, D., Meyers, A., Zaldivar, N., Skalicky, A., Levenson, S. & Heeren, T. (2002) “Welfare Reform and the Health of Young Children”. Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine. Vol. 156, No. 7.
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Culpitt, I. (1992) Welfare and Citizenship: Beyond the Crisis of the Welfare State. Sage, London.
Dury, B., Creed, P. & Winefield, A (1997) “Effect on Well-being of Willingness-to- Participate in Training Courses for Unemployed People.” in Tomlinson, J., Patton, W., Creed, P. & Hicks R. (eds.) Unemployment: Policy and Practice. Academic, Brisbane.
Edwards, M. with Howard, C. & Robin Miller, R. (2001) Social Policy, Public Policy: From Problem to Practice. Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest.
Feyer, A. &Broom, D. (2001) “Work and Health:” in Eckersley, R., Dixon, J. & Douglas, B. (eds.) The Social Origins of Health and Well Being. Cambridge University, Cambridge.
Flutter, C. (2001) “France’s Regional Unemployment Problem and the 35 Hour Week.” School of Geography and the Environment, Oxford University.
http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/~jburke/wpapers/ wpg01-09.pdf
Freire, P. (1972) Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
Fukuyama, F. (1992) The end of history and the last man. Free Press, New York.
George, S. (1997) “Winning the War of Ideas.” Dissent. Vol. 44, No. 3, Summer, pp 47-53.
Goodin, R. (2001) “ False Principles of Welfare Reform.” Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 36, No. 3, August. pp.189-206.
Goodin, R., Headey, B., Muffels, R. & Dirven, H. (1999) The Real worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge University, Cambridge.
Green, D. (1999) An End to Welfare Rights: The Rediscovery of Independence. IEA Health and Welfare Unit, London.
Gregory, B (2000) A Longer Run Perspective on Australian Unemployment. Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 425, December.
http://cepr.anu.edu.au/pdf/DP425.pdf
Hammer, S. (2002 forthcoming) The Rise of Liberal Independence and the Decline of the Welfare State. PhD Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane.
Hayek, F. (1944) The Road to Serfdom. Routledge, London.
Howard, J. (2000) “Quest for a decent society” The Australian 12th. Jan, p.11.
Howard, J. (1999) “Building a Stronger and Fairer Australia: Liberalisation in Economic Policy and Modern Conservatism in Social Policy.” Address to ‘Australia Unlimited Roundtable.’ 4th. May http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/1999/ AustraliaUnlimitedRoundtable.htm
HREOC (2002) Social Justice Report 2001.Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Sydney.
Hutton, W. (2002) The World We’re In. Little Brown, London.
Jamrozik, A. (2001) Social policy in the Post Welfare State. Pearson, Frenchs Forrest.
Keating, P. (1994) Working Nation. AGPS, Canberra.
Kelsey, J. (1995) The New Zealand Experiment: A World Model for Structural Adjustment. Auckland University & Bridget Williams, Auckland.
Kinnear, P. (2000) Mutual Obligation: Ethical and social implications. Discussion Paper No. 32, The Australia Institute, August.
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McClure, P . (2000) Participation Support for a More Equitable Society, Final Report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform, Canberra, Department of Family and Community Services.
Mead, L. (1997) From Welfare to Work : Lessons from America. Institute of Economic Affairs, Health & Welfare Unit, London.
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Stilwell, F. (2000) Changing Track: A new political economic direction for Australia. Pluto, Annandale.
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Sullivan, L. (2000) Behavioural Poverty Centre for Independent Studies, St Leonards.
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How did the attempt to abolish poverty become a war against the poor?

ON LINE opinion – Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate

Posted Tuesday, 11 June 2013

also published in New Community Quarterly, Issue 41, 2013

In this article I shall try to answer the question implicit in the title. In order to do this adequately I shall cast a fairly wide net attempting to explain how various features of Western society are a part of the answer. In the final section of the article I shall suggest a method by way of which, if adopted, we could build a more socially just and economically productive Australia.

The worldwide economic depression subjected about a third of the people of the developed world to an impoverished existence for most of the decade prior to the outbreak of World War II. After the second world war a serious attempt was made in Britain and Australia to expand the welfare state significantly. In 1964, the United States President Lyndon Johnston declared a “war on poverty”. In Australia, in 1972, following the election of the first Labor government in 23 years, the Poverty Inquiry was substantially expanded. By the mid-1970s, it appeared reasonably likely that a guaranteed minimum income would be introduced because the Whitlam Labor Government had increased the scope and generosity of the social security system. Eligibility for social security had changed in emphasis from forcing people to establish an entitlement for a payment to trying to ensure that everyone experiencing financial hardship received their full entitlement. In Canada and the United States governments attempted to introduce generalised income guarantees for the less well off in the 1960s and 70s.

Since the mid-1980s welfare has been cut back in Europe, North America and in Australia and New Zealand. Throughout the 1980s and 90s many critics of US welfare policies attempted to force cutbacks, they particularly targeted monies paid to lone mothers. In 1996, an ideological shift reducing federal aid to impoverished people over the previous decade, culminated in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, which, as claimed by President Bill Clinton, “end[ed] welfare as we know it.”(Wikipedia [b] 2013). The European social insurance provisions came under attack long before the recent global recession sometimes referred to as the Global Financial Crisis.

In the late1980s Friends of the ABC held a meeting to discuss funding cutbacks in the Australian Broadcasting Commission in Canberra. I became the most unpopular bloke in the room when I suggested that ABC journalists had brought the problem on themselves by substantially increasing the time that was devoted to economics, especially the widespread use of the term “rational economics” when referring to neoliberal economic policies, the concentration put into trade weighted indices, the stock market, commodity prices, the value of the Australian dollar and the value of products whilst increasingly neglecting social values.

George Monbiot writing in The Guardian on the 14th January 2013 noted that

“In 2012, the world’s 100 richest people became $241billion richer. They are now worth…just a little less than the entire output of the United Kingdom.” He suggested that the policies leading to this result included reductions in the tax rates paid by high income earners, failing to pursue tax payments from the rich, “government’s refusal to recoup a decent share of revenues from minerals and the land; the privatisation of public assets and the creation of a toll-booth economy,…and the destruction of collective bargaining.”

“The Economic Policy Institute, a think-tank, calculates that chief executives at America’s 350 biggest companies were paid 231 times as much as the average private-sector worker in 2011” (JS.2012). This same think tank calculated that in the year 2000 these executives or their equivalents had been paid in the order of 400 times average private-sector workers: whereas in 1975 this ratio was only 20 times the average workers salary. At Walmart the ratio between the pay of the CEO and the median workers pay is over 1,000 to one. “The average total remuneration of a chief executive of a top 50 company listed on the Australian Securities Exchange in 2010 is $6.4 million – or almost 100 times that of the average worker” and it needs to be remembered that two-thirds of Australian workers receive less than the average wage. The CEOs of Sweden’s 50 largest companies earn on average 40 times more than an industrial worker, a finding that a union organisation head believes is ‘totally unacceptable’ and requires a ‘popular uprising’ to remedy”.

In September 2001, following what the Americans are wont to call “9/11” the United States launched the War on Terror. Millions of people in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere in Africa and Asia have lost their lives in, or fleeing from, this never-ending killing spree. The CIA disappeared and tortured thousands in a worldwide program of rendition and secret prisons. There are still 166 prisoners being held in legal limbo at Guantanamo and as I write 100 of them are on a hunger strike. There are daily drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan or Yemen. These are targeted assassinations of what are meant to be “Islamist rebel leaders” but swept up in what the US militarists are apt to call “collateral damage” are women, children and wedding parties. The role of the military arm of the US government going round the world meeting lots of nice people then subjecting them to rendition, torture, or death, dehumanises those Western citizens who don’t vocally oppose such illegal actions. The “War on Terror” inexorably changed from the pursuit of Al Queida to a war of terror against much of the Middle East and beyond. George W. Bush’s simplistic dichotomy “You are either with us or against us” led many US allies (such as Australia) to adopt grotesque Kafkaesque terrorism laws. Such processes turn thinking adults into silent witnesses of State violence in fear of becoming enveloped in the witch-hunt that follows the expression of dissent.

The war on drugs began in the United States in 1914 with the Federal government outlawing heroin. Throughout most of the first half of the 20th century US governments thought that drug addiction could be cured by treatment but in 1951 legislation was passed providing for minimum mandatory sentences for possession of some drugs. This approach was eagerly adopted by the Eisenhower administration in 1952. “The addition of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to the federal law enforcement apparatus in 1973 was a significant step in the direction of a criminal justice approach to drug enforcement” (Head 2013). Since that time the US has invaded Panama and other Central and South American countries, arming Contras and other paramilitary groups to fight leftists and “drug runners”. It has filled its own prisons with people convicted of various “crimes” involving drugs. In doing so it has condemned many of its own citizens to a custodial system that blights their lives. When countries like Australia want to adopt harm minimisation polices such as heroin trials, drug injecting rooms or clean needle exchanges the US comes calling. This increases the difficulties of developing sensible humane drug policies and consequently alienates another generation of young people and older people with addictions to “illegal” drugs.

Monbiot, in the article referred to earlier, notes that the 2012 “annual report by the UN Conference on Trade and Development should have been the obituary for the neoliberal model developed by Hayek and Friedman and their disciples”. Monbiot asserts that this report “shows unequivocally that their policies have created the opposite outcomes to those they predicted. As neoliberal policies (cutting taxes for the rich, privatising state assets, deregulating labour, reducing social security) began to bite from the 1980s onwards, growth rates started to fall and unemployment to rise”.

Often associated with granting mining leases to rich people or giving them access, at less than replacement cost, to vast tracts of forest to wood chip is the necessity to criminalise environmentalists. This is just part of resource expansion which the State foists on the citizenry in the name of productivity and development. Little wonder ordinary people feel alienated from such acquisition of wealth by the few. The carbon price debate is just one small part played out in the multinational globalisation of resources. The climate change deniers are walking in the footsteps of Mussolini’s Black Shirts.

Once the State can cut off a section of the working class or the unemployed from the main working class movement it can set out to expand its wedging and politics of envy. Howard started with the young unemployed but it wasn’t long before all unemployed were metamorphosed into “dole bludgers” and “job snobs”. Asylum seekers became grist to the mill. Then Disability Pensioners soon found out they were a bunch of “malingerers” whose numbers had to be cut by a third. Then came the turn of single parents and their children. Subsequent Labor governments have followed suit.

The last throw of the dice for the outgoing Howard Government was to impose the Intervention on 73 Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory ostensibly to safeguard Aboriginal children from sexual abuse or neglect and to protect women from being assaulted. The police and the army were sent into remote Aboriginal communities. The Government suspended the Racial Discrimination Act in order to quarantine half the social security payment made to Indigenous people. The amount quarantined was placed on a ‘Basics’ card that could only be used for approved purposes at certain stores and alcohol was banned from many communities.

Labor came to power in 2007 promising to continue the Intervention for a year before reviewing it. A committee was set up, headed by Aboriginal leader, Peter Yu, that recommended winding back most of the compulsory aspects of the Intervention except where it could be proven that Indigenous people were incapable of handling money. Labor ignored the report. It has moved towards providing incentives for the use of a Basics card whilst allowing people to “request” they not be required to have a Basics card. At the same time this government has expanded the areas of the Northern Territory and elsewhere in Australia where Aboriginal and other ethnic groups are cajoled into a paternalistic administration of their social security. It has reinstated the Racial Discrimination Act and so cannot specify any particular ethnic group that is forced to participate. What it does instead is select geographical areas where particular ethnic groups predominate and legislate to force all residents of those areas to participate in its paternalistic form of social security.

The process of marginalising various sections of society which can in turn be denigrated – the unemployed called dole bludgers, disability pensioners become malingerers, single parents become welfare mums who brought their problems on themselves, the original owners of this land are converted into drunks and paedophiles, asylum seekers are called illegals and queue jumpers – has now turned round to bite the very people who engaged in maligning the disadvantaged. Commentators around the country are calling on the government to end “middle class welfare”. The values which neoliberal economics promote inspire envy and hatred of out-groups and undermine solidarity.

Monbiot points out “the recent jump in unemployment in most developed countries – worse than in any previous recession of the past three decades – was preceded by the lowest level of wages as a share of GDP since the second world war.” The promise of neoliberal economics – that if governments would get out of the way and leave everything to the market then the rising tide would lift all boats and everyone would be better off – has failed to come true.

Following the second world war Britain moved away from a categorical means-tested benefit system by adding a social insurance system and later a tax credit system. The US largely maintained its welfare charity model to which were added private insurance and eventually a tax credit system. Australia introduced some universal payments such as child endowment but largely stuck to increasing the scope and generosity of its system of categorical benefits and pensions. In 1992 it introduced a privatised superannuation system.

Tax credits, social insurance and privatised superannuation are all tied to participation in the labour market or other financial contributions. They are of no help to people who cannot enter the labour market. When the values which emerged in the wake of the second world had inspired a desire to provide a liveable income for everyone were eroded by the corrosive values of neoliberal economics – solidarity evaporated and the poor were left to the ravages of the rich.

It is time to turn back, back from greed and downward envy, back from abusing asylum seekers, social security recipients and Indigenous people. We need to retreat from excessive inequality and turn our backs on indifference to the plight of others. It is time to note the social security advances in Brazil, Bolivia and Venezuela where they are moving to ensure all citizens have access to a liveable income – the slogan that drives this campaign is “For all – the poor first”. The reason for doing this is that more equal societies are happier, less fearful and healthier societies. Monbiot notes “The greater inequality becomes…the less stable the economy and the lower the rate of growth”. This is a good economic reason for advancing equality as well as being the decent thing to do.

The best way of moving in the direction of a more egalitarian society is to discard the charity-style categorical means-tested welfare system and embrace a citizenship entitlement system for all permanent residents. Such a universal Basic Income would be paid to every individual permanent resident irrespective of their wealth, marital status or other social feature. To pay for such a scheme income tax would be paid on all other income the person earned or acquired from the first to last dollar gained. There would no longer be a political need to subsidise less productive industries, in order to keep people in work, thereby unleashing a huge creative and productive potential.

Bibliography

ACTU (2013) “Executive Pay Watch.” http://www.actu.org.au/Issues/ExecutivePayWatch/default.aspx
BIEN (2013) Basic Income Earth Networkhttp://www.basicincome.org/bien/
CEO (2013) CEO pay in Perspective. http://www.payscale.com/data-packages/ceo-income
Head, T. (2013) “History on the War on Drugs.”About.com [Civil Liberties].
JS. (2012) “The ratio of CEO to worker compensation: Are they worth it.” The Economist 8th May http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/05/ratio-ceo-worker-compensation
Monbiot, G. (2013) “If you think we’re done with neoliberalism, think again.” The Guardian, 14th January. This article in a fully referenced version entitled “Bang Goes the Theory.” http://www.monbiot.com/2013/01/14/bang-goes-the-theory/
Ramirez, l.(2013) “Guantanamo Prison Hunger Strike Grows.” Voice of America 8th May.http://www.voanews.com/content/guantanamo-bay-hunger-strike-grows/1657331.html
The Local (2011) “Swedish CEO salary ‘unacceptable’: union.” 7th February. http://www.thelocal.se/31884/20110207/#.UY2RPODrbFI
Tomlinson, J. (1999) “The Politics of envy.” Union Song site http://unionsong.com/reviews/envy.html
Tomlinson, J. (2007) “We are having a ‘save the Aboriginal children’ blitzkrieg.” ON LINE opinion http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=6046
UNCTAD (2012) Trade and Development Report: Policies for Inclusive and Balanced Growth. http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2012_en.pdf
Wikipedia [a] (2013) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_on_Poverty
Wikipedia [b] (2013) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_Responsibility_and_Work_Opportunity_Act

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Howard rediscovers the family

 

He’s now got a passion for compassion
he sent us reeling with his feeling
when he tried to sell us, or was it tell us
that you don’t need communion with a union
we’d increase contact with an individual contract
and if we were at a loss we could listen to the boss
because he’s our family’s friend in the end.
If we are feeling pain standing out in the rain
it’s not economic strain but family gain.

Mutual obligation fixes constipation
and working for the dole purges the soul.
Howard will never fail if you’re old and frail
when it comes to kero baths* he does it for the laughs
and to show that Liberals really care – so there.
Now he’s got a passion for compassion.
He’s cute and warm and never meant to harm,
he’s our family’s friend – where will it end?

I’ve got a notion that he’s pissing in the ocean
if he thinks we’ll believe him then he’s dreaming.

*Howard’s minister for the aged defended a Sydney Nursing Home bathing the elderly in Kerosene baths.

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Howard’s table

Written in 2002

I want to tell you a story;
it’s a bit like a fable
about the crumbs that fall
from off the rich man’s table –
they scatter far and wide.
They’ll never be enough to enable
justice to prevail.
All the hand-outs and the hand-me-downs
can’t give equality,
they’ll never be enough to provide
income security.
I thank you for your condescending words
and your philanthropy
I noticed how you look up to them
and how you look down on me.
I thank you for the lukewarm soup –
for your generosity.
I look forward to the day
that I’ll be secure enough to say
“Stick your charity”.

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I wish I had had this book when teaching social policy

ON LINE opinion – Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate

Posted Monday, 11 April 2016

Richard Denniss has penned a remarkably accessible book entitled Econobabble: How to decode political spin and economic nonsense. It is part of the Redback Quarterly series and costs only $20.

The book rests on a number of premises, namely: there are, in Australia, no good economic reasons why we shouldn’t raise more taxes to pay for better health, education and social services or use regulation to ensure that ‘market outcomes’ don’t dominate our values p.143. The public are convinced about the benefits of investing in health, education and protecting the environment – it is the econobabblers who exaggerate the price and minimise the benefits p.144.

The mining industry employs a huge army of lobbyists, dissemblers, liars and PR people to spruik the benefits of mining: creating jobs, providing governments with royalties, paying taxes, employing Aborigines and creating heaven on earth. As the disaster of Adani’s Carmichael open-cut mega-mine looms it is worthwhile recalling, as Denniss reminds us that “99 per cent of Australians don’t work in coal mining p.31” and that the “taxes and royalties paid by all mining companies to all levels of government account for less than 5 per cent of government revenue. And that’s the total amount paid, not the net amount after we deduct the subsidies they receive. The Queensland government earns more from speeding fines and car registrations than it does from the coal industry p. 32”.

Denniss quotes with approval J. K. Galbraith’s assertion that “the modern conservative is engaged in one of man’s oldest exercises in moral philosophy: that is, the search for a superior moral justification for selfishness p.12.”

Conservatives don’t really want to reduce budget deficits. “If they did, they’d be happy to close the tax loopholes from which they benefit p.148”. Conservatives rarely debate why we should not have a childcare system on par with France or Scandinavia’s social welfare system; Denniss says “Why bother with actual debate when you can simply argue that ‘we can’t afford it’ p.150”.

Denniss points out that conservatives love budget deficits. When the economy is booming you do, as Costello did, cut taxes to the wealthy saying it is good for the economy. “When in a few years the economy begins to falter you cut spending to the poor. Introduce co-payments, tighten welfare eligibility criteria and if feeling particularly brave, cut taxes for the wealthy again. Tell the punters that the tax cuts will ‘give investors confidence’ p.72”. You may remember the odd treasurer who has done this in Australia in recent years.

Denniss notes, “The average household in Australia has total debts of around $230,000. As a proportion of household income, on average Australian households carry 150 per cent debt. The net debt the government holds on our behalf, however, accounts for only 17 per cent of our national income. That is down from 41 per cent when Menzies left office. The OECD average, meanwhile, is 51 per cent p. 86.” He argue that the government should increase the national debt to pay for necessary infrastructure and because such assets last many decades they should be accounted for over the longer term.

In relation to regulation of the economy the “business community is forever calling for ‘labour market deregulation’, and in 2006 the Howard government delivered them the WorkChoices legislation – which amounted to 1,000 pages of regulation. It took a lot of new regulation to deregulate the labour market, but the business community was happy nevertheless p.91.” Big business never complains about the vastly increased regulations imposed on unemployed people or the massive regulations imposed on Indigenous communities under the Northern Territory Intervention.

Business’ selective objection to regulation is perhaps no more clearly displayed than by the fact that “most shock jocks claim to hate ‘nanny-state regulation’ but they simultaneously claim to love ‘law and order’ p. 96.”

In Chapter 4, Denniss looks at budget deficits. He ridicules the statement by Tony Shepherd, the Chair of Abbott’s National Commission of Audit, that “Households understand they must live within their means. Governments must do so too.” He points out that Menzies had Budget deficits in 9 out of his 18 years in office. The Snowy Mountain Scheme was largely built on borrowed money.

In Chapter 6, Denniss argues that so called free trade agreements are nothing of the sort. They are simply the terms and conditions and restrictions that two or more countries agree as the basis for regulating trade. In relation to the Trans Pacific Partnership whilst Trade Minister Robb had over a thousand meetings with business lobbyists, “unions, environmental groups and academics were prevented from seeing the draft text of the TPP deal p.123.”

In Chapter 7, Denniss discusses the use and misuse of economic modelling and concludes that on far too many occasions rich companies or industry groups have used expensive economic modelling simply as a way to shut out opposition groups from engaging in debates.

“The simplistic debate about whether economic growth is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ prevents progressives from (discussing) which parts of the economy they wish to grow, and which parts they want to decline p.151.”

In an interesting aside Richard Denniss points out that:

For decades, market liberals have chosen to focus on the ‘deregulation’ of markets, but have been largely silent about ‘values issues’, such as freedoms in relation to homosexual sex, same sex marriage, euthanasia, abortion or the prohibition of recreational drugs.

For decades, ‘social conservatives’ have chosen to focus on ‘values issues’ related to sexuality, drugs, and death, while remaining largely silent about ‘social justice’ issues such as the gap between rich and poor, the adequacy of the social safety net, and the need for decent wages and conditions p. 106.

I suggest that you buy a copy of Econobabble before the next election, or your next visit to the pub.

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In search of the dole bludger

The preoccupation with the fecklessness of those who find themselves excluded from paid employment has been a consistent feature of the Australian income support system. This preoccupation has given birth to a number of myths such as:

  • they’d find a job if they really looked
  • Abbot’s job snobs  – they are too fussy
  • they should shift to where the work is
  • they realy are working but claiming benefits too
  • they wouldn’t work in an iron lung,
  • they are not job ready, they are lazy
  • the benefit system is too generous at 21% below the poverty line

Defining the dole bludger

Instead of seeing people who could work but who choose not to as problem individuals, were we use a social model of citizenship then we would conceive of this as a problem for society. The solutions sought under a social model of citizenship would be along the lines of what changes would be necessary to society in order to incorporate such people into the workforce.

What advantaged accrue to our society as a result of continuing to identify problem individuals and concentrate on them as individuals? Does the whole society benefit from this process or only some sections of society?

Do powerless people benefit or only the powerful?

In some societies the solutions proffered are meant to:

  • rehabilitate these problem individuals,
  • punish these problem individuals,
  • ignore these problem individuals,
  • accept these problem individuals,
  • try to incorporate them into other aspects of society, or
  • redefine the problems which the society recognises the individual is experiencing.

By preserving with the concept of problem individuals we create some problems for the society. By making “work” whether in the market economy or “preparedness to work” in the benefit system as the defining characteristic of inclusion our society has constructed its own burden.

There may have been a time when we really did need all hands to the pump- when ever person in any society was needed in the labour market if we were to avoid disaster. Those days are long passed. Since the mid-1970s the market has been totally incapable of absorbing all the available labour in this country.

Instead of defining social citizenship (particularly the entitlement to income support) as something that is earned, it would be possible to see citizenship as something that is an entitlement for all born in a particular country and all who after migrating to a country meet the requirements of citizenship.

Citizenship means in its simplest form “You are one of us you have the identical rights and duties as have all other citizens. It is an act of inclusion. Citizen’s right to vote and other political rights can only be removed in this country if an individual commits a serious crime. But when it comes to targeted social services entitlements  take on a special form, our government has no difficulty constraining people’s accesss to services and even basic income support.

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Income guarantees, social justice and environmental sustainability

Paper delivered at Ecopolitics X ANU, Canberra 26-29 September 1996.

Australia’s current Social Security system is a hotchpotch of programs which purport to provide a social welfare safety-net.  The Labor and Liberal Parties are committed to expanding “self provision” in times of unemployment, illness and retirement.  Once policies such as privatised superannuation are widely implemented, support for publicly provided income maintenance will be eroded thus undermining the social wage and social justice. Further, this economic rationalisers’ dream of everyone providing their own income support will increase exploitation of the natural environment, and leads to a decline in the provision of long term technological, educational and social infrastructure as those in a position to maximise profit taking during their working life will do so rather than forgoing immediate returns in the interests of future productive capacity or environmental sustainability.  Self provision of income support requires people to maximise their contributions to funds during their working life in order to maximise their income in retirement.

This paper presents an analysis of the efficacy of existing income maintenance provisions, evaluates the myth of “self provision” and argues for the introduction of a guaranteed minimum income as the basis for building a socially just and ecologically secure future.

Existing income maintenance provisions

Policy debates around the existing system of income support in this country have recognised that the present Australian system has grown out of long reliance on employment (Castles 1994) to provide basic income security for the bulk of the working class and that the Commonwealth funded social security is meant to provide a pretty tatty safety net through which many people fall when they encounter hard times.

The present system of income support has been criticised for:

(a) being paid at an inadequate level,
(b) failing to provide an adequate safety net because it does not ensure all those without other income receive assistance sufficient to maintain themselves at least at the poverty line (Raper 1994),
(c) treating people in equivalent financial need unequally (Perry 1995),
(d) undermining citizenship (Watts 1995 a,b),
(e) creating dependency (Crosio 1994 contra Watts 1994, 1995 b)

(f) failing to create the opportunity which could free people to utilise their creative or productive potential (McDonald 1995, Tomlinson 1991, 1995 c , Tomlinson & Lincoln 1995)
(g) being poorly understood with resulting low take-up (Raper 1995),
(h) being unnecessarily complex (Joint Committee of Public Accounts 1983), confusing (Raper 1995),
(i) overly targeted / regulated (Standing Committee on Education, Employment and Training 1992,Tomlinson b),
(j) stigmatising (Baldwin 1995) and
(l) causing work disincentives because of excessive withdrawal rates on earned income (Economic Planning Advisory Council 1988).

The existing system of income support conforms substantially with the blue print set down by the Labor Government in 1947.  The Poverty Inquiry (Henderson 1975) set up by the Liberal Coalition Government and expanded by the Whitiam Government provided the only government funded independent review of the entire system of income support since 1947. Henderson recommended replacing the existing system of income support with a guaranteed minimum income (Henderson 1975 a, Chapter 6).  There have been other constrained reviews such as that conducted during Brian Howe’s time as Minister for Social Security (Cass 1986, 1988).

By the time Labor left office the system failed to provide security and was becoming more tightly targeted / regulated (Tomlinson 1995 a,b).  It was not capable of providing a sound basis on which to build a modern Australian citizenship ( Watts 1995 a, b, Tomlinson 1996, Cox 1995) and had become obsessed with the need to ensure that individuals became self providers of income support (Tomlinson 1995 b). The arrival of the Howard Government has increased this push towards self provision – newly arrived migrants are no longer entitled to rely on publicly provided income support until two years after arrival.  Moves have been foreshadowed to limit the time young people in particular can rely on government unemployment benefits (Bessant 1996, Thompson 1996).  It would seem that the current Australian Government is determined to replicate The New Zealand Experiment so comprehensively criticised for ignoring social costs by Jane Kelsey and Sue Bradford (Kelsey 1995, Bradford 1996).

Self provision

In the general income support debate the central policy questions have revolved around: categorical targeting (Mitchell, Harding & Gruen 1994) and deciding which unit of income is appropriate for payment the individual, family or household (Hayden 1975, Edwards 1976, 1984).  These questions have become enmeshed in the simplicity versus complexity debate, much time has been spent discussing comprehensiveness, effectiveness, efficiency, adequacy, affordability and the propensity for government provided welfare payments to create dependency (contra Watts 1995 b).  The less eligibility debates have centred around means and asset testing, the need to ensure no disincentives to work or engage in other approved activities and most importantly the question of self-provision versus publicly supplied income support.

This last feature in the present decade has centred around replacing government benefits and pensions by replacing them with superannuation, and to a lesser extent privatised unemployment insurance (Latham 1996).  Like many other aspects of income support it was a re-run of much earlier debates.

The Australian income support system has since before federation relied on governments raising taxes, some of which, it reallocated to groups whose income was low and whom it considered worthy (Smith 1993).  The Commonwealth has consistently rejected introducing a social insurance model to assist the less well off.  The conservatives attempted to introduce social insurance forms in the 1930s but they were rejected by the Labor Party.  The Hancock Inquiry proposed a national superannuation scheme in 1976 which would, had it been introduced, been a form of social insurance (Hancock 1976).

In the mid 1980s the Hawke/Keating Government driven by a naive belief in economic rationalism (Pusey 1991, Ormerod 1994, Gollan 1993) and spooked by their ill-founded hysteria over aged dependency ratios (oblivious to the fact that overall dependency ratios are the real fiscal determinants of mode of distribution outlays) decided not to introduce a GMI or a national superannuation scheme along social insurance lines or even to broaden the existing categories of the income maintenance program.  Putting their faith in a corrupt private insurance industry, they introduced a privatised compulsory “national” superannuation scam (ACTCOSS 1991, Pha 1992, Tomlinson 1995 a, b).  They exacerbated this situation by increased targeting of existing benefits and applying more stringent work/activity testing.  The Current Liberal Minister for Social Security has now intensified pressure on the unemployed by insisting they maintain a “where I looked for work” diary and by setting up a “dob in a dole bludger” hot line in her Department.

This current Australian superannuation model is the epitome of the economic rationalists’ dream of self provision.  Unlike the Hancock (1976) proposal, there is no basic benefit paid to people with disabilities and others who are unable to contribute.  The rich do very well out of it: their benefits are subsidised by PAYE taxpayers, total, tax concessions on Superannuation amount to $8 billion a year (ABC 1996) the poor find their contributions eaten up in administrative costs, some contributors have found their contributions have just disappeared through fraud (ACTCOSS 1991).  This form of privatised superannuation discriminates against the marginalised, the sick, women, casual workers, low skilled workers, Aborigines whose only work has been the Community Development Employment Program and other people who experience long periods out of the work force.  The current form of privatised superannuation continues the inequalities of peoples’ working life into the post work phase of their lives.

It is a misnomer to call the Australian system of superannuation “self provision” rather it is inverse Robin Hoodism where the government of the day robs the poor in order to subsidise the wealthy.

There is a growing recognition that: (1) many members of the working class when employed may receive a wage not much above the Henderson Poverty Line. (2) Commonwealth income support payments leave many recipients living below that Line.

Income forgone paid into compulsory superannuation increases difficulties for low income earners even when they are employed. (ACOSS 1994 pp. 22-30)

Universal income guarantees

The guaranteed minimum income debate in Australia began in the early 1970s (Braybrook 1970, Horne 1970, Scott, 1972, Benn 1981, Henderson 1975 a, b, Priorities Review Staff 1975, Liffman 1978, Tomlinson 1973).  By 1973 the then Minister for Social Security, Bill Hayden indicated the Whitlam Government’s intention to introduce a guaranteed minimum income (Hayden’1973).  The Main Report of the Henderson Poverty Inquiry recommended a two tiered guaranteed income which would be based on the family as the unit of income thereby superseding most of the categorical income support payments available to low income earners (Henderson 1975 a, b).  The essential ideas inherent in the Henderson GMI proposals had been outlined by a British Liberal economist Lady Rhys-Williams in 1943.

The arguments for and against introducing universal income guarantees in Australia has waxed and waned since that time.  Modern income guarantee proposals have taken three main forms, the first two found early expression in Britain: GMI ( Rhys-Williams 1973) and Basic Incomes (Jordan 1973, 1987, McDonald 1992, Parker 1991, Secretary of State for Social Services 1972) and negative income tax (NIT) an American derivative (Rolph & Break 1961, p. 404, Friedman 1962 Chapter 4, Theobald 1963, Lampman 1965, Moynihan 1973, Williams 1972).  There has been a fourth form of income guarantee as was expressed in the Special Benefit legislation in Australia 1947-87 (Tomlinson 1989), currently in France where it is called Minimum Integration Income (French Embassy 1988) , and as was suggested in the United States of America by Tobin (1965).  This last form of income guarantee is a catch-all safety-net.

Ecological outcomes arising out of income support choices

Environmentalists have been strong advocates of income guarantees, they have utilised social equity / distributional reasoning and have argued that income guarantees have the capacity to diminish western society’s drive for excessive productivity (Watts 1994, Van Parijs 1992).  This environmental argument is subsequently employed by those who see the work/hedonism trade-off as an important determinant of income policies and as grounds for opposing the introduction of a universal income guarantee (Whiteford 1981, Saunders 1981 contra Saunders 1994, Stilwell 1993, pp. 85-88. , Tomlinson 1989, Watts 1994).

There are reasons why environmentalists should support a GMI or an adequate Commonwealth system of income support on ecological and economic sustainability grounds.  One such argument for this is that both the present social security system and even more so a GMI result in intergenerational cash transfers.

In the case of a GMI, because this system would be more widely understood, such transfers between generations would be more transparent than with categorical systems.  On the other hand superannuation and other forms of self provision mean that the person’s capacity to extract the maximum economic advantage from the employed period of their life determines the amount on which they will have to draw in the post work phase of their lives.

Self-providers have substantial economic reasons for opposing environmental measures which will, in the short term, limit their income and hence decrease their personal superannuation pay out.  Those who rely on a GMI or other forms of tax payer funded income support payments have their economic security intimately connected with long term national economic sustainability.

The short term economic reason which might incline self providers with the raison d’etre to engage in unsustainable environmental exploitation becomes less compelling once self providers realise that their long term economic security and social comfort in later years is also intimately connected with the economic and environmental sustainability of the nation as a whole and that there is a finite limit to the earth’s productive capacity.

During the last century there has been a massive increase in population and production throughout the world.  Within the last decade world marine food production has started to decline as has the number of hectares of the world’s arable land.  Environmentalist have declared that allowing population and production to continue to expand until we reach a point where the finite capacity to produce is reached is self destructive.

Further  they maintain that well before that point is reached widespread species extinction will occur and humans’ quality of life diminish (Ehrlic & Ehrlic 1992).

In Australia during the last two centuries invading humans and feral animals have been responsible for half the mammalian extinctions in recorded history ( Amos, Kirkpatrick, & Giese 1993, contra Chisholm & Moran 1993).  They have turned the Murray Darling River system into a sewer, removed 90% of the rain forrest, had major impacts on coastal fisheries (Kailola et.al. 1993) and degraded much of the arable land.

During the Hawke period in office the Government made the first tentative steps to recognise the fact that without environmental sustainability there could not be economic sustainability (ESD Working Group 1991).  Unfortunately, like Brian Howe’s social justice strategy, environmental sustainability became a stand alone policy unconnected to anything else.  Such stand alone policies are hung out on the flag pole just so they can be pointed to during election periods or at times when party activists try to recall why they joined the Party.

Whilst it may be possible, in the short term, to marginalise environmental sustainability and social justice policies – the longer it is done the greater will be the ultimate social, environmental and economic impact.  We are still at a stage in Australia, and throughout the world, where the social justice questions could be addressed by abolishing the military and through developing equitable distributional strategies (Wheelwright 1991, Hunt 1987, Smith & Smith 1983, Debus & Merson 1977, George 1980,1990, Chomsky 1988, Peck 1987).

Social comfort

There are quality of life reasons why prime aged workers have a vested interest in ensuring environmental sustainability at the time they retire.  During retirement people have far more time available to visit the places they have only talked about during their working life.  Whilst many Australians still do the big overseas trip shortly after leaving employment for the last time, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of citizens who now choose instead to visit Kakadu, the Bungle Bungles, Ayres Rock, the Great Barrier Reef and many other wilderness areas, about which they could only dream when they were wage slaves.

Because retirement for most older Australians equates with limited income, time on their hands and declining health they often rely on doing things either around the house or within a few kilometres of it.  Many of these activities involve supplementing the household income.  Vegetable gardens are established, fishing becomes much more confined to local beaches and rivers.  Gone are the days when they could afford or could handle larger vessels which carried them to distant ocean reefs.  They develop more awareness of the problems of over exploitation of local areas – frequently leading campaigns to stop professional fishing in their area or to prevent other environmental degradation.

They come to clearly understand the connection between devastation of locally occurring natural resources (which they now need to utilise) and the economy.  This awareness is increased every time they buy bait and can’t catch a feed in the local creek or have to drive to distant fishing spots in order to ensure tomorrows breakfast.

Universal income guarantees, viable environments and economic sustainability

The environment is the one thing which we all own in common (though we each exploit it individually and differently).  The environment is the ultimate basis of present and future wealth.  Through distortions such as “self provision”, we depart from acknowledging it as the producer of our common wealth.  Privatised superannuation “self provision” operates in Australia at the moment in such a way that those who receive the greatest financial rewards throughout their working lives are the ones who get most from the superannuation system in retirement.  They are often the very same people who are engaged in the greatest exploitation of the natural environment.  They are frequently the employers (or managers) who in their ruthless extraction of surplus value (Bottomore, et. al. 1983 pp. 472-476) are least conserving of other humans’ health and well being.  The mystifying rhetoric of “self provision” is designed to disguise the rewards which go to those who take the most from the common pool of environmental wealth.

At the time of the enclosures in England a poet expressed this same idea:

“The law locks up the men and women
who steal the goose from off the common
but leaves the larger villain loose
who steals the common from the goose.”(anon.)

Governments in a democracy can’t indefinitely impose unpopular policies.  Citizens respond to the issues in terms of the way they see their interests being best served.  This does not imply that people only act from an egotistical perspective, they may well act out of altruism, and still have their perceived best interests being served.  The socioeconomic structures position all of us – determining how we see the world, how we perceive our interests.

For a long time it has been recognised that the degree to which people are prepared to defer gratification is dependent upon the certainty they have that deferment will actually result in gratification (Ternowetsky 1980 chapter 5, Loney 1986).  Australians’ appreciation of politicians and their public servants’ reliability in honouring promises can be judged from the humorous response which follows in the wake of statements like “I’m from the Government and I’m here to help you”.

If people are placed in a situation where their economic security in their retirement ( a period for most people where they have limited control of income generation) is intimately connected to the amount they can accumulate during the employed period of their lives then most will attempt to maximise their income during their paid employment period.

On the other hand, were people told that during the paid work period of their lives they would pay contributions/taxes to sustain children, disabled and retired members of their society and that their retirement income would be provided by the younger generations when they entered the workforce then different structural pressures would exist.  The egocentred might at first only want to pay to maximise the earning capacity of younger citizens arguing that the elderly were going to do nothing for them.  But even the most ego centred individual might realise that to adopt such an uncaring attitude towards senior citizens might set an unfortunate precedent for the time when they reached the end of their working life.

Future economic prosperity is totally dependent upon having an environment both natural and industrial which has the capacity to continue to produce sufficient wealth to maintain standards of living.  If retirement income is dependent upon those in employment paying their taxes which are then redistributed to the young and the retired this results in the basic social structure being in place to encourage all permanent residents to develop environmentally sustainable exploitation and to ensure that investment is made in industrial, educational and technological infrastructure.

Even with a system of retirement income being provided by way of self provision the total amount of income available for all retired people will ultimately be determined by the state of the environment and the continued investment in educational industrial and technological infrastructure.  However the social structure would not be in place which would encourage self-providing workers to forego income in the interest of future generations.  Self provision reinforces egotism by providing clear economic advantage to those who set out with a beggar thy neighbour attitude to maximise their personal economic well being.

Future directions and problems

The focus of struggle ahead for those interested in universal, adequate, comprehensive, easily understood and socially equitable forms of income guarantees will be to run the fight up to reactionary forces (well intended or otherwise) who wish to retain the existing forms of income support and simultaneously confront the economic rationalists who would reduce the amount and scope of government provided income support through the promotion of privatised self-provision on the one hand and stigmatised welfare relief on the other. (Jamrozik 1994, p. 102, Rees, Rodley & Stilwell 1993, Vintila, Phillimore & Newman 1992)

If we are going to win such a struggle we are going to have to build broad community support far beyond the confines of the social welfare industry, trade union and progressive community politicians – in particular we need to garner support from environmentalists and the uncommitted.

Much of the current social / environmental debate in Australia revolves around employment versus conservation, increased production versus species protection, and other issues which pit sensible ecology against social equity.  These issues are not necessarily oppositional.  The Greens, the Democrats and some members of the Labor Party (Langmore & Quiggan 1994) realise the connection between public provision of retirement incomes and sustainable economic development.  The one million Australians who play some part in environmental protection organisations are potentially the most powerful source of support for the introduction of a GMI.

The challenge for those interested, in the promotion of social justice is to form a united front combining progressive human service workers, the non-aligned and most particularly environmentalists, to increase awareness of the environmentally sustaining nature of income guarantees over “self-provision”.  Such a coalition would build an Australian society committed to economic and environmental sustainabilty.  It would be an Australia committed to the promotion of human rights and social justice.  In Lady Rhys-Williams words it would “provide a floor below which no body would fall without imposing a ceiling above which no body could rise”. (Glyn p. 163)

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Income Maintenance

John worked in the Department of Social Security in 1964-65 and again in 1968-73.

His 1989 PhD thesis examined the political obstacles to the introduction of a guaranteed minimum income in Australia.

He was the Director of the Australian Capital Territory’s Council of Social Service from 1988-93.

He has lectured on income maintenance in all of Australia States and Territories and was a Senior Lecturer in Social Policy at Queensland University of Technology from 1993-2006.

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Income Security

John’s first social work job was with the Department of Social Security in Brisbane in 1964. He was then and continues to be concerned that people have sufficient income to live a dignified life, have access to adequate shelter for themselves and their children and to feel that they are safe.

Over the years his ideas as to how such goals might be achieved have changed from an initial ideal that ensuring people were assisted to gain access to specific social security benefits or pensions for which they had an entitlement, through to promoting the idea of providing a guaranteed minimum income, before becoming an enthusiastic supporter of the concept of providing every permanent resident with a universal basic income. You can see some of his ideas evolving here.

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Income support for Australia: a proposal

The choice in Australia is stark. Citizens can let governments continue down the existing economic fundamentalist path towards even more minimum income support, increasingly targeted, with greater selectivity and increasingly compulsory ‘mutual obligation’ or they can work to convince government that it should adopt a more liberating, universal, unconditional income support system.

Social theorists suggest we have passed over to a post modern state. Science is reaching into the recesses of the universe and the darkest depths of the oceans. Military experts consistently vacate the moral sphere in favour of smart bombs. Therefore one might expect human beings, at least in what we quaintly call the developed world, to have an advanced understanding of the basis on which we supply income support to the least affluent in our community. After all we have the capacity to measure the negative effects of poverty and maldistribution. We are surrounded by economic and social modellers who claim predictive capacities for their constructions at which the architects of the modern welfare state, like William Beveridge, could only marvel. Yet in Australia we still maintain an income support system remarkably similar to that which prevailed in Britain at the time of the 1834 Poor Law legislation.

I propose we abolish the entire patchwork of government provided income support programs and replace them with a universal Basic Income paid to each individual who is a permanent resident. Such an income guarantee would be paid irrespective of wealth, marital status, preparedness to work, child minding responsibilities or the lack of them, education, moral virtuousness or any other social feature. In order for the payment to act as an alternative income support system the level of payment would need, at a minimum, to be set at the rate of the single age pension. This form of basic income is affordable and could be implemented within one year of the government agreeing to legislate for its introduction. But first let’s consider the history of income support and the reasons to change from the current system of income support.

A glimpse of past income support programs

In feudal England a number of support systems existed for members of the community who fell on hard times – their extended family in the first instance, others in the village with a surplus, the lord of the manor or the church. Strangers might not be helped and could be banished from the village and left to die at the crossroads. Each area had its own helping characteristics. However, before one was assisted others in the village had to have sufficient resources to help, there was an expectation of ‘mutual obligation’ and one had to be in good standing with other community members. In times of widespread crop failures these local helping systems broke down.

Not much changed in relation to the way poor people were helped until towards the end of the 18th Century. At Speenhamland, Berkshire in 1795 a number of landlords were unable to pay sufficient wages to ensure their farm labourers had an adequate income to sustain themselves and their families. The system provided a fixed scale of relief in line with the size of the labourer’s family and the price of wheat. In return labourers were required to continue to work. The scheme involved topping up the wages paid by the individual farm owners.

The scheme was criticised by workers organisations because they saw that the minimum assistance had the capacity to become the going wage and that it was a subsidy to employers. Many trade unions to this day have opposed income guarantee schemes on similar bases. Others criticised it as a form of ‘work for the dole which they saw as undermining the dignity of paid labour.

The early 1800s saw the continuation of in-door work houses (principally for widows, orphans and invalids) and for the able bodied out-door charity relief work to assist those unable to gain paid employment. These schemes relied upon two principles: the first was determining who was worthy to receive assistance, and the second principle was less eligibility, that is any assistance provided had to be of a lesser amount than could be obtained through paid work.

Many of the moral attitudes which led to the creation of work houses (which later came to be known as poor houses) and the outdoor relief schemes persist to the present day. The ideologies implicit in the system of 18th and 19th century welfare relief continue though the methods of delivery have changed. For instance, following the reforms in Bismarck’s Germany, relief in kind was increasingly replaced by cash with some attempt to codify what eligibility /worthiness meant in practice.

The Australian Welfare State

In 1908 legislation was passed to pay age and invalid pensions to those who met the required eligibility criteria. Until 1973 applicants for social services could be refused payments because “they were deemed not to be of good moral character”. In the 21st. century eligibility requirements for social security no longer have such explicit moral requirements but the way in which need / eligibility is construed in the legislation implies approval for some social actions and disapproval of others. Eligibility still equates with worthiness.

When, in the 1930s, confronted by 30% of its male labour force unable to find paid work it was to an outdoor work relief system that Australia turned. The ‘Susso’ scheme involved single and sometimes married men being required to move from town to town looking for work and in its absence engaging in make-work jobs for local councils in return for their sustenance. This ‘work for the dole’ idea was reintroduced for young unemployed people by the Howard Government in 1997 and is in the process of being extended to older unemployed people, sole parents and Disability support Pensioners.

Governments have since 1908 been concerned to ensure that income support payments are not a more attractive alternative than paid work and have legislated extensive restrictions on who can and who can’t get paid. The unemployed, to be paid a benefit, have to be willing, ready and able to take any paid work. They can be compelled to move from their home town, undertake training however inappropriate, and so forth. Less eligibility lives. The existing system is widely perceived as a hand out when what is needed is a hand up.

There has been a parallel debate

While the Australian welfare system has evolved from the Poor Laws to poor laws there has been another debate proceeding apace. That debate draws different conclusions from the Speenhamland experience. It finds in Speenhamland a kernel of trust in others, a way to get the productive needs of society met through utilising the available labour and the provision of a base below which no one would fall.

In 1848 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote The Communist Manifesto which heralded a system where the basis of production and distribution would be “From each according to ability and to each according to need”. Though such a system has not been implemented in any country the promise of the Manifesto has presented a challenge to all other systems of income distribution since that time. Bismarck’s reforms were measured against the Manifesto. The early Australian welfare state was described by visiting European social scientists as ‘Socialism without ideology’.

Though some aficionados suggest earlier writers, I think the earliest fully elaborated comprehensive income guarantee plan was put forward by Dennis Milner in a book called Higher Production by a Bonus on National Output: A proposal for a minimum income for all varying with national productivity. After a brief flurry of activity by him and his fellow Quakers the idea submerged until British Liberal economist Lady Rhys-Williams in 1943again raised it. Her book was called Something to look forward to. Lady Rhys-Williams’ aim was “To provide a floor below which no one could fall without imposing a ceiling beyond which no one could rise.” The economic fundamentalist writer Milton Friedman claims that year also as the time during which he developed his ideas on his form of income guarantee (the Negative Income Tax) but it took him a further 18 years before he published his ideas.

In 1975 Professor Ronald Henderson in the First Main Report of the Poverty Inquiry, borrowing heavily on Lady Rhys -Williams’ ideas, advocated a Guaranteed Minimum Income for Australia.

Since that time many different forms of income guarantees have been promoted around the world. The major point of difference is the degree to which authors wish their income guarantee to ape the welfare income support system with its various categories of payment and means test or instead argue that income support should be in the form of a truly universal payment to all as a right of citizenship.

Perhaps now is the time to say “Farewell to Alms”

The system of basic income which I advocate would be paid to each individual over the age of 16. A different rate would need to be struck for younger children. The only eligibility requirement being that applicants establish their status as a permanent resident.

This system would replace all other income support systems, be paid fortnightly and at least at the rate of the single age pension. It would be paid by the Tax Department. All tax free areas would be abolished. Tax would be paid on the first through to the last dollar earned. People, unlike most social security and family allowance recipients now, would always be financially better off for every extra dollar earned. If Australia really wants a deregulated labour market then it should introduce such a system. At present it has a highly deregulated mode of production on one side of the equation. On the other side Australia maintains one of the most confusing and contradictory yet highly regulated (targeted) social safety nets in the world.

A basic income would be simple, comprehensive and understandable. It would remove financial disincentives to seek employment. Above all it would be liberating of labour and intellect. It is now time to remove the constraining withered hand of welfare. It should be replaced by a determination to reach back to those of our fellow citizens lagging behind us in order to provide them with a hand up.

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Income support for unemployed people: Human rights versus utilitarian rights

Published in Journal of Economic and Social Policy, Vol 6, Issue 2, 1.1.2002

Abstract

This paper considers the treatment of unemployed people’s rights and entitlements, focussing particularly on the last decade and a half. It places the debate about entitlements within the context of the historical development of the entire Australian social security income support system. It considers rights in relation to obligations from the perspectives of both utilitarianism and universalism. It concludes that only the provision of a universal Basic Income can prevent Australian Governments undermining unemployed people’s economic security and foisting socially destructive obligations upon them.

Introduction

The main components of the Australian income support system were put in place by the Chiffley Labor Government in its 1947 consolidation of much of its social security(1) legislation (Kewley 1973, ch.14). In the four decades following the end of the Second World War, Liberal and Labor Governments slowly expanded the scope and generosity of the income support system. However, a significant, gradual but relentless diminution in the entitlement of citizens to access a base level of income support has marked the period since the mid-1980s (Castles 2001, pp. 29-31).

Both Labor and Coalition Governments have designed their income support policies in such a way as to have a direct impact on unemployed people. The ‘reciprocal/mutual’ obligation strategy was directed, in the first instance, towards compelling the young unemployed to participate and was then extended to include older unemployed, single parents and some people with disabilities (Reference Group on Welfare Reform 2000). The significantly increased breaching regime waged by the current Coalition Government drastically changed the level of income insecurity experienced by people without paid work who are forced to rely on Federally provided income support (ACOSS 2000; Bessant 2000).

This paper will:

  • reflect upon the ideologies which informed the construction of the welfare safety net,
  • compare those ideologies with current hegemonic ideas which determine welfare outcomes at the start of the third millennium,
  • argue that the constrained view of income support entitlements promoted by the Howard Government constitutes a retreat from a welfare state informed by human, social and economic rights as set out in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and associated Conventions (which Australia has signed and ratified).

The Howard Government has adopted a utilitarian or traditional ethical perception of rights tied to complementary obligations which the unemployed are expected to meet (Rees 2000; Charlesworth 2001). These obligations are imposed on unemployed people at the very time when they are facing a huge challenge just trying to survive.

The imposition of utilitarian rights, in preference to the adoption of a human rights stance, creates three socially undesirable outcomes.

Firstly, it diminishes the attraction of universal income maintenance. This, in turn, constitutes a major impediment to the introduction of liberating income support policies such as a Basic Income.

Secondly, the imposition of ‘mutual obligation’ denigrates those who rely on income support programs by:

  • enforcing participation in a limited range of approved activities,
  • devaluing many of the family and civic contributions which income support recipients make, and
  • inverting the concept of ‘social capital’ (Cox 1995; Putnam 1993) from civic solidarity to one of compelled individual effort. This undermines the communal aspect of ‘social security’ by placing an excessive concentration on an individual’s contribution.

Thirdly, it devalues all permanent residents’ social citizenship through the erosion of pre-existing social and economic rights.

Foundations of the post-war Welfare State

The Australian welfare state grew out of the pre-federation welfare policies of the colonies and after 1908 was to be based on full employment plus assistance to those perceived to be ‘in need’ (Kewley 1973; Roe 1976; Kennedy 1982; Dickey 1980). Castles (1985, 1994) described it as a ‘workers welfare state’. Certainly the blend of a strong arbitration system, occupational welfare provisions and full employment in the early post Second World War period made the task of the Labor Party, committed to expanding income support provisions for the most vulnerable, easier to implement.

The British post war welfare state had an influence on social policy directions taken in Australia (Timmins 1995). The intense involvement of leading Labor Party figures, such as Evatt, in the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation imbued the expanding social security legislation with a concept of rights which drew heavily on ideologies which informed the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

The widespread acceptance of such constructions arose out of Australians’ image of themselves as a people committed to egalitarianism. They conceived of the broad categorical system of income support and assistance to children via Child Endowment as a form of ‘universal’ assistance to all in need. Introduced in 1941 Child Endowment excluded the first child. By the early 1950s, it was widely regarded as having become a payment covering all children – though differential rates applied depending on the number of children under 16 years in a family. It was claimable by ‘mothers’ of children born in Australia, those who had lived here for 12 months or earlier if they could establish the child intended to remain permanently; the Child Endowment was not regarded as taxable income (Kewley 1973, ch. 10). Even ‘non-nomadic’ Aboriginal people not reliant on Commonwealth or State Government support were included (Kewley 1973, p. 195).

It was never Utopia

In Australia there have always been people, with little or no income, who were excluded from the beneficence of the Federal welfare system:

  • Asians until the 1940s,
  • city Aborigines until the 1960s,
  • rural and remote Indigenous people until the 1970s,
  • people out of work as a result of industrial action (Barwick 1997),
  • those who could not pass the work test,
  • until 1973 those deemed ‘unworthy’ by the Department,
  • those the Department deemed dependent upon a spouse, whose income precluded payment,
  • single mothers until 1973, and
  • single fathers until 1976.

There were others who could not meet the eligibility requirements for particular benefits or pensions. Yet this did not stop a series of ministers of social security consistently proclaiming that the ‘social security safety net assists everyone in need through no fault of their own’. Goodin (2000; 1988) explains that, whilst the commanding ethos of the post-war welfare state relied on the assumption that the collective would meet the basic needs of vulnerable individuals, it was not however intended that any individual should totally escape the need to be self supporting, whenever possible, and to impose the condition that the State not be the automatic first point of call for help.

Nevertheless, when the author worked for the Department of Social Security in the 1960s and 70s, officers generally assumed that nearly everyone, without access to other income, had an entitlement to some form of benefit or pension. Certainly some officers were less committed to this notion than others. Some were concerned to weed out: ‘work shy’ applicants for unemployment benefit, ‘malingerers’ from the ranks of the ‘Invalid Pension’ applicants, and were ever watchful for the possibility that a ‘Widow’s Pensioner’ was secretly living in a ‘bona fide domestic relationship’ with some bloke or in the case of ‘Widow Pensioner’ applicant (who had left the matrimonial home) the possibility that she did not have ‘just cause’ for leaving.

Prior to 1972 the Department, under Coalition administrations, concentrated on the question of personal entitlement (as specified under the Federal legislation as interpreted by an individual official). The incoming Whitlam administration, with Bill Hayden as Minister, changed this personal perception of entitlement towards one of right to payment except in situations which were specifically precluded by social security legislation. This was done by legislative change, policy pronouncement and by setting up administrative appeal processes to ensure people received their entitlement as specified in the legislation. Hayden abolished the provision which allowed the Department to deem someone ‘unworthy’ and extended income support provision to single parents who were female. This expansion of income support entitlement was further extended to include lone fathers by the Fraser Government’s Minister for Social Security, Margaret Guilfoyle.

The last major policy extension to income support entitlement was the introduction, during the Fraser administration, of the Family Allowance Supplement. This scheme was expanded, improved, and renamed the Family Income Supplement by the incoming Hawke Labor Government. The Family Assistance Office currently administers the Australian family payments system. It has, in recent years, undergone a series of administrative changes and is not dissimilar, in aim, to the United States and British working families tax credits (Goodin 2000).

The retreat

Incremental improvements and extensions to income support policy, which had occurred steadily from 1947, halted in 1986. Commenting on ‘the policy shift from entitlement to obligation’ Eardley & Matheson (2000, p. 182) suggest ‘The first distinct elements of the new framework of support for unemployed people emerge from Labor’s Social Security Review (Cass 1988).’ There were some minor changes, such as allowing ex-prisoners to gain immediate access to social security, still to come, but, in large part, the ‘political’ concentration became one of ensuring no one received more than the amount to which they were entitled, and crackdowns designed to ensure people were meeting every requirement for eligibility became more frequent (Castles 2001). The unemployed and lone parents were singled out for particular surveillance by the Department (Nolan 1997).

The Department of Social Security’s Annual Report 1986-87 (p. 99) revealed how targeting was used to decrease the number of low income people who were paid income security:

With the progressive introduction of new administrative measures during 1986-87, there was a substantial decline in the number of people receiving benefits. At the time of the 1986-87 Budget the Treasury estimated that there would have been an average of 605,000 beneficiaries had the measures not been implemented…In short, there was a substantial increase in the number of unemployed over the year but a substantial decrease in the number of unemployment beneficiaries.

This was not an entirely new tactic. Windschuttle (1981) notes that the Fraser Government in 1976 achieved a decrease in the number of unemployment beneficiaries during a time of rising unemployment by pressuring CES officers to take a tougher interpretation of the existing regulations.

Targeted welfare benefits can never deliver benefits equitably even to those who meet all the eligibility requirements (Boston & St. John 1998). The high point of the rights orientation in the administration of social security was during Bill Hayden’s reign but, by the time Hayden was Treasurer, unemployment had risen to four (4) percent and youth unemployment had dramatically increased. He and Clyde Cameron claimed the ranks of the unemployed were swelled by ‘work-shy lion tamers’ and ‘dole bludgers’ (Windschuttle 1981, pp. 180-190). Guilfoyle’s administration of the Department did not dismantle many of the gains made under Labor, but the prevailing ethos in the Department began the drift back towards a view of personal eligibility.

In 1977 a school leaver, Karen Green, successfully challenged in the High Court the blanket decision, announced in March 1976 by the then Employment Minister, that school leavers would have to wait six weeks before they were entitled to unemployment benefit (Kewley 1980). The Director General of the Department of Social Security then individually determined her case and found that she had made insufficient effort to seek work in the six weeks immediately after leaving school and rejected her claim (Kewley 1980). Windschuttle (1981, p. 191) asserts that ‘The Liberal government openly ignored Justice Steven’s (of the High Court) interpretation and imposed its own on the case’. Lengthy waiting periods for school leavers and unemployed people who are breached or fail in other regards to meet their ‘mutual obligations’ are now enshrined in the social security legislation.

Coming to power the Hawke Labor Government, with Don Grimes as Minister, improved a range of disability programs but in terms of income support policies there was little improvement. The re-imposition of the pension assets test ‘was announced in the Budget of 1983-84. The Social Security Minister at the time was Don Grimes. The Legislation was not passed until September 1984 and was not implemented until March 1985, by which time Brian Howe was the Minister’ (personal communication with David Stanton a former senior officer in the Department of Social Security). The search for savings in this portfolio was on in earnest. Mendes (1998, pp. 34- 35) describing Labor’s social policy directions suggests:

Targeting enabled Labor to provide substantial increases in real incomes to most social security beneficiaries…(but) had little or no impact on inequalities within the paid workforce…The increases in social security were financed not by a redistribution of income from the rich to the poor, but rather by a redirection…within the social security system…the gains for beneficiaries were too often at the expense of the living standards and rights of other disadvantaged groups.

In a recent book Edwards et al. (2001) discuss unifying income support schemes for young people, the introduction of the Child Support Agency, the imposition of the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) and ‘solving’ unemployment via Working Nation. Edwards et al. (2001) note each of these policy debates ‘started with a fairly simple idea: a single youth allowance, a child support levy, a graduate tax and a job compact’ (p. 10) and that ‘A common overriding constraint on ministers was the budget “bottom line’” (p. 181). Edwards was involved in the development of each of these policies. A major weakness of the book is that it largely ignores the way ‘equity’ debates concerning such things as: what constitutes a suitable amount of income, and the imposition of ‘reciprocal obligation’ initiated by Hawke/Keating Labor paved the way for the Howard Government to compel: ‘Dole Diaries’, literacy training, ‘Work for the Dole’ and other ‘mutual obligations’. The Hawke and Keating Government’s social welfare ministers ardently advanced the proposition that, in order to promote equity between those whose taxes paid for social welfare and those who received it, there needed to be some reciprocity demonstrated by the recipients.

Semantics

At a simple semantic level the Howard Government’s claim to be enforcing a policy of ‘mutual’ obligation is misleading. The Macquarie Dictionary defines mutual as:

  1. possessed, experienced, performed, etc by each of two or more with respect to other or others; reciprocal: mutual aid.
  2. having the same relation each towards the other or others: mutual foes.
  3. of or pertaining to each of two or more or common: mutual acquaintance (1987, p. 1175, italics in original).

There is no reciprocity in the relationship between the Howard Government and unemployed people. The opinions of unemployed people were not sought; their interests are not considered. The Government unilaterally imposed the policy; the Government unilaterally extended the policy in the 2001/2002 Budget. There is no respect for unemployed people implicit or explicit in compelling them to engage in ‘Work for the Dole’. Unemployed people are (until the election) powerless to amend this policy or mitigate its impacts. The power differential extant between unemployed people and the Government is huge. As a result of this, unemployed people and the Government can’t have the same relation each towards the other. The only sense in which the Government policy of ‘mutual obligation’ is common, is in the sense that the policy is ordinary, mundane and lacking sophistication. The Government imposes ‘mutual obligation’ on the unemployed, they have few ways of affecting the Government. There was never any deal done between the Government and unemployed people to seek mutual acceptance of the policy. ‘Mutual obligation’ is a compact between the Government and all citizens .

Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism began in the 18th century as a movement within the British liberal tradition. The liberal tradition is closely associated with the ideas of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, and a liberal collectivist stream with Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham and other utilitarians. Bentham developed a complex calculus of pleasure (good) and pain (bad) with the intention of introducing enlightened social legislation in line with morality (Sills 1968). Whilst there are elements of egalitarian principles present in the writings of Bentham, they are tentative steps towards equality as understood by socialists. The liberal collectivists’ link with conservative ideas about the common good is a major point of disjunction with the individualist strand of liberal thought.

In recent times utilitarianism is best known for one of its central ideas summed up in the phrase ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’. A problem with such an idea, if rigidly enforced, is that it can degenerate into rule by 50 percent plus one. Alex de Torqueville (1862) pointed out this form of ‘democracy’ can result in what he termed the ‘Tyranny of the Majority’. The protection of minorities can never be safeguarded under regimes which impose a 50 percent plus one rule. One has only to look at the deplorable way asylum seekers are treated in Australia or to consider the treatment of Indigenous citizens’ property rights in this country to see the level of viciousness that can be applied to minority interests by a democratically elected government (Cunneen 2001; Reynolds 1998).

The Howard Government has imposed a ‘majority rules’ regime in relation to the unemployed. Unemployment income support policies are not assessed against the measure of the greatest good of all unemployed people, the greatest good of all recipients of income support, or the greatest good of all poor people. They are measured against an economic liberalist interpretation of the greatest good of the entire population. This account of the ‘greater good’ makes explicit the ‘benefits’ received by unemployed people but does not take any account of the costs borne by unemployed people. It converts ipso facto all employed into givers, providers – indeed benefactors if not genuine philanthropists. The underlining of the division between the productive and the non-productive, the giver and the receiver, the socially valued and the socially devalued does not enhance a unified civil society. It divides the society between the included and the marginalised.

Prime Minister Howard (1999; 2000) has set out the central ideological features of his approach to government. In these two papers he lays bare his conception of a social coalition consisting of government, business, church agencies, families and individuals. He also portrays his amalgam of a socially conservative agenda and his radical liberal economic policies. Such an approach was adopted with alacrity by a former welfare minister in his Government. In her paper on ‘welfare dependency’ she said ‘In short, good economic policy is good welfare policy’ (Newman 1999, p. 10).

The way rights are conceived affects who benefits

Stuart Rees (2000) comments that when a government

emphasises that rights have to be earned, that people can only insist on their rights if they have carried out their social responsibilities…It softens a general public for the idea that rights are conditional, not universal…By contrast, the tradition of human rights which contributed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) advocates a universal standard to protect against the tyranny of the state…In the Rights of Man (1791) Thomas Paine identified a universalist tradition with reference to conditions which gave security to citizens and thereby facilitated a civil society…Advocates of universal rights do not reject the ethicists’ (Utilitarians’) regard for duties and obligations but they do emphasise that duties and obligations serve to enhance rights; they are not a precondition for them. The universalist argument relies on the assumption that rights are accorded to people because they are human beings. In 1948 the universal declaration was designed to represent the highest aspirations of a common people (Rees, pp. 296-298, italics not in original).

Arguments which go to solidarity and inclusion are based on a universalist conception of rights and are centred around ideas of mutuality and reciprocity rather than reciprocal or mutual obligation. Universalists base their views on a far more optimistic understanding of humankind than that which informs those addicted to the idea that even the right to sustainable income support is conditional. Much of the motivation which underpins the utilitarian view of rights revolves around the way risk is assessed (Sztompka 1999). Conservatives have a belief in the inherent imperfection of human beings (Tomlinson 1999; 2000). This preoccupation with the unemployed to ‘disappoint’ finds voice in the current ‘dependency’ debates (Tomlinson 2001) being waged by members of the Howard Government and by the conservative Indigenous lawyer Noel Pearson (1999 [a], [b] contra Tomlinson 1999). Minister Vanstone (2001), commenting on a three year longitudinal study, put out a press statement with the misleading heading ‘Research confirms transgenerational welfare dependence’ seemingly oblivious to the fact that a three year longitudinal study is incapable of establishing evidence about intergeneration impacts (Goodin et al. 1999). Three years is but a small part of even one human generation.

Whether the dependency rhetoric about ‘mutual obligation’ is dressed up in the language of the ‘active society’ (Cass 1988), the Reference Group on Welfare Reform’s (2000) notion of ‘participation income’; by Pearson who suggests: ‘The first step in leeching out the poison from welfare is to ensure that Government stops dealing poison to individuals in our society, through sending cheques in the mail’ (p. 59), or by Minister Abbot who accuses many unemployed people of being ‘job snobs’, it denigrates those who are forced to rely on income support. Diana Bagnall (1999) wrote ‘the phrase ‘mutual obligation’ (is) jargon for the notion that you don’t get something for nothing’ (p. 47) and went on to point out: ‘This is not about affordability so much as morality…the immorality of welfare dependency’ (p. 48).

Fortunately there still are in Australia a few writers, like Ray Cassin (2000, p. 22), who remember the history of income support.

You can be ‘on’ social security in the literal sense of receiving benefits, but this usage does not carry the pejorative flavour of being ‘on’ welfare. The reason is not mysterious: we do not talk about social-security dependency, or social-services dependency because ‘social security’ and ‘social services’ are bound up with an older notion of entitlement, and an understanding of mutual obligation that goes beyond tit-for-tat reciprocity…The ideal of mutual obligation underpinning a system of social security is not one of reciprocity, but of obligation borne by all of us to contribute to the support of people who would otherwise be destitute.

The resistance in Australia and in Britain to taking seriously the promise of the early post World War 2 welfare state exemplified in Beveridge’s determination to abolish the five giants of ‘squalor, want, ignorance, disease and idleness’ (Timmins 1995), is clear in the current British Prime Minister’s suggestion that what the socially excluded really need is ‘not money or welfare – but opportunities’ (Morton 1999, p. 1). Blair ‘believes that the best form of welfare is work, and like our own Federal Government, the rhetoric of the Blair Government is strong on the language of mutual obligation’ (Morton 1999, p. 2).

The oft repeated mantra of Howard and his ministers that ‘the best form of welfare is work’ needs to be put alongside the labour market reality that there are in Australia seven (7) unemployed people for every job vacancy and in Queensland there are 16 unemployed people for every job vacancy (ABC TV News 27/4/2001, ACOSS 2001 [a]). The problem for many who are lucky enough to get one of these vacancies is that they find such work is often casualised, insecure, part-time and poorly remunerated. All it guarantees is a precarious existence and continuing poverty. Yes it is work but it is offered on such demeaning terms that it is welfare.  In the last decade and a half, Australians have witnessed:

  • increasing deregulation of the labour market,
  • attacks on the Arbitration system,
  • expansion of precarious employment,
  • undermining of award conditions through the expansion of individual work- place contracts, and
  • these occupational features have proceeded alongside:
  • increased targeting of welfare benefits,
  • tightening of eligibility, and
  • diminution of social security provisions.

All of these features have undermined Australian citizens’ sense of security, yet this has not been sufficient to satisfy the Howard Government.

There has been an income support appeal process in place since Bill Hayden in 1973 began the process. Social security appeal mechanisms have for decades allowed income support recipients to challenge Departmental determinations of their entitlement. Such appeal mechanisms have provided an important bulwark against the unfettered power of government to discriminate against the least bureaucratically sophisticated citizens. It has been possible for illiterate clients to appear unassisted before the Social Security Tribunal and at least have their case reviewed by an independent panel of three. Early in 2001 the Howard Government announced its intention to amalgamate all Federal administrative appeal tribunals into one body. A single commissioner was to determine each case and appeal applications were to have been in writing (ABC TV 7.30 Report 21/2/2001). Such an approach would make it inordinately harder for income support recipients to obtain an appropriate appeal hearing. Labor and the minor parties disallowed this proposal in the Senate.

From then and now

The way Ministers speak about unemployed people affects the security of the income support they receive. Two examples exemplify how substantially attitudes have changed since the early 1970s.

In May 1973, for example, Hayden issued instructions that the work test be applied less strictly than formally. These instructions accorded with his view that most people wished to be employed and that it was preferable that a few people took advantage of the system and slipped through it than that people genuinely seeking work should be unfairly penalized (Kewley 1980, p. 134).

In April 2001, Mal Brough, the Minister for Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business commenting on his Department’s (2001) assessment of the Job Network said:

20,700 welfare recipients referred to the Job Search Training and Intensive Assistance surrendered their benefit rather than undertake either program…the study confirmed the Government’s mutual obligation program is working. Compliance is a strong motivator and it also flushes out dole cheats (Brough 2001[a], p. 2).

In Appendix C of the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business study (2001) it is acknowledged that in 20 to 30 percent of cases it had no details as to why people left these programs.

A couple of weeks earlier at a conference of ‘Work for the Dole’ Co-ordinators, Mal Brough (2001[b], p. 7) commenting on those who left these programs said it was a savings to tax payers if people decided they no longer wanted to be on benefit ‘for whatever reason’ and in a personal note said:

And if you’ve a genuine unemployed person you want to put as much resources into getting them back into work and assisting them as you can. The last thing I want to see is any dollar – let alone lots of them – being spent on people who shouldn’t be there in the first place (p. 6).

In less than 30 years Australian ministers have moved from an acceptance that the occasional person be paid even though perhaps not fully entitled to a benefit to a resolute disregard for the fact that many income support recipients leave the income support system ‘for whatever reason’. For many it is because they can’t hack the harassment. One of the most oppressive elements of this harassment is the ever present possibility of being breached, ACOSS (2001[b]) notes there were 349,100 breaching penalties imposed in the 2000-01 year. People can be breached for not attending a Centrelink seminar or interview, inadequately completing their dole diaries, not applying for ten jobs a fortnight, or failing to comply with a directive given by a privatised job finding agency. The financial penalty for failing to attend a Centrelink interview can vary from between $678 to $1431. For unemployed people, whose income support payments are significantly below the Henderson Poverty Line, such penalties are inordinately punitive. The poem immediately below attempts to summarise the socially destructive impact of such breaching and the sense of futility such regimes evoke.

The downsides of the Social Security breaching regime

Strike a light – it’s dark
Where ya living?
In the Park.
Going ok – so they say;
not like Ben, he sleeps on the railway roof
– failed to meet his mutual obligation
now he’s living above his station.

Categorical income support versus Basic Income

Whenever payment of income support is conditional upon the recipient fulfilling a particular social action then a government, or its agents, can use their discretion to determine whether the obligation to comply has been met. If the provider of the income support payment decides the recipient has failed to fully meet the imposed obligation it can withhold the payment. This removes the security from the social security system. From 1947 until the advent of the Howard Government, unemployed people had only to establish they had very limited income and that they complied with the activity test, designed to assess their work search bona fides, in order to be paid. The Howard Government’s ‘mutual obligation’ regime has massively increased the hoops through which applicants for unemployment benefit now have to jump before they will be paid. The 349,100 breaching penalties imposed in 2000-01 attests to that (ACOSS 2001[b]). This increases the level of insecurity recipients experience.

A Basic Income paid, without social requirements, to all permanent residents is the most efficient politically feasible method capable of ensuring that all unemployed people are guaranteed at least survival income (Tomlinson 2000).

Where does this leave us?

The Howard Government’s addiction to an ethical or utilitarian view of rights which is conditional upon first meeting obligations is a far cry from the form of rights expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the associated Covenants. For instance, Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognises ‘the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living’. Article 8(3)(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that ‘No-one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour’. Even allowing the qualification in section C(4) of this Article, which excludes from the category of forced labour ‘work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations’, much of the Howard Government’s ‘mutual obligation’ agenda is in breach of these international agreements which Australia has signed and ratified.

The imposition of forced labour on one section of the Australian people undermines the citizenship of all citizens because it is uncertain when and to whom such compulsion will be extended. It downgrades the social and economic rights previously available to all citizens. By ignoring the citizenship rights of those who receive income support it separates them from other citizens – marking them off as less worthy.

The requirement that such people engage in certain specified activities before they will be paid income support ignores the contribution that many non- employed people already make to their neighbourhood, their families and their society. The Government devalues unemployed people’s voluntary contribution through the suggestion that only approved forms of participation constitute a contribution. For instance, conservationists who sleep up trees for months on end in order to prevent their destruction are making a real contribution in the fight against the salination of Australia’s farmlands. However the Government steadfastly refuses to accept their not inconsiderable efforts as an approved form of contribution to this society. Howard asserts that if the society makes a contribution to unemployed people it is only fair that they give something back to society. Such statements suggest unemployed people make no contribution unless they are compelled to meet their ‘mutual obligation’. This separates unemployed citizens from ‘productive’ citizens. In one breath it brands unemployed people as less valued whilst forcing them to ‘perform compulsory labour’ thus undermining solidarity and civil society.

Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the Australian Government’s imposition of ‘mutual obligation’ is that, as Rees (2000) points out, it reinforces the view that all rights are conditional and that universality has no place in the modern world. This has the effect of delegitimising universal income support policies such as Basic Income. An unconditional universal Basic Income could prevent a government imposing ‘mutual obligation’ policies on the least affluent. As such, it is a policy which has the capacity to enhance the liberty and productivity of all citizens (Tomlinson 2000). This feature of Basic Income has been recognised for 80 years (Milner 1920).

Conclusion

Over the last decade and a half Australian governments have significantly modified the way in which they conceive of the income support system provided to unemployed and other low income people. The human rights/ universalist approach which informed much of the administration of the post Second World War welfare state has been replaced by a utilitarian emphasis. This change in orientation began under the Hawke/Keating Labor administration and been intensified by the Howard Liberal administration.

Howard’s utilitarian approach has emphasised applicants need to meet imposed obligations as a prerequisite to benefit receipt. This concentration on obligations has undermined poor people’s right to obtain at least a sufficient income to sustain them. This ideological shift has been underpinned by a punitive breaching regime. In the 2000-01 year 349,100 penalties were imposed on unemployed people, nearly a 200 percent rise in three years (ACOSS 2001 [b]).

The expansion of the Howard Government’s ‘mutual obligation’ regime has removed security from the social security system. The human rights/ universalist concept of entitlement to sufficient income to sustain unemployed people during downturns in the economy has been considerably diminished.

Entitlement to most income support benefits in post-Second World War Australia were conditional but never before have so many unemployed Australians experienced so much uncertainty concerning the likelihood of their continuing to receive benefit payments.

Presently many of Australia’s most important trading partners are facing recession. Global restructuring, driven by economic fundamentalist ideas, is leading to downsizing, ‘workplace flexibility’, increasing part-time work, and precarious employment. The diminution of social security entitlements and the imposition of ‘mutual obligations’ directly erodes the social and economic rights of those excluded from paid work but it also decreases the citizenship rights of the employed. The increasingly widespread insecurity of employment means that the majority of Australian workers now confront at least the prospect of unemployment at some stage in their lives.

Unless Australian people in sufficient numbers determine to reject the utilitarian conception of income support and to replace it with a universalist approach then the introduction of a universal Basic Income will remain a distant hope. A universal Basic Income is the one form of income support which could ensure that no permanent resident in Australia was without sufficient income to sustain them because, by its very nature, it does not allow governments to impose any social obligations on recipients. A Basic Income is the epitome of a universalist human rights approach.

Footnote

(1)  Though the Department and the legislation controlling it were known as Social Services I will use the title “Social Security” which was subsequently adopted.

References

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Individual rights, collective rights and Basic Income

Written in 2008

Abstract

Basic Income proposals, at least in their 20th and 21st century western manifestations, most commonly involve a payment made to individuals rather than to families, households or any other group of people. Because of this, the concept of a Basic Income runs the danger of being criticised as promoting individualism over collective solidarity. Standing (2004, pp.23-33) provides a detailed discussion of such claims.

Choosing the individual as the unit of payment allows a Basic Income to ensure both individual autonomy and collective well-being primarily because of the unconditional and universal nature of a Basic Income.

The payment of a Basic Income to individuals rather than to families (or some other group) not only enhances the autonomy of all individuals, it provides the best basis for promoting the interests of families, households, villages and entire nations. A Basic Income promotes collective solidarity without paternalistic intervention in the lives of individuals.

Introduction

Means-tested / categorical payments, irrespective of whether individuals or families are the unit of income, have the capacity to create divisions between sections of society. A notorious example of this was the Howard Liberal Coalition Government’s claims that unless lone parents and unemployed people gave something back to society in return for receiving poverty-line income support, they were free loading (Howard 1999, 2000). Such claims generated a downward envy in the minds of many working class people (Tomlinson 1999). This in turn allowed the Coalition Government to add disability support pensioners to the list of people to be accused of not providing something back to the government in return for their benefit.

In the mid 1960s I was employed as a social worker in the Commonwealth department responsible for social security payments. There I encountered many situations where individuals were refused a welfare payment because of their relationship with a partner who was expected to support them. There were also times when a person might become entitled to a payment by establishing they were the partner of someone who qualified for an age or disability support pension. It seemed to me then as now that the individual should be the unit of payment in relation to applying welfare means tests as well as for calculating income tax.

In Australia, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, poverty emerged as apolitical issue (Stubbs (1966), Henderson Harcourt, and Harper 1970). The McMahon Liberal Coalition Government responded by setting up the Henderson Poverty Inquiry to research the issue. In 1972 the incoming Whitlam Labor Government greatly expanded the Inquiry. The first main report of the Inquiry entitled Poverty in Australia was released in 1975 and in Chapter 6 Henderson advocated introducing a guaranteed minimum income and proposed using the family as the unit of income (further discussion of this history can be found at Tomlinson 2003, Chapter 9). The Labor Government was initially supportive of the idea but soon became preoccupied with trying (unsuccessfully) to survive.

During this brief period of Labor rule (1972-75) a number of other reports were released which impinged on the income maintenance and tax debates. One, the Asprey Committee on Taxation, held that: “The right to be taxed as an individual has always been accorded in Australia. At a time when women are playing an ever greater role in the economic and other affairs of society, the withdrawal of this right would certainly be regarded as a retrograde step. (p. 134)”. In fact, at the time, the taxation system did allow an income earner to claim deductions for medical and educational expenses incurred by children and unemployed spouses. In 2008 in Australia there are several family tax benefit schemes and taxation avoidance mechanisms such as family trusts.

Another contemporaneous report which had relevance in relation to income maintenance, proposed that Australia develop a social insurance superannuation scheme along similar lines to New Zealand (Hancock 1976). The Hancock scheme would have provided a form of social insurance providing no fault accident coverage and income support in old age. In the late 1980s the Labor Government greatly expanded the privatized superannuation industry by making it compulsory for employers to pay superannuation payments for most workers. During 1991 the Australian Capital Territory’s Council of Social Service, in an aptly titled monograph “The Super Tax Rort”, criticised the expansion of the privatised superannuation industry. Privatised superannuation, as Gerard Hughes (2008) has demonstrated in relation to Ireland and New Zealand, undermines egalitarianism when compared with social insurance and other government controlled pension systems.

For most of the 20th century in Australia the industrial arbitration system took account of the family. The “family wage”, later more commonly referred to as the “basic wage”, was introduced nationally in Australia by the 1907 Harvester judgement in the Arbitration Court. This “family wage” was intended to be sufficient to support a man, his wife, and three children. The introduction of the family wage in Australia clearly provided the average man who was lucky enough to be in regular unionised employment with the “capacity” to support a wife and a small number of children. Such a policy could be implemented because of the then widespread acceptance of a sexual division of labour (in terms of men’s and women’s jobs). The Harvester judgement simply confirmed existing gender discrimination. It was to condemn the female workforce to a wage rate of approximately 54 to 70 per cent of the male rate for over 50 years. Cass (1983, p.62) reports a study of women workers in Australia in 1928 which showed that 30 per cent were helping to support or totally supporting other family members. Whelan (1979, p.55) notes that at the time of the Harvester judgement, 45 per cent of male workers were single. It was not until 1974, with the Commonwealth Arbitration Court’s equal pay decision and the signing of two International Labour Organisation Conventions by the Whitlam Government, that the principle of equal wages for equal work was accepted nationally. Widespread gender segmentation in employment means that women, on average, still earn considerably less than men (Broderick 2008).

Intra-family income transfers

One of the myths which had sprung up about families was that in most, if not all, there is an equitable sharing of wealth: or at least that everybody receives sufficient, provided there is something for all to share. This myth requires its adherents to adopt a belief in a form of trickle-down economics. No real attempt had ever been made to verify the fact that income in households was indeed shared equitably. At the time it provided a very comfortable belief for those who argued the importance of maintaining family structures.

In 1975, the Australian Government’s Taxation Review Committee, headed by Mr Justice Asprey, found that a high degree of sharing “is by no means universal. In some marriages, and not by any means only unhappy ones, almost completely separate patterns of spending and enjoyment may be the rule.”(p.135). Later work by Meredith Edwards (1981) clearly established the inequitable nature of many intra-family transfers; she worked hard to end the myth that providing funds to one family member ensures that all family members are adequately renumerated.

Whilst governments maintain the myth of the stereo-typical nuclear family (with its presumed equitable intra-family transfer of income) it is not necessary for them to address the reality of the frequent inequalities which are prevalent inside families. If governments were to accept the presence and frequency of the massive inequalities in intra-family income transfers, they would be hard pressed to justify basing income maintenance policy on the presumption that all members of a family will be looked after if one member receives sufficient income to allow him or her to provide for all. They would be forced to recognise that if equity or equality was the intended goal of social welfare policy, even if limited to equal treatment of the poor, then it would be necessary to create policy around individual equity rather than persevere with the myth that providing money to one member of a family will result in equitable treatment for all family members.

Whilst governments can maintain the pretence that intra-family transfers are equitable, or at least not the business of government, they are protected from the need to account for the lack of total cover in income maintenance policies. Governments get away with the vague suggestion that the current package of welfare benefits, when coupled with wages policies, ensures there is a safety net below which no-one falls. It was the conservative Canadian Senator Hugh Segal, at the 2008 Basic Income Earth Network Congress, who pointed to the fact that:

The case for the status quo in present governments’ approaches might be sustainable if it could be argued that the present spider web of programmes (sticky enough to entrap but not strong enough to support) had produced real progress; less poverty overall; higher levels of return and enhanced productivity in the labour market; greater independence and increased consumer confidence. Sadly, there is no such productive progress to report (pp. 3-4).

I first became aware of the intensity of this collective/individual debate in relation to income support payments in the early 1990s when I met with the national director of Catholic Social Services in Australia, seeking his support for the introduction of a Basic Income. He strongly supported the then (and still existing) Australian social security practice of paying means tested benefits and pensions using the family as the unit of payment. He felt that such practices helped keep families together. As I write this paper I have recently returned from the 2008 Basic Income Earth Network Congress in Dublin which was hosted by CORI (the Conference of the Religious of Ireland) which has many similar functions to Catholic Social Services in Australia. CORI has been advocating for a Basic Income paid to individuals since the mid 1990s.

Only the most dogmatic would hold that paying a government benefit to an unemployed spouse would weaken the marriage bonds. Available evidence shows that marriage break-up amongst people who are unemployed happens substantially more frequently than for those who are employed. Anything which decreases the financial pressures on families experiencing unemployment is likely to increase feelings of certainty and security and as such, it would be likely to help sustain marriage.

It has been argued that the major attraction for government of adopting the family as the unit of payment of income maintenance is that it transforms an individual in need into a person who is dependent upon a spouse or a parent and therefore is no longer in need of support from the State. During the 1970s when the United states of America took its most serious look at introducing a Negative Income Tax (a form of income guarantee), it was the issue of the ‘dependency’ of women which most worried the Senate Committee on Finance who were vitally concerned to know “if the incentives built into the negative tax would stem the rising Aid for Dependent Children outlays by getting women to work more (Williams 1972 p. 41, see also Moynihan 1973)”. This is a frequent theme in United States’ welfare debates (Mink 1998, Leonard 1997 pp. 19-20).

I shall shortly attempt to expose the essential patriarchal assumptions which inform the choice of the family as the income unit. This is particularly the case in societies where males are the main income earners in a family.

The essential point developed so far is that if the intention of the income maintenance system is to promote equity and to maximise opportunities for all family members then it is counterproductive to use the family as the unit of payment. The only viable alternative to the family is to use the individual as the unit of payment in both the social security and taxation systems.

Paternalism

Standing has written at length about the damaging impact of paternalism in the lives of those reliant upon the state for income support. In his 2002 text Beyond the New Paternalism, he makes the point that by the last quarter of the 20th century the concept of the “right to labour almost collapsed” due to widespread unemployment but that by the end of the century “a remarkable chorus of politicians and commentators were preaching that everyone had a duty to labour. People had to be responsible and to contribute, and unless they took jobs or took training to prepare for jobs, they were undeserving of state support (p. 9).”

Goodin (2000 p.58, 1988) explains that, whilst the commanding ethos of the post war welfare state relied on the assumption that the collective would meet the basic needs of vulnerable individuals, it was not intended that any individual should totally escape the need to be self supporting, whenever possible. Goodin (2001 p.198) makes the point that: “If we seriously believe that work is good for you and that it is the state’s legitimate role to force you to do it, then we would have no grounds for confining our paternalism to the poor. Paternalistically speaking, it would be equally important to make the rich work too.”

Hugh Stretton (1996) and others (e.g. Goodin 1988 p. 7) see in the imposition of individualised obligation and eligibility determinations a return to the charity system of the Poor Laws, so aptly described by Polanyi (1945). Whilst stigma is a problem embedded in every targeted welfare system (Boston and St. John 1998, Tomlinson 2003 Chapter 2), it is in relation to 19th century English workhouses that it is most clearly observed. Sanborn (1899), cites Charles Lamport (1870) to support this point:

Its practice is, that no destitute person, however meritorious, can benefit by this organization without having to pass under something very like the old Roman yoke. On the one side of the Caudine forks, a man stands erect, self-respecting and respected, and with name unstained; on the other side he crouches, a changed and degraded being. He has become a social pariah, hopes destroyed, spirit crushed, reputation gone. Society, before it yields what it dare not refuse, so embitters the morsel by contempt that neither giver nor receiver is blessed in the act.

When comparing the security which a Basic Income provides with the uncertainty inherent in paternalistic welfare regimes Standing (2006) wrote:

…we are talking about basic security as an economic and social right. This is essentially a republican or claim right, developed by Rousseau, Thomas Paine and others. …A right…is unconditional in behavioural terms. You do not have a right if you have to do x, y and z in order to have an entitlement. …

Second, we are talking about basic security. Basic means it must be meaningful, not a gesture…

Third, for basic income security, the income must come in a form that is nonpaternalistic. It should not be given to you as a discretionary gesture, in the goodness of somebody’s heart; it is not charity. It must be in a form that you can decide how to use it. It must be individual and must be equal (pp. 5-6).

The Macquarie Dictionary defines “paternalism” as: “the principle or practice, on the part of a government or of any body or person in authority, of managing or regulating the affairs of a country or community, or of individuals, in the manner of a father dealing with his children (Delbridge, Bernard, Blair, Peters, and Butler 1991 p. 1300).”At an individual level the word “paternalism” evokes an image of a stern, concerned father acting in what he perceives as the best interests of his perverse children. But women as well as men have happily imposed their views on the lives of others. Jocelyn Newman when she was a welfare minister in the conservative Howard Liberal Coalition Government released a discussion paper purporting to set out The Challenge of Welfare Dependency in the 21st Century but any fair-minded reading of that paper shows her intention was to encourage people to find an alternative to ‘living on welfare’ in order to prevent ‘dependency’ upon the government. It is little wonder that Minister Newman was so concerned about preventing dependency in others – when she retired she received three generous parliamentary pensions – one in her own right and two wives’ pensions in respect to both her deceased husbands. One had been a member of a state parliament and the other a Federal parliamentarian.

Amanda Vanstone as Minister for Immigration intervened adversely in the lives of many asylum seekers in a manner which was only slightly less oppressive than her male predecessor, Phillip Ruddock. Jenny Macklin, currently Minister of Indigenous Affairs in the Rudd Labor Government has maintained many of the policies of the Howard Government’s Northern Territory Intervention, particularly the practice of “quarantining” half the social security payments of Indigenous people on 73 Northern Territory communities so that the money can only be spent at specified stores on a limited range of goods approved by the government. This “quarantining” provision necessitated the suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act when it was introduced by Mal Brough during the last year of the Howard Government (Altman and Hinkson, 2007).

The Macquarie Dictionary defines “maternal” as to having the qualities of being a mother (p. 1098) and “paternal” as befitting a father (p. 1300). Interestingly, the word “maternalism” is not part of the English language. Governments, even governments made up predominantly of men, have no gender. Yet there is no word to describe the exercise of female authority in government. We maintain a clear distinction between concepts of matriarchy and patriarchy, yet the distinction between maternal authority and paternal authority apparently evaporates once governments come to exercise authority over the less privileged in society. Maggie Thatcher, a “Lady not for turning”, nick named “The Iron Maiden”, is a commonly conjured image of a dominating female political figure in the West. Indra Gandhi is probably her closest counterpart in the East.

In attempting to locate a word without the gender connotations of “paternalism”, it seems to me that what Standing and Goodin call paternalism is a form of domination and at times dictatorial intervention in the lives of others.

Obviously people don’t need to be compelled to do what they intended to do. Paternalistic supporters of workfare, like Lawrence Mead (1968, 1986, 1997), who assert that they help the poor escape their poverty and dependency (by forcing them to take low paid workfare jobs) because that is what the poor really want for themselves, have a hard case to make. One of the earliest critics of such assertions was Franz Fanon, who, in his The Wretched of the Earth, asserts that:

colonialism therefore did not seek to be considered by the native to be a gentle, loving mother who protects her child from a hostile environment, but rather as a mother who constrains her fundamentally perverse offspring from managing to commit suicide and from giving reign to its evil instincts. The colonial mother protects her child from itself, from its ego, and from its physiology, its biology and its own unhappiness which is its very essence (1967 pp. 169-170).

In the case of the Northern Territory Intervention, the paternalists in the Howard and Rudd Governments are restraining their unruly Aboriginal charges not so much in the Aborigines’ own interests but allegedly in the interests of the Aboriginal people’s children. Government ministers seem blissfully unaware that since the earliest days of the colonial adventure in Australia government policy claims to have been directed at saving the Aboriginal children because the adult Indigenes were considered by whites to be beyond salvation (Tomlinson 2007). In relation to Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers during the Howard Government, it would be impossible to argue that the Government was acting in the interests of the asylum seekers. Clearly it was acting in the interests of the Liberal Party and the majority of the established citizenry.

Life with a Basic Income

For well over a decade it has been recognised that a major problem facing advanced economies is the existence of too many workers chasing too few private sector jobs (partly as a result of the economic fundamentalist success in drastically cutting the number of public service jobs) (Rifkin 1994, Omerod 1994, Gorz 1999, Boreham, Dow & Leet 1999, Stilwell 1999, 2000). Stigmatising, selective, targeted, categorical welfare payments, coupled with ‘mutual obligation’ and other compelled activity scenarios, are tackling a problem – the trouble is that they are tackling the wrong problem.

Stigma is embedded in every targeted welfare system, mainly because of the detailed inquisitorial nature of assessing who is and who is not “worthy” to receive the payment. The more discretion given to the dispenser of assistance the greater the danger of abuse by the assessor and the less certainty of eligibility there is in the mind of the applicant.

The cost of existing systems is systematically underestimated. …(they) are riddled with poverty traps, unemployment traps, savings traps and behavior traps that are arbitrary, inefficient and inequitable. This is partly because of the selective, means-tested and behavior-conditioned schemes. It is also partly because of the growing flexibility of working patterns and lifestyles. The response of bureaucrats and politicians almost everywhere has been to tighten conditions for entitlement and extend paternalistic controls (italics in original, Standing, 2004 pp.24-25).

A Basic Income, because it provides a known financial advantage for every extra dollar earned, abolishes both poverty traps and work disincentives (Lerner, Clark & Needham 1999 pp. 20-21). Gorz (1999 p.85) claims “The universal, unconditional grant of a basic income is, therefore…the best instrument for redistributing both paid work and unpaid activities as widely as possible (italics in original).”

It seems an absurd proposition made by economic fundamentalists that the mode of production has to be deregulated for the sake of ‘efficiency’ but that the system of welfare redistribution should be increasingly regulated. Such ways of assessing eligibility result in a very inefficient method of benefit delivery because of:

  • the intrusive nature of enquiries which need to be made,
  • the degree of detail required to be ascertained, and
  • the multiple variables which need to be taken into account in such a process.

Autonomy as solidarity

A Basic Income promotes collective solidarity without paternalistic intervention in the lives of individuals. In 1975 Jeffry Galper suggested that:

Contrary to the present reality, the ideal situation would be one in which the individual’s maximum contribution to the society as a whole would be, simultaneously, exactly that person’s maximum contribution to his or her own self-development. In a truly humanized society the ideal towards which we would strive would be the elimination of the duality between actions which primarily benefit the individual actor and those which benefit others (p. 48).

A Basic Income paid to individuals would ensure the married were not disadvantaged compared with the unmarried. By providing a financial incentive, it would encourage family formation and stability – but would not of itself enforce any particular view of appropriate morality. It would allow family members who felt that continued cohabitation was intolerable to leave and set up on their own or in co-operation with others. Thus, the selection of the individual as the unit of payment increases freedom, diversity and individualism, all of which are central liberal values.

A Basic Income is a universal payment which does not evoke ethnic divisions and destructive competitiveness. Because it paid equally to all individuals, as a right of permanent residence, it does not encourage a politics of downward envy (Tomlinson 1999).

Escaping poverty

Recently there have been several Australian social welfare agencies advocating for an increase in funding for single age pensioners. They have drawn attention to the plight of this predominately female group, although there is a significant group of single men who are having difficulty surviving on Australian social welfare payments. Currently a single pensioner gets paid 60 per cent of the pension rate for a couple.

It might appear at first glance that this issue could be addressed by using the family as the unit of income for calculation the pension rate. A superficial look at the situation might suggest that the problem could be overcome by leaving the partnered rate where it is but substantially increasing the single pension rate. But this would have a number of undesirable consequences.

What needs to be recognised is that many unemployed people, sickness beneficiaries, students and others on various forms of allowances are forced to live on social welfare payments far below that which single aged pensioners receive. In recent years the criterion used to determine who is paid a disability support pension and who is placed on a Newstart unemployment benefit has been considerably tightened. This now means that people with severe disabilities who are considered capable of working 15 hours a week are forced to meet the eligibility requirements which apply to all unemployed people.

In Australia the single age pension rate is set at about 25 per cent of average weekly earnings and this is also about the rate of the Henderson poverty line. In many European Common Market countries the poverty line is set at about 60 per cent of average weekly earnings and many countries pay social welfare at about that rate.

To address poverty in Australia, the real issue is not about fiddling with the unit of income but rather substantially increasing the rate of payment of social welfare to bring Australia more into line with the European Common Market countries.

If equity was a serious consideration: A conclusion

Were Australia to move away from its history of a “needs based” means-tested social welfare safety net towards a poverty prevention scheme (such as a Basic Income), then many of the serious inequalities and inequities, which are rife in the existing social welfare system, could be addressed.

Even if it were fair to insist that fully fit unemployed people meet certain participation requirements before they would be paid a Newstart unemployment benefit, there is no equity in insisting that someone who is only considered capable of working 15 hours a week meets identical participation requirements.

Aboriginal people die on average 17 years younger than other Australians. In Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory, three-quarters of Indigenous male and two-thirds of Indigenous females die before the age of 65 years compared with the Australian population as a whole where one-quarter of males and one-sixth of females deaths occur before that age (ABS and AIHW 2003, p183). The age pension is paid at age 65 for men and at a slightly younger age for women. Three-quarters of Aboriginal men die before they can qualify for an age pension. So even though Aboriginal people have the same entitlement to receive an age pension the outcome, when compared with other Australians, is neither equal nor equitable.

The bureaucratically-sophisticated easily manoeuvre their way around Centrelink’s requirements and get paid their benefits. Those who are poorly educated, people with severe mental health or addiction difficulties and those who are less bureaucratically-sophisticated (though they are often suffering greater financial hardship) are frequently breached for 8 weeks or have their payments indefinitely withheld.

De Wispelaere and Stirton (2008) suggest any administratively efficient social policy scheme “must tell us (1) how one becomes eligible to receive the grant; (2) who amongst the general population ought to receive the grant; and ( 3) how we ensure that those who are eligible (and only those) effectively receive their entitlement (p. 4)”.

Often there are considerable similarities between people who have a combination of a partial physical impairment, a minor metal health or personality problem and a recent poor work history. Yet the type of benefit they are paid can vary widely depending on who they see and how they are assessed:

  • one person could be rejected on the grounds they won’t meet their participation requirements,
  • another could be considered as not capable of working 15 hours a week and provided with a disability support pension,
  • another could be found to have a temporary illness and placed on sickness benefit,
  • another could get Newstart unemployment benefit, and
  • another might just have had their 65th birthday and so be given an age pension.

Then, given that the Australian system uses the family as the unit of income, even if the person meets all the requirements for payment of a benefit or pension but they are living with a partner, the partner’s income and assets will determine whether the person actually receives any payment. Given such disparity in possible outcomes for applicants, there is no way that Australian governments can claim they are capable of eradicating poverty whilst they persevere with the existing system of welfare.

Paul Spicker (2007) notes that many of the Northern European welfare systems which most effectively deal with poverty are social protection systems rather than poverty alleviation schemes, and he assert that “If a system is based on support for everyone, poor people will also be helped. If it supports only the poor, some are likely to be excluded (p.136).”

It is a nonsense to suggest that the inordinate complexity, invasion of privacy, stigma inducing practices of the Australian social welfare system results in a fair distribution of payments in line with people’s needs. It is not possible to know if what occurs is equitable or reasonable. “Need”, like beauty, is in the eye of the assessor. No two people will come to identical assessment of need. But we do know that the Australian social welfare system does not treat all applicants for assistance equally.

De Wispelaere and Stirton (2008, p. 5) claim that Basic Income schemes, because they are universal and entail no conditionality apart from establishing residency, are unlike participation income schemes and many targeted social welfare programs in that they avoid the problem of having to tightly define standards of eligibility.

Is a Basic Income capable of treating all applicants for assistance equitably? The answer is of course “No”. But it is capable of treating everybody equally. A Basic Income, provided it was paid (using the individual as the unit of income) at a rate above the poverty line, would abolish poverty. Governments would be in a position to know how much income support they were paying to each and every permanent resident of the country and would be far better placed than they are now to work out what extra goods and services are required in order to promote equity and social justice throughout the land.

Bibliography

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Williams, W. (1972) The Struggle for a Negative Income Tax, Institute of Governmental Research. University of Washington, Seattle.

Key Words
Basic Income, individualism, collective wellbeing, autonomy, paternalism.

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Inequality and Peace

I don’t want to build my wealth on the dispossession of others.
I don’t want to create my health at the expense of others.
My liberty can’t emerge by subjecting you to tyranny.
Your starvation cannot satiate my hunger.
To the extent that the world is unfair, unjust and unequal
only the privileged can change that situation peacefully;
only they have the power to relinquish their advantaged position.
The poor, the disadvantaged, marginalised and displaced
can change the world – but they can’t change it by giving up privilege.
They can and will combine to destroy the powerful,
to force change and overthrow systematic injustice.
If we are to live in a peaceful world then we all have to play a part.
We need to confront injustice, inequality, inhumanity and tyranny
each and every day, here, there and everywhere.
Those who have the most have the most to offer
and if they don’t offer to share they are to blame for the violence.

Written 2003.

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Is it social inclusion or social illusion?

ON LINE opinion – Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate

Posted Monday, 8 December 2008

In Australia, since at least the first decade of the 20th century, the income support system was supposedly based on the “need” of the recipient. Those who were assisted were, in the language of the day, considered to be “in need” of financial assistance from the government. Indigenous Australians, despite being the most impoverished, were not included in the income support system.

Running in parallel with calculations of need were deliberations about “desert”. People had to be considered to be of good character to receive government assistance. Those who were assisted were compelled to conform to the behavioural mores of the day.

The Whitlam Government attempted, via the Australian Assistance Plan, to involve ordinary citizens in a major community development – civic improvement campaign. Conservatives, in the mid 1970s, derided such mass mobilisation as “social” and even “socialist” engineering. They sought to return determinations of welfare eligibility to traditional ways.

The language employed by Conservatives in this ideological struggle avoided any notion that the traditional method of determining who would be paid was equally a form of social engineering. This was because it attempted to get recipients to conform to Conservative moral imperatives. The language of both the right and left of this argument obfuscated their real political and social intentions.

Many different income support schemes exist around the world. Payments may be directed to all permanent residents (as is the case with the Alaskan Basic Income or to every person in a specified social category, for example the elderly. Child Endowment in Australia (from 1942 to 1976) was paid (without a means test) to permanent residents with children (Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs). Current family allowances are means tested in Australia.

Some payments, like most Australian social security benefits and pensions, are categorical benefits which are means and asset tested. At the other end of the income distribution system some privatised welfare benefits (such as superannuation) are subsidised by the government through preferential tax treatment – the greatest benefits flow to those who can afford to make the largest personal contributions. Then there are social insurance schemes which fund government superannuation in New Zealand and pensions in many parts of Europe.

There are also guaranteed minimum income schemes such as Minimum Insertion in France and other parts of Europe which guarantee a minimum income to all permanent residents. The groups which benefit the most from such social minimums are people who are unable to establish eligibility for standard social benefits. These payments are paid at a lower rate than social insurance payments or other categorical benefit levels. Until the mid-1980s Australia had a special benefit scheme which fulfilled a similar function.

In 2007, Jurgen De Wispelaere and Lindsay Stirton wrote:

Any welfare scheme must perform three essential tasks. First, a welfare scheme must establish the operational criteria of eligibility that define the intended beneficiaries. Second, it must identify those within the population who meet these criteria of eligibility and distinguish them from those who are not eligible. Third it must transfer eligible beneficiaries’ payments correctly (p.528).

There have always been eligibility conditions applied to welfare payments in Australia. With the exception of Child Endowment and the Blind Pension, means and asset tests have also been applied. Unemployment benefits have always had activity tests, for example applicants had to establish they were fit, ready and able to work.

In 1986 Minister Brian Howe set up an internal Social Security inquiry headed by Professor Bettina Cass who recommended that many social welfare payments have activation/participation eligibility requirements added. Her recommendation was adopted by the Labor Government. Howe at the time insisted at many conferences that such policies undermined dole bludger rhetoric and led to greater support for government-provided unemployment benefits. He and Professor Cass also argued that activation/participation policies helped people find work and eased their integration into the broader community.

In England in 1996, Professor Tony Atkinson, argued the case for a non-means tested basic social benefit but one which had participation requirements such as establishing that an applicant had caring responsibilities or was undergoing training. His reasoning was not dissimilar to that of Cass and Howe in Australia. Both the Australian income activation/participation and Atkinson’s policies are forms of participation income which claim to achieve social inclusion, greater work readiness, and public acceptability. De Wispelaere and Stirton (2007) strongly dispute such claims.

By the time the 12-year rule of the Hawke/Keating Labor was drawing to an end, this activation/participation rhetoric had evolved into “Reciprocal Obligation” with the associated claim, inherited from Blair Labour in the United Kingdom, that such policies promoted “Social Inclusion” (Lund 2008). The incoming socially conservative Howard government metamorphosed reciprocal obligation into “Mutual Obligation” and Jocelyn Newman, the social welfare minister shrilly denounced the propensity of welfare clients to sink into “welfare dependency”. (Tomlinson 2004)

Promoters of participation income claim that by insisting that people who are out of work make some effort to gain a job, such as undergo training, look for jobs, or engage in community service, they are making it more likely that those out of the paid workforce will find employment.

The reciprocal/mutual obligation brigade claim it is more acceptable to those in employment for the government to pay income support to those out of work when people who are unemployed give something back to society by undergoing training, looking for jobs or engaging in community service.

Welfare officers claim that they legitimate the paying of benefits when they establish that clients have less wealth than the means tests allow and also meet all the applicable eligibility criteria.

As one wanders through the endless Australian welfare debates since 1908 (when the first Commonwealth social security legislation was enacted) to the present time, there is an amazing similarity of tone. There are short periods of aberration where joy and a generosity of spirit prevail: the Whitlam period, the 1941-49 years, 1908- 12, and 1983-4 when Don Grimes was masterminding social policy. For the rest, one is struck by a mealy- mouthed meanness, an absence of trust in welfare beneficiaries, a sense of parsimony – of eking out a living out of the parish poor box and a smell which is reminiscent of the stale musky interior of a medieval dole cupboard.

As I write this article I have just witnessed the generous government bail-outs of financial institutions both here and overseas. It was with some amusement that I listened to Senator Carr who was defending the $6.5 billion bail-out of the automotive industry: “We are operating on the basis of mutual obligation. This is not a blank cheque, this is about developing capability and it’s about ensuring long-term high skilled, high-wage jobs,” he said (Rodgers 2008). I recalled my mother saying “One law for the poor and another one for the rich”.

Third way politicians who claim to be implementing socially inclusive policies, social scientists who promote participation income schemes, public servants pushing mutual obligation regimes and welfare workers who support categorical or means tested benefits all have at least one thing in common. They are all responsible for implementing non-universal policies.

As politicians go about saying they are assisting people to be socially included they are enforcing policies which, because they don’t embrace everyone, necessarily exclude some. As social scientists go about denying assistance to some people on the basis that they have not met their requirement to participate they are consigning some to exclusion. As public servants determine who has and who has not met their obligations or contributed sufficiently they relegate some citizens to the margins of society. As welfare workers decide who is eligible for payment on account of whether they have met all the applicable criteria and have not exceeded the income/asset means test they are dividing the population into those worthy and those unworthy to receive the payment.

Universal payments such as the Basic Income operate quite differently. By their very nature, universal payments are made to everyone: that is everyone is included.

At the end of 2008, Australia has a Deputy Prime Minister whose portfolio responsibilities include “Social Inclusion”. If the past is anything to go by, it will be a long while before we get around to including every permanent resident in a universal income support system.

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Is this mutuality? No, but it is mutual obligation

Published in Parity not sure when.

One solution to poverty, as the sage suggested would be to ‘get the hungry to eat the homeless’. However such a solution seems to have fallen from favour in most countries many centuries ago. As too had the idea that strangers could be left at the cross roads outside the village to starve. By the Elizabethan period, in the 17th Century, a system of poor laws based on the parish had been established to assist the very poor in their communities. Such Elizabethan poor laws were, according to British researcher Karl Polanyi, predicated on a number of interwoven ideas:

  • productivity was not to be interfered with, so the amount of welfare assistance provided was to be less than could be obtained from working; this process has come to be known as the principle of less eligibility,
  • only ‘the worthy’ were to be assisted, out of a sense of duty to those who ‘through no fault of their own’ had been injured or otherwise prevented from working,
  • this, of course, meant rejecting the undeserving poor, and
  • as funds were limited, assistance was to be directed to those in most need, whilst ensuring people met their responsibility to the Parish and simultaneously felt grateful for the pittance they received.

Such views about the functions of welfare provision have a resonance in current Australian income support debates. In 1988 Professor Robert Goodin argued that “what distinguishes a welfare state from a poor law state is that agents of a welfare state must have no discretionary power over those resources that the state allocates for the relief of people in distress”. Goodin’s view of appropriate welfare services is not to be found in Jocelyn Newman’s pronouncements on what she calls ‘welfare dependency’, nor her fear that such ‘dependency’ is widespread and about to become intergenerational. Prime Minister Howard consistently refers to helping the ‘needy’ by maintaining the current austere social safety net whilst ensuring that unemployed people meet their ‘mutual obligations’. Some Labor parliamentarians such as Mark Latham and Wayne Swan seem equally fearful that Australian productivity is about to be swamped in a sea of ‘welfare dependency’.

In late August the Final Report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform was welcomed by the Government, Labor and the Democrats. Michael Raper, president of ACOSS, saw it being a bridge over troubled waters -even if it had a few planks missing. The mainstream press response has been generally positive, praising the way in which the Reference Group had attempted to reinterpret Howard’s hardline ‘mutual obligation’ as expressed in the 200,000 of the poorest Australians subjected to benefit cuts for ‘breaching’ a Centrelink dictate, his ‘work for the dole’ and his attack on young illiterate unemployed people. The press took heart in the Report’s suggestion that sanctions should be a last resort and that the emphasis should be on a ‘partnership between income support recipients and the government designed to encourage participation in the economy and society’.

It is true that in the section of the Report dealing with ‘mutual obligation’ there was a recognition that “Some responses (to their interim report) argued that placing conditions on income support diminishes citizenship rights to an adequate minimum income.” However this did not stop the authors of the Report claiming “Nevertheless, compulsion will be required for a minority of income support recipients and to ensure that governments, businesses and communities meet minimum standards in ensuring access to economic participation opportunities.” At least 200,000 income support recipients in the last 12 months were breached by Centrelink -for them compulsion is an ever present threat. Government however has no legislative provisions in place which can compel “businesses and communities meet minimum standards in ensuring access to economic participation opportunities”. It would seem reasonable to ask what organisation is going to materialise so as to be in a position to compel governments to ensure “access to economic participation opportunities”. The Australian Government’s response to the reports of the United Nations Human Rights and Elimination of Racism Committees concerning the present Government’s breaches of international agreements, which Australia has signed and ratified, was to tell the UN to stay out of ‘Australia’s business’. Given such a response I am at a loss to identify the vehicle which the Reference Group thinks will compel the Australian Government to ensure economic participation.

This is in fact the crux of the mutual obligation debate: legal powers exist to compel income support recipients to reciprocate. But those who receive income support have no way of compelling the Government to meet its ‘reciprocal obligations’ which the Report identifies as being necessary if there is to be increased participation in the economic and social life of the nation. Under the title of Participation Support for a More Equitable Society the Reference Group advocates removal of the current legislated right of people with parenting responsibilities to not work until their youngest child turns 16 years. This right been reduced to when the youngest child turns 6 years after which they will be required to attend yearly interviews. Then when the child turns 13 parents will have to demonstrate how they intend to access economic participation opportunities. A variant of ‘work for the dole’ or other compelled activity will be extended to some Disability Support Pensioners.

The trade off that income support recipients are offered is a single rate payment for all ‘working age’ recipients plus a number of add on payments to: ‘increase participation’, cope with special ‘needs’, family circumstances or disabilities. Howard’s introduction of the oh so Common Youth Allowance saw 46,000 16-18 year olds have their payments diminished or cut completely. Such reductions in benefit has occurred under both Labor and Liberal administrations since 1986 when ever common payment regimes have been installed. There is no reason to believe something different will happen this time. The Government has loudly proclaimed it will retain the value of benefits but, since 1986, such promises have always been given before the cuts occurred. Even if the rates are not cut recipients are having the conditions under which they receive payment eroded by the imposition of compelled activity.

If there is a logic in having the same base rate for all ‘working age’ recipients why should it not be extended to older and younger people. Many people older than 65 years work as do many under the ‘working age’. There are two reasons why this has not been done, firstly the age lobby is united and powerful compared with working aged groups who have been divided amongst themselves; and secondly to include the young would mean relating to the reality of a group who have been successfully marginalised. On top of this it would mean having to admit the present income support discrimination against the young is unjustified.

The Reference Group Report may have portrayed a kinder face of ‘mutual obligation’ than the Government has, hither too, been able to present; but it has not been able to escape the inherent miserly conservative agenda which has been part and parcel of the administration of welfare services in this country since the invasion. The parish has been replaced by the Commonwealth but the values of the Elizabethan poor laws still stick to the soles of our shoes.

It is as if governments believe there is no other way to ensure a productive society other than to compel those who have the least opportunities. Just take one example: wealth taxes are an anathema to the rich in this country so we don’t have wealth taxes in the form that many OECD countries have. But we do have wealth taxes. They are called asset tests and are imposed on many forms of social security payments. Our wealth taxes are applied at the very time when people are experiencing financial crises and result in only small savings to government outlays. It would be possible to tax all wealth and vastly increase government revenue.

There is nothing wrong with encouraging people to play a part in society and the economy. Compulsion can be replaced with trust, enablement, mutuality and assistance. People will take opportunities to engage. Only those addicted to a poor law view of the world want to force the poor to sing for their supper. There is nothing wrong with having one rate of social security income support for all permanent residents in this country -but it does not need to come with strings attached. There is no need to link work readiness and income support. In 1975 Professor Henderson recommended a Guaranteed Minimum Income. Nowadays many are promoting the introduction of a universal Basic Income paid to each individual and at a rate at least that of the age pension. Once such a program was in place Governments would no longer be able to threaten the livelihoods of those most marginal to the productive process. For this to happen it will require Australian’s to choose between a poor law state and a welfare state.

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It’s the same the whole world over

ON LINE opinion – Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate
Posted Monday, 23 January 2012

The law locks up the men and women
Who steal the goose from off the common
But leaves the larger villain loose
Who steals the common from the goose.

The above was written by that little known (but oft quoted) poet Anonymous at the time of the “Enclosures” in Britain and describes the process whereby village land which had hitherto been available to everyone to graze their livestock was acquired by one person to the detriment of all others.

When the British came to Australia they “acquired” which had, until then, been communally owned by members of various Aboriginal language groups. With the exception of a few trinkets handed over by John Batman in Victoria the rights of the existing owners were entirely ignored. Various devices were put in place to give the appearance of civility to this brutal dispossession. Myths about Australia being “terra nullius” – a land belonging to no one – gained ascendency by the 20th century. The High Court’s Mabo judgements put a bit of a spike in that hoary one but politicians rushed through legislation cunningly called the Native Title Act to “legitimate” all prior alienation of Indigenous land and to legalise ways by which future governments could continue to acquire land.

Judges were able to find that “the tide of history had washed away” the Yorta Yorta people’s claim to Native Title. The High Court’s Wik judgement found to the dismay of the Howard Government that Native Title had not been totally extinguished on pastoral leases. Where the leases specified a pastoralist was entitled to do certain things on his or her property they were still able to carry out such activities but if they wished to extend the activities then Native Title considerations might apply. The Government legislated to “provide certainty” to pastoralists and delivered, in the words of Tim Fisher (the then Deputy Prime Minister), “bucket loads of extinguishment.” This Howard Government could not bring itself to acknowledge the reality of Aboriginal prior ownership; preferring instead to speak about Indigenous “custodianship” of the country.

David Marr, in his 2011 book Panic, points to the non-Indigenous response to Aboriginal land ownership as a primal panic – just one of the panics that the citizens of this nation embrace when they think about gays, asylum seekers arriving by boat, terrorism and drugs. He could equally have pointed to the hysterical downward envy that the Howard Government had been able to induce in the populace when they thought about those who were unemployed (read young dole bludgers), single parents (read young immoral unmarried mothers), disability support pensioners (read malingerers), Aborigines living on outstations in remote regions such as the Northern Territory (read drunks feeding on the public teat who abuse their children).

Getting here from there

This is the land where in the 1960s and 70s people talked about giving everyone a fair go, where people fought for and expected a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work where social security was accepted as part of the social support system which assisted the elderly, widows, the sick or disabled and those down on their luck. People generally saw unions as the mechanism by which the abuses of the industrial system were controlled. And by 1972 there was a realisation that we had to improve the position in which we had placed Aborigines. It was a time when the Whitlam Government talked about introducing Aboriginal land rights. In 1976, the Fraser Government succeeded in passing the Northern Territory Land Rights Act.

The wealth of Australia and Australians has increased enormously since 1960, yet Australians are now less generous and more suspicious of people who are forced to rely on social security. We really need to ask why it is that clever politicians can induce in us such dark fears that we turn on our neighbours and exhibit so little trust in those our economic system has made redundant. We are hourly bombarded by economic statistics yet most Australians are economically illiterate. So what might seem an “economic” justification for a reluctance to increase the level of benefits paid to those who are unemployed, is not economics rather it is an ideological smokescreen.

Nobel laureate in economics, Joseph Stiglitz, claims that what is prolonging the economic downturn in western developed countries is a failure to solve some of the long term problems such as increasing inequality, unemployment and environmental threats. He suggests that increased taxation at the top income levels coupled with distribution downward whilst at the same time addressing climate change would lift the world out of recession.

Australia had a Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) from 1947 until 1988 when it was replaced by a private job finding service made up of a number of for-profit and non-profit agencies. This service conglomerate is supposedly monitored by a Commonwealth Department. The Sydney Morning Herald in December 2011 exposed several of these private and church providers defrauding the Commonwealth.

These same agencies daily recommend to Centrelink that unemployed people have their benefits stopped or suspended. One law for the agencies another for the unemployed.

Lowering unemployment, narrowing income inequality, enhancing the dignity of low-income earners and providing socially meaningful occupations to those without employment are challenging tasks for any government. But they are not insignificant responsibilities, something that can be brushed aside because they are difficult to achieve. It may be that those forced out of the labour market by a downturn in the economy have little individual political pull but governments that ignore their obligation to those without employment can, as we saw in Tunisia at the start of the Arab Spring, be brought to their knees.

Unemployment can be a devastating experience exacerbating mental health, personality and identity issues. Even short-term unemployment challenges the way those thrown out of work see themselves and those around them. Deborah Padfield, who has experienced long term mental health difficulties, writing about the cost that flexible labour markets inflict on vulnerable workers notes that:

Income and self-respect matters hugely; employment can represent structure, an outlet for energies, hope of a future, colleagueship. You no longer have to fudge answers to “what do you do?”, let alone “What are you?”

But there is work and work. Insecure, low-paid work means none of these things.

In many countries, including Australia, unemployment benefit schemes require those out of work to take any job irrespective of how demeaning it is or how unsuited to a particular applicant. Such short-sighted policies seldom provide the first step on the ladder of opportunity. For many, such policies result in their being deskilled and living an increasingly precarious existence in an ever increasingly flexible sector of the labour market. Lost is their sense of occupation or trade or profession.

In a seven-year longditudional study, Peter Butterworth (from the Centre for Mental Health Research at the Australian National University) found that generally “being employed was better for mental health than being unemployed” but “moving from unemployment to a poor quality job was actually associated with a significant decline in those people’s mental health and well being.” Butterworth also found that there was no evidence that moving into one of these poor quality jobs led to an increased likelihood of moving into a higher quality job” over the 7 year period.

Why have we become meaner?

The accepted wisdom, at least on the left, is that when John Howard came to power in 1996 he set out with alacrity to win the culture wars in relation to winding back workers rights, ending the Black armband view of Australian history, lessening welfare generosity and stopping asylum seekers arriving by boat. However, this is only a part of the story. From at least 1987, Brian Howe was ranting about the surge in “welfare dependency”. Even in the Whitlam Government there were ministers rabbiting on about the ranks of the unemployed being swelled by “work-shy lion tamers”. This was years before Peter Costello warned against allowing the unemployed to become “job snobs”. It was Howe who started increasing the obligations the unemployed had to meet before they would be paid benefits.

It was in 1992 that the Keating Government introduced mandatory detention of asylum seekers arriving by boat. It too was the government that drafted the Native Title Act. Keating increased the requirements forced upon the unemployed, which he called “Reciprocal Obligations”. Howard may have won the culture wars but he was greatly helped by many in the Labor Party.

Mal Brough may have been the one to introduce the Northern Territory Intervention but it has been continued and extended by Rudd, Gillard and Macklin. Macklin has even gone so far as to use the Aboriginal Benefit Account (into which mining royalties owed to Aboriginal communities are paid) as her own little slush fund.

She has been criticised by the Auditor General for this. She even used the Aboriginal Benefit Account to pay $9.5 million to communities whose town leases she has seized. Aboriginal people are incarcerated for petty theft in disproportionate numbers whilst nothing happens to this minister.

Yes, “It’s the same the whole world over.
Ain’t it all a blooming shame.
It’s the rich what lives on clover
and the poor what gets the blame.”

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Jocelyn Newman

You know she’s got cancer?
Yes but it’s in remission.
I wonder how she’ll feel when she meets her maker
and is asked what she’s been doing for the last 5 years?
She will no doubt reply:
making the unemployed keep dole diaries,
cutting 46,000 young people off benefit
hectoring the unemployed, single mums
and those bludgers on disability pensions.
Then God will tell why she is in remission –
She was giving cancer a bad name.

Written circa 2002

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John Howard is destroying our welfare

Published 21/11/2007 in Al-Moharer
http://www.al-moharer.net/mohhtm/tomlinson263.htm

His prostrate on fire and his heart full of hate,
he wants to destroy the entire welfare state.
For years, day by day, he’s cut bits away
and though he’s been deft, there are parts of it left.
He’s slashed and he’s burned and it is depleted
but he tells us the job is still not completed.
The widow and kid are still getting a quid
and he sighs with regret that his target’s not met
while the unemployed maid is still getting paid
it’s opportunely time for an “obligations” upgrade.

With his heart full of hate he’s going to cremate
all that he can find of the old welfare state.
In its place he’ll create a new form of despair,
and in a lasting nightmare he intends to ensnare
all those in wheel chairs and those needing care.
With his bellicose piety he’ll impose
a variety of incentives,
invectives,
directives and
detectives
as he builds his opportunist society.

John Tomlinson and Penny Harrington

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John Howard’s VSU

QUT, Student rally against Voluntary Student Unionism 2005.

 

Where do you start with John Howard, the lies about asylum seekers throwing children overboard, the lies about weapons of mass destruction, the lies about the Australian Wheat Board…

… no I can’t cover all the lies there are so many…

so I’ll just describe some of the things he’s done which affect students directly.

He has kept the income support payments so low that many younger students are trying to survive on 44 % of the Henderson poverty line.

Until 1997 HECS fees contributed about 20% of the cost of a degree. The Nelson changes will raise that to 44% without the surcharge and up to 56% if the surcharge is applied.

The decreasing Commonwealth contribution to the cost of running universities means that Universities are under pressure to either increase costs on students or cut the quality of services and education that students receive.

The bigger your HECS debt the longer it will take before you can hope to establish a family, buy a home or even afford a decent car.

Nelson set out to destroy your guild so that you will have less chance to pressure this Government to behave responsibly.

These days most student have to work as well as study.

The Government has removed the protection against unfair dismissal. It has set out to destroy the Arbitration Commission and the system of Award wages which were the foundation stone of the Australian workers welfare state. Wages are being slashed and many are being forced to work in unsafe conditions.

I know that there are other speakers will cover some of these issues in greater detail and so I want to concentrate on the issues which affect some of the poorest Australians. The Government is now imposing increased requirements on students and other social security recipients before they will be paid.

The Government has attacked disability support pensioners, lone parents and the unemployed – particularly the young unemployed. Many of the people who have a disability, are sole parents or are unemployed are students too. In 2002 the Government imposed 386,946 breach penalties on social security recipients. This left many without funds for 26 weeks.

The changes to the disability support pension which come into effect in July will mean that many disability support pensioners will be $93 per week worse of than at present. A single parent (with two children the youngest of whom is over 8 years of age who is working 15 hours per week) will be $ 86 per week worse off.

If they are also students they stand to lose even more.

The changes will mean Full time students will get the lower paid Austudy rather than Newstart, those with disabilities wont get the pensioner educational supplement of $31.20 a week on top of the other cuts.

As far as John Howard and his Government are concerned ten years, ten long years they’ve lived ten years too long.

Billy Connolly reckons that John Howard fulfils only one useful function:
He shows us what Harry Potter will look like when he gets old.

 

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Just when you thought it was safe to get back into the water

It was the first day of March 2018. Though the aftermath of the Barnaby scandal was still washing around Parliament House and the people all along Northbourne Avenue in Northern Canberra were still mopping-up following an act of God, I dared to turn on the radio. With some trepidation, I set the dial to the ABC’s Radio National Breakfast program and Fran Kelly was speaking with a government minister who goes by the pseudonym of Dan Tehan. He was speaking about the Turnbull Government’s intention to reintroduce legislation to legalise compulsory drug and alcohol testing of New Start recipients. Who if they were to be found to have partaken of drugs or alcohol would be subjected to an “income maintenance” regime which would put 80% of their below-the-poverty-line income for things of which his government approved.

This “income maintenance” regime is a similar to that which Coalition and Labor Governments have forced upon Aboriginal people on 79 communities in the Northern Territory since 2007. It appears that their error of judgement was to allow themselves to be born Aboriginal and to be still living on their tradition lands rather than choosing to disappear. By such wilful action they were not only presuming on non-Indigenous humanity but were simultaneously presenting an obstacle to non-Indigenous people gaining ownership of land which they might like to acquire.

Tehan’s proposed drug testing regime “income maintenance” is also similar to a cashless welfare card scheme so enamoured by the likes of Twiggy don’t-give-blackfellas-money Forrest, billionaire and miner of Indigenous land. The cashless welfare card has been imposed in the East Kimberleys and Port Augusta because Indigenous people are a considerable percentage of residents there. There is another region where such vile policies are pursued and that is Logan City because Aboriginal people, Torres Strait Islanders, Pacific Islanders and Maoris constitute a substantial part of the population there.

Dan Tehan told Fran Kelly that the Government was wanting to drug test New Start recipients “to help them help themselves”.  Despite Fran’s valiant attempt to alert him to the downsides of compulsory drug and alcohol testing of welfare recipients he pressed on undeterred. Fran noted that the Australian Medical Association, several drug rehabilitation academics and rehabilitation agencies have pointed out that compulsory testing and treatment is likely to interfere with rehabilitation. Tehan was too stupid to listen to her or acknowledge the possibility that the experts might know something that he, an arts graduate majoring in political science who also has a master’s degree in foreign affairs and trade, did not know. Perhaps he got to know a thing or two about drugs as minister for veteran’s affairs or minister for defence materiel. Or it could be that he is just bloody minded and ignorant.

The ABC should know that children listen to the Breakfast Program and that children should not be subjected to displays of such oafish stupidity by people purporting to be cabinet ministers. I despaired and went to town. Upon returning I fool heartedly turned on the radio to listen to the ABC’s PM program.

There were the dulcet tones of the hysterical senator Michaelia Cash from Western Australia screaming about the young women working in Bill Shorten’s Office about whom she had heard some rumours and if senator Doug Cameron did not stop asking her who in her office leaked to journalists, news about Federal police raids about to take place on the office of a union, she would use parliamentary privilege to spell out rumours she had heard about the young women.

Well what are we left with, Tehan might well make an excellent minister assisting the prime minister on ANZAC Day celebrations but he is totally unsuited to be minister for social security. Turnbull would assist every citizen were he to permanently station Tehan in the carpark at Anzac Cove and provide a demountable in which he could live 13 months of each year. Nothing can save Michaelia Cash from her own ugly mouth and mind. Every time she opens her mouth she detracts from the sum total of human decency. She should be permanently stationed at the old Lang Hancock lease in the town of Wittonoon.

written: 2/3/18

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Justifying Basic Income

Written in 2005. Don’t think it was published

In Real Freedom for All Philippe Van Parijs says paying a Basic Income to everyone, irrespective of whether or not they make a contribution to production, is justified because the knowledge endowment and previous technological advances are frequently unacknowledged and may be are unknowable which are used by those individuals who make intellectual or technological “inventions”. Under the present system such inventions if patented provide that individual with wealth. In any case such past knowledge endowment or previous technology is not owned by the individual making the invention but is owned by every member of the society collectively.

This analysis is an adaptation of Thomas Paine’s 1795 (in Agrarian Justice) justification for providing an income guarantee to every member of a society because all own the wealth which flows from privatising the collective ownership of the land of the nation.

On the other hand, those in the “participation income”/ “mutual obligation” corner who want to make payment of income support dependent on the individual receiving income support “giving something back”. They insist that those assisted have to be prepared to enter / re-enter the workforce or make some other contribution to justify payment. This is their way of preventing “free loaders” “abusing” the “generosity” of the beatified “taxpayer”.  With all the subtlety of a door to door salesperson about to offer a set of free steak knives with the next purchase, the “participation income”/ “mutual obligation” crowd also suggest that they are not so much motivated by a fear that some unemployed person might get “something for nothing” as by a “desire to seek the inclusion” within the warm embrace of mainstream society of those whom neither government nor industry can find employment.

Australian disability activist David Morell (1998) considers;

‘inclusion’ in the ‘community’ is not enough. Indeed the very concept does not make sense. The ‘community’ itself is so full of oppression, separation, exclusion, diverse interests and conflict for many of those who are already ‘included’ in it as to render the uncritical use of the concept positively misleading and pursuit of the goal of inclusion disempowering (p.17).

This point is reinforced by Abberley (1999) who contends that:

just because a main mechanism of our oppression is our exclusion from social production, we should be wary of drawing the conclusion that overcoming this oppression should involve our wholesale inclusion in it….

a society may be willing and in certain circumstance become eager to absorb a proportion of its impaired population into the workforce, yet this can have the effect of maintaining and perhaps intensifying its exclusion of the remainder. We need to develop a theory of oppression which avoids this bifurcation, through a notion of social integration that is not dependent upon impaired people’s inclusion (p.53).

Amongst the ranks of “participation income “advocates are the “workfare”, “time limited welfare” disciplinarians of the poor, whom the charitable or overly tactful would call paternalists (Standing 2002). Within this group there are people like Lawrence Mead, one of the ideological defenders of the Wisconsin welfare cutbacks. Mead claims that forcing people into poverty line work is good for them because somewhere down the track they will eventually get better paid jobs. Mead claims his “help and hassle” regime forces poor people to do what is “not only in their best interests, but what they really want to do anyway”. His argument conveniently ignores the fact that poverty line workfare “employees” drive wages down, that low minimum wages in the US and the length of time people stay on the bottom rung of the wage ladder confounds Mead’s claims (Johnston 2005).

Mead’s, John Howard’s and Tony Blair’s Third Way path to poverty alleviation via righteousness and mutually obligated inclusion is predicated upon the idea maximising national production though the imposition of obligations upon the very people who are most marginal to the productive process – those for whom government and industry has failed to find employment. We are asked to believe not only will such policies enhance production but that will make single parents and unemployed people happier.

Such claims about the increased personal satisfaction flowing from imposed obligation would seem to run counter to liberal and social democratic philosophies about individual freedom. Individuals are often, if not always, in the best position to determine what would make them happy. Individual left to their own devices will maximise the opportunities they wish to pursue. If self-actualisation for poor people was really what drives mead and the “mutual obligation” crowd then they would be attempting to impose the maximum personal liberty on recipient of income support.

It is hard not to believe the imposers of obligations upon those most marginal to the productive process are not behaving like the Little Red Hen in the fairy story who turned down requests from the other farm yard “animals who wanted to share the bread she made after having ignored all her requests for help in making it” (Van Parijs 1997, p.133).

Bibliography 

Abberley, P. (1999) “The Significance of Work for the Citizenship of Disabled People.” Abstract. Vol. 3, No. 3, December.
Johnston, D (2005) “ Stroke the Rich.” The San Francisco Chronicle 11th April
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2005/041105Y.shtml
Morell, D. (1998) “The Long View from Conferenceville.” Abstract. Vol.2, No. 1, March.

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Left-overs

Written circa 2000

“5,000 fewer jobs in Centrelink will make the Department more responsive.”

NASA had just announced that it was putting its Mars flights programs on hold following the loss of two recent missions, it was also reviewing its motto “Cheaper Faster Better” on the back of a report which found that NASA’s excessive cost cutting had substantially contributed to the demise of both Mars flights.

Basic income and citizenship

Many writers have argued that a minimum income guarantee should be a right of citizenship. Most, when questioned on this point, say that they would include all people who have permanent residency. As the Auckland Unemployed Workers Rights Centre puts it:

Our support for the (Universal Basic Income) UBI has always been on the basis that it should be a basic right of residency, a recognition that we are all stakeholders in society and that a UBI would provide choices and flexibility for people to participate in and contribute to society (1998, p.6).

I share the view that all permanent residents of a country should have an entitlement to a Basic Income and would argue that in a mature democracy in relation to the need for and the right to be provided with a basic income of both citizens and permanent residents are not significantly different.

Ensuring both citizens and permanent residents have a right to a basic income is an act of inclusion, even incorporation. Installing a UBI will be a small step not a panacea for all social ills.  Even if we succeed in putting in place in our country a universal basic income this will only mean the removal of one obstacle (albeit an important one) to introduction of a socially just society.  For as disability activist David Morell (1998), warns “Citizenship is more than ‘inclusion in the community’.” (p.16) He says:

‘inclusion’ in the ‘community’ is not enough. Indeed, the very concept does not make sense. The ‘community’ itself is so full of oppression, separation, exclusion, diverse interests and conflict for many of those who are already ‘included’ in it as to render the uncritical use of the of the concept positively misleading and the pursuit of the goal of inclusion disempowering (p.17).

A Basic Income is just that – an income floor guaranteed to all permanent residents.  For it to be meaningful it has to be set at a level sufficient to ensure everyone sufficient to maintain them above the Henderson poverty line.

Economics of surplus: are we attacking the wrong problem?

It would matter little what level of unemployment existed in Australia if we were able to find a way to provide all permanent residents with a basic income sufficient to sustain them provided we were prepared as individuals and as a society to allow people to define their own social meaning outside the paid workforce and to be willing to recognise others evaluation of their importance to self.  

Perhaps this is a pipe dream in a country where:

  • the Federal Government’s response to the High Court’s exposure of the myth of terra nullius and the Court’s determination that native title and lease holders rights could co-exist but that where the two conflicted the existing rights of leaseholders prevailed, was to remove indigenous people’s rights over property in order to “provide certainty to pastoralists and miners” (in fact to expand the existing property rights of national and transnational owners of capital),
  • the Prime Minister John Howard chose the National Aboriginal and Islander Day Observance Committee (NAIDOC) Week to push through Native Title Amendment Act in the Senate,
  • we participated in an eight year blockade of Iraq – the imposition of sanctions in that country resulted in the death of over 1 million Iraqi children (Arbuthnot 1998, Simons 1998), and connived with the Indonesian dictatorship in the subjugation of East Timor for 23 years,
  • we seem more intent upon negotiating Multinational Agreement on Investment (MAI) treaty (DEETYA 1998 p.10)than in meeting the United Nations foreign aid targets so as to help assist the 1,000 million people living on the brink of starvation,
  • the nursing home user pays regime which the Government imposed on frail aged Australians undermined the confidence of the majority of the elderly (Macklin 1998),
  • we display an uncaring attitude towards fellow Australians experiencing disadvantage and disability, and
  • we denigrate people excluded from paid employment reinforcing the impression that we as a nation are oblivious to the suffering of our less advantaged comrades.

If we are to build an alternative way of relating to our fellow citizens then we will need to jettison much of the economic rationalist ideas which now clutter our intellectual saddle bags.

Stripped of its finery economics is about how we exchange our surpluses, whereas as a science it has somehow been transformed into an economics of scarcity where everything is expressed in monetary terms. …We have created the shadow of scarcity, the polar shadow of which is greed. This is fuelled by  the dominant world paradigm based on rationality and self-interest. … Fortunately we are not always rational and will cooperate when we really come to know and trust each other and have the power and resources to implement solutions. This is the foundation to an economics of abundance – of labour, goodwill and renewable resources (Fricker 1998, p.1).

The last part of this paper will examine the obstacles to the development of such trust.

The bludgers wouldn’t work in an iron lung

The most frequent response I have encountered when discussing the introduction of a Basic Income with people who have not thought a lot about Australia’s system of income support is: “If everyone could get ‘the dole’ for doing nothing then none of the bludgers would work they’d just go and lie in the sun on Surfers Paradise beach.”and when I ask: “Why do you think that?”  They say “Well I wouldn’t go to work if I could get away with it.”  Usually when pushed on this response people say that they’re bored with the work they are doing and would like to have time to write, read, do further study, spend more time with the family, do more interesting work or that they just need a break.  But at the moment, they are working too hard or doing too much unpaid overtime (which they claim they to need to do either to keep their job or to do their job well).  If pushed further many admit that going to work provides meaning in their lives and that they work, for reasons in addition to economic necessity. They may even agree they couldn’t manage anything like their current standard of living on an income at the Henderson poverty line and would work to maintain their  current consumption level.  Some accept that in large part their identity is tied to their conception of themselves as someone who works, who produces, who contributes to the society and even to the type of work that they do.  Almost invariably, when they reach that point of analysis, they revert to their first statement “Yeah, I’d still work but if you had a Basic Income in place, we’d be overrun with dole bludgers and very soon there’d be hardly anyone working and the whole society would be bankrupted.”

The issue of work withdrawal and affordability has been debated ad nauseam and there is no compelling evidence to support the assertion that people provided with a UBI would desert work in droves. (See NZUBI Web Site, Van Parijis 1992, VCOSS and Good Shepherd 1995, Tomlinson 1989, Ch. 3, 1991, Watts 1995, contra Pixley 1993).  Nor is there any evidence that a UBI is unaffordable (Rankin 1998, VCOSS and Good Shepherd 1995).  There is an  abundance of  contrary evidence to the assertion that if a UBI were in place then people would leave work in large numbers and that a UBI would be unaffordable. The interesting feature is the resilience of such beliefs.

An explanation

The most compelling explanation of the resilience of these myths is that it is our failure to trust ourselves which in turn leaves us unable to trust others.  Our reluctance to trust ourselves or to trust others to continue to contribute to the society derives from a central conservative ideological position which conceives of humans as inherently imperfect.  The belief in the flawed nature of humans derives from either the concept of original sin or from the belief that though we might start off life without blemish on our journey we become corrupted -as we are sinned against we learn to sin.  Robert Theobald (1998) suggests that “Today we are largely driven by a belief in original sin; we feel that most people, most of the time will behave destructively unless constrained by coercive power” (p.1).

The lack of optimism about fellow humans found in the ranks of those who oppose the introduction of a UBI, their conservatism, their need to blame and coerce the least affluent / advantaged, their denigration of the very people from whom they extract surplus capital and the those who constitute the reserve army of labour, is only matched by their fervent desire to exploit to the maximum the environment and their fellow humans for individual gain (Tomlinson & Lincoln 1995).  The exploitative belief structure which seems to be driving both economic rationalist and anti-UBI agendas is a unique, sometimes contradictory, blend of classical conservative and market liberal thought.  It takes unto itself beliefs in the sanctity of privately owned property yet can legislate to abolish indigenous people’s property rights (Native Title Amendment Act 1998).

The Benthamite principle of greatest good for the greatest number is supposedly arrived at as the end result of intense individualised competition. Liberty is, for economic rationalists, a freedom from restraint. Freed even from the restraint of tradition, good form or the ‘common good’. The promotion of the individual’s right to exploit, which economic rationalists define as freedom, reduces the ‘common good’ to the end results of trickling down prosperity – a urinary  rather than a unified economic theory.

The promotion of ‘self provision’ over collective provision suits those with the capacity to provide for themselves but is a statement of intending neglect of those unable to afford to provide for themselves. Beyond this basic criticism of self provision several writers (ACTCOSS 1991, Pha 1992, ACOSS 1998)have pointed out that many of those who are allegedly providing for themselves are quite wealthy individuals who receive a considerable subsidy from the state. The better off superannuates receive far greater assistance from the state than do pensioners.

The very Governments (of the United States, Britain, New Zealand and Australia) who are flirting with an international treaty to guarantee international capital (MAI) protection are those engaged in removing existing rights of workers and welfare beneficiaries.  They want industrial relations deregulated but want to maintain the highly regulated modes of distribution.

The adoption of economic rationalism and globalisation with its associated downsizing and job exportation, its user pays and self provision, its denial of citizenship (exemplified in Maggie Thatcher’s “There’s no such thing as Society” statement) coupled with the plunder by transnational corporations of the third world’s labour and ecological resources constitutes this celebration of extreme individualism.  All of this goes under the name of world best practice. In the Australian context world’s best practice means:

  • cheapest: accomplished by non-unionised labour, long (12 hour) shifts, lack of environmental protection, gutting of award conditions, unsafe work sites-all of which add to the increased likelihood  work place injuries, that is industrial murder,
  • deregulation,
  • competition,
  • individualised contracts,
  • low paid, casual / insecure of employment, in a word in immiseration.

There is an alternative and that alternative starts with the introduction of a Universal Basic Income.

Bibliography

ABS, Australian Bureau of Statistics (1996)  Labour Force. Cat. No 6202.0.
ACOSS,  (1998) Budget Priority Statement 1998-99. ACOSS, Sydney.
ACTCOSS, (1991) The Super Tax Rort. ACTCOSS, Canberra.
Arbuthnot, F.  (1998) “Dying of Shame.” New Internationalist.  Jan/Feb, pp.12-13.
Auckland  Unemployed Workers Rights Centre (1998) “Common Misconceptions about the Community Wage (Workfare)” Mean Times. Vol. 9 Issue 1, June, pp. 6-7.
Cass, B. (1988) Income Support for the Unemployed in Australia: Towards a more Active System. AGPS, Canberra.
Castles, F. (1994) “The Wage Earners Welfare State Revisited.” Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol.29, No.2.
Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs ( DEETYA), (1998) “Cross-border investment: Rules of the Game.” News on Higher Education. Vol.1, No. 1, June, p.16.
Easton, B. (1997) The Commercialisation of New Zealand. Auckland University, Auckland.
Ficker, A. (1998) “Beyond Scarcity and Greed.” Paper given at the Beyond Despondency  Conference, Wellington. 26 -28 th. March.
Gorz, A  (1995) Paths to Paradise: On the liberation from work. Pluto, London.
Green, D. (1994) Community Without Politics. Institute of Economic Affairs, Health and Welfare Unit.London.
Horin, A. (1998) “Dole cut for thousands of young jobless.” Sydney Morning Herald. June,29th . p.10
Kelsey, J. (1995) The NewZealand Experiment: A World Model for Structural Adjustment. Auckland University & Bridget Williams, Auckland.
Langmore, J. & Quiggan ,J. (1994) Work for All: Full Employment in the Nineties. University of Melbourne, Carlton.
Macklin, J. (1998) Current House Hansard. [Australian Federal Parliament] 24th.
March. pp. 1,004-1,010.
Morrell, D. (1998) “The Long View from Conferenceville.” Abstract. Vol. 2, No. 1, March, pp.16-19.
Murray, M. (1997) “…And Economic Justice For All”: Welfare Reform for the 21st. Century. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk.
Native Title Amendment Act 1998.
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More Info

Let’s get Basic 

I think this was a paper given at a Coffee Unemployment circa 2001.

Income insecurity is a constant preoccupation of citizens surviving on low incomes. Categorical, selective, targeted welfare payments which exist in Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States have not succeeded in abolishing Beveridge’s five giants of ‘squalor, want, ignorance, disease and idleness’ (Timmins,1995). The modern welfare state, in the countries mentioned, does not guarantee all permanent residents a secure income. Each of these countries has toyed with the idea of introducing generalised income guarantees for all permanent residents. Such partial income guarantees which have been installed have had eligibility requirements attached to them which demand either proven incapacity to labour, work willingness or some socially approved basis for not working (such as sole parenting or age).

With the exception of some reasonably generalised family tax credits or family welfare benefits there has been a move away from broad income support policies towards more targeted forms of categorical income arrangements. As the promise of generalised income support receded, governments in these English speaking western countries have introduced compelled activity as part of the eligibility requirements for entitlement to income support. In New Zealand, following the 1999 election victory, the Labour / Alliance Government began slowly dismantling much of the compelled activity superstructure of their conservative predecessor’s income support system. This is the first step away from the ‘Third Way’ activity requirements, workfare, Wisconsin ‘reforms’, ‘work for the dole’, and ‘mutual obligation’ preoccupations of a series of governments in these countries. The governments which most ardently push a ‘mutual obligation’ agenda are the very ones who are preoccupied with ‘welfare dependency’. Ray Cassin, chief leader writer of The Sunday Age, reflecting on this phenomena points out that:

You can be ‘on’ social security in the literal sense of receiving benefits, but this usage does not carry the pejorative flavour of being ‘on’ welfare. The reason is not mysterious: we do not talk about social security dependency, or social-services dependency because ‘social security’ and ‘social services’ are bound up with an older notion of entitlement, and an understanding of mutual obligation that goes beyond tit-for-tat reciprocity….

The ideal of mutual obligation underpinning a system of social security is not one of reciprocity, but of obligation borne by all of us to contribute to the support of people who would otherwise be destitute (2000 p. 22,see also Cass 1995 p. 38).

The constant claim of government spokespeople in Australia when defending the existing categorical benefit system is that (through an austere safety net) it assists all in need. However the breaching of 200,000 social security recipients in the 1999/2000 financial year plus the extension of ‘work for the dole’ and other compelled activities demonstrates the tenuous security experienced by those receiving social security.

Once writers might have argued for an income support proposal on the grounds that its introduction would enhance equity, equality, justice, or because it removed an anomaly, lessened stigma, made claiming easier for recipients, provided similar benefits to all in like situations or increased recipients’ feelings of security. A universal unconditional Basic Income does all these things. However the consolidation of economic fundamentalism in the last decade now means that economic efficiency arguments are often the only propositions listened to by government ministers. There is nothing wrong with having to establish the utility of any proposal but what has changed is that arguments which go to the usefulness to clients of any income support program are relegated to the periphery of government concern. Narrow economic efficiency arguments now take centre stage. Consequently this chapter will set out universal Basic Income’s claim to being the most efficient way to provide a guaranteed minimum income to all permanent residents in a way which enhances both national productivity and personal creativity.

From 1918 until 1922 Dennis Milner, Mabel Milner & Bernard Pickard campaigned for the introduction of a Basic Income (Van Trier 1995 Part 1). As Walter Van Trier (1995) and Philippe Van Parijs (1992[b] p. 25) reminds us, ever since the first book length plea for Basic Income written by Milner (1920) economic efficiency arguments have played a major role. Milner wanted to ensure the inadequacies of the British poor law system were overcome, to enhance national productivity, and to provide a more equitable base from which workers might negotiate wages (Van Trier 1995 Part 1). Many of the issues dealt with here are synonymous with those which preoccupied the Milners and Pickard. Milner did not see the introduction of a Basic Income as the be all and end all just one step on the way to a more secure life for all citizens. Milner entitled his book Higher Production by a Bonus on National Output: A proposal for a minimum income for all varying with national productivity. Milner (1920 ch.2) argued that the amount of funds available for distribution should be 20% of national production as this would provide a share of the nation’s wealth for all permanent residents whilst encouraging all to produce more to raise the value of the dividend.

Why have income support?

The standard justification for the provision of welfare services has been that people needed them and were unable to obtain them by other means. Following the Poverty Inquiry’s recommending the introduction of a Guaranteed Minimum Income in 1975, Bill Hayden, Minister for Social Security in the Whitlam Government, and a supporter of the introduction of a Henderson style GMI (Tomlinson 1989 ch. 6) felt the Australian income support system ‘had grown like topsy’ and needed to be integrated into a coherent whole. He acknowledged the basis on which benefits were supplied was at times difficult to justify and confusing to recipients. Hayden was grappling with many of the same issues which, 25 years later the Final Report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform (2000 [b]) acknowledged when they wrote: the current income support system “is overly complex and relies heavily on assumptions about capacity and behaviour that are now questionable” and that pension / benefit / allowance transitions cause life difficulties and unintended incentives and disincentives (pp. 19 & 68).

In Chapter 2 the argument was mounted that ‘needs based’ explanations do not adequately explain why welfare programs are provided. It was argued that such explanations serve to mystify the intent of providers and disguise the real level of need both amongst recipients and those who are refused.

‘Needs based’ provision can be supplied on an individual basis, as occurs in emergency relief agencies. More commonly ‘needs based’ income support in advanced economies is provided to categories of people, such as those who have a disability or who are unemployed. Chapters 3, 4 and 7 demonstrated similarities in the income support needs of people divided by categorical assistance programs and others who are denied benefits. It was also argued that governments and agencies use such ‘needs based’ categorical benefits as a way of limiting the levels of assistance and the amount allocated to relieve hardship. It was further argued that the creation of specific forms of categorical assistance divide recipients from each other, from the wider working class and from their humanity.

Discrimination on the basis of age, locality, race, gender, disability and class structure Australian society. These hegemonic forces impact on all aspects of social life and are clearly observable in income support policy. Young unemployed people are paid at lower rates than older job seekers. In Chapter 5 the failure of the State to provide the bush with anything like the same level or range of services as their city cousins was examined. The methods by which Indigenous Australians have been excluded from the ‘white’ social security system and from economic development were detailed in Chapter 6. Throughout this book there has been considerable discussion of the patriarchal presumption which suggests that the family is the appropriate unit of income for the payment of welfare benefits. Chapter 7 specifically investigated the ableist construction that it is an individual’s impairment rather than the disabling society which should be the point of focus. At one level, this book is a polemic against the elitist presumptions that working class people have a propensity to sink into the slough of ‘dependency’ unless compelled to meet government imposed ‘mutual obligations’.

In Chapter 8 the relationship between welfare provision, categorical payment forms and trust were examined. The argument was put that it is our failure to trust ourselves to do the right thing which leads us not to trust others and which prevents governments introducing a universal Basic Income. Governments in English speaking western countries hedge their bets on income support policies through the imposition of selectivity, categorical eligibility requirements and ‘mutual obligations’. When governments consider:

  • threats to productivity,
  • work disincentives,
  • work readiness of minority racial groups,
  • single motherhood,
  • working class compliance, or
  • the capacity of people with disabilities to work

they rely on the conservative belief in the imperfection of human beings rather than the belief that people treated with dignity will respond constructively. In Australia the Government has excluded recently arrived migrants from applying for the normally available categorical income support payments for two years following their arrival. Examples have been provided of many quite poor citizens who have no income support entitlement from the State because of the increasingly targeted income support policies of the last decade. This has led some to assume it would be impossible to convince Australian governments in the foreseeable future to introduce a Basic Income.

The contradictory belief structure which leads governments to assume that the rich need to be encouraged to produce but the poor have to be compelled to labour lies at the heart of the construction of the income support systems of the countries discussed. The fact that such arguments (about lesser eligibility, the poor’s fecklessness, the associated need for coercion and the importance of increasing the huge differentials in income between the owning and labouring classes) are a nonsense, does not make them any less valued by social conservatives. John Kenneth Galbraith ridiculed such arguments by pointing out that “It always boils down to the highly improbable case that the rich are not working because they have too little income and the poor because they have too much.” [cited in Boreham, Dow & Leet (1999) p.104]

It was earlier suggested that research could go some way towards reassuring governments about the work intentions of the less affluent. Yet it was recognised that because economic fundamentalism holds hegemonic sway, such research would be viewed through this ideological lens. Beyond links to the poor law assumptions about the need for ‘less eligibility’ there are clear connections with public choice theory in the way the governments construct income support policies, insisting that behaviour “is best understood by assuming its motivation is single-purposed, acquisitive and unchanging (Stretton & Orchard 1994 p. 18)”.Coupled with this is the related neoclassical liberal belief that welfare problems “are rational responses to the incentive structures that face individuals. Social harmony will emerge spontaneously only if the appropriate market signals are operative (Barry 1998 p. 58).”

A quick look at two alternatives to Basic Income

Little space has been devoted, in this book, to consideration of privatised superannuation, as has been implemented in Australia or social insurance coverage as exists in many parts of Europe and North America. Superannuation in Australia is an occupational benefit and, by definition, excludes those not in the paid workforce, or those whose spouses are not in the paid work force. It excludes the bulk of the Indigenous population because they are employed under the Community Development Employment Program. It disadvantages those with multiple employers, casual and seasonal workers, women and those on low incomes. Professor Russell Mathews, a leading Australian economist, referring to the Australian system, wrote:

it is difficult to conceive of superannuation arrangements that would be more administratively wasteful, less certain to provide adequate retirement benefits and therefore less likely to reduce the burden of age pensions on government budgets, and more inequitable for both employers and employees (cited by Stretton 1996 p.26).

Social insurance proposals have been considered in Australia but rejected. They have been implemented in many countries but they do not have the capacity to provide a secure income to all citizens because “the benefit rates are generally based on prior wage levels rather than need. They are not designed to provide adequately for those with special needs…The highest rates go to the most privileged…rather than those in most need of assistance (Perry 1995 p. 18)”. In terms of both equity and efficiency both these forms of self provision fail to provide an adequate income support base for all permanent residents of a country.

Efficiency

Given prevailing perceptions of human behaviour, it will not be an easy task to convince governments of English speaking countries to implement a universal income guarantee for all permanent residents. If governments are to be convinced to move in the direction of Basic Income then making available research on productivity, work willingness and ‘dependency’ which confounds their preconceptions will be an important part of the struggle.

Governments in the countries under discussion consistently suggest they are providing social security in an efficient and accountable manner. They are certainly capable of determining the cost of delivering specific categorical benefits to those recipients who are paid. They can and do calculate how much they ‘save’ by cutting people off income support when they do not meet the totality of eligibility requirements for any specific benefit. This is accounting or target efficiency. They seem disinterested in how people who are refused benefits get by, or what social costs are incurred in the wake of decisions to remove income support from such citizens. Target efficiency processes give no measure of how efficient the system of social security is. Because the central issues which should be taken into account when assessing the efficiency of a social security system are not considered.

Some of the system wide efficiency measures, which would need to be taken into account if the efficiency of the system was being calculated, would be:

  • are any of the people excluded from the social security system poor,
  • how many people who have an entitlement miss out,
  • how satisfied are the people who are confined to low levels of income support,
  • does the social security system advance social justice for all permanent residents,
  • are the human rights of all residents protected (or even enhanced),
  • does the system remove all obstacles to inclusion of people with a disability,
  • are all genders, ages and ethnic groups treated equally or equitably,
  • is there equitable treatment provided to city and country people, and
  • does the system of income support provide sufficient security to recipients so as to allow them to contribute to society in ways with which they are comfortable?

Governments sometimes move away from narrow accounting efficiency measures and attempt to look broadly at efficiency in terms of what is happening across an entire economy. In 1993, in the Labor Government’s Green Paper, the Committee on Employment Opportunities declared:

The loss of production through unemployment is the greatest single source of inefficiency in our economy. Unemployment is also the most important cause of inequality and alienation for individuals, families and communities (p.1).

A recent cross-country study (Goodin, Headey, Muffels & Dirven 1999) compared citizens’ response to different income support policies. The three countries considered in detail in this study were chosen because a decade of comparable panel data existed allowing the authors to explore the issues of: economic growth, efficiency, poverty, inequality, social integration, stability and autonomy. The countries chosen for analysis were: the United States where the welfare state represents the liberal form, Germany with its corporatist welfare regime and Holland which has a social democratic style of welfare. Goodin, Headey, Muffels & Dirven (1999) explain:

The classically liberal welfare regime is rooted in capitalist economic premises and confines the state to a merely residual social welfare role. The classically social democratic welfare regime is rooted in socialist economic premises and assigns the welfare state a powerfully redistributive role. The classically corporatist welfare regime is rooted in communitarian ‘social market’ economics and sees the welfare regime as primarily a facilitator of group-based mutual aid and risk pooling (Italics in original p. 39).

Goodin, Headey, Muffels & Dirven (1999 Part 3) make the point that in social policy debates it is frequently asserted that inevitable trade offs occur between economic growth, efficiency, poverty, inequality, social integration, stability and autonomy. But what they found was the Dutch social democratic welfare regime equalled or exceeded the performance of the corporatist Germans and the liberal US system across all these social and economic objectives.

Such findings have considerable relevance to the direction an informed nation would choose if it wanted to change its system of income support services from one grounded on ideological assumptions to one based on substantiated research. The Australian welfare state might once have had considerable social democratic aspects but has, in recent times, moved closer to the US liberal regime of minimalist provision.

The careful cross country analysis of panel data presented by Goodin, Headey, Muffels & Dirven (1999) allowed these researchers to follow real people’s experiences of work and welfare. In the past cross country analysts have been forced to compare aggregated statistical samples. Importantly, as Goodin, Headey, Muffels & Dirven looked at individuals they found an exceedingly small percentage of people who remained on welfare indefinitely under any of the systems investigated. Such findings fly in the face of the current Australian Government and Opposition’s preoccupation with ‘welfare dependency’ and its only known antidote – ‘mutual obligation’.

The really important message from this book is that whether one is seeking to promote economic growth and efficiency, stability, autonomy or to decrease poverty and inequality then the social democratic welfare state along the lines of the Netherlands exceeds the performance of the German corporatist regime which, in turn, exceeded that of the United States liberal regime (Goodin, Headey, Muffels & Dirven 1999 Part 3).

Australia has lost its way on welfare reform

The architects of ‘mutual obligation’ see it as having the capacity to move the social security system away from a rights focus and towards an individualised eligibility determining regime. The Reference Group on Welfare Reform (2000 [a], [b]) so internalised this proposition that they have proposed that even people who meet every requirement for payment of a specific categorical benefit should have the amount they are actually paid affected by how they ‘participate’ in the social and economic life of the community. The Minister in charge of income support is on record as saying “Simply providing payments to everyone who fits into a particular category fails to recognise the different capacities and potential people have to contribute to their own future (Newman 1999 p. 9).” This is the height of inefficient supply of benefits.

The final report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform (2000 [b] p.3) claimed that if nothing was done “Australia may be consigning large numbers of people to an intergenerational cycle of significant joblessness” and went on to prescribe extending compulsory participation from the unemployed to sole parents and Disability Support Pensioners. The Treasurer allocated funds in the 2001/2002 Federal Budget to extend the imposition of ‘mutual obligation’ to these categories of beneficaries.

In late August the Final Report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform (2000 [b]) was welcomed by the Government, Labor and the Democrats. Michael Raper, President of ACOSS, saw it being a bridge over troubled waters – even if it had a few planks missing. The mainstream press response was generally positive (contra Cassin 2000), praising the way in which the Reference Group had attempted to reinterpret Prime Minister Howard’s hardline ‘mutual obligation’. The press took heart in the Report’s suggestion that sanctions should be a last resort and that the emphasis should be on a ‘partnership between income support recipients and the government designed to encourage participation in the economy and society’.

It is true that in the section of the Report dealing with ‘mutual obligation’ there was a recognition that “Some responses (to their interim report 2000[a]) argued that placing conditions on income support diminishes citizenship rights to an adequate minimum income (2000[b] p. 33).” However this did not stop the authors of the Report claiming:

Nevertheless, compulsion will be required for a minority of income support recipients and to ensure that governments, businesses and communities meet minimum standards in ensuring access to economic participation opportunities (p. 32, see also p. 40).

In the financial year 1999/2000 at least 200,000 income support recipients were breached by Centrelink -for them compulsion is an ever present threat. Government however has no legislative provisions in place which can compel “businesses and communities meet minimum standards in ensuring access to economic participation opportunities”. It would seem reasonable to ask what organisation is going to be in a position to compel governments to ensure “access to economic participation opportunities”. The Australian Government’s response to the reports of the United Nations Human Rights and Elimination of Racism Committees concerning the present Government’s breaches of international agreements, which Australia has signed and ratified, was to tell the UN to stay out of ‘Australia’s business’ (Garran 2000, p.1, Bessant 2000 [b]). Given such a Government response it is impossible to identify the vehicle which the Reference Group thinks will compel the Australian Government to ensure economic participation.

This is in fact the crux of the ‘mutual obligation’ debate: legal powers exist to compel income support recipients to reciprocate. But those who receive income support have no way of compelling the Government to meet its ‘reciprocal obligations’ which the Report identifies as being necessary if there is to be increased participation in the economic and social life of the nation. Under the title of Participation Support for a More Equitable Society the Reference Group advocates removal of the current legislated right of people with parenting responsibilities to not work until their youngest child turns 16 years. This right has been reduced to when the youngest child turns 6 years after which they will be required to attend yearly interviews (p. 43). Then when the child turns 13 parents will have to demonstrate how they intend to access economic participation opportunities (p. 43). A variant of ‘work for the dole’ or other compelled activity will be extended to some Disability Support Pensioners (pp. 12 -18).

The trade off that income support recipients are offered is a single rate payment for all ‘working age’ recipients plus a number of add on payments to: ‘increase participation’ and cope with special ‘needs’, family circumstances or disabilities (p. 24). The introduction of the Common Youth Allowance saw 46,000 16-18 year olds have their payments diminished or cut completely. Such reductions in benefit has occurred under both Labor and Liberal administrations since 1986 whenever common payment regimes have been installed. There is no reason to believe something different will happen this time. The Government has loudly proclaimed it will retain the value of benefits but, since 1986, such promises have always been given before cuts occurred. Even if the rates are not cut recipients are having the conditions under which they receive payment eroded by the imposition of compelled activity. The report acknowledges that the different benefit structures and advantages, which currently exist, cause confusion and unintended disincentives yet goes on to promote its uniform ‘work age’ payment plus ‘individualised add ons’ which must lead to even greater confusion (pp.22-31).

Perhaps more importantly it fails to advocate a general income guarantee for all ‘working age’ people (p. 22). Its recommendations, in relation to income support, only relate to those who now receive government income support. It stops short of advocating working families tax credits as exist in the United States and Britain and advocated by the Labor Party in Australia (p. 28). The Final Report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform (2000 [b]) does not develop the idea of a general income guarantee to all working Australians as was recommended in Perry (1995) and Baldwin (1995). In fact, in this regard, it is a retreat from the Henderson Poverty Inquiries (1975, Vol. 1 ch. 6) recommendations.

The Report fails to successfully address a number of crucial dilemmas which arise out of its main recommendations. If there are advantages in having a uniform base rate of payment for all ‘working age’ income support recipients, why (apart from the imposition of conservative charity values) would there be any advantage in confusing such a structure with several add on payments calculated at an individual level? Many of these add on payments require determiners to apply considerable discretion. For example, assessors will determine what is appropriate participation ‘in the economic and social life of the nation’ for each applicant.

If there is a logic in having the same base rate for all ‘working age’ recipients why should it not be extended to older and younger people? After all, many people older than 65 years work as do many under the ‘working age’. There are two reasons for this: firstly the age lobby is united and powerful compared with ‘working age’ groups who have been divided amongst themselves; and secondly to include the young in such an income guarantee scheme would reverse decades of governments’ attempts to marginalise this age group. On top of this it would mean having to admit the present income support discrimination against the young is unjustified.

The Reference Group Report may have portrayed a kinder face of ‘mutual obligation’ than the Government has hitherto been able to present; but it has not been able to escape the inherent miserly conservative agenda which has been part and parcel of the administration of welfare services in Australia since the invasion. The parish has been replaced by the Commonwealth but the values of the poor laws remain.

There is nothing wrong with encouraging people to play a part in society and the economy. Compulsion can be replaced with trust, enablement, mutuality and assistance. People will take opportunities to engage. Only those addicted to a poor law view of the world want to force the poor to sing for their supper. There is nothing wrong with having one rate of social security income support for all permanent residents in this country -but it does not need to come with strings attached. There is no need to link work readiness and income support. In 1975 Professor Henderson recommended a Guaranteed Minimum Income. This book advocates the introduction of a universal Basic Income paid to each individual and at a rate at least that of the single age pension. Once such a program was in place governments would no longer be able to threaten the livelihoods of those most marginal to the productive process. For this to happen will require governments to choose, in Goodin words (1988 p. 7), between ‘a poor law state and a welfare state’.

A long time coming

It is as if governments believe there is no way to ensure a productive society other than to compel those who have the least opportunities. Governments in English speaking western countries seem obsessed by the cost of income support. The more important question is whether income support is affordable. Generous income guarantees become affordable when the amount of government revenue is raised. Presently governments have a preference for providing minimal welfare rather than increasing taxation. Just take one example: wealth taxes are an anathema to the rich in Australia, as a result there are no wealth taxes (in the form seen in many OECD countries). But Australia does have wealth taxes. They are called asset tests and are imposed on many forms of social security payments. Australian wealth taxes are applied at the very time when people are experiencing financial crises and result in only small savings to government outlays. It would be possible to tax all wealth and vastly increase government revenue and hence be in a position to expand the quality and coverage of income support. Instead governments have been content to let the welfare system evolve from the Poor Laws to poor laws (Stretton 1996).

In feudal England a number of support systems existed for members of the community who fell on hard times – their extended family in the first instance, others in the village with a surplus, the lord of the manor or the church. Strangers might not be helped and could be banished from the village and left to die at the crossroads. Each area had its own helping characteristics. However, before one was assisted others in the village had to have sufficient resources to help, there was an expectation of ‘mutual obligation’ and one had to be in good standing with other community members. In times of widespread crop failures these local helping systems broke down.

Not much changed in relation to the way poor people were helped until towards the end of the 18th Century. At Speenhamland, Berkshire, in 1795 a number of landlords were unable to pay sufficient wages to ensure their farm labourers had an adequate income to sustain themselves and their families. The system provided a fixed scale of relief in line with the size of the labourer’s family and the price of wheat. In return labourers were required to continue to work. The scheme involved topping up the wages paid by the individual farm owners (Polanyi 1945).

The scheme was subsequently criticised by workers organisations because they saw that the minimum assistance had the capacity to become the going wage and that it was a subsidy to employers (Polanyi 1945 pp. 99-107). Some trade unionists to this day oppose income guarantee schemes on similar bases seeing Speenhamland type income guarantees as Capital’s method of lowering wages or as a form of ‘work for the dole’ both of which they see as undermining the dignity of paid labour.

There has been a parallel debate

Some observers draw different conclusions from the Speenhamland experience. They find a kernel of trust in others, a way to get the productive needs of society met by using the available labour and providing a floor below which no one would fall.

In 1848 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote The Communist Manifesto which heralded a system where the basis of production and distribution would be ‘from each according to ability and to each according to need’. Though such a system has not been implemented in any country, the promise of the Manifesto has presented a challenge to all other systems of income distribution since that time. Bismarck’s reforms were measured against the Manifesto.

In Britain the earliest fully elaborated (book length) Basic Income proposal was put forward by Dennis Milner (1920, Van Trier 1995). After a brief flurry of activity between 1918 and 1922, his contribution disappeared from income support policy debates for over half a century. The British Liberal economist Lady Rhys-Williams, in 1943, set out a plan to introduce a guaranteed minimum income. In her book entitled Something to look forward to Lady Rhys-Williams’ aim was to provide an income floor without interfering with earnings. The economic fundamentalist writer Milton Friedman claims he developed his ideas on his form of income guarantee (the Negative Income Tax) during that year but it took him a further 18 years to publish his ideas. In 1975 Professor Ronald Henderson in the Main Report of the Poverty Inquiry, borrowing heavily on Lady Rhys -Williams’ ideas, advocated a Guaranteed Minimum Income for Australia.

Since that time many different forms of income guarantees have been promoted around the world. The major point of difference is the degree to which authors wish their income guarantee to ape the welfare income support system with its various categories of payment and means test or instead argue that income support should take the form of a truly universal payment to all as a right of citizenship.

Modern Basic Income proposals

Amongst proponents of generalised income guarantee there are divisions between supporters of Negative Income Tax (NIT), Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI), and Basic Income. The structural differences of each system were described in Chapter 9. The major difference between each of these income guarantees (in their pure form) and categorical income support payments is that generalised income guarantee eligibility does not necessitate any social requirements. However, many of the generalised income guarantee programs which have been promoted since 1943 have added social requirements, such as the willingness to work.

The major difference between GMI or NIT and Basic Income forms is that the first two are selective and Basic Income is universal. Proponents of NIT and GMI argue that it would cost the State less to introduce their models compared with a Basic Income. It is true that government outlays would be lower under NIT and GMI; but the actual drain on the budget bottom line of an unconditional Basic Income (because of increased tax compliance and ease of administration) might not be much greater than with other forms of income guarantees (Van Parijs 2000 pp. 8-9).

Dennis Milner (1920) set out to create a comprehensive program which would include everyone. He envisaged, in his proposal, everyone – irrespective of circumstances – being guaranteed an income as a right of citizenship (Van Trier 1995). Milton Friedman, when he advocated NIT, wanted to ensure that any income transfers went only to the poor. Lady Rhys Williams wanted to ensure no poor person missed out. Since then the majority of NIT and GMI advocates have wanted to direct the most assistance to those most in need. The arguments about selectivity covered in Chapters 2, 3 & 8 relating to categorical benefits have equal application to selective generalised income support programs.

There are many forms of generalised income guarantee schemes installed in Europe and there are plans afoot in several countries to move in the direction of a Basic Income (Van Parijs 2000). The actual model of Basic Income implemented in any country will depend on what other social wage components are retained and the capacity of that country to afford it. Van Parijs (2000) outlines many options a government might employ to reshape its tax and social welfare infrastructure as part of the Basic Income implementation process.

Until 4 years ago I believed that it would be more politically feasible to introduce a GMI than a Basic Income partly because the perceived cost of such schemes would be lower than for a Basic Income and Don Grimes (a progressive minister in the Hawke Cabinet) informed me that he and many of his colleagues were opposed to providing a guarantee of income support ‘to millionaires’. The other reason for supporting a GMI over a Basic Income is that the money is seen to be directed towards those living on low incomes.

Over the last few years:

  • the increasingly targeted income support system,
  • the increasing marginalisation of young people,
  • the imposition of ‘mutual obligation’,
  • the hegemony of economic fundamentalism,
  • the income redistribution upwards via tax, education and health systems,
  • the exponential growth of the ‘what’s in it for me’ mentality,
  • the widespread working class acceptance of incessant calls for lower taxes, and
  • the rise of a form of wedge politics designed to denigrate migrants, lone parents, those with a disability and Indigenous people whilst generating an ‘envy’ for the poverty line income they receive

has led me to revisit Goodin & Le Grand’s (1987) suggestion that if the rich do not benefit then the system will be under constant challenge.

The desire to assist those in greatest financial need to the greatest extent conflicts with the desire to treat people equally. The rationalisation that equality is a less important goal than equity explains the basis for promoting selectivity. The realisation that to treat unequals equally is as unjust as treating equals unequally supports the imposition of selectivity. On the other hand Boston & St John (1998 pp. 100-101) assert that if all are assisted equally then poorer people gain more because a dollar is worth more to them than to the rich. Claus Offe (1992), echoing Goodin & Le Grand (1987) describes the universal basic income as ‘economically’ inefficient because it delivers benefits to all when only some need the assistance but is ‘politically’ efficient because “spreading entitlement to benefits to ‘all’ is the inescapable political precondition that must first be met in order to make the arrangement popular with the middle class (pp. 72-73)”. The other problem with arguments to equity is that people differ from each other in what they consider fair. A further confounding feature, if Goodin & Le Grand (1987) are correct, is that poor people will experience greater security of income support if the affluent are included; and because everyone benefits this may lead to increased public support for raising income guarantee levels. That is, more money may go to the poor because more money is going to the rich.

Andre Gorz (1985 ch. 4) proposed a form of guaranteed income dependent upon a minimum contribution of 20,000 hours of labour over a life time. Since then the likelihood of increasing “insecurity of employment for all (Gorz 1999 p. 56)” led him to reject this guaranteed minimum income form and opt for a full unconditional Basic Income (pp.86-87). He specifically rules out any compulsion to contribute by ‘volunteer effort’ to society, as the various ‘mutual obligation’ regimes demand (1999 pp. 86-90). Gorz sees the purpose of the provision of a Basic Income “not to exempt people from doing anything at all, but to open up possibilities for everyone to engage in a whole host of individual or collective, private or public activities which no longer need to be profitable in order to flourish (1999 p. 100)”.

An Australian supporter of Basic Income (McDonald 1995 ch. 10) is critical of Henderson style GMI because of its categorical nature and its welfare style attempt to help those in need. McDonald sees the social welfare approach to income guarantees as attempting to assist those ‘most in need’ whereas a Basic Income has the capacity to ‘prevent need’. McDonald is critical of the social welfare approach to income guarantees because they result in high Effective Marginal Tax Rates due to combined income guarantee withdrawal and income tax rates (pp. 71-77). He believes that for those in work the money derived from a Basic Income will replace some of the income workers obtain from employment (p.72).

As mentioned earlier some trade unionists oppose universal income proposals on just such grounds. Reviewing the Canadian Macdonald Commission’s advocacy of a partial Basic Income set at a very low level, Lerner, Clark & Needham (1999 pp. 22-23, 31-33) saw that the Macdonald Commission plan had the capacity to “promote a race to the bottom in terms of wages and workplace standards as people in below-subsistence poverty competed fiercely for diminishing hours of paid work”. This is why they argue for a full Basic Income. As Standing (1999 p. 104) asserts “Having the assurance of basic income security would actually enable workers to say no with greater ease when confronted with sub-subsistence wages”. For the overwhelming majority of workers the question is not whether the provision of universal income guarantees lowers the amount received as a result of employment or not, nor is it whether there will have to be higher income tax rates needed to raise government revenues to pay the guarantee. The real question is: will workers at the end of each fortnight receive in their hands from all income sources – more, about the same or less than they do under the existing system?

Work done by Rankin (1997, 1998) in New Zealand, suggests that a universal income (with a 39% income tax rate plus the retention of much of the existing social security system) is affordable. Such an income guarantee would ensure that no pensioner or beneficiary would experience any cut in income. It would also mean that low income and no-income workers cash in hand situation would be improved following the introduction of his universal income compared with the present. Rankin envisages such a universal system as laying the foundations for a more generous income guarantee over time. In a recent letter Keith Rankin wrote “In particular, what matters is that the universal payment should be seen as income deriving from collectively owned property and not being a redistributive handout”.

Saunders (1995) suggests that it would be necessary to set the income tax rate at 50% if the intention was to introduce a full Basic Income in Australia. This may well be the case, but because of the payment of the income guarantee to all, if the amount paid as an income guarantee is deducted from the amount of income tax paid then the effective tax rates on earned income for the majority of full time workers would be roughly the same as they are now. Presently in Australia, once a beneficiary has exceeded the ‘income free limit’ the minimum combined tax and social security withdrawal rate is 60% and can be as high as 200%. The highest income tax rate applying to those earning over $60,000 is 47%. The majority of full time workers seem oblivious to the fact that such high effective marginal withdrawal rates apply to social security beneficiaries.

The rate of income tax necessary to fund a Basic Income will substantially depend on the level of other taxes. The rate and composition of the entire tax structure; for instance, consumption taxes (GST, VAT or wholesale sales taxes), customs and excise taxes, the presence or absence of wealth and death taxes will influence the required level of income tax. Alaska, for instance, provides a partial Basic Income funded entirely from a resource tax on oil extraction (Van Parijs 2000 p.4).

Throughout the workforce there is a growing fear of unemployment and a recognition that the prevalence of part-time, insecure and casual employment is increasing. This has yet to translate into a realisation that a Basic Income has the capacity to ensure everyone a secure income. If Gorz (1999) is correct and insecure employment is ‘coming soon to a work place near you’ then the installation of a Basic Income (paid at least at a level which has the capacity to sustain individuals and families in modest dignity) would be a good insurance policy. A universal Basic Income will at a minimum prevent the marginalisation, denigration and alienation to which many governments subject unemployed people. A Basic Income would raise the income of many social services beneficiaries, part-time and casual workers and would simultaneously raise income tax compliance because the taxation department would integrate collection of tax and payment of the guarantee.

Efficiency of income guarantees

Categorical benefits, by their very nature, set out to privilege certain categories of people. These categories may indeed be composed of very ‘needy’ people, but there is no guarantee they are the only ‘needy’ people yet the categorical system of income support assumes that the correct targets have been set and will be met. Goodin (1992) concedes that in a perfect world a welfare system might be able to identify and pay all the poor and only the poor. But the State is often employing surrogate measures and is basing its presumptions about ‘need’ on sociological ‘facts’ which are “uncertain, highly variable and, in any case constantly changing (p. 210)”. Because of this Goodin (1992) asserts that an efficient income support system is dependent upon avoiding such presumptions about human behaviour through the provision of an unconditional universal payment.

This point is reinforced by Perry (1995 p. 26), an Australian Department of Social Security researcher, who writes:

If the overall purpose is to provide for those who cannot, or are not expected to, participate in the labour force and for the unemployed who are looking for work, there are a number of gaps and inconsistencies…While from the perspective of each payment type certain exclusions seem reasonable, looking at the overall list of those with incomes below the social security cut-out points who are not eligible for payment, there does not seem to be any obvious principle distinguishing who is covered and who is not [italics in original].

Elsewhere in this text, Perry points to situations where one individual may have eligibility for one of six different types of benefit with differing conditions, means and asset tests applying (p. 23). The Australian Social Security Act and associated regulations run to around 1,500 pages each (p. 21). She concludes the Australian system of income support is complex, applies inappropriate assumptions, has too many gaps in provision, is insensitive to changing circumstances of recipients and subjects people in like circumstances to different treatment (p. 51). All of these features of the categorical system are the antithesis of efficiency.

When Goodin, Headey, Muffels & Dirven (1999) tackled the question of efficiency of the generous Dutch income support system and its minimalist United States counterpart they found considerable inefficiencies in the far less redistributive American system. Michael Murray (1997), an American supporter of the GMI, criticises the United States income support system for being:

  • inefficient as an alleviator of poverty (pp.166-168),
  • inefficient to administer because of its compelled activity and other stigma generating policies (ch. 4, p. 194), and
  • inefficient because of its complexity (ch. 2, 6).

He considered the United States system of income support so inefficient at ensuring that all poor people received benefits, that when he proposed his suggested form of GMI, he wanted every citizen included except those who applied not to be part of the system (p.158).

Perhaps the most telling argument in favour of the efficiency of a Basic Income is that it provides all with a known minimum level of income which is paid irrespective of any other income source, making any other social policy much easier to implement. For example, if a government increases housing subsidies to make rental accommodation more affordable to social security recipients this can have differential impacts depending on whether the recipient is a pensioner or beneficiary. A further example is provided by Watts (1995[b]) who considers Basic Income a fundamental basis of citizenship, which “can underwrite both the freedom to choose…social transformations [like regendering of work] and can underpin further transformations [like redistributing wage work and shifting to an ecologically sustainable economy] (p. 26)”.

The economic fundamentalist preoccupation with efficient work places, designed to cope with the emerging globalisation, has led employers to downsize, contract out, expand the number of part-time jobs, attempt to deregulate industrial conditions, casualise the workforce, and increasingly use job hire firms. Each of these approaches has impacted on the sense of security of workers by expanding the extent of precarious employment. This in turn has meant that workers and their unions are often more inclined to resist change in the work place than would be the case were an unconditional Basic Income in existence. The reason is simple; at present, the choice for many retrenched workers is between employment and a stigmatised categorical income support system for which they might not qualify. A Basic Income ensures an income floor which provides retrenched workers with the income base from which to move on to other jobs (Van Parijs 1992[b] p.7). That is, the absence of a Basic Income creates an inefficiency in any economy subjected to increasing levels of technological change. It seems an absurd proposition for economic fundamentalists and conservative governments to claim that the mode of production has to deregulated for the sake of ‘efficiency’ but that the system of welfare redistribution should be increasingly regulated.

The ‘less eligibility’ argument, mounted by conservatives from the days of the Elizabethan poor law, suggests that unless welfare benefits are paid at a lower rate than would be obtained from paid jobs then work disincentives will occur. Such thinking continues to dominate policy debates in Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Canada and the United States. This, when coupled with the economic fundamentalist mind set (which suggests that minimum wage legislation makes it increasingly difficult for employers to afford to provide jobs for the least skilled) has two impacts; minimum wages are kept low and so subsequently are benefit levels. “In effect, those at the lower end are being asked to fund jobs growth through wage reductions with rising inequality as a key outcome (Bell 2000 p. 253)”.

Van Parijs (1992[c] p.229) claims that because a Basic Income is paid, irrespective of all other sources of income, it can be used by those who desire work as a wage subsidy; yet, because it provides sufficient income on which to live, it does not compel any potential worker to work under conditions which that worker finds unacceptable. He concludes that “Whereas a rising means-tested benefit makes it increasingly difficult for unskilled people to find a job, a rising basic income makes it increasingly feasible (Van Parijs 1992[c] p.229)”.

With the qualification that there may be some jobs offered in any country which are so unsafe and poorly remunerated that no one in their right mind would take them- forcing people to take such jobs by threatening the removal of benefits is unconscionable. If the intention of those who promote categorical benefits which demand work readiness is to force workers to take all available jobs then this aim might be more efficiently achieved through a Basic Income than by the enforcement of ‘less eligibility’. The inordinate invasion of privacy in the lives of applicants for unemployment benefits, the imposition of ‘mutual obligation’ and other stigmatising practices all have to be paid for by governments out of permanent residents’ taxes. If the aim is to ensure that all job vacancies are filled, the provision of an unconditional Basic Income has the capacity to do that without compulsion. This would be both just and efficient.

World wide the major problem facing advanced economies is too many workers chasing too few jobs (Rifkin 1994, Omerod 1994, Gorz 1999, Boreham, Dow & Leet 1999, Stilwell 2000). Stigmatised, selective, targeted, categorical welfare payments coupled with ‘mutual obligation’ and other compelled activity scenarios are tackling a problem – the trouble is that they are tackling the wrong problem. A Basic Income, because it provides a known financial advantage for every extra dollar earned, abolishes both poverty traps and work disincentives (Lerner, Clark & Needham 1999 pp. 20-21). Gorz (1999 p.85) claims “The universal, unconditional grant of a basic income is, therefore…the best instrument for redistributing both paid work and unpaid activities as widely as possible [italics in original].”

The fear that generous categorical payments create work disincentives because the financial margin between working and living on benefits is not sufficient to make people want to work derives out of the public choice perception of human behaviour. It ignores the entire sociology of work research and assumes that the poor have to be compelled if they are to be productive. Most beneficiaries have only the vaguest idea of how the tax and social security combined withdrawal rates operate. Most categorical combined tax/benefit withdrawal rates are so high that they create for many a financial disincentive to part-time work which leads in turn to governments compelling people to take part-time work on threat of loss of all benefits. This is a very inefficient way to construct social policy. With a Basic Income there is always a financial incentive to work- the withdrawal rate is the tax rate – and is, as a result, known and easily calculated.

Attempting to ascertain the degree of impairment experienced by an individual applicant and then paying those applicants who can establish they have met some predetermined ‘level of incapacity to work’ is very costly and an extraordinarily inefficient method of providing income support to those with a disability. People with equivalent levels of impairments often have widely different employment histories (Perry 1995 p.29). It would be more efficient to provide a universal income guarantee if the desire is to encourage productivity / contribution / inclusion by those who have a disability. Australian governments have recognised this in relation to Blind Pensioners (Jordan 1984, Kewley 1973) but continue to subject others who have severe disabilities to stigmatised, selective, targeted, categorical payments.

Robert Goodin (1992 pp.196-197) points out that attempting to determine work capacity by measuring levels of impairment and the adoption of any other unit of payment than the individual creates target inefficiencies because such tests of eligibility are ‘surrogate measures’ – they do not test the things they purport to measure directly.

If income support is paid using the family as the unit of income then many people will not receive an income guarantee. It was shown in Chapter 9 that the assumption that if one member of a family is provided with sufficient income to support the entire family unit then this money will be distributed in an equitable manner is a flawed assumption. Therefore, if a government is interested in increasing the target efficiency of any form of income support (ensuring that those whom the benefit is designed to assist are assisted) then this can only be done by paying the benefit directly to the individual who is the intended beneficiary. This is why supporters of Basic Income insist that each individual should receive the guarantee in their own right. Persevering with the family as the unit of income simply creates target inefficiencies (Goodin 1992 pp.196-207).

Much of the argument in this Chapter about the efficiency of a Basic Income has concentrated on the supply of benefits, in the least stigmatising fashion, to all who need them. A Basic Income regime does away with the need for the entire government income support surveillance apparatus, creating savings to government expenditure. Exponents of a secure equitable income support system would therefore regard a Basic Income as politically efficient.

But there are wider efficiency arguments which can and should be mounted in support of an unconditional Basic Income.

  • A Basic Income requires the least interference in the lives of citizens.
  • It supplies all permanent residents with equal assistance.
  • It is the most inclusive form of income support payment and the most secure, thus enhancing citizenship.
  • It provides sufficient income to allow the possibility that people will explore their creative capacity.
  • It removes many of the obstacles to a reinvigoration of the industrial, technical and computing infrastructure.
  • It allows the State a fuller understanding of the impact of its other social wage policies.

However, a Basic Income is just that – an unconditional universal income guarantee. It delivers an income floor without interfering with productivity. It is a vast improvement on categorical selective social services. It is an advance on all social insurance and private provision schemes which invariably result in the ‘individualisation of risk’ (Lerner, Clark & Needham 1999 p. 11) and as a result create a ‘do it yourself welfare state’ (Klein & Millar cited in Page 1998 p.307).

A Basic Income is not a utopian panacea – it will not abolish all social difficulties. But, it will allow the State to construct its other social welfare, health, education, disability, ethnic and community service policies on a firm and known foundation. It is a far cry from the Communist Manifesto’s promise to create a society based on the principle: ‘from each according to ability to each according to need’. In this regard it may not be the best income support policy, in any absolute sense, just the best income support policy capable of being implemented in the early 21st century.

Bibliography

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Barry, N. (1998) “Neoclassicism, the New Right and British Social Welfare.” in Page, R. & Silburn, R. (eds.) British Social Welfare in the Twentieth Century. Macmillian, Basingstoke.
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Bell, S. (2000) “Unemployment, Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution.” in Bell, S (ed) The Unemployment Crisis in Australia: Which Way Out? Cambridge University, Cambridge.
Bessant, J. (2000[b]) “International Obligations and Mandatory Sentencing.” Social Alternatives. Vol. 19, No. 2, May.
Boreham, P., Dow, G. & Leet, M. (1999) Room to Manoeuvre. Melbourne University, Carlton South.
Cass, B. (1995) “The Future of Income Support in an Open Economy: The concept of participation income”. Income Support in An Open Economy. VCOSS & Good Shepherd, Melbourne.
Cassin, R. (2000) “Let’s just call them leeches and be done with it.” The Sunday Age 27th. August, p. 22.
Committee on Employment Opportunities (1993) Restoring Full Employment. AGPS, Canberra.
Friedman, M. (1962) Capitalism and Freedom. University of Chicago, Chicago.
Garran, R. (2000)”Canberra to shun UN Committees.” The Australian. 30th. August, p. 1.
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Goodin, R. (1988) Reasons for Welfare: The political theory of the Welfare State. Princeton University, Princeton.
Goodin, R., Headey, B., Muffels, R. & Dirven, H. (1999) The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge University, Cambridge.
Goodin, R. & Le Grand, J. (1987) Not only the Poor: The Middle Classes and the Welfare State. Allen & Unwin, London.
Gorz, A. (1999) (trans. Turner, C.) Reclaiming Work: Beyond the Wage Based-Society. Polity, Cambridge.
Gorz, A. (1985) (trans. Imrie, M.) Paths to Paradise: On the Liberation From Work. Pluto, London.
Henderson, R. (1975) Poverty in Australia Vol I and II. Australian Government, Canberra.
Jordan, A. (1984) Permanent Incapacity: Invalid Pension in Australia. Department of Social Security, Canberra.
Kewley, T.(1973) Social Security in Australia: 1900-1972. Sydney University, Sydney.
Lerner, S. Clark, C. & Needham, W. (1999) Basic Income: Economic Security for All Canadians. Between the Lines, Toronto.
McDonald, A. (1995) Unemployment Forever? Or a Support Income System and Work for All. A & D McDonald, Urangan.
Milner, D. (1920) Higher Production by a Bonus on National Output: A proposal for a minimum income for all varying with national productivity. George Allen & Unwin. London. (http://www.etes.ucl.ac.be/BIEN/FirstUncondSch.html).
Offe, C. (1992) A Non-Productionist Design for Social Policies.” in Van Parijs, P. (ed.) Arguing For Basic Income. Verso, London.
Murray, M. (1997) “…and economic justice for all.” M.E. Sharpe, Armonk.
Omerod, P (1994) The Death of Economics. Faber & Faber, London.
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Perry, J. (1995) A Common Payment? Simplifying Income Support for People of Workforce Age. AGPS, Canberra.
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Rankin, K. (1997) “A New Fiscal Contract? Constructing a Universal Basic Income and a Social Wage. Social Policy Journal of New Zealand. Vol. 9, November.
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Saunders, P. (1995) “Conditionality and Transition as Issues in the Basic Income Debate.” in VCOSS & Good Shepherd, Income Support in An Open Economy. VCOSS & Good Shepherd, Melbourne.
Standing, G. (1999) “Seeking Equality of Security in the Era Of Globalisation.” in Lerner, S. Clark, C. & Needham, W. (eds.) Basic Income: Economic Security for All Canadians. Between the Lines, Toronto.
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Tomlinson, J (1989) “Income Maintenance in Australia the Income Guarantee Alternative.” PhD. Murdoch University, Western Australia.
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Van Parijs, P. (1992[b]) “Competing Justifications of a Basic Income.” in Van Parijs, P. (ed.) Arguing For Basic Income. Verso, London.
Van Parijs, P. (1992[c]) “The Second Marriage of Justice and Efficiency.” in Van Parijs, P. (ed.) Arguing For Basic Income. Verso, London.
Van Trier, W. (1995) “Every One A King.” PhD. Thesis Department of Sociology, K.U. Leuven.
Watts, R. (1995[b]) “Basic Income, Employment and Citizenship:” in VCOSS & Good Shepherd, Income Support in An Open Economy. VCOSS & Good Shepherd, Melbourne.

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Letter to Wayne Swan, Treasurer

 

Dear Treasurer,

I understand the political imperative of getting the budget in surplus in 2012/13 even though the economic situation in which Australia finds itself does not mean there is any economic urgency to reach a balanced budget.

The Government’s decision to reduce lone parents’ payments (when the youngest child turns 8 years of age) to the level of the Newstart payment in order to save $200 million a year may help the Government to balance its books but it does nothing to help some of the poorest Australian families.

This Government action is not fiscal rectitude. Rather it amounts to cavalier indifference to the wellbeing of lone parents and their vulnerable children. The Government argues that its plan will assist lone parents back into work – it may well force some lone parents to work when they really need to be available to assist their children. They are better placed than the Government to work out when it is appropriate for them to return to work. Many lone parents will not find work but will have their weekly family budget slashed by $100 thereby making it impossible to maintain mortgage repayments or keep up with the rent. Many will subsequently become homeless.

The financial burden may well shift from the Government to relatives or charities and the $200 million the Commonwealth “saves” will be small beer compared with the emotional and financial cost of broken families.

I cannot vote for a Government that shows such a callous disregard for the well-being of low income lone parents and their children. Please cancel this social security cutback.

Dr John Tomlinson

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Make poverty his story

Published in Parity, Vol. 21, No. 1, Feb 2008: 37.

The struggle for human rights has taken many forms over the centuries. Some of those struggles have been for: the right of assembly, the right not to be detained arbitrarily, the end of slavery, the franchise, the end of gender discrimination, the right to be represented by a union, universal access to basic education and health services and the demise of racial discrimination. Such battles are not over, even in developed nations such as Australia.

People are still trafficked in the sex industry; unionists are run off some work sites – often with the assistance of agents of government; asylum seekers are mandatorily detained; the recent anti-terrorism legislation severely limits citizens’ rights; free assembly is only guaranteed if the police don’t oppose it; prisoners serving lengthy sentences are denied the vote – as are people who are transient or people under the age of 18 years; many poor people do not gain access to schools and health services; many gender inequalities remain and discrimination on the basis of race is a daily occurrence. This is particularly so in Indigenous Australia. At least in most Australian cities, lip service is paid to the importance of all these human rights.

Despite Australia signing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights nearly sixty years ago, we have not passed enabling legislation which could give effect to the generous economic and social rights which these treaties promise. Were we to enact national legislation honouring the international commitments which we, as a nation, have made to the world and to our own people, many of the current human economic rights for which many Australians are struggling would need to be recognized by the government.

These international treaties cover rights such as the right to work, the right to adequate social services and the right to decent income support. Were these guaranteed by the government, then most people who find themselves homeless would be in a position to find their own shelter. Those who were homeless would need to be provided with adequate accommodation. We would no longer live in a wealthy country where more than 60 percent of those who approach a homeless person’s crisis accommodation centre are turned away.

Many social science writers are arguing that whilst the 20th century was the one which started to enshrine political human rights – the 21st century will be the one in which we obtain economic human rights. They suggest that the western world is now so wealthy there is no longer an excuse for governments which fail to guarantee the basic economic needs of every permanent resident of a country. We could feed, house, clothe, educate and provide basic health services to every person on the planet if we spent just one twelfth of the money the world spends annually on military expenditure on social welfare instead.

For us to move in this direction would take a massive change in the thinking of many of the richest people in the world. But there are many more of us than them and if we start to move towards more egalitarian policies we can drive our governments away from the “profits first people last” policies of the “greed is good” minority.

We need to recognise that while there are many poor white people in western countries, poverty is predominantly experienced by people whose skin colour is brown or black and if we look closely we notice that the majority are female. Rich white men don’t know much about poverty. Some claim they became rich because of their good luck, some because of their superior intellect and some because of hard work. We should ask the last of these rich white men “Whose hard work?” The reality is that most people who become rich by honest means were given a good start in life by their parents. Those lucky enough to be able to use their “superior intelligence” have every right to contribute to humanity, but what gives them the right to take inordinately from the common wealth?

If we are going to succeed in making poverty and homelessness history, we need to work with poor brown, black and white women and men in a way which respects their autonomy. We must work with working-class and middle-class people to convince them to get involved in the struggle for a fairer world or at least not oppose the provision of basic income support and community services to all permanent residents of their country in the short-term and everyone in the world after that. But we will have to work very hard with rich white men to get them to understand the destruction that poverty causes and the benefits that ending it would bring. In that sense, we are going to have to make poverty his story.

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Martin Luther King Jr.

“I am now convinced that the simplest approach
will prove to be the most effective — the solution
to poverty is to abolish it directly by a now widely
discussed measure: the guaranteed income.”

Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community?

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Martin Luther King Jr.

untitled

“I am now convinced that the simplest approach
will prove to be the most effective — the solution
to poverty is to abolish it directly by a now widely
discussed measure: the guaranteed income.”

  Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community?

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Moving away from paternalism

ON LINE opinion – Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate

Posted Friday, 14 March 2008

Of all the issues which the 2020 Summit in Canberra needs to address the most pressing is modernising Australia’s social security system. The first Commonwealth social security legislation, providing for age and invalid pensions, was passed in Australia in 1908. Until that time, social welfare had been managed entirely by the states. The states inherited the British poor law system of financial assistance, but without work houses. The system was imbued with the poor law mentality of “lesser eligibility” whereby it was intended that any person assisted would always be better off working than receiving assistance.

Not surprisingly, the Commonwealth adopted a similar mentality to the states. The government of the day insisted that various eligibility criteria and means tests were incorporated into the legislation to ensure that only the very ill and financially distressed were assisted. This form of targeted assistance was a far cry from the widespread European tradition of social insurance and is even further removed from the system of Basic Income which is currently being considered in a number of countries.

During the first half of the 20th century, an applicant for a pension had to establish they were of good character. This requirement remained in place until 1973 when Bill Hayden ordered it be dropped. As late as 1972, I saw files where applicants for invalid pensions were advised, “That they were not deemed worthy to receive a pension”. The poor law system sought to erode citizenship rights of claimants whereas Hayden attempted to implement a social security system based on entitlement.

Stigma is embedded in every targeted welfare system, mainly because of the detailed inquisitorial nature of assessing who is and who is not “worthy” to receive the payment. The more discretion given to the dispenser of assistance the greater the danger of abuse by the assessor and the less certainty of eligibility there is in the mind of the applicant. In 1870, Charles Lamport, wrote of the British poor law system, “Society, before it yields what it dare not refuse, so embitters the morsel by contempt that neither giver nor receiver is blessed in the act”.

With the demise of the Whitlam Government, Australia’s social security administration retreated towards noblesse oblige until the late 1980s when the establishment of a moral entitlement was mediated through what came to be called “reciprocal obligation”.

In 1996, the incoming Howard Government pursued this policy relentlessly; renaming the process “mutual obligation” and insisting that if people were to be supplied with poverty-line income support “then it was only fair that they gave something back in return”. It was like throwing a dollar into a blind person’s cup and then threatening to take the dollar back if the blind person continued to refuse to see.

Howard (The Australian, May 4, 1999 and January 12, 2000) set out his plans for social welfare in this country; the social security system became more selective and targeted, and recipients were forced to meet increasingly oppressive requirements. Although the Howard Government claimed that its policies were aimed at getting recipients of income support back into work, the Brotherhood of St Laurence (PDF 263KB) and St. Vincent de Paul [Ziguras, Dufty and Considine (2003)] argued that the excessive obligations imposed on recipients (in return for payment) amounted to a policy of “welfare as work”.

The Howard Government rhetoric about obligation was at its shrillest during the Intervention into Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory where all Indigenous recipients of social security living on communities had half their payments earmarked for approved purchases. Here was a perfect example of how the very poorest citizens of the nation were expected to make the greatest return to the Government for benefits that other citizens received without having to make an equivalent return. (Tomlinson 2008)

The Rudd Government has persevered with the Northern Territory intervention in relation to quarantining half of people’s social security payments, in the short term, although it has attempted to accommodate Aboriginal objections to other aspects of the intervention. Somewhat similar interventions have recently been embarked upon in several Indigenous communities in the Kimberlies and on Cape York.

However we look at “mutual obligation”, “reciprocal obligation” or the quarantining of welfare monies under such interventions, each of them amounts to a form of paternalism. In fact most, if not all, of the requirements imposed on social security recipients allegedly “to assist them to return to work” or to “rehabilitate themselves” are paternalistic in so far as government agents assert they are helping people who otherwise would not be clever enough to help themselves.

Why should governments be allowed to impose paternalistic obligation upon social security recipients just because they need the benefits to survive? Professor Guy Standing in his book Beyond the New Paternalism (2002) provides hundreds of reasons why we should trust social security recipients to celebrate their autonomy and why we should oppose income support policies which interfere with the liberty and initiative of social security recipients.

Governments since 1908 have maintained that targeted means-tested benefits are the “most efficient” (cheapest) way to help people avoid poverty and assist “the needy”. One hundred years of poverty traps and enduring poverty should be long enough to convince even the most obtuse that they are wrong.

There is a better way and that way is the provision of a Basic Income. A Basic Income would be paid to every permanent resident of Australia, as an individual, whether they live alone or with others, irrespective of their wealth or lack of it. It would be paid to those who engage in paid work as well as to those who are not remunerated for their labour.

A Basic Income is affordable. Australia is an affluent country which could easily afford to introduce a Basic Income paid to every permanent resident at a rate slightly above the age pension for single pensioners. An amount of $500 per annum above the age pension rate would be needed to cash out the tax deductibility concession currently provided to age pensioners who have additional income, if they are not to lose in the transition to a Basic Income. A Basic Income at this level would ensure that no current social security pensioner or beneficiary would be disadvantaged by the shift to a Basic Income while most low income earners would be financially advantaged.

Perhaps the clearest and most succinct refutation of the suggestion that Basic Income is unaffordable is put forward by Jose Iglesias Fernandez (2002). He argues for a Basic Income for Catalonia at a rate of half the per capita income of this region of Spain. He says that since the wealth needed already exists, the question is not affordability but willingness to redistribute that income. The proposal suggested here for Australia is a Basic Income of approximately 25 per cent of average weekly earnings which would involve considerably less redistribution than that suggested for Catalonia.

The existing system of social security is inadequate, unjust and maintains people in poverty. It is clumsy, difficult to administer, hard to understand, discriminates against people with partners, poorly assists people with disabilities and has survived at least 50 years too long.

Australia needs to move to a socially just, easily understandable Basic Income which would sustain people above the poverty line if they cannot gain other income and help low income workers to escape poverty altogether. It could free people to become more productive. The economy would expand because a Basic Income would free up entrepreneurial imagining, make it easier for mature workers to gain further training, provide opportunities for workers to engage in new occupations and remove many obstacles to technological innovation.

A Basic Income would ensure that people have access to money when they are in financial need. It does not interfere with incentives to increase income and it rewards self-help. It inculcates the young, reminds the middle aged and the old of the need to ensure that no one goes to bed hungry and in this way allows and encourages intergenerational transfers by underlining the importance of social solidarity. It stigmatises no one because it treats all permanent residents equally.

It converts meaningless phrases like “increasing community capacity” or “increasing social capital” or “ensuring social insertion /inclusion” into a substantial process by encouraging sharing while allowing an equal taking from society’s income pool. It is a universal program, and because it does all these things, it enhances the quality of community life. Above all, it is the decent thing to do.

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Mutual obligation

Written in 2003

It’s somewhere between
the obscene and unclean
but John Howard is my inspiration.
You work for the dole.
You mortgage your soul,
and he calls that liberation.
Get off your fat arse,
do a job that’s first class.
Yes, work is your obligation.
A hand-up it seems
is just far away dreams
leading to much consternation.
You have to say “Nay,
I don’t want any pay.”
It’s part of building the nation.
Fair pay will not last
it’s a thing of the past,
what you need is incentivation.
It’s somewhere between
the obscene and unclean
but John Howard is my inspiration.
If you’re troubled or sore,
if you’re crippled or poor
then you must show no hesitation.
You must do what is right,
you must work day and night
helping to build this fine nation.
Fair pay so it seems
is a thing of our dreams,
all you need is incentivation.
If you’ve got kids galore
and you’re terribly poor
then work is your obligation.
It’s somewhere between
the unclean and obscene
but John Howard is my inspiration.

 

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Mutual Obligation: The semantics  of Howard’s social coalition

Written in 2004

My mate Tony Abbott reckons it is the poor’s problem they are poor.
Pass it on – Denigrate the Poor.

It’s a game the entire neighbourhood can play.

The Real Agenda: Highlights, Income, Revenue, Balance Sheet, Assets, Stock Performance.

The Macquarie Dictionary defines mutual as:
1. possessed, experienced, performed, etc by each of two or more with respect to other or others; reciprocal: mutual aid.
2. having the same relation each towards the other or others: mutual foes.
3. of or pertaining to each of two or more or common: mutual acquaintance (1987 p.1175 italics in original).

There is no reciprocity in the relationship between the Howard Government and unemployed people.

The opinions of unemployed people were not sought; their interests are not considered. The Government unilaterally imposed the policy; the Government unilaterally extended the policy in the 2001/2002 Budget & again in the 2002/ 2003 Budget.The 2004 Budget did not do much there is an election coming. Have you enrolled?

There is no respect for unemployed people implicit or explicit in compelling them to engage in ‘Work for the Dole’. Unemployed people are (until the 2004 election) powerless to amend this policy or mitigate its impacts.

The power differential extant between unemployed people and the Government is huge. As a result of this, unemployed people and the Government can’t have the same relation each towards the other.

The only sense in which the Government policy of ‘mutual obligation’ is common is in the sense that the policy is ordinary, mundane and lacking sophistication.

The Government imposes ‘mutual obligation’ on the unemployed, they have few ways of affecting the Government.

There was never any deal done between the Government and unemployed people to seek mutual acceptance of the policy.

‘Mutual obligation’ is a compact between the Government and all citizens – one which (hopefully) will be undone in the 2004 election.

Mutual obligation is imposed upon the poor but the real target is the working class it is just that at the moment the Howard Government is not powerful enough to take head on the entire trade union movement but it is powerful enough to attack low paid workers  and those excluded from the labour market

The only way you can protect your own position is to act in solidarity with all those excluded from labour market.

Whilst you allow them to: denigrate the unemployed, incarcerate the asylum seekers, and disproportionately incarcerate Indigenous people, you undermine your own future!!!!

 

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Narcissism is very much alive and well in recent Australian politic

ON LINE opinion – Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate

Posted Wednesday, 6 April 2016

Tony Abbott is the Liberal Party’s Mark Latham. Having lived through the Latham train wreck of plagiarised policies and unnecessarily aggressive shirt fronting of Prime Minister Howard I did not think I’d see his like again in Australian politics. But I was wrong.

Abbott continues to outdo Latham at every turn. His machismo narcissistic defence of all that happened on his watch defies belief. He wears, as a badge of honour, his failure to get the bulk of Hockey’s “End of entitlement” 2014 Budget through the Senate. He seems totally oblivious to the fact that Julia Gillard managed to negotiate most of her budgets through the parliament even when she had no absolute majority in either House. Abbott’s reasoning seems to run along the lines that his failure trumps Gillard’s success.

Narcissism is very much alive and well in recent Australian politics. One had only to watch Kevin Rudd’s two stints at the helm to understand that he thought he was the smartest kid on the block and that everyone else had little to offer. He is so full of himself that he now thinks he is the best person to be the next Secretary General of the United Nations.

And then there is Malcolm Turnbull, a man of urbane wit and charm, who promised so much when he challenged Abbott for the leadership of the Liberal Party: an economic explanation of the economic situation facing Australia, a blueprint for the way forward, an informed conversation in place of three word sloganeering and all that just for a start. He wanted us to believe that there was no more exciting time to be living in Australia – that there would be invention and innovation.

Admittedly he did not say it but the majority of voters considered, given his past record, he was likely to introduce climate change policies that would hopefully help avert raising the world’s temperature by 2 degrees. Many thought he would usher in more humane asylum seeker policies and resolve the marriage equality debate without an $160 million plebiscite. I was even foolish enough to believe that he would soften Abbott’s confrontational policies towards the building unions.

Most people listening to what Turnbull was saying, in the run-up to the challenge, believed that he thought equity and fairness should be the basis on which to build a budget. That he would walk away from cutting services and payments to the less affluent whilst simultaneously pandering to the big end of town.

At first, when he kept sticking to the Abbott policies, my friends kept saying to me – give him time, he’s only been in the job a month, he’s got to placate those Abbott Neanderthals he’s dispatched to the back bench….

But, there were worrying signs in both the Ministries Turnbull created. Mal Brough, as Minister for State being investigated by the federal police was not a good look and then there was Jamie Briggs who thought he could tough it out because he really did not get it that a young bureaucrat was not flattered by his advances.

But most worrying of all was Arfur (as in Arfur Daly) Sinodinos who could at one and the same time have management duties at Australian Water Holdings, be treasurer of the Liberal Party in New South Wales, and not know that Australian Water Holdings was donating large sums to the NSW Liberal Party. He did not know that Australian Water Holdings was 30 per cent owned by the Obeid family whilst he was in senior management positions with the company.

Arfur was a long time Chief of Staff of John Howard, and the most recent duties he has in the Turnbull Government is as Cabinet Secretary. In recent days, the NSW Electoral Commission has been making some rather untoward comments about Sinodinos’ relationship with the Free Enterprise Foundation, a slush fund set up by people associated with the Liberal Party, to channel money anonymously to the Liberal Party. The Electoral Commission has suggested that a large number of donations to the Free Enterprise Foundation have come from property developers and other people who are prevented by law from making donations to political parties in NSW. Arfur Sinodinos has also been investigated by the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption which has yet to report.

Unremarkably the Labor Party is of the opinion that Sinodinos should step aside while the NSW Electoral Commission and the Independent Commission Against Corruption matters are ongoing. But on current form it looks as if he will stay until the stench becomes unbearable.

All the while the Labor Party has been getting its policies out there and for the large part has had clean air. Even the quarantining of existing negative gearing on old houses and limiting negative gearing to new premises, due to come into effect in 2017, did not hit much turbulence. This was mainly due to some government ministers saying it would cause house prices to plummet whilst other minsters claimed it would cause house prices to skyrocket. The Libs weren’t helped by a BIS Shrapnel Report on negative gearing that Treasurer Morrison leapt upon as an attack on Labor’s negative gearing policies. Unfortunately for Morrison it turned out that the BIS Shrapnel report had been modelled on entirely different assumptions to Labor ‘s proposal.

Morrison has enough on his plate. The Budget has been brought forward a week so that there will be time to debate the legislation meant to ensure supply in the event of Turnbull calling a double dissolution. Rumours are rife that Turnbull and Morrison are at loggerheads on a number of economic matters, their differences on increasing the GST and superannuation tax concession cuts in recent weeks have added to mutterings. Morrison seems hell bent on providing tax cuts to business whilst others want tax cuts to compensate for those entering higher tax brackets due to bracket creep. All Liberals seem to agree that there have to be cuts in benefits and services to the less affluent. All of this seems remarkably reminiscent of the 2014 Budget.

Turnbull is determined that the trigger for a double dissolution shall be the refusal to reintroduce John Howard’s Star Chamber, the Australian Building and Construction Commission. It will be “an agency with draconian powers denying the right to silence or a lawyer of choice to anyone it deems worthy of investigation, it in fact has no powers of criminal investigation and acts in the civil jurisdiction but with the ability to impose massive fines for behaviour it deems unacceptable.”

During the last week in March Turnbull announced he was intending to allow the States a certain percentage of income tax to help them pay the $80 billion in cuts to the health and education budgets forecast to be slashed by Abbott later this decade. Turnbull is even promising that in the long term he will allow them to raise or lower the rate of state tax in their state. Like a pompous headmaster lecturing spendthrift students he added that if the states raise their own revenue rather than relying on the Commonwealth credit card they will be more responsible in their spending on health and education. Such a lecture totally ignores the fact that the states did not create the $80 billion shortfall – it was Abbott and Hockey who created the hole.

Returning to pre World War II tax arrangements might look like excitement and innovation to some people, cutting services and funding to the less affluent might sound like a good idea to those rich enough to live at Point Piper, further decreasing the bargaining power of workers and unions might appeal to the super rich as a good idea; but if Malcolm Turnbull thinks these actions are the epitome of equity and fairness then he may be far more narcissistic than either Latham or Abbott.

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No sense in work-for-the dole scheme

Published in Courier-Mail, Ed.2, 1 April 1997, p.19

THE Howard Government’s scheme to compel the jobless to work for their benefits has generated widespread public support.

People in comfortable jobs, driven by a concern that unemployed people are getting something for nothing, expect those without work to make a contribution.

As unemployment levels remain above 8 percent, there develops a nagging belief that many who are receiving benefits either don’t want to work or aren’t looking hard enough. Many parents, seeing the unhappiness experienced by their unemployed children, feel that work of any kind will keep their children occupied and work-ready.

Others, in nostalgic mood, remember enjoying public facilities constructed by enforced labour during the 1930s Depression and argue that what was good enough then is good enough now. They forget that “susso” work, as it was then called, kept 30 percent of the nation in poverty and it was only through Keynesian economic expansion, with labourers being paid award wages, that the Depression ended.

Work-for-the-dole programmes have a long history in Australia and overseas. In the United States, such Workfare programmes are widespread. The New Zealand First Party, a partner in a coalition government, is supporting work-for-the-dole in that country and has estimated that an extra $60 million to $80 million will be needed to implement it. At the Beyond Poverty Conference in Auckland in mid-March, academics urged the New Zealand Government to spend the money creating real jobs.

From the early 1970s, government-funded training allowances were phased out in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and replaced by the Community Development Employment Programme, which pays participants at about unemployment benefit rates. Such programmes were compulsory at first, but recognition that the International Labour Organisation’s conventions and United Nations covenants were being breached by enforcement led to the programmes becoming voluntary.

Many Aboriginal and Islander communities reject unemployment benefits, which they call “sit-down money”. Indigenous Australians continue to participate in the CDEP because there is often no alternative work where they live.

The major problem with CDEP is that it maintains the participants in poverty and their communities remain undeveloped and poorly resourced. There is insufficient income generated to allow people to escape the cycle of under-development.

The workers and their employers do not contribute to superannuation so, at the end of their “working” lives, the inequality continues.

During the past several years, economic rationalist governments have removed many of the regulations which constrain business while increasing the complexity of regulations applying to benefits paid to workless Australians.

This has made many feel they are regarded as worthless Australians.

The previous government’s green paper on employment started with the assertion that “the nation’s number one priority is to find jobs for unemployed Australians” and went on to suggest “the loss of production through unemployment is the single greatest source of inefficiency in our economy”. Compelling people who have been long-term unemployed to work for the dole is hardly a sufficient response to such a major inefficiency in our economy.

The Australian Council of Social Service and the National Skillshare Association, like most community welfare agencies, are opposed to compelling the unemployed to work for the dole. They have lamented the recent massive cutback in voluntary training and other labour market programmes.

ACOSS points out that under the Government’s current proposal those 18 to 20-year-old unemployed people forced to undertake 20 hours work for the dole will be $63 a week worse off than someone working 20 hours a week in a job and receiving part unemployment payment.

The work-for-the-dole scheme is an idea from an earlier era; it did not solve the economic problems of the 1930s and it will not solve those of the 1990s. It will not provide a stepping stone to real jobs because the type of work to be done will not provide the sort of training needed to get a real job.

Compelling people to work does not make economic or social sense. If there are socially or environmentally useful jobs which need to be done, they should be undertaken by paid employees or volunteers.

The money expended forcing people to work could be spent providing education and training programmes which people voluntarily want to undertake. Universities, TAFEs and other trainers constantly have to turn people away because of a lack of places. Most social welfare agencies find the number of unemployed volunteers offering to work for them is greater than they can handle. So, the unemployed are making a contribution to society.

In 1981, Keith Windschuttle’s ground-breaking research into modern unemployment in Australia showed that many parents were more likely to believe stereotypes about young dole bludgers than the reality of their own children’s struggles to obtain work.

Work-for-the-dole will reinvigorate the myth that all unemployed people are workshy. The scheme only makes sense if the Government’s intention is to turn unemployed people into social lepers.

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On returning to Australia in late 2018

Dear Comrades and fellow travellers

Thank you for removing the Turdbull Government in my absence. I should go away more often.

Ben Eltham in New Matilda writes:
Malcolm Turnbull made Australia less fair, and more unequal. In economic terms, his signature policies were a series of tax cuts, most of which accrued to big business and wealthy individuals. There is little to be said for these as genuine reforms. They will not make Australia’s economy more competitive, or improve productivity or innovation. They will rapidly increase wealth and income inequality. Skewed markedly towards the top 20 per cent, they will allow the rich to get richer, but leave the lower-middle classes no better off.

The tax cuts will, however, blow a big hole in future federal budgets subtracting tens of billions a year from government revenues. Most remarkably of all, the tax cuts were implemented while the budget was still in deficit. So much for the budget emergency.

In social policy, Turnbull was similarly regressive. It’s true he wasn’t quite a slash-and-burn hacker in the same mould as Abbott and Hockey; with Morrison as Treasurer, government spending has actually been increasing. But most of this spending is going to Defence and national security, while many aspects of the welfare safety net are being starved. Health and education spending are well down on their levels as a share of GDP when Labor left office; $2.2 billion has been cut from universities, billions more from hospitals and schools.

https://newmatilda.com/2018/08/27/turnbull-obituary-frying-pan-fire/

Scumbag Morrison our new leader of the Liberal Party has appointed Tony Abbott as some sort of phony ambassador to Indigenous Australians and the Indigenous community claims that Abbott put them back 30 years with his $500 million cut to health and community services to the Indigenous community in his first Joe Hockey budget.

Everyone seems relieved that Peter the glutton Dutton missed out on becoming Leader of the Liberals. Given his office of profit under the crown with his child care centres and the obvious conflict with sections of Section 44 of the constitution it might have been very interesting. Seems if you need a foreign au pair to look after your kids Peter is the go to man. Some wit suggested to Fran Kelly on today’s ABC Breakfast that it would appear that he has added the Nanny State to his other ministerial portfolios.

Seems like the leaking from Border Farce officers about Peter’s indiscrete usage of his ministerial responsibilities to do favours for his friends and the rich generally is about to move from a trickle to a deluge according to Michelle Gratham.  “Après moi le déluge” of King Louis XV of France style. Although, I thought Dutton was under the impression he was Napoleon.

The Catholic Bishops have decided they have to keep the secrets of the confessional to themselves leaving me to wonder what they have to hide.

Whilst I was sojourning and during the run up to Malcolm of Point Piper’s final demise I saw a photo of Bill Shorten and Tanya Plibersek who were looking like a honeymoon couple laughing so hard I thought they might wet themselves.

Anyway, it is nice to be back in Straya the Coup Capital of the world.

 

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Open letter to Peter Beattie Premier

 September 2009

I am appalled by your press announcement 12/9/2003 regarding new offences in public places and particularly your planning to give the police the power to sieze unopened alcohol in a public place.

I realise that you may regard this as clever politics and in a half smart state you might even get away with it. However such a move is contrary to humanity and justice. It may well be in breach of a range of international and some national legal requirements.

I suggest you get a staff member to at least have a read http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/mjil/
Melbourne Journal of International Law
1 July 2003

HOMELESSNESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: REGARDING AND RESPONDING TO HOMELESSNESS
AS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION

PHILIP LYNCH AND JACQUELINE COLE

This article argues that homelessness is a violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms, including the right to liberty and security of the person, the right to freedom from discrimination, the right to privacy, the right to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of association, the right to vote, the right to social security, the right to health, and the right to an adequate standard of living.

Recognising homelessness as a human rights violation is of significant normative value and legal import.

The article attempts to encourage and equip people working for and on behalf of people experiencing homelessness to invoke human rights law in litigation and public policy advocacy.

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Poverty

Many a learned dissertation has been written about poverty. In the mid 1980s, a collection of Federal public servants was assigned to investigate poverty, to describe and come up with ways to mitigate poverty. Unsurprisingly they found they couldn’t even measure it. And this was in the wake of the Poverty Inquiry of the 1970s that had succeeded in describing many of the multifaceted aspects of poverty.

In a rich country like Australia the presence of poverty is a crime against humanity. But that does not mean we should devote excessive resources to investigating poverty. Rather, we should direct our efforts to investigating inordinate wealth and creating ways to distributing wealth more equitably.

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Precarious, unsafe and socially inadequate employment, poverty, categorical- means-tested welfare and downward envy or a universal basic income.

The existing labour market and welfare systems of Australia are as described in the first part of the title of this article.
Over a century ago, in the early years of the 20th century the Australian labour market and welfare system were described by Albert Metin, a visiting French scholar, as “socialism without doctrine” (Wikipedia 2017). The introduction of age and invalid pensions in 1910 coupled with the industrial arbitration system formed the basis for such a description. In the mid 1980s, at the height of the welfare state, our system was described by Professor Francis Castles as a “workers’ welfare state”. But in 2001, in a sad reflective article entitled “A farewell to the Australian welfare state” he described the erosion of the welfare system.

Precariousness

Insecure, casual, part-time, low paid, unsafe employment is increasingly becoming the new reality for many in the Australian labour market. Guy Standing (2011, 2014, 2016) has written a number of books detailing the rise of the precariat throughout the Western world. Tim Dunlop (2016) has described the gig economy here.

With full-time award-waged secure employment becoming scarcer, it might be assumed that Australian governments would boost the generosity and scope of the social security system to sustain workers confronted by unemployment or underemployment. However, governments of both Labor and conservative persuasion have tightened eligibility requirements and forced thousands of social security recipients from more generous social security provisions such as Disability Support Pensions or Sole Parent Payments on to New Start (a confusing name for a benefit once called Unemployment Benefit) which is paid at a far lower rate and has a range of government imposed obligations attached to it. As I write the Turnbull Government is attempting to legislate to move students and young unemployed people from New Start to the even less generous Youth Allowance.

Since 1987 governments have been obsessed with stamping out what they call the “welfare dependence” of social security recipients. It was once considered that those reliant upon continuing social security payments were simply exercising their rights as permanent residents of this country. The implied moral hazard which recent governments attach to receipt of social security has been imbibed by many employed Australians who resent their taxes going to unemployed people, single parents and those with severe disabilities. This process is aptly named downward envy and it has been consciously encouraged by all governments since John Howard became prime minister in 1996 (Tomlinson 1999). The intention is to divide the working class into employed and unemployed, to divide those who receive social security into a number of separate categories so that they won’t be able to build solidarity, let alone solidarity with the entire working class.

Possible alternative directions

One of many alternatives to the status quo is the implementation of a universal basic income paid at a level above the Henderson Poverty Line to each and every individual permanent resident irrespective of their marital, employment or other social status and one which ignores whether they live alone or with others.

Such a payment would not be able to be garnisheed by the government or by anyone else. This arrangement is necessary to avoid a fiasco like the Turnbull Government’s computer generated letters of demand. Some of the most financially vulnerable people who are not bureaucratically sophisticated have been sent a letter saying that up to six years previously they were overpaid social security. See (McKenzie–Murray, 2017, Stewart 2017) for a description of the emotional and mental health harm that demanding that people immediately repay a debt to the Commonwealth when the overwhelming majority were not overpaid social security in the first place.

A basic income would be paid to Gina Rinehart and every lesser mortal who permanently inhabits this wide brown land. In order to ensure that no-one presently in receipt of welfare assistance or social security is disadvantaged by the change to a basic income, the annual payment would need to be in the order of $500 above the single age pension which is pegged at 27.7 percent of the total average male earnings (National Commission of Audit 2017). In order to ensure that less affluent residents are not adversely affected by the introduction of a basic income many of the educational, health, housing, legal, veteran’s and particularly disability services would need to remain in place.

How would we pay for a basic income?

 The Australian Budget has not been in surplus since the early years of the first Rudd Government, the current Turnbull Government has been unsuccessfully attempting to slash social security in order to balance the budget. Both Governments have run into heavy headwinds in the Senate.   A basic income combined with leaving intact most of the educational, health, housing, legal, disability and veteran’s services would require much more funding than the existing social welfare/income support programs.

Having acknowledged this it is important to point out that is not the end of the matter. There are many things which could be done to find the extra money needed to pay for a real people’s welfare state undergirded by a basic income.

I would start with the tax system:

  • reintroduce death duties on all estates over $2 million,
  • abolish the tax free area for income tax purposes,
  • remove negative gearing on all housing,
  • reinstate capital gains taxes to original levels,
  • abolish family trust tax scams,
  • ensure multinationals pay taxes at reasonable rates,
  • clamp down on rich Australian individuals and firms avoiding and evading taxes, and
  • sort out the superannuation system as will be detailed below.

The changes in capital gains and negative gearing would help take some of the excessive heat out of the private housing market and if we were to combine that with reinvigorating the social and public housing systems we might seriously address homelessness and its associated despair.

 Subsidies

The next thing I would concentrate on is business and farm subsidies. Well over $25 billion is provided in subsidies to business annually.  A lot of the money is disguised as employment promotion schemes which would be unnecessary once a basic income was in place. There are a multitude of subsidies to rural industries which would no longer have the same imperative once a basic income underpinned every permanent resident. The idea of propping up the development of northern Australia by subsidising those who want to open up marginal enterprises would be laughable if it did undermine much of the ecology of northern Australia. Such pipe dreams should be sole prerogative of people with enough money of their own to pursue such ecocide. There may well be good reasons to subsidise renewable energy schemes like the wave generator off Bunbury and thermal electricity generation. Solar and wind technology may also need continuing subsidisation. Emerging forms of renewable energy could also be helped by subsidies but no more money should be put into diesel subsidies for mining industries. Coal should not get another cent. The myths about clean coal should be sequestered in disused mine shafts.

There are many other taxes which could be tweaked; such as transaction taxes on money transfers. All these changes whist quite momentous are not so far out of the ball park as to be not worth considering. Clearly we could afford to introduce a basic income without impinging on the wellbeing of Australians receiving up to average weekly earnings. It needs to be remembered that two-thirds of Australians receive less than average weekly earnings.

The one-third of affluent Australians earning more than average weekly earnings would be required to pay more than they are currently paying to Treasury and yes some of them will whinge that their wealth is not continuing to increase at a far greater rate than ordinary workers. But even though they might not immediately recognise it, they too will benefit by residing is a more egalitarian society (Pickett & Wilkinson 2009, Marmot 2016).

Superannuation

In 1991 the ACT Council of Social Services produced a monograph entitled The Super Tax Rort. At the time, Keating was foreshadowing the introduction of a privatised form of compulsory superannuation and the Council foresaw a number of potential pitfalls with his proposal arguing that low income earners, recently arrived migrants, casual workers, women and older workers would receive few benefits. The Council saw the potential for rich people to grab the bulk of the tax windfall.

Today we see that there are many rich people who receive, as a result of their superannuation investments, a greater financial benefit in foregone tax than do age pensioners. The superannuation schemes are riddled with inequities, risks, constant changes and contradictions.

There exists no clear equity argument to regard a dollar of superannuation any differently from a dollar of social security or a dollar of earned income or a dollar of unearned income received.  Treating them in a different way in the tax and social security system is illogical and results in inequities.

Once a basic income was in place it would be important to tax monies received from superannuation in exactly the same way as money received from employment, investment, royalties and tax should be paid on each and every dollar received from any source. The basic income would not be taxed.

Military Spending

 Australia uses the euphemism of “Defence spending” to describe our expenditure on equipment and salaries to maintain our war machine. We despatch troops around the world meeting nice people and killing them. Recently our governments have used the military to arrest asylum seekers arriving by sea, shipping them to Pacific Islands where they are incarcerated, slowly driven mad, raped and murdered by private contractors or local thugs.

We could save billions of dollars annually if we processed such asylum seekers on the mainland of Australian. We would save many more billions if we turned our foreign military machine into a true defence department and just safeguarded Australia from invasion.

Conclusion

 These proposals do nothing to lower the corporate tax rate in Australia, they do nothing to attract business empires who need to be bribed with tax holidays, massive tax write offs or any of the other corrupt business inducements which have been part and parcel of the neo-liberal extravagance since the mid 1980s (Mays, Marston & Tomlinson 2016). These proposals are about addressing social justice agendas, about fairness, about the equity which all Australians should have in a decent Australian future.

 The main purpose of a social security system is to provide emotional, psychological and financial security to people when they are prevented from adequately maintaining themselves. One hundred years of categorical means-tested income support has shown that only universal provision can guarantee the abolition of poverty. A major reason to have a tax system is to fund the welfare state and to provide necessary services and protections the populace requires. Under the proposals outline above we can do both. We don’t need to threaten and cajole the least powerful of our citizens. We can assist them by reinventing a generous Commonwealth of Australia committed to social solidarity and universal provision.

Bibliography:

ACT Council for Social Services (1991) The Super Tax Rort. ACTCOSS, Canberra.
Dunlop, T. (2016) Why the future is Workless. Newsouth, Sydney.
McKenzie–Murray, M. (2017) Centrelink’s debt collection ‘pushed him over the edge’ The Saturday Paper. Hard copy pages 1 & 4. 18th February. https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/2017/02/18/centrelinks-debt-collection-pushed-him-over-the-edge/14873364004249
Marmot, M. (2016) Fair Australia: Social Justice and the Health Gap. ABC, Sydney. http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/boyerlectures/series/2016-boyer-lectures/7802472
Mays, J. Marston, G. & Tomlinson, J. (2016) Basic Income in Australia and New Zealand: Perspectives from the Neoliberal Frontier. Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke.
National Commission of Audit (2017) “Age Pension 7.1” http://www.ncoa.gov.au/report/phase-one/part-b/7-1-age-pension.html
Pickett, K. & Wilkinson, R. (2009) The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better. Allen Lane (Penguin), London.
Standing, G. (2011) The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. Bloomsbury, London.
Standing, G. (2014) A Precariat Charter: From Denizens to Citizens. Bloomsbury, London.
Standing, G. (2016) The Corruption of Capitalism: Why Rentiers Thrive and Work Does Not pay. Biteback, London.
Stewart, E. (2017) “How Centrelink debt letters are harming Australians’ mental health.” ABC, Sydney. 12th January. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-12/centrelink-debt-letters-harming-mental-health/8169182
Tomlinson, J. (1999) “The politics of downward envy.” Union Song website
http://unionsong.com/reviews/envy.html
Wikipedia (2017) “Socialism without doctrine.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialism_with_no_doctrine

Originally Published in On Line Opinion  on 23rd February 2017 under the title “Precarious, unsafe and socially inadequate.”

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Review of Francis Castles, The Future of the Welfare State: Crisis Myths and Crisis Realities

Published in Australian Journal of Social Issues. 2, Winter 2005: 317-318

Francis, or as he is better known in Australia, Frank Castles spent many years as a researcher at the Australian National University. He has recently moved to the University of Edinburgh. He popularised the phrase “workers welfare state” to describe the Australian welfare state in 1985. In an article published in the Australian Journal of Social Issues in 1994, he revisited his earlier work and revised somewhat his conclusions. Just as he was leaving for Edinburgh in 2001, he wrote a brief article which was scathing of the Howard Government’s cutbacks in social security provision which the Government continues to market under the misleading label of ‘welfare reform’.

Castles’ new book, The Future of the Welfare State, is a review of changes which have occurred in the structure, size and composition of the welfare states of the 21 nations which comprise the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). He undertakes this task in order to test a number of claims about ‘crises’ facing welfare states in the developed world.

The first of the claims he tests is the suggestion that as a result of globalisation welfare states are being cut by governments wanting to ensure that their welfare systems are not disproportionately generous (costly) compared with other nations with whom they are competing for investment income. The second major claim he investigates is the assertion that welfare is going to be unaffordable because of the disproportionate aging of their workforces. The data he interrogates is the “OECD Social Expenditure Database, otherwise known as SOCX which provides data on the social expenditure of all OECD member countries from 1980 to 1998 (p. 9)”.

Castles recalls that the welfare state crises of the 1970s in the wake of the first world oil shock (that the rapidity of social expenditure growth was unsustainable) and 1980s (that big social expenditure meant poor economic performance) proved to be unfounded (pp. 1-8). Castles explains that he conducted this research to investigate if the assertion that welfare states had been pruned to facilitate the flow of foreign investment was a myth or reality. He points out that if the myth about the need for cutbacks was given credence then this myth, of itself, could provide pressure on national governments to reduce welfare state expenditure (p. 46).

Castles’ review of the first major claim leads him to conclude that the ‘race to the bottom’ crisis of welfare spending is not occurring (Ch.2). He found that “The only evidence of a significant globalization effect to emerge anywhere in the analysis is an apparent relationship between the growth of foreign direct investment and cutbacks in existing programme spending. However, this is an effect that proves not to be statistically robust (p.17).”

The component nations of the OECD are not an undifferentiated collection of countries but present considerable variation in how they structure their welfare spending. In Chapter 3, Castles revisits Richard Titmuss’ (1974) ‘residual’, ‘industrial redistributive’ and ‘institutional redistributive’ models of welfare states and Esping- Andersen’s 1990 model of ‘liberal’, ‘conservative’ and ‘social democratic’ welfare states before going on to propose his own model. He distinguishes Scandinavian, Southern European, Continental Western European and English-speaking welfare states. Australia is assigned to the last of these categories. He found that countries assigned to these categories have considerable similarities with others in their grouping which remain over the entire period under study. In Chapter 4 Castles find little evidence for the idea that there is a convergence in welfare states in European countries and argues that an even wider variation will result when the European Union is expanded. He concludes in Chapter 8 that rather than a crisis of spending in the OECD welfare states there will be for the foreseeable future a “steady state welfare state”, albeit one with considerable variation amongst the OECD countries.

In Chapters 6 and 7, Castles investigates the suggestion that welfare states are in crisis because of low fertility and an ageing population. Australians are frequently told that this is the case. Castles’ review of the available data demonstrates that with the exception of Southern Europe most countries will easily cope with demographic change. In countries like Australia, the degree of adaptation necessary is small. Scandinavian countries have turned around the readiness for couples to have more children with family friendly policies. Continental Western European countries, with far more generous pension schemes than Australia, have moved to handle the problem by reducing the generosity of pensions. This is hardly an option for Australia. “The primary problem confronting the English-speaking welfare states is the well known tendency for these countries to manifest higher levels of poverty and inequality than most other countries in the OECD (p. 178.)”

The Future of the Welfare State is a tightly written book. It is jam-packed with statistical analysis and detailed argument probably more suited to post graduate than undergraduate study. It provides some grounds for optimism – Castles says the glass is half full but as I sit in Australia and reflect on our Government it seems to me that the glass is half empty. Castles warns that it is academics from countries like Britain, the United States and Australia who generate the crises of the welfare state propaganda. He says “It is not accidental that the most strenuous claims that ‘there is no alternative’ but to cut back welfare state spending because of international economic and demographic pressures originate in the countries that are least generous to the poor (p. 179).”

Bibliography

Castles, F. (1985) The Working Class and Welfare. Allen & Unwin & Port Nicholson, Wellington.
Castles, F. (1994) “The Wage Earners Welfare State Revisited.” Australian Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 29, No. 2. pp.120-145.
Castles, F. (2001) “A farewell to the Australian welfare state.” Eureka Street. Vol. 11, No. 1, January-February.

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SARS

Australians would do well to learn some lessons from the SARS epidemic in China. Clearly we need an excellent health system if we are to avoid major health problems which emerging viruses might create. Unless people have a universally affordable health system then many who can’t afford to go to the doctor will put off going until their condition deteriorates. By the time people get really sick they will have spread infections to many with whom they come in contact.

The Federal Government is planning to alter the Medicare system in a way which will mean that many families, in which there is only one person employed, will have great difficulty paying for visits to the doctor. These changes to Medicare potentially constitute a real threat to everyone’s health when SARS or other infectious viruses enter this country.

Written circa 2003, but a co-charge was briefly introduced by Labor before they dumped it in the 1990s. The Liberals have tried several times since 2003 to levy a co-charge.

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Small government for people with small minds

Paper given at the Third National Unemployment Conference,  QUT, Brisbane 13-15/6/96.

Abstract

The advent of a new right government in Canberra signals a massive challenge for unemployed people throughout Australia.  This is particularly so given the size of the majority of the Howard Coalition Government because it means the possibility of returning to a revisionist social democratic government is at least 5 years away.

New Zealand experienced an economic rationalist Labour Government before they elected a new right government and they now have rampant individualised work contract employment and a social welfare system which is incapable of ensuring the poor are provided with an adequate income or decent health services.

Australia seems destined to duplicate the New Zealand social disaster.   Howard heralds economic nirvana through lowering taxes on the rich, revitalising small business, making sure the unemployed meet stricter activity tests, that migrants are not entitled to social security for two years, reducing the size of government, smashing the power of unions, individualising work contracts and watering down unfair dismissal legislation.

These features provide the back drop to the coming attack on the unemployed.  It is always easier to blame the victims of government ineptitude than to develop truly liberating social policies and practices (Ryan 1971).  This paper will attempt to provide a policy analysis and a practice paradigm which might confront government and enhance the options for unemployed people.

The 1996 election and its aftermath

Racism was the defining feature of the 1996 election in Australia. Many back benchers will act as storm troopers for the coming fascism.   It will take form in the denigration of political correctness which is code for ensuring the right of Bob Katter to slag off at “femo-Nazis and slanty eyed ideologues”, for freeing Pauline Hanson to trot out her ignorant views about Aborigines, for Graeme Campbell to denigrate migrants and Australia’s indigenous people.

There are sections of the media, such as A Current Affair owned by Australia’s richest resident, who will play a vital part in drumming up bash a dole bludger campaigns ( A Current Affair 19/2/96, 20/2/96, 4/3/96, 15/3/96, contra Littlemore 18/3/96).   The automatons of commercial current affairs will do this to disguise their owners’ tax bludging .  A Current Affair attacked “the Paxton Kids” because they would not move a couple of thousand kilometres leaving their friends and family behind.  As Brian Toohey pointed out it would seem the minimum requirement of the job that the Prime Minister be prepared to live in the Lodge but Howard has insisted he live at Kirrabilly in order to be with his family(Toohey 1996).

The Howard Government claims it will not increase taxes yet is contemplating increasing Higher Education Charges, introducing  death charges for the elderly in nursing homes, and reintroducing Medicare co-charging whilst refusing to raise the Medicare levy.   All these increased charges are taxes whether our not they are so recognised by the general public.  The difference between such taxes and generalised taxes like income tax is that such taxes are predicated upon a user pays notion.    Interestingly enough in these cases such taxes will fall predominantly on poorer Australians because they are flat rate taxes, even if they were to apply across  the board they would still disproportionately impact on the poor (Smith  1993).

Of course if the Howard Government was interested in rational economic solutions to ensure universal availability of affordable health services, rather than economic rationalist dogma, it would abolish any tax advantage to private medical insurance and promote Medicare (McAuley 1993).   It would do this because Medicare now administers its fund three times more efficiently than do any of the private funds and having one health insurer in Australia would result in even greater efficiency gains.   The real reason why such a scenario is unattractive to the Coalition Government is that it would erode the privileged access of the rich to health services and promote a more equitable distribution of health provision based on concepts such as need compared with the present private health system which is based on the capacity to pay.

Rapping with Johnny Howard

Hand on my shoulder and called me son
I’d been working in his factory since eighty – one.
Stay out of the union, escape the award
and an employment contract is assured.

I work all day and half the night
trying to ensure I do things right.
Work harder, work smarter, work faster
if you want to avoid economic disaster.

The whole game now is efficiency
he wants me to do the work of three.
By the drive for profit he is haunted
I asked him what he really wanted
he said that what he wanted most
was for me to become father, son and ghost.

Drink the wine and eat the host
and you might become father, son and ghost.
A million people without work today,
we’ve lost our path, we’ve lost the way.

They want me to do the work of three
how can they call that efficiency?
So I’ll drink the wine and eat the host
father son and holy ghost.

Conscripting the reserve army of labour

Marxists have long pointed to widespread unemployment as a weapon capitalists use to tame their captive workforce and hold down wages (Marx 1970  Vol 1, chs. 10,17, 22, Bottomore, T.,  Harris, L., Kiernan,V. & Miliband, R. (1983) pp.422- 423).    In 1991 when the Liberal Party under the leadership of John Hewson set out the present Liberals’ real agenda in Fightback they attacked what they called “the army of the jobless” for being a drain on “Australians in work” (Liberal and National Parties 1991, p. 18).

This style of attack on those which government and industry have excluded from the labour force is a replication of the “bash a dole bludger campaigns” waged by Labor in 1974 and the Liberals under Fraser (Windschuttle 1981).   Such campaigns aim to politically marginalise those without paid work by creating a division between those segments of the working class alienated from their labour and those alienated from the labour force.

Labor in Government from 1983-92 was more subtle when it attacked the unemployed.    They mainly concentrated their attempt to delegitimate those who were excluded from the workforce through excessively targeting labour force programs and income support schemes.    Though Ministers of Social Security, like Brian Howe, were not averse to using the dependency rhetoric.    The real pity is that there was at the time insufficient solidarity amongst those without paid work to convert Hewson’s “army of the jobless” into an unemployed workers army (Tomlinson 1994).    The fear that if soldiers were to return from World War Two to unemployment caused Chifley to find ways of abolishing unemployment.

There is another possible scenario and that is for the entire working class to recognise its essential unity and build a real workers welfare state which would ensure sharing of work, work for all who wanted it and a guaranteed minimum income (Tomlinson 1995).    Given the 1996 election result and the fact that our citizens are atomised – seeking rewards and receiving punishments as individuals – this would not appear to be likely in the near future.

Privatisation

There is no structural difference between privatising a profitable company which we all own in common and allowing some rich land owners to fence off parts of the town common in 16 century England.  It might be useful to remember a poem written at the time of the enclosures.

The law locks up the men and women
who steal the goose from off the common.
But leaves the larger villain loose
who steals the common from the goose.
(anon)

Small government

The entire anarchist tradition is based on the premise that government, particularly big government, can intrude upon the lives of citizens.   Aborigines and other low income earners  know only too well the excesses of which government is capable (Tomlinson 1996).   The Deaths in Custody Report established that Aborigines died in large numbers in custody precisely because so many of them had been incarcerated (Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 1991).   Unemployed people and supporting parents regularly have their privacy invaded by agents of the State.

Why then shouldn’t we applaud the Howard Government’s decision to cut the Commonwealth Public Service by up to 30,000?   The simple reason is that people and particularly poor people are served by these officers.   Aborigines have no reason to trust State Governments and would prefer to be assisted by Commonwealth Agencies.    Where functions are passed from the Commonwealth to one of the states or territories, if a similar service is to be provided, then that state or Territory Government will have to employ as many public servants as the Commonwealth has sacked in order to provide the same quality of service.   This will not result in a decrease in the size of government overall.    However what is more likely to happen is that services to the powerless will be cut.

Howard: the irrational agenda

There have been blueprints suggested which could substantially lessen the rate of unemployment whilst maintaining the existing social democratic framework and utilising economic practices prevalent within the OECD (Langmore and Quiggan 1994).   Yet the Howard Government seems set upon adopting an economic rationalist agenda not dissimilar to that set out in Fightback (Liberal and National Parties 1991).    The privatisation of Telstra,  attacks on unions and the implementation of individualised work contracts have been the main planks of the first months of Howard’s Government.    Privatisation, attacks on unions and individualising work contracts were laid out in Fightback and roundly criticised (Vintila, Phillimore & Newman 1992, Rees, Rodley & Stilwell 1993, Rees & Rodley 1995).    Howard’s ideas for the transformation of the Australian workplace have been imported from Thatcher’s Conservatives, New Zealand’s Rodgernomics and American Reganonomics.     These ideas don’t result in greater equity nor more employment, they can’t be implemented without massive social costs and they are based on increasing competitiveness and often don’t result even in increased production ( Lateline 1996, Omerod1994, Carlin 1996.).

Even if these ideas had worked in the 1970s and 80s they have passed their use by date if the aim is to develop a modern economy which is abreast of world events and capable of increased production without huge social costs (Rifkin 1994, Omerod 1994).

The real agenda involved in doing it “Howard’s Way” is to reinforce the segmentation of those lucky enough to have paid employment  and further divide them from those excluded from the labour market.    The decision to delay welfare payments to migrants, the suggestion that because the underfunded programs over which indigenous Australians have some control have not solved all the difficulties which Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders are facing proves they can’t be trusted to handle money, that young homeless kids are getting money too easily, that the old are getting a free ride in nursing homes and that people would find work if they weren’t encouraged to stay on benefits are but sub-themes.   This political static has an important part to play in further alienating the voters from their inherent humanity.     The main game is to attack the vulnerable – the young, unemployed people, the frail aged, recently arrived migrants and indigenous Australians.   After the Government has succeeded is convincing middle Australia that each of these groups of people aren’t worth worrying about then it will have increased the power it has available in attacks on its real target – decreasing the wages of all working people.   Australians need to remember Pastor Niemoller’s poem:

When they came for the Communists
we were not Communists
– so we did nothing.
When they came for the Jews
we were not Jews
– so we did nothing.

 When they came for the Social Democrats
we were not Social Democrats
– so we did nothing.
When they came for the Trade unionists
we were not Trade Unionists
-so we did nothing.

When they came for the liberals and intellectuals
we were scared
– so we did nothing.
When they came for the Churchmen
we were frightened
– so we did nothing.

When they came for us
we looked for help
– but we were alone.

We must ensure that we don’t get sucked into becoming recreationists as Australia returns to the social repression of the 1950s and 60s.   We must not recreate “boongs”, “wogs”, “cripples”, “youths” and “dole bludgers”.     The language we use when referring to people whom the government, racists and economic rationalists want to marginalise must reflect the respect the intended targets are due.

What  can we do?

The first step towards ensuring that we aren’t returned to the callousness of the 1960s is to reject the Howard Government’s attacks on the powerless and vulnerable in our society.   We must refuse to be bought off with some short term individual gain or even individualised survival plan.    We have to struggle collectively to maintain unions’ collective bargaining power, we have to fight to maintain all the institutions which protect the vulnerable.    When Jocelyn Newman boasts that she dobs in “dole cheats” and that she is going to set up a hot line to expose anyone who gets welfare payments for which they don’t meet all the requirements we might counter by dobbing in tax cheats, people engaged in business fraud, politicians who are fiddling their expense accounts or engaging in other corrupt activities.   If they took tax fraud and corruption seriously they could more than wipe out any budget deficit in 1996-97.  There are enough examples from the Fitzgerald Inquiry, West Australia Inc, the Wanaroo Council and the Crown Casino to lead to the sustainable assumption that politicians are more likely than not to be engaged in some form of corrupt activity.

We should establish a dob in a polly hot line, I hope all those tax officers who have been sacked had the sense to keep copies of as many government members’ tax returns as they could before they left.     Perhaps the 2,800 ex-employees of the Department of Employment, Education and Training kept a record of the various government members connections with employers who were fiddling money from labour market programs.   And I wonder what the ex-employees of Health and Family Services will be able to bring out with them.

We must work to expose the the destructive effects of competition policy; join with others to increase cooperation and build  mutually supportive networks on the way to building a caring and fair society.   That is: we must find work for all or share all the work.

Bibliography

A Current Affair (1996)  Channel 9,  19 & 20 th. February, 4 &15 th March.
Bottomore, T.,  Harris, L., Kiernan,V. & Miliband, R. (1983) A Dictionary of Marxist Thought. Cambridge, Harvard University.
Carlin, J.  (1996) “Down-sizing’s Wall Street guru admits he got it all wrong. Canberra Times.  13/5/96, p.13.
LateLine (1996) ABC T.V. 26th. March.
Liberal and National Parties (1991) Fightback!: Taxation and Expenditure Reform for Jobs and Growth. Canberra, Coalition Parties.
Littlemore, S. (1996) Media Watch ABC TV, 18 th. March.
Mc Auley, I. A Tax By Any Other Name: The real cost of private health insurance. Marrickville, Australian Consumers Association.
Marx, K. (1971)  Capital Vol.1 (ed.) Engles, F. London, Lawrence & Wishart.
Omerod, P. (1994)The Death of Economics. Faber & Faber, London.
Rees, S., Rodley, G. & Stilwell, F. (eds.) (1993)Beyond the Market. Leichhardt, Pluto.
Rees, S. & Rodley, G. (eds.) (1995) The Human Costs of Manageralism. Leichhardt, Pluto.
Rifkin, J. (1994) The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labour Force & the Dawn of the Post-Market Era. New York, Putnam.
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (1991) National Report. Vols.1-5. Canberra, AGPS.
Ryan, W. (1972) Blaming the Victim. New York,Vintage.
Smith, J. (1993) Taxing Popularity: The Story of Taxation in Australia. Canberra. Federalism Research Centre, ANU.
Tomlinson, J. (1994) “Application for Funds to Establish an Unemployed Workers Army.” Anarchist Age Monthly Review. No. 41, May.
Tomlinson, J. (1995)”Building a real workers’ welfare state.” Paper given at the Asia –  Pacific Regional Social Services Conference, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, November.
Tomlinson, J. (1996) “Citizenship and Sovereignity.” Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 31, No.1 February.
Toohey, B. (1996) “Peter Thompson’s Breakfast Program” Radio National, ABC.25 th March.
Vintila, P. Phillimore, J. & Newman, P. (eds.) (1992) Markets Morals and Manifestos. Murdoch, Institute for Science and Technology Policy
Watts, R. (1995) Unemployment and Citizenship in Hicks, R., Creed, P, Patton, W. & Tomlinson, J.(eds) Unemployment Developments and Transitions. Academic, Brisbane.
Windschuttle, K. (1980) Unemployment. Ringwood, Penguin.

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Social entrepreneurs: Controlling the community’s “bad lands”

Published in New Community Quarterly, 2(2), pp. 36-40. 2004

The themes of the Howard Government: ‘social capital, social conservatism, social coalition, mutual obligation and participation income’ all undermine the concept of universal rights and erode previously established social security entitlements. McClure (2000[a], [b]) attempted to legitimize the extension of the breaching of 300,000 plus Centrelink clients annually (ACOSS 2001). Initially those breached were mainly young unemployed people and, to a lesser extent, single parents. The Howard Government has signaled its intention to extend its imposition of mutual obligation to more single parents and those with a disability.

The unifying constant in ‘social capital, social conservatism, social coalition, mutual obligation and participation income’ is the replacement of rights with a benefit /obligation compact. The techniques the Howard Government uses to delegitimise the entitlements of people with a disability, refugees, migrants, asylum seekers, Indigenous people, unemployed individuals or single parents are remarkably similar. The task facing community organizers is to alert members of each of these groups to identify the similarities and to confront the issues they have in common.

A mechanism that the Government often utilises to suppress dissent is its promotion of an increasingly virulent band of social entrepreneurs who are charged with the task of riding into the community’s “bad lands” under the guise of increasing that community’s capacity. Many social entrepreneurs claim to draw their inspiration from ‘Third way’ political pundits. Guy Standing (2002 Chapters 7 and 8) demolishes the myth that the ‘Third way’ is a significant departure from the economic fundamentalist prescription for welfare cutbacks.

Such social entrepreneurs gleefully reiterate the Howard Government’s diatribe about ending welfare dependency and the need to be self-reliant (contra Tomlinson 2003, Goodin, Headey, Muffels and Dirven 1999). Labor leader Mark Latham has also adopted this rightwing rendition of Maggie (the shopkeeper’s daughter) Thatcher’s version of self-help. Aboriginal lawyer Noel Pearson is the Howard Government exemplar of this approach on Cape York. I have criticised the Latham / Pearson line elsewhere (Tomlinson1999). What is of interest here is that the current crop of social entrepreneurs is seemingly oblivious of the fact that many of the creative approaches to community work, they claim for themselves, have been part and parcel of the practice of community work at least since the 1940s (Alinsky 1969, Gandhi 1965).

Alinsky and Gandhi use the concept of self-help in a quite different way from that of the current crop of social entrepreneurs. The major difference between them can be found in the ideologies that underlie their thinking. When Alinsky or Gandhi accentuated self-help it was in the context of mutuality underpinned by communal or social democratic solidarity. Today the purveyors of social entrepreneurial thought want to impose their form of self-help in the context of individualized self-reliance.

This paper will consider ways in which people with disabilities and their allies can:

  • build alliances with potential counter hegemonic forces,
  • earn from similar struggles of other denigrated and marginalised groups,
  • confront those who are working to undermine universal human rights and existing entitlements,
  • confound efforts to ensnare them in an obligatory envelope which will impede their liberation, and hopefully
  • join the fight for the rights of others and for themselves as a part of their struggle for full citizenship.

The background

The Howard Government’s themes of: ‘social capital, social conservatism, social coalition, mutual obligation and participation income’ increasingly impact upon people with a disability. These themes have also surfaced in relation to Indigenous Australians, migrants, temporary refugee visa holders and asylum seekers.

Indigenous Australians survived the invasion, dispossession, genocide, protection, exclusion, assimilation, integration, self-management, and even the promise of self- determination (which was held out by the Keating Government as part of its plans for reconciliation). Indigenous self-determination has been relentlessly opposed since the Coalition won office in 1996. Indigenous self-determination, in the opinion of the Howard Government, undermines ‘National sovereignty’ (contra Tomlinson 1996). They have instead been offered the Howard/ Herron/ Ruddock/Vanstone’s prescription of ‘practical reconciliation’ provided they are quiescent about Indigenous sovereignty / native title and land rights issues.

Recently the Howard Government announced its intention to abolish the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission and to mainstream Indigenous service provision. These decisions follow in the wake of a seven-year imposition of its failed “practical reconciliation” policies (Tomlinson 2004).

The Keating Labor Government, with Gerry Hand as Minister for Immigration, introduced a six month waiting period before migrants could claim social security benefits. The incoming Howard Government extended this waiting period to two years. Hand also installed the policy of mandatory detention of asylum seekers who arrived on our shores without valid visas. This policy, which has been ruthlessly enforced by the Liberal Government, is in breach of a number of international agreements that Australia has signed and ratified (Maley 2004). The Howard Government has in addition adopted the practice of issuing three-year temporary visas to asylum seekers once asylum seekers have been found to be refugees. This policy increases refugees’ uncertainty, prevents family reunion and is frequently physically and socially debilitating (Maley 2004, Lock, Quenault and Tomlinson 2002).

When the Whitlam Government came to office it raised the rate of payment for16 year old unemployment beneficiaries to the adult rate. During the early 1970s, with increased use of automated machinery and an economic downturn, there was a significant loss of jobs usually done by young people. By the last year of the Whitlam Government there was a considerable rise in the level of youth unemployment. Clive Cameron and Bill Hayden responded to this by suggesting that the young were becoming “dole bludgers” and “work shy” (Windschuttle 1981, pp. 180-190). This attack on young unemployed people paved the way for the Fraser Government’s denigration of all unemployed people and particularly the young without work who were again paid youth level unemployment benefits. This inexorably led, during the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments, to Brian Howe’s increased tightening of eligibility across a range of social security payments from 1986. This has now led us to Howard’s onslaught on social security payments to the young (Horin 1998, p.10) culminating in his “Oh so” Common Youth Allowance. Until the mid 1980s 16 year old people with severe and permanent disabilities were paid full adult disability pensions. In 2004 a young person, in receipt of a Disability Support Pension and living at home, gets only 60% of the adult rate.

Few people with disabilities have been active in wider income support and citizenship struggles. When ‘work for the dole’ and other impositions of the ‘mutual obligation’ policy were seen to apply only to young unemployed people, people with disabilities and their agencies did little to resist the Government’s imposition of obligations upon the young. Now people with disabilities, previously unmindful of John Donne’s caution, find that ‘The bell tolls for thee.’

Part of the problem – part of the solution

In 1977, two posters in the shop front window of the Darwin Unemployed Workers Union read “Hitler had the Jews, Stalin had the Kulaks, Fraser has the Unemployed.” and “Drive carefully 3,000 Unemployed People walk Darwin streets.” The first poster drew attention to the then Government’s negative stereotyping, marginalisation and persecution of unemployed people – the second to the extent of unemployment and the presence of unemployed people as community members.

In 2001, I was a member of a Brisbane Disability Scholars email network. I regularly circulated material on income security, community work and politics. A couple of days before the election I sent the group the following email:

I have just had a security update from The Office of National Assessment. It would appear that John Howard has taken Janet and the kids up on to the roof at Kirribilli and is threatening to throw them off the roof unless the Australian people vote Liberal tomorrow. Clearly Howard is presuming on Australian people’s humanity and compassion. Such offensive illegal queue jumping is to be resisted. There have been people waiting for years in third world countries for the chance to throw themselves off the roof at Kirribilli House. The Navy has been instructed to get him down and take him on a Pacific holiday to Manus or Nauru.

Several satire impaired scholars took umbrage demanding that the network concentrate on “disability issues”. Others in the group wanted a broader discussion of social issues suggesting that you never know when “the words of the prophet will be written on the subway wall” – so please keep your eyes wide, open or shut is your choice.

It is important for all of us who want to inhabit a socially caring world to try to understand the interconnectedness between the specific issue with which we are dealing and other social forces. To misquote John Donne “no issue is entire of itself”.

Human rights versus utilitarian rights

Before investigating Howard’s contractual social insecurity system, this paper will provide a brief outline of what a social security system based on universal human rights might look like. I have elsewhere argued that only the provision of a universal Basic Income can prevent Australian Governments undermining unemployed people’s economic security and foisting socially destructive obligations upon them (Tomlinson 2003, 2002, 2001)

Whenever payment of income support is conditional upon the recipient fulfilling a particular social action then a government or its agents can use their discretion to determine whether the obligation to comply has been met. If the provider of the income support payment decides the recipient has failed to meet the imposed obligation it can withhold the payment. A universal system recognizes that targeted welfare benefit systems can never deliver benefits equitably even to those who meet all the eligibility requirements (Boston & St. John 1998). An Australian universal welfare system would, at a minimum, aim to abolish Beveridge’s five giants of ‘squalor, want, ignorance, disease and idleness’ (Timmins1995).

A fully universal Basic Income system would be a flat rate paid to each individual permanent resident of Australia irrespective of whether they lived alone or with others, irrespective of other income or assets and irrespective of their employment or any other social status.

Stuart Rees (2000) comments that when a government “emphasises that rights have to be earned, that people can only insist on their rights if they have carried out their social responsibilities…It softens a general public for the idea that rights are conditional, not universal (pp.296-297).”

By contrast, the tradition of human rights which contributed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) advocates a universal standard to protect against the tyranny of the state….In the Rights of Man (1791) Thomas Paine identified a universalist tradition with reference to conditions which gave security to citizens and thereby facilitated a civil society….Advocates of universal rights do not reject the ethicists’ (Utilitarians’) regard for duties and obligations but they do emphasise that duties and obligations serve to enhance rights; they are not a precondition for them. The universalist argument relies on the assumption that rights are accorded to people because they are human beings. In 1948 the universal declaration was designed to represent the highest aspirations of a common people (Rees pp.297-298).

Arguments which go to solidarity and inclusion are based on a universalist conception of rights and are centred around ideas of mutuality and reciprocity rather than reciprocal or mutual obligation. Universalists base their views on a far more optimistic understanding of humankind than that which informs those addicted to the idea that even the right to sustainable income support is conditional. Much of the motivation which underpins the Utilitarian view of rights revolves around the way risk is assessed (Sztompka 1999, Kemshall 2002). Conservatives have a belief in the inherent imperfection of human beings. This preoccupation with the alleged ‘propensity’ of social security recipients to ‘disappoint’ finds voice in the current ‘dependency’ debates.

The Howard Government’s addiction to a Utilitarian view of rights that is conditional upon first meeting obligations is a far cry from the form of rights expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the associated Covenants. For instance, Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognises “ the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living”. Article 8(3)(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that “No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour”. Even allowing the qualification in section C(4) of this Article which excludes from the category of forced labour “work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations” much of the Howard Government’s ‘mutual obligation’ agenda is in breach of these international agreements which Australia has signed and ratified.

As people with disability have discovered – post McClure 2000[b] – the imposition of forced labour on one section of the Australian people undermines the citizenship of all citizens because it is uncertain when and to whom such compulsion will be extended. It downgrades the social and economic rights previously available to all citizens. By ignoring the citizenship rights of those who receive income support it separates them from other citizens.

The requirement that people engage in certain specified activities before they will be paid income support ignores the contribution that many non-employed people already make to their neighbourhood, their families and their society. The Government devalues social security recipients’ voluntary contribution through the suggestion that only approved forms of participation constitute ‘a contribution’. It brands social security recipients as less valued whilst simultaneously forcing them to ‘perform compulsory labour’ thus undermining solidarity and civil society. Such compelled activity is the polar opposite of social capital.

Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the Australian Government’s imposition of ‘mutual obligation’ is that, as Rees (2000 p.297) points out, it reinforces the view that all rights are conditional and that universality has no place in the modern world. This has the effect of delegitimising universal income support policies such as Basic Income. An unconditional universal Basic Income could prevent a government imposing ‘mutual obligation’ policies on the least affluent. A universal Basic Income is a policy that has the capacity to enhance the liberty and productivity of all citizens. This feature of Basic Income has been recognised for 80 years (Milner 1920 ch.1).

An indecent obsession

John Howard most clearly spelt out his economic liberal and social conservative agendas in his “Roundtable speech” in 1999 and his preoccupation with his form of conservative social coalition in a brief article in the Australian on the 12th.January, 2000. Essentially the argument he put forward in May 1999 is that:

Economic policy liberalisation and modern conservatism in social policy share important common values and objectives. …Both recognise the role of markets and of government….Both promote opportunity, incentive and responsibility over dependence and welfarism. And both support the full realisation of individual potential as well as the reality of social obligation. (pp.3-4).

When he writes about his social coalition he employs a classically liberal vision of ‘a social contract’ in which those who receive a payment from the state are required to return something to the ‘society’. The Liberal Prime Minister’s determination to foist onto Australian people his social conservative agenda was an underlying theme in the Reference Group on Welfare Reform Interim Report (McClure 2000[a]). From page 47 to 51 the Report deals with Howard’s social coalition in terms similar to those Howard used. Howard in his 2000 article in The Australian says:

Put simply, it describes a partnership of individuals families, business, government, welfare and charitable organisations each contributing their unique resources and expertise to tackle disadvantage at its source ….
Most of all, the social coalition is firmly rooted in notions of mutual obligation (p.11).

Howard makes no bones about the Government’s attempt to promote conservative social policy administered by the churches operating in close association with business. Howard’s obsession with ‘mutual obligation’ and ‘dependency’ has been extensively criticised (Hammer 2002, Goodin 2001,Tomlinson 2001, Castles 2001).

The more things change the more they stay the same

Jocelyn Newman (1999), the Howard Government welfare Minister, who instigated the McClure Report, set down the track on which the Committee’s train (of thought) was to run and on time. She outlined the Government’s position in her paper “The Challenge of Welfare Dependency in the 21st. Century”. The present Government would have citizens believe that the only way ‘the scourge of welfare dependence’ can be removed is by compelling recipients of social security to meet specified obligations to the State.

The McClure Committee dutifully reported to the Government in line with their riding instructions. “Participation income support” became the latest buzz phrase. Of course anyone who had studied income support policy in this country immediately recognised it as a simple restatement of the Brian Howe / Bettina Cass active society strategy with the addition of extra compulsion and more ruthless breaching. The Howe / Cass line, in turn, was a reworking of the 1947 unemployment benefit activity test.

At a more general level the thrust of ‘mutual obligation’ is a restatement of the 1908 social security requirement to be of “good moral character.” This was not new either but part and parcel of the less eligibility policy – designed to distinguish between the worthy and unworthy poor – explicit in the 1834 Poor Law. This Law was an updated version of the 1601 Elizabethan Poor Law, which was an attempt to codify the established charity practices of the parishes. As Goodin 2001, Stretton 1996 , Castles 2001 and Tomlinson 2003 point out there is a direct line between at least the 16th. Century English welfare policy and the current Howard Government’s welfare preoccupations. Joel Handler (2002) traces the legislative concern about the undeserving back to the 1348 Labourer’s Act with its express preoccupation with “the sturdy beggar”.

Ray Cassin, senior writer for the Melbourne Age Newspaper, responded to the McClure Report in an article neatly entitled “Let’s just call them leeches and be done with it” in which he makes the point that:

You can be ‘on’ social security in the literal sense of receiving benefits, but this usage does not carry the pejorative flavour of being ‘on’ welfare. The reason is not mysterious: we do not talk about social-security dependency, or social-services dependency because ‘social security’ and ‘social services’ are bound up with an older notion of entitlement, and an understanding of mutual obligation that goes beyond tit-for-tat reciprocity…..

The ideal of mutual obligation underpinning a system of social security is not one of reciprocity, but of obligation borne by all of us to contribute to the support of people who would otherwise be destitute (The Sunday Age 27/8/2000 page 22).

This quotation from Cassin alerts us to the fact that there has been a significant change to the legimitating mechanism that underpinned the Australian system of income support in the 1960s when compared to the present day. We have moved from Noblesse Oblige to ruthless compulsion.

The contradiction – a crisis

What the Howard Government fails to understand, primarily because their reading of Althusser (1977), Gramsci (1978), Poulantzas (1978) and Marx (1970) is deficient, is that the ideological apparatus of social control is far more powerful than compulsion – even compulsion based on fear of starvation. They have sown the seeds of their own destruction and this is the basis that all those who wish to live in a non-censorious world will use to bring down this Government.

The Howard Government may presently have popular support for their slogans of ‘mutual obligation’, ‘work for the dole’, ‘social coalition’ and ‘participation income’ but that popularity is based on a mystification. The capitalist press markets terms like ‘welfare reform’ and ‘social capital’ as warm, fuzzy and socially stabilizing concepts. This part of the ideological control mechanism is well oiled.

It is the job of the counter hegemonic forces to unpack this language. We need to demonstrate again and again the socially destructive nature of breaching hundreds of thousands of the poorest Australians. We need to point to the homelessness and poverty inducing features of these policies. We need to explain the actual impact on families when their only income is removed because one member did not meet every dictate of some Centrelink operative. We need to demonstrate the socially destructive aspects, the dislocation and the counter productive nature of such policies. Above all, we need to elaborate upon the sheer ruthlessness of policies that drive many to despair, exacerbate mental health difficulties and lead some people to suicide.

Marginalising the marginalised

Those disability scholars, agencies and activists who think that they can just work on disability issues without making links with the Indigenous, peace, union, unemployed, refugees, and other social struggles, succeed only in further marginalising the very issues which are most central to their developing the critical mass likely to force real change in the way people with disabilities are treated (Tomlinson 2003, Chapter 7).

Earlier in this paper I made the point that few people with disabilities have been active in the “other societal struggles for a better world” but some people with considerable disabilities have been very active. I will never forget the inspiration a young blind woman provided, as she strummed her guitar and sang, whist marching with other Aotearoan unemployment activists into police lines outside the Auckland Hilton in the North Island of New Zealand. I was comforted by the fact that she could not see the fear in my eyes, though disconcerted by the realisation she sensed the dread in my heart. Friends in wheelchairs, colleagues with mental health difficulties, and people with limited intellectual capacities are involved in broader social struggles. They provide a model for us to follow.

Building a counter hegemony

Gaining acceptance for the breadth of change, which many disability activists would like to accomplish, will require that they contribute to the building of a counter hegemony. This will require they make links with progressive unions, political parties, and activist groups. They need to become partisans in the struggle for a fairer world.

It was noted earlier that ruthless compulsion not Noblesse Oblige underpins the current system of income support. Whatever reformist gains might once have fallen, like crumbs from the rich man’s table, to humble petitioners will not be, if they ever were, sufficient to result in significant positive changes to the way in which this society responds to people with disabilities.

If disability activists are serious about getting their agenda incorporated into societal structures they will need to help build those new social structures. It strikes me as a nonsense to suggest that people who say they are working to counter ableist interpretations can ignore racism, sexism, ageism, classism and urbanism. Drawing inspiration from Marx and Lenin I suggest “The struggle for one is the struggle for all”. But if Marxist Leninism is not quite your cup of tea; remember, that the American civil rights campaigner Eugene V. Debs wrote “When I rise it will be with the ranks, not from the ranks”.

Bibliography

ACOSS 2001 New Research: hardship intensifies from rise in social security penalties. Media Statement, 13th. August.
Alinsky, S. (1969) Reveille for Radicals. Vintage, New York.
Althusser, L. (1977) For Marx. (trans. Brewster, B.) Verso, London.
Boston, J. & St. John, S. (1998) “Targeting versus Universality: Social Assistance for All or Just for the Poor. in Boston, J. Danziel, P and St. John, S. (eds.) Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand. Oxford University, Auckland.
Cassin, R. (2000) “Let’s just call them leeches and be done with it” The Sunday Age 27/8/2000 p.22.
Castles, F. (2001) “A farewell to the Australian welfare state.” in Eureka Street. Vol. 11, No. 1, Jan- Feb.
Gandhi, M.(1965) [ed] Merton, T. Gandhi on non-violence. New Directions, New York. Goodin, R. (2001) “False Principles of Welfare Reform.” Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 36, No.3, August pp.189-206.
Goodin, R., Headey, B., Muffels, R. & Dirven, H. (1999) The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge University, Cambridge.
Gramsci, A. (1978) Selections from Political Writings 1921-26, Hoare, Q. (ed. and trans) International, New York.
Hammer, S. (2002 forthcoming) The Rise of Liberal Independence and the Decline of the Welfare State. PhD Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane.
Horin, A. (1998) “Dole cut for thousands of young jobless.” Sydney Morning Herald. June,29th . p.10.
Howard, J. (1999) “Building a Stronger and Fairer Australia: Liberalisation in Economic Policy and Modern Conservatism in Social Policy.” Address to ‘Australia Unlimited Roundtable.’ 4th. May
Howard, J. (2000) “Quest for a decent society” The Australian 12th. Jan, p.11
http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/1999/AustraliaUnlimitedRoundtable.htm Kemshall, H. (2002) Risk, social policy and welfare. Open University, Buckingham.
Lock, J., Quenault, M. & Tomlinson, J. (2002) Some Reasons Why Australia Should Abolish the Detention of Asylum Seekers. Occasional Paper No.02/1, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, Sydney.
Maley, W. (2004) “Refugees.” In Manne, R. (ed.) The Howard Years. Black Inc. Agenda, Melbourne.
Marx, K. (1970) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol 1. (trans.)
Moore, S. & Aveling, E., (ed.) Engels, F., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol.1, Lawrence & Wishart, London.
McClure, P. (2000 [a]) Participation Support for a More Equitable Society. Interim Report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform, Department of Family and Community Services, Canberra.
McClure, P. (2000 [b]) Participation Support for a More Equitable Society. Report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform, Department of Family and Community Services, Canberra.
Milner, D. (1920) Higher Production by a Bonus on National Output: A proposal for a minimum income for all varying with national productivity. George, Allen & Unwin, London.
Newman, J. (1999) The Challenge of Welfare Dependency in the 21st Century. Department of Family and Community Services, Canberra.
Poulantzas, N. (1978) State, Power, Socialism. Camilleri, P. (trans) NLB, London.
Ruddock, P. “Changing Direction.” Paper given at the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission’s Setting the Agenda Conference, 26/3/2002, Canberra.
Standing, G. (2002) Beyond the new paternalism: Basic Income as Equality. Verso, London.
Stretton, H. (1996) Poor laws of 1834 and 1996. Brotherhood of St Lawrence, Fitzroy. Sztompka, P. (1999) Trust: A Sociological Theory. Cambridge University, Cambridge. Timmins, N. (1995) The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State. Harper Collins, Hammersmith.
Tomlinson, J. (2004) “The inherent flaw in the concept of ‘practical reconciliation’”. Online Opinion, 9th. March.
http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=2056
Tomlinson, J. (2003) Income Insecurity: The Basic Income Alternative. http://www.basicincome.qut.edu.au/interest/e-books.jsp
Tomlinson, J. (2002) “Income Support for Unemployed People: Human Rights versus Utilitarian Rights.” Journal of Economic and Social Policy Vol.6 , No. 2, Winter.
Tomlinson, J. (2001) “ The Basic Solution to Unemployment.” Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 36, No.3, August.
Tomlinson, J. (1999) “The Importance of Trust.” Paper given at the 6th National Conference on Unemployment, University of Newcastle, 23&24 September. A copy of this paper can be found at: http://www.basicincome.qut.edu.au/docs/import_trust.rtf
Tomlinson, J. (1996) “Citizenship and Sovereignity.” Australian Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 31, No.1, February.
Windschuttle, K. (1981) Unemployment. Penguin Ringwood.

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Social Role Valorisation

Goofy
I’m thrilled you’re skilled in SRV
but what does that mean for me.
You’ve done the Goofie Wolfie Wolfensberger
passing workshops;
You’ve passed it here.
You’ve passed it there.
You’ve passed it every bloody where.

But I don’t have the slightest care.
Will I go to hell if I can’t spell
Social role valorisation?
Is that the thing which will save the nation,
Social role valorisation?
We used to call it being normal.
Normalisation
N.O.R.M.A.L.I.S.A.T.I.O.N.
But now you say it’s
Social role valorisation.
Devised by Goofy to save the nation.
But I don’t know if I can spell
Social role valorisation.
I just want to be treated like an ordinary person.
no ifs, no buts, no exclamation.

Is that too much too ask?
Is that too hard a task?
Too treat me as you would another.
Show the same respect for me
as you’d show your father, child or mother?
In the message that you send
are you saying you can’t be my friend
treat me like any other-
treat me like a person?

Someone,
someone,
an ordinary person.
Someone,
someone
who is like another.

I’ve got my differences
and in some ways they are special
but why draw inferences?
Why say it’s not valued
what I do,
what does it mean to you?
Why must I play the roles
you’ve decided I should play?
Can’t I be my self?
My own self?
I’m the best qualified person in the world
to be my self.

And what I do, I think is normal.
And that’s the way I’d like you to think of me,
generally,
fairly ordinary.
In some ways special
aren’t we all special in some ways?
Perhaps your friend.

Someone to do things with.
I wish I could release you
from the bonds of SRV.
Do you need his imprimatur?
Do you need his authorisation?
Do you need
social role valorisation
to be kind to me
to help me be
or just
to help me see
I can be free?

Written in 1999 performed in workshops, lectures, conferences dealing with intellectual disability to point out how the jargonised “Social role valorisation” prevented people from being seen as who they were. Written in 1999.

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Spanish UBI

Below is a link to a 5 min video on Universal Basic Income. It is from the Spanish UBI movement, but the text is in English. Whilst it is in a cartoon format it succeeds in informing rather than amusing feel free to use it as you see fit – I think it is a valuable addition to the debate. Video:https://youtu.be/tnbdpM5aPLA

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Submission to Inquiries into Social Security and Taxation 2008

http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/submissions/pre_14_november_2008/Tomlinson_J ohn.pdf

I write in relation to the reviews of the Australian social security system and taxation system. My submission is in the form of a proposal to construct the social security system in a way which would improve equity and remove inefficiencies.

Essentially, I am proposing that:

  • the main income support system is paid by Taxation, as was the case between 1910 and 1927.
  • the main income support is in the form of a universal Basic Income paid to each individual permanent resident; it is paid irrespective of marital or other social status, irrespective of income or wealth, and irrespective of whether the individual works or not; and would have no conditions attached other than the need to establish permanent residence.
  • Ideally, no distinction would be made in the rate of payment on the basis of age ( but I do accept that in the short term, in order to garner widespread acceptance, a lower rate might be needed for children living in the family home).

A Basic Income along such lines will promote egalitarian solidarity but would not on its own ensure equity, some residual services and payments will be required to be provided by Federal and state governments and by non–government not for profit agencies in order to deal with issues of disability, illness, child and other care responsibilities.

The rate of payment would have to be slightly above the single age pension rate if some poorer people are not to lose in the changeover. Thus, under a Basic income many poor people currently discriminated against, by the existing social security system, will be lifted out of poverty.

The rate of taxation required in the short term would be in the order of 43-47% and would be payable on the first through to the last dollar earned (the Irish Government has done a lot of work in this regard see their September 2002 Green Paper entitled Basic Income).

Because each individual receives the equivalent of the age pension the net rate of taxation on earned income would be slightly less than under the existing system for all workers earning up to the average male weekly earning (two thirds of all workers); those earning more than the average wage would pay slightly more tax and those on high incomes significantly more.

Those who currently receive superannuation do not pay tax and this system could continue – but if they wished to receive the Basic Income, they would have to pay the full rate of tax on their superannuation. It would, however, be simpler to treat superannuation as income and pay everyone the Basic Income.

I am attaching my latest paper “Individual rights, collective rights and Basic Income” which looks at some of these issues but there is a vast body of literature on the subject of Basic Income which can be found on the Basic Income Guarantee Australia website:
http://www.basicincome.qut.edu.au/index.jsp

Of particular relevance to the current Australia inquiries is my e-Book: Income Insecurity: The Basic Income Alternative
http://www.basicincome.qut.edu.au/interest/e-books.jsp

Basic Income Guarantee Australia is a national affiliate of the Basic Income Earth Network On whose web site a huge array of academic papers can be accessed.
http://www.basicincome.org/bien/

The Basic Income debate is intensifying in many parts of Europe, Latin America, Southern Africa and Canada. The last time there was as much international interest in the income maintenance debate Australia (through the Henderson Poverty Inquiry and Treasury’s Priority Review Staff) made a significant contribution. It would be a pity if we sleep through this revival in interest in Basic Income throughout much of the world.

 

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Teeth

Australians all let us regret
that they think we are useless
they’ve destroyed our dental scheme
we’ll soon be old and toothless.

Written in 2005

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Thatcher, M, (1987) talking to Women’s Own magazine, October 3

“I think we’ve been through a period where too many people have been given to understand that if they have a problem, it’s the government’s job to cope with it. ‘I have a problem, I’ll get a grant.’ ‘I’m homeless, the government must house me.’ They’re casting their problem on society. And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first. It’s our duty to look after ourselves and then, also to look after our neighbour. People have got the entitlements too much in mind, without the obligations. There’s no such thing as entitlement, unless someone has first met an obligation.”

 http://briandeer.com/social/thatcher-society.htm

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The basic solution to unemployment

Australian Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 36, No.3, pp.237-248. 2001

Abstract

 A country’s system of income support determines the impact unemployment has on low income earners. Governments throughout the English speaking western world have imposed means testing, targeted benefits, activity testing and ‘mutual obligation’ regimes to discourage those without paid work from becoming ‘dependent’ on the State. These governments are obsessed by the need to limit the amount of income support so as discourage people remaining on benefits (the old less eligibility principle)[1].

There is an alternative approach to income support: that of Basic Income which, if implemented, could as Gorz (1999) and Goodin (1992) suggest, result in a more equitable sharing of paid work, civil activity and leisure without inhibiting productivity.

In this article, I shall examine the way the existing Australian system of income support, with its associated compulsion imposed upon income support recipients, is an inadequate ‘solution’ to either income needs or employment. The analysis suggests that a Guaranteed Minimum Income would be an improvement but that a universal Basic Income is the most useful approach; if implemented, it would meet both the income and employment needs of Australians consigned to the reserve army of labour.

A brief history of the denigration of people who are unemployed

Since at least the 1950s, successive Australian governments have believed that low paid workers and people who are unemployed in have a propensity to sink into the slough of ‘dependency’ unless the state was ever vigilant. This was why the unemployment benefit eligibility requirements, since that time, in the opinion of Allan Jordan a senior policy officer in the Department of Social Security, have demanded that applicants establish they are “fit, ready and willing to work” (cited in Windschuttle 1981; 181).

Hence the old Department of Social Security joke that “Christ would be refused unemployment benefits because he had a beard, wore sandals and hung round the Cross”.

From the end of the Second World War until 1974 unemployment in Australia remained around 1% most of the time (Stilwell 2000). Since then unemployment has dramatically risen as it has in most parts of the western world, (Rifkin 1994; Ormerod 1994; Kelsey 1995). Associated with the rise in the level of unemployment has been, in the Australian and New Zealand context, an increase in the vitriol which governments have directed towards those whom government and industry policy excluded from the paid labour force (Bradford 1997; Boreham, Dow & Leet 1999: ch. 1).

In 1972 the advent of the Whitlam Government initially heralded a new deal for social security recipients; but as the level of unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, rose in Australia so too did the frequency of attacks on unemployed people. Starting with Hayden and Cameron’s slurs about ‘work shy lion tamers’ and ‘dole bludgers’ (Windschuttle 1981:180-190), attacks on unemployed people increased in intensity during the Fraser Government (Tomlinson 1982: ch. 3). During the Hawke and Keating Governments, Brian Howe, Minister for Social Security, gave expression to negative evaluations of unemployed people through rediscovering their propensity for ‘dependency’. This in turn led Professor Bettina Cass, heading a review of the Department, to propose extending the work testing of unemployed people to encompass activity testing (Cass 1988). Which suggestion, in turn, has found recent expression in the ‘participation income support’ agenda proposed by the McClure Report (2000). Jocelyn Newman (1999), the then Minister with responsibility for income support, who commissioned this Report was obsessed with the alleged propensity of poor people to become ‘dependent’ on the State. The Howard Government’s Work for the Dole and wider ‘mutual obligation’ agendas are simply an extension and intensification of the obligating regimes imposed on unemployed people in Australia for the last half century.

Where income support for unemployed people fits in the Australian social security system

The Howard Government has declared its intention to maintain a social welfare safety net in order to assist all in need through no fault of their own (Howard 1999, 2000; Newman 1999: 7). The Australian income support system is currently non-contributory, categorical [2], selective, and targeted towards categories of beneficiaries on the basis of some presumed ‘need’. From 1941 until 1987 child endowment was a universal payment. Now metamorphosed into family allowances, it too fits the general mould. There is still one payment, ‘the blind pension’, which is not selective. It is a subcategory of the disability support pension.

Attempting to ascertain the degree of impairment experienced by an individual applicant, and then paying those applicants who can establish they have met some predetermined ‘level of incapacity to work’, is very costly and an extraordinarily inefficient method of providing income support to those with a disability. People with equivalent levels of impairments often have widely different employment histories (Perry 1995: 29). If the desire is to encourage productivity/contribution/inclusion by those who have a disability, it would be more efficient to provide a universal income guarantee. As just mentioned, Australian governments have recognised this in relation to ‘blind pensioners’ (Jordan 1984; Kewley 1973) but continue to subject others who have severe disabilities to stigmatised, selective, targeted, categorical payments. Goodin points out (1992: 196-97) that attempting to determine work capacity by measuring levels of impairment, and the adoption of a unit of payment other than the individual, creates target inefficiencies because such tests of eligibility are ‘surrogate measures’. They do not test directly the things they purport to measure.

The majority of payments made to unemployed people Jobsearch, Newstart, and the Common Youth Allowance are, like the bulk of income support payments, categorical, means tested and targeted. They currently have associated obligations compelling unemployed people to participate in training, volunteer effort, Work for the Dole or any other program Centrelink or the recently Christianised and privatised job search agencies dictate. The Reference Group on Welfare Reform (McClure 2000) has foreshadowed extending such compulsion to lone parents (whose youngest child is over 13 years) and to some disability support pensioners.

The Reference Group has also proposed that the current categorical payment system be replaced with one ‘working age’ payment system (for those who now receive benefits and pensions) which would discriminate between applicants in terms of ‘special needs’, family composition, participation requirements and other income. This proposal has been criticised for its individualising entitlements, its complexity and its failure to incorporate all citizens (Tomlinson 2000).

A return to the Poor Laws

There have been right wing writers (Sullivan 2000; C. Murray 1984; Mead 1986, 1997) who have stoked the fires of ‘dependency’ rhetoric and thus encouraged the general direction of the Howard Government’s income support policy. Nor has the existing system of income support in Australia been without its critics on the left for failing to efficiently deliver sufficient benefits to those in the most financial need 3. The categorical/selective approach has drawn criticism both here and overseas 4. Despite this, there continue to be supporters of the current categorical system in Australia, for example Whiteford (1998). Pixley (1993) and Cass (1988) ardently promoted the ‘active society’ approach, at least during the period Labor was in power.

Governments in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Britain and the United States consistently suggest they are providing social security in an efficient and accountable manner. They are certainly capable of determining the cost of delivering specific categorical benefits to those recipients who are paid. They can and do calculate how much they ‘save’ by cutting people off income support who do not meet the totality of eligibility requirements for any specific benefit. This is accounting or target efficiency. The governments in question seem uninterested in how people who are refused benefits get by, or what social costs are incurred in the wake of decisions to remove income support from such citizens. Target efficiency processes give no measure of how efficient the system of social security is. Because the central issues which should be taken into account when assessing the efficiency of a social security system are not considered.

If the efficiency of the system, as a whole, was being calculated some of the questions which would have to be taken into account, would be:

  • Are any of the people excluded from the social security system poor?
  • How many people who have an entitlement miss out?
  • How satisfied are the people who are confined to low levels of income support?
  • Does the social security system advance social justice for all permanent residents?
  • Are the human rights of all residents protected (or even enhanced)?
  • Does the system remove all obstacles to the inclusion of people with a disability?
  • Are all genders, ages and ethnic groups treated equally or equitably?
  • Is equitable treatment provided to city and country people?
  • Does the system of income support provide sufficient security to recipients so as toallow them to contribute to society in ways with which they are comfortable?

The ideological underpinnings of the present Australian Government’s approach have been succinctly enunciated by the Prime Minister (Howard 1999, 2000). They amount to an amalgam of individual liberal economic policy and conservative social policy. The central features of this conservative position, are:

  • support for traditional values, such as the family;
  • the importance of work ;
  • sexual restraint;
  • the sanctity of private property; and
  • the belief in the inherent imperfection of human beings.

From the liberal position, the Howard Government takes the importance of the individual which it overlays on a general conservative social orientation. Hugh Stretton (1996) and others (e.g. Goodin 1988: 7) see in the imposition of individualised obligation and eligibility determinations a return to the charity system of the Poor Laws so aptly described by Polanyi (1945).

Generalised income guarantees

In a recent 12 month period 200,000 recipients of income support were ‘breached’ by Centrelink (ACOSS 2000). Income insecurity is a constant preoccupation of citizens surviving on low incomes. The categorical, selective, targeted welfare payments which exist in Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States have not succeeded in abolishing Beveridge’s five giants of ‘squalor, want, ignorance, disease and idleness’ (Timmins 1995: 13 – 31). Jamrozik’s (2001 Chs 1-2) description of an assisting rather than a stand alone welfare support system is an echo of Churchill’s response to Lord George’s declaration that the introduction, in 1909, of the first state pensions in Britain had “lifted the shadow of the workhouse from the homes of the poor”; Churchill said “We have not pretended to carry the toiler on to dry land. What we have done is to strap a lifebelt about him” (cited in Timmins 1995: 13). The modern welfare state, in the countries mentioned, does not guarantee all permanent residents a secure income. Each of these countries has toyed with the idea of introducing generalised income guarantees for all permanent residents. Such partial income guarantees as have been installed have had eligibility requirements which demand either proven incapacity to labour, work- willingness or some socially approved basis for not working (such as sole parenting or age).

Many forms of generalised income guarantees have been suggested, including: Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI), Negative Income Tax (NIT) and Basic Income. The major difference between GMI or NIT and Basic Income is that the first two are selective while Basic Income is universal. Proponents of NIT and GMI (for example. Friedman 1966; 205-219; Henderson 1975 Vol. 1 ch. 6) argue these models would cost less to introduce than would a Basic Income. It is true that government outlays would be lower under NIT and GMI; but the actual drain on the budget bottom line of an unconditional Basic Income (because of increased tax compliance and ease of administration) might not be much greater than with other forms of income guarantees (Van Parijs 2000: 8-9).

The history of Australia’s flirtation with income guarantees has been described elsewhere5. The essential advantage attaching to GMI or NIT, compared with categorical income support, is that ‘it provides an income floor below which no one falls without imposing a ceiling beyond which no-one rises’ (Rhys-Williams 1965: 163).

A non-conditional GMI or NIT, paid to each individual, would at least ensure that no permanent resident would be without an entitlement to a base income. This provides some limited security for those facing unemployment. But because NIT and GMI schemes are selective, unemployed people may not be able to calculate how their cash- in-hand income will be affected by part-time or even low wage full time work. The existing system of income support, because of combined income support withdrawal and income tax rates, exposes people who exceed the income free level to effective marginal ‘tax’ rates of between 60% and 200% for each additional dollar earned. This has to be compared with a 47% income tax rate for incomes over $60,000. The fact that a Government sees such a situation as unremarkable stems from the belief that the poor need to be compelled but the rich need to be encouraged.

Employment Minister Abbott (2001) suggested that the “mutual obligation” requirements are placed on the unemployed to give them a little nudge, to get them out of a sense of complacency about their “dependency” on welfare and to assist them to find paid work. Such ‘job finding assistance’ would if it resulted in full time employment allow those who were unemployed to escape such high withdrawal of benefit rates, however Abbott was unable to explain why Work for the Dole was being extended at a time when job vacancies were decreasing and unemployment increasing. The oft repeated mantra of Howard and his ministers that “the best form of welfare is work” needs to be put alongside the labour market reality that there are in Australia 7 unemployed people for every job vacancy and in Queensland there are 16 unemployed people for every job vacancy (ACOSS 2001).

I do not draw attention to this inequitable treatment of income, between those reliant on the income support system and those who derive their livelihood from other sources, to support the ill-informed assertion that decent income support payments inhibit work willingness. I do it to argue that the people who are the most marginal to the productive process are unnecessarily disadvantaged by the confusing multiple withdrawal rates which occur when people are working and receiving categorical selective benefits. Few workers regard the income advantage derived from working as the sole reason for engaging in employment. Financial advantage is one factor influencing job choice. The actual decision to seek or accept work will depend on many factors – of which the financial aspect is only one. When Professor Connie Benn headed the Brotherhood of St Lawrence’s ARC Project in the mid 1970s she instituted a GMI experiment and found that bread winners from low income families continued to work or actively seek work even when their families would have been as financially well off had they simply relied upon the GMI provided by the Brotherhood (Benn 1981; Salmon 1974).

The fear that generous categorical payments create work disincentives because the financial margin between working and living on benefits is insufficient to make people want to work derives from the perception of human behaviour that underlies ‘public choice’ theory. Such thinking takes little account of the large number of people who remain in or seek employment despite the fact that their cash in hand situation, compared with surviving on social security, is not substantially improved by working. It ignores the much of the sociology of work research and assumes that the poor have to be compelled if they are to be productive. Most beneficiaries have only the vaguest idea how the tax and social security combined withdrawal rates operate. And most categorical combined tax/benefit withdrawal rates are so high that they create for many a financial disincentive to part-time work which, in turn, leads governments to compel people to take part-time work on threat of loss of all benefits. This is a very inefficient way to construct social policy. With a Basic Income there is always a financial incentive to work – the withdrawal rate is the tax rate – and is, as a result, known and easily calculated.

The fact that such arguments (about lesser eligibility, the poor’s fecklessness, the associated need for coercion and the importance of increasing the huge differentials in income between the owning and labouring classes) do little to explain less affluent people’s behaviour, does not make them any less valued by current Government ministers. John Kenneth Galbraith ridiculed such arguments by pointing out that “It always boils down to the highly improbable case that the rich are not working because they have too little income and the poor because they have too much” (cited in Boreham, Dow & Leet 1999: 104). The recently elected New Zealand Labour/Alliance Government, with the active support of the Greens, has moved to slowly dismantle much of the infrastructure of compulsion that characterised the income support system of their conservative predecessors (The Jobs Letter 2000: 3).

Basic Income

Eighty years ago Dennis Milner (1920) was the first British person to articulate a fully elaborated (book length) Basic Income proposal. And from 1918 to 1922 he, Mabel Milner and Bernard Pickard campaigned for the introduction of a Basic Income (Van Trier 1995: Part 1). Milner wanted to ensure that the inadequacies of the British Poor Law system were overcome, to enhance national productivity, and to provide a more equitable base from which workers might negotiate wages. Many of the issues I am canvassing here are the same as those which preoccupied the Milners and Pickard. Milner did not see the introduction of a Basic Income as the be all and end all just one step on the way to a better life for all citizens.

Because Basic Income is a universal payment, people are always advantaged by any extra income obtained. The withdrawal rate is the income tax rate, which makes the cash-in-hand situation easier to calculate than a combined tax and income support withdrawal rate.

The ‘less eligibility’ argument, mounted by conservatives from the days of the Elizabethan Poor Law, suggests that unless welfare benefits are paid at a lower rate than would be obtained from paid employment, there will be a disincentive to work. Such thinking continues to dominate policy debates in Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Canada and the United States. When coupled with the economic fundamentalist mind set (which suggests that minimum wage legislation makes it increasingly difficult for employers to afford to provide jobs for the least skilled), this has two impacts; minimum wages are kept low; and so, subsequently, are benefit levels.

Stephen Bell has recently (2000: 253, 268) suggested that:

In effect, those at the lower end are being asked to fund jobs growth through wage reductions with rising inequality as a key outcome. The implication is that societies confronted by the new economy, if they wish to retain some semblance of civility, must now confront distributional issues head on.

The problem with guaranteed minimum income schemes is that they perpetuate the postwar residual welfarist model of income maintenance and run a strong risk of creating a dependent and marginalised subgroup of ‘recipients’ vulnerable to the politics of downward envy.

He cites Pixley (1993) and Latham 1998 p. 203) in support of this assertion. Latham’s analysis in relation to universal income guarantees and dependency is challanged by many, including Watts (1999; Tomlinson & Bleasdale 1999/2000). Pixley (1993) has drawn similar severe criticism (Watts 1995 a, b, 1994, Tomlinson 1995). To the extent that a GMI or a NIT is selective, it means that payments go only to the poor rather than to all citizens. There are traces of welfare thinking and the potential for some envy embedded in both GMI and NIT, but if that was a major concern both ‘difficulties’ can be abolished by choosing a universal Basic Income, paid to each individual, as the form of income guarantee.

Van Parijs (1992b: 229) claims that because a Basic Income is paid irrespective of all other sources of income, it can be used by those who desire work as a wage subsidy6; yet, because it provides sufficient income on which to live, it does not compel any potential worker to work under conditions which that worker finds unacceptable. He concludes: “Whereas a rising means-tested benefit makes it increasingly difficult for unskilled people to find a job, a rising basic income makes it increasingly feasible.”

With the qualification that there may be some jobs offered in any country which are so unsafe and poorly remunerated that no one in their right mind would take them, forcing people to take such jobs by threatening the removal of benefits is unconscionable. If the intention of those who promote categorical benefits which demand work readiness is to force workers to take all available jobs then this aim might more efficiently be achieved through a Basic Income than by the enforcement of less eligibility. The essential argument here, as Milner foresaw in 1920; 81 is:

there is no way imaginable of compelling willing work, which is the only efficient work. Much the most important thing to do in the elimination of slackers is to make sure there is no advantage in being one….the only way out of the difficulty that has no loopholes is to pay an existence allowance to everyone.

The categorical benefit approach results in an inordinate invasion of privacy in the lives of applicants for unemployment benefits. The imposition of ‘mutual obligation’ and other stigmatising practices all have to be financed from permanent residents’ taxes. If the aim is to ensure that all job vacancies are filled, the provision of an unconditional Basic Income has the capacity to do that without compulsion. This would be both just and efficient.

World-wide the major problem facing advanced economies is too many workers chasing too few jobs (Rifkin 1994; Ormerod 1994; Gorz 1999). Stigmatised, selective, targeted, categorical welfare payments coupled with ‘mutual obligation’ and other compelled activity scenarios are tackling a problem -the trouble is that they are tackling the wrong problem.

A Basic Income, because it provides a known financial advantage for every extra dollar earned, abolishes both poverty traps and work disincentives (Lerner, Clark & Needham 1999: 20-21). As Gorz (1999: 85, italics in original) claims: “The universal, unconditional grant of a basic income is, therefore… the best instrument for redistributing both paid work and unpaid activities as widely as possible.”

It seems absurd for economic fundamentalists and the current conservative Coalition Government to claim that the mode of production has to be deregulated for the sake of ‘efficiency’ but that the system of welfare redistribution should be increasingly regulated. The existing targeted categorical income support system would, if continued, move effectively towards a charity-based benefit determination. As Castles suggests (2001: 29): “the McClure Report will complete the process of tearing down the edifice of Australia’s distinctive welfare state. What will remain will be a system of mean, discretionary and moralistically charged benefits, wholly inappropriate to an advanced democratic nation.” The Minister who commissioned the McClure Report is on record as saying (Newman 1999: 9): “Simply providing payments to everyone who fits into a particular category fails to recognise the different capacities and potential people have to contribute to their own future.” This is the height of inefficient supply of benefits.

Conclusion

Efficiency arguments which can and should be mounted in support of an unconditional Basic Income include the following:

  • A Basic Income requires the least interference in the lives of citizens.
  • It supplies all permanent residents with equal assistance.
  • It is the most inclusive form of income support payment and the most secure, thus enhancing citizenship.
  • It provides sufficient income to allow the possibility that people will explore their creative capacity.
  • It removes many of the obstacles to a reinvigoration of the industrial, technical and computing infrastructure.
  • It allows the State a fuller understanding of the impact of its other social wage policies.

However, a Basic Income is just that – an unconditional universal income guarantee. It delivers an income floor without interfering with productivity. Its withdrawal rate on earned income is easily understandable, as compared with the combined income tax and benefit withdrawal rate of selective systems such as a GMI or NIT. It is a vast improvement on categorical selective social services. It is an advance on all social insurance and private provision schemes which invariably result in the ‘individualisation of risk’ (Lerner, Clark & Needham 1999: 11) and as a result create a ‘do it yourself welfare state’ (Klein & Millar, cited in Page 1998: 307).

End Notes

  1. The principle of less eligibility was an integral part of the poor law administrations England from 1601 until the early 20th Century was designed to ensure that what ever assistance was provided via the welfare system was less than could be obtained from working and was provided in a demeaning manner in order to discourage people applying for welfare relief. The process of determining, who would be assisted and who would be refused, divided applicants for assistance into the worthy and unworthy poor.
  2. Categorical benefits, in the Australian Social Security system, are paid to poor people who apply and are regarded by officers of Centrelink as meeting specific eligibility requirements: eg. Sickness Benefits are paid to people who would be eligible for Job Search or New Start unemployment payments apart from the fact that they have a temporary disabling medical condition.

Selectivity refers to the imposition of income and asset tests.

  1. See for instance Tulloch 1979; R. Watts 1995a, 1999; Perry 1995; VCOSS & GoodShepherd 1995; Baldwin 1995; Stilwell 1999, 2000; Tomlinson 1989.
  2. Particularly pertinent to this debate are the works of Stretton 1996; Gorz 1995; 1999, Rankin1997, 1998; Ritchie 1997; Bradford 1997; Standing 1999; Lerner, Clark & Needham 1999; M. Murray 1997; Boston, Danziel & St. John 1998; Goodin 1988, 1992; Goodin & Le Grand 1987; Goodin, Headey, Muffels & Driven 1999; Page & Silburn1998; Van Parijs 1992a, 2000; BIEN web site; NZUBI web site.
  3. See for example Tomlinson 1989, Tomlinson & Lincoln 1995; Watts 1984, 1995 a;Tulloch 1979; Kewley 1973; Henderson 1975: Vol. 1, ch. 6 & Vol. 2 Appendix 6;Priorities Review Staff 1975.
  4. Basic incomes have the capacity to provide a wage subsidy to employers because some of the wages which employers have to pay in order to sustain workers are paid for by the State. This was recognised by Milner as early as 1920. Such a phenomenon is not unique to Basic Income it occurs with regard to many aspects of the social wage. For instance, Kewley (1980; pp 90-95) notes Child Endowment was seen in the 1940s as replacing part of the Basic Wage.

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The Corruption of Capitalism explains why the future is workless

ON LINE opinion – Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate
Posted Tuesday, 11 October 2016

Professor Guy Standing from The School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London was a founding member of the Basic Income European Network (in recent years renamed the Basic Income Earth Network). Standing, for many years a senior economist with the International Labour Organisation, is perhaps best known for his book The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class published in 2011. His latest book is entitled The Corruption of Capitalism: Why Rentiers Thrive and Work Does Not Pay looks principally at the way neoliberalism has developed in capitalist societies in recent years.

Tim Dunlop, a Melbourne academic, journalist and author, has an abiding interest in the future of work. Recently he published Why the future is Workless. It is at times a rollicking good read and contains some amusing anecdotes. For instance, at page 41 he writes “Last year, my wife was invited to a breakfast meeting, scheduled to start at 6.30 am on a cold Melbourne morning. The subject of the meeting: work-life balance”! He quotes, at page 14, from the English Poor Act of 1552:

If any man or woman, able to work, should refuse to labour and live idly for three days, he or she should be branded with a red hot iron on the breast with the letter V (presumably short for vagrant) and should be judged the slave for two years of any person who should inform against such idler.

Not surprisingly Dunlop spends much of the first two chapters pointing to the deeply ingrained nature of the work ethic. At page 21, he notes that employment, which in ancient Greece was considered the duty of slaves, has become in capitalist countries “the defining characteristic of human worth”. At page 42, he declares:

We hold ourselves and others to impossible standards of participation even as 40 odd years of market liberalisation, technological development and growing inequality have made it plain that the system is not rewarding the average person in the way it once did. It is almost a psychosis, this elevation of work to the centre of our existence.

Hand in hand with this analysis he obliquely refers to Hockey’s 2013/14 pronouncements that “The age of entitlements was over ” by noting “These were not ‘entitlements’ as it is now fashionable to label them, but the material expression of what most citizens saw as the whole point of government.”

Standing, at page 12, makes the point that:

At the heart of neo-liberalism is a contradiction. While its proponents profess a belief in ‘unregulated’ markets, they favour regulations to prevent collective bodies from operating in favour of social solidarity. That is why they want controls over unions, collective bargaining, professional associations and occupational guilds. …Neo-liberalism is a convenient rationale for rentier capitalism.

In Australia, the stated grounds for seeking a double disillusion election in 2016 were a perfect example of Standing’s point. Dunlop, at page 209 says: “The big lie of neoliberalism is that it wants a small state, the truth is, that it wants a compliant state.”

At pages 29-30, Standing notes that in Western countries:

…rising productivity used to be matched by rising average wages…But, since the 1980s higher productivity has not led to higher wages. For instance, real wages in the USA have stagnated for over three decades while productivity has risen steadily.

Towards the end of Chapter 1, Standing considers the con of austerity economics, elaborating upon Dunlop’s point about “entitlements”. Standing returns to the downsides of austerity economics for the less affluent many times throughout his book.

Dunlop quotes extensively from Standing before going on in Chapters 4 and 5 to ask “Will a robot take my Job?” and “Will an app take my job?” It takes him 71 pages to discover these are not the real question. This was the least useful part of the book for me. A redeeming feature occurred at page 148, when he wrote: “if the state genuinely believed that unemployment benefits were a temporary payment to people ultimately able to find employment, there would be no need to impose conditions” because the payment would only last a short time.

Chapter 6 examines universal basic income and he again draws heavily upon Guy Standing’s work. He accepts that a universal basic income must be universal, provided unconditionally and be a supplement to the welfare state not its replacement. He could have been pre-empting a motion passed at the United Kingdom Trades Union Congress, representing six British million workers in September 2016. Dunlop concludes that an unconditional basic income would radically transform our relationship with paid work not only providing a safety net “for those who fall through the cracks, but a trampoline for everybody to launch themselves into society on terms that are much more their own.”

Standing in Chapter 2 looks at the various ways corporations find ways to defraud the citizens and in Chapter 3 he examines some shonky rich corporations and politicians and the various ways they extract subsidies from the state or avoid taxes. At page 109, he states “Tax credits look like welfare payments, but they are in reality a subsidy, providing capital with unearned income. They make it easier for employers to pay low wages (and employ part-time rather than full-time staff). He suggests they are similar to the oft-criticised 19th century English Speenhamland system.

Guy Standing on page 166 notes that:

The growth of public debt in most industrialised countries is largely due to tax cuts for the wealthy and subsidies for selected interests. Cutting public debt, if desired, could be done by raising taxes and eliminating regressive and inefficient subsidies.

In Chapter 5 Standing lists the ways in which rich people, corporations and corrupt politicians are acquiring that which we own in common whether it be land, opportunity, minerals, petroleum or whatever and removing our common ownership – he concludes that “the precariat has the most interest in recovering the commons from the rent seeker.”

Both Dunlop and Standing note the phenomenal increase in the share of income going to owners of capital. Standing says that in the twentieth century it made sense to focus on wage bargaining but no longer. At page 291, in a call reminiscent of The Communist Manfesto, Standing declares “The precariat have nothing to lose but their insecurity.”

Both writers conclude that if we are to solve the issue of increasing technological/ robotised unemployment, and if it is not to end in tears, then an unconditional basic income is the best method of ensuring income security for all.

Standing in his final Chapter concludes that:

Existing social assistance schemes are costly, administratively inefficient, inequitable and ineffectual in reducing insecurity and inequality… targeting and means testing do not work as intended. Still, moralistic politicians continue tightening conditions, making schemes more selective and punitive and stigmatising some of society’s most vulnerable people. Workfare is inevitably dressed up shamelessly as ‘reintegrating’ people into society.

And Dunlop, at page 197, claims that:

In a world where technology is likely to drive either job losses, or at the very least, a rise in precarious employment, the idea that people should have to rely on having a job in order to participate in society in a decent way is an increasingly obscene idea. To maintain our current work ethic – one that equates having a job with human decency and moral rectitude – is not only anachronistic but cruel.

Should you, gentle reader, wish to read more about basic income I can recommend a 2016 Palgrave MacMillian publication entitled Basic Income in Australia and New Zealand: Perspectives from the Neoliberal Frontier edited by Jennifer Mays, Greg Marston and myself.

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The dark days of the Ruddites

The government tells those aged between 17 and 25
they’ve got to be either learning or earning
or their social security will be withheld.
Young unemployed don’t need to be compelled;
they need to be provided with opportunities to learn
and helped to build careers so they can earn.

When I was that age I was burning and yearning
sometimes instead I’d be sucking and trucking
or ducking and chucking-up all over the footpath.
In those days there was plenty of work
and governments didn’t have to shirk
their responsibilities to pay unemployment benefits.

This Rudd Government chases false prophets;
it has sunk so low as to plagiarise Latham:
yes, Mark Latham who could always find someone to slam.
Plagiarising good ideas from clever people is smart
but Rudd’s ideas show the brain and heart are far apart.

Will someone help Labor find good ideas to steal
maybe some with a decent human feel?
If they weren’t so lazy then they might reveal
they can think for themselves and can appeal
not only to base instincts of downward envy…
then “we’ll have pie in the sky when we die”.

First published in New Community Quarterly Vol.7 No.2 Winter 2009. p.5

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